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ABSTRACT 
John R. Rhodes: Agents of Empire: The Frontier U.S. Army and the Transition from the War 
with Spain to the Occupation of Cuba 
(Under the direction of Joseph T. Glatthaar) 
 
This dissertation examines how the U.S. Army conducted a successful initial occupation 
of Santiago, Cuba, after the Spanish surrender of eastern Cuba to General William R. Shafter’s 
Fifth Corps on July 17, 1898. U.S. Army officers replicated and adapted lessons learned from 
their frontier and Reconstruction experiences to evacuate Spanish prisoners, relieve humanitarian 
crises, discover the causes of tropical fevers, control the Cuban population, establish a logistical 
infrastructure, and create a military government. Their actions during the occupation of Santiago 
became the model for how the U.S. Army conducted the remainder of its occupation of Cuba. 
Based on both published government records, newspapers, and memoirs; and unpublished 
personal papers, letters, diaries, and official correspondence collected from three archives, this 
study shows how the U.S. Army used a blend of coercion and conciliation during the occupation 
to disband the Cuban Liberation Army and delegitimize the Cuban revolutionary government. 
With firm control over the Cuban population and the creation of a loyal constabulary, and with 
no serious political or military challenger, the U.S. Army gave government officials in 
Washington the time to determine unilaterally the future relationship between Cuba and the 
United States.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
 
When General José Toral surrendered the Spanish army defending the city of Santiago de 
Cuba and the surrounding province to the United States on July 17, 1898, the U.S. Army 
encountered a host of problems. The veteran Fifth Corps, composed of the Army’s regulars and a 
few of its best volunteer units, had done all the fighting in Santiago, but had become paralyzed as 
a sizable portion of it fell victim to fevers and dysentery. The War Department needed to 
evacuate the entire corps to a healthier climate, leaving behind a small cadre of regular officers 
to administer the province, aided by a few regiments of newly recruited volunteers. 
Simultaneously, the Army assumed responsibility for the care and safeguarding of 24,000 
Spanish prisoners from potentially vengeful Cubans until the War Department could transport 
them back to Spain. The biggest problem that the U.S. Army faced, however, was occupying 
much of eastern Cuba, an area ravaged by three years of civil war. Not only were hundreds of 
Cubans dying each day from disease and starvation, but the fighting had also destroyed the 
island’s infrastructure, farms, and livestock, preventing any hope of a rapid economic recovery. 
Because neither the McKinley administration nor the War Department provided satisfactory 
long-term policy directives during the initial occupation, the U.S. Army’s officers relied on both 
their past experiences as a constabulary on the American frontier and familiar institutional norms 
to improvise the occupation of Santiago without a long-term understanding of the future 
relationship between Cuba and the United States. 
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This dissertation will examine the conduct of the U.S. Army during the initial occupation 
of Santiago until the beginning of the complete occupation of Cuba on January 1, 1899. It is 
primarily a study of how the U.S. Army transitioned out of a conventional war to become an 
army of occupation charged with conducting what we would call “nation building” today, and of 
the challenges the officers and soldiers faced in the process of making that transition. This work 
also attempts to reveal the complex array of experiential, institutional, and practical military 
factors that interacted to shape the U.S. Army’s behavior in Cuba.  
This work argues that the Department of Santiago was effectively a testing ground. 
During the initial occupation, American officers employed methods that became the model for 
how the U.S. Army conducted the remainder of its occupation of Cuba. After thirty years of 
acting as the “multipurpose army” for the federal government, U.S. Army officers had the skills 
and experience necessary to deal with the Cuban population and enforce American policy.1 
Drawing upon past practices on the frontier, they instinctively improvised an effective 
occupation strategy that consisted of disbanding the Cuban Army, establishing a monopoly of 
military force, controlling the Cubans by garrisoning forces in Cuban population centers, 
administering the island’s revenues, and creating a functioning military government. Besides 
President William McKinley’s limited guidance and accepted norms of international law, the 
Army’s decisions and actions in Santiago reflected the institution’s cultural norms, the past 
experiences of its soldiers and officers, and the influence of social and political trends—
including humanitarianism, ethnocentric prejudices, and progressive government.  
Other scholars who have examined the U.S. occupation of Cuba have emphasized racial 
ideology and imperialistic motivations as the main forces influencing the occupation. There is no 																																																								
1 A term first used by Michael L. Tate in a 1980 article. Later Tate used the term extensively in The Frontier Army 
 	3	
question that strongly held ethnocentric beliefs influenced the daily thoughts and actions of the 
American soldiers in Cuba. It is ironic, however, that at the very moment the practice of 
American overseas imperialism was being pioneered for the first time, all but the highest-ranking 
officers in Santiago did not concern themselves with notions of American hegemony and geo-
political interests. Instead, these agents of empire, who on a daily basis translated American 
power into action, acted pragmatically to resolve the numerous problems inherent to occupation 
and nation building. I contend that critical humanitarian and military problems, the U.S. Army’s 
institutional culture, and American progressive reform movements played a significant role in 
determining the actions and decisions of the U.S. Army’s officers during the initial occupation. 
Understandably, contemporary American values and their previous military experiences 
influenced the U.S. Army officers. Almost all of them firmly believed in the progressive goals of 
efficient and “modern” administration and economic, administrative, and social reforms. Not 
only were these reform impulses in Santiago comparable to the various organizational reform 
programs being promoted in American civil society, but the officers also shared many of the 
same humanitarian concerns and ethnocentric beliefs as their civilian associates. Most 
unfortunately, these strongly nationalistic U.S. Army officers never doubted that every perceived 
ill in Cuban society could be remedied by adopting “superior” American practices and 
institutions. 
Just as contemporary reform movements and American values influenced the Army’s 
officers, their experience as a constabulary on the American frontier strongly influenced their 
actions during the initial occupation of Cuba. The logistical debacle that occurred while 
transporting and supplying the Fifth Corps during the fighting around Santiago clearly 
demonstrated that the U.S. Army was institutionally unprepared for overseas expeditions and 
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conventional warfare on a large scale. However, the post-Civil War Army did have a long 
tradition of controlling Native Americans, settlers, and strikers; dealing with humanitarian 
emergencies; and sustaining small garrisons on the North American continent. Generations of 
Army officers formed, molded, and internalized a pacification doctrine that blended coercion 
with conciliation.2 The U.S. Army’s method of conquest passed to each new generation of 
officers through experience, and they brought these tried and true methods of occupation to 
guide them through the Cuban experience. In essence, the U.S. Army’s career officers had spent 
most of their time in service implementing imperialistic U.S. government policies on civilian 
populations in North America. The occupations of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, and the 
Philippines were just their first experiences doing it overseas. Nor was it their first foray into 
occupying people of different culture, language, and skin color. Relying on their many past 
experiences, the U.S. Army instinctively set about disbanding the Cuban Liberation Army to 
monopolize military force, gaining control of government revenue, and garrisoning the towns in 
Santiago province to control the Cuban population and implement the McKinley administration’s 
policies. 
After Spain surrendered the last remnants of its once mighty overseas empire, the United 
States faced new crises in managing these unstable peripheries that were populated by what they 
considered to be racial minorities. Racial prejudices prevented white Americans from perceiving 
the people of Spain’s former island colonies as being compatible with the republican ideology of 
the United States. It took over two years before the United States found a solution to this 
dilemma by abandoning the concept of assimilating Spain’s island colonies in favor of new 
strategy of hegemonic control and limited interventions. While the McKinley administration, 																																																								
2 Brain McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 9. 
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Congress, and the American people debated, as Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton have stated, 
the “distinctly American dilemma” of how to “exercise a coercive national power and maintain 
the commitment to universal freedom” in Spain’s former colonies, the U.S. Army maintained 
order, as it had done for decades, not knowing the outcome of the debate.3  
The few scholars who have studied the U.S. occupation of Cuba from 1898 to 1902 have 
focused largely on the policy debates and decisions that contributed to the creation and the 
implementation of the Platt Amendment, which stripped Cuba of much of its sovereignty, as a 
precondition for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Cuba. But why did the Cubans allow the 
hated amendment to be added to their constitution? By establishing a monopoly over government 
finances and military force and by ending the immediate humanitarian crises, the U.S. Army 
gave officials in Washington time to decide on a foreign policy for future bilateral relations with 
Cuba. Examining how the U.S. Army forcefully asserted control over the Cuban population can 
produce a greater understanding of how a successful post-conflict military occupation allowed 
the occupier to dictate future policy. 
 
Historiography 
 At noon on July 17, 1898, U.S. soldiers raised the American flag over the Governor’s 
Palace in Santiago de Cuba. In the plaza below, the 9th Infantry, along with General William 
Rufus Shafter and his staff, presented arms. As the colors rose, wrote Secretary of War Russell 
A. Alger, “a salute of twenty-one guns was fired, and our bands played the ‘Star Spangled 
																																																								
3 Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500-2000 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 424 and xix. 
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Banner.’ The campaign in Cuba was at an end.”4 In Alger’s memoir, The Spanish-American 
War, the ceremony served as a picture-perfect conclusion to the fighting in Cuba before the 
author shifted the focus of his narrative on the War with Spain to the military campaigns in 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Alger gives only cursory accounts of the onset of yellow and 
malarial fever within the ranks of the victorious U.S. Army’s Fifth Corps and their subsequent 
evacuation to Montauk Point, New York, to recover from their tropical ailments. Ten years later, 
the former Commanding General of the Army, Nelson A. Miles, released his memoirs Serving 
the Republic for many of the same reasons as Alger.5 The two heads of the War Department had 
faced harsh criticisms from the press for their inadequate preparation and planning for the war, 
their immature enmity towards one another, and their poor handling of the Santiago campaign. 
Although primarily motivated to defend their authors from allegations of gross mismanagement 
by their rivals and the press, these memoirs also provided idealistic and nationalistic narrative 
accounts of the entire War with Spain. Unfortunately, neither memoir provides information on 
the Army’s subsequent occupation of Santiago Province. 
For more than fifty years after the first narrative histories of the War with Spain were 
released, English-language academic studies on the War with Spain, including Walter Millis’s 
The Martial Spirit (1931) and Frank Freidel’s The Splendid Little War (1958), still gave only 
cursory accounts of the evacuation of the disease-ridden Fifth Corps after the surrender of the 
Spanish garrison and provided no account of the subsequent occupation.6 In the liberal 
																																																								
4 Russell A. Alger, The Spanish-American War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1901), 220. 
5 Nelson A. Miles, Serving the Republic: Memoirs of the Civil and Military Life of Nelson A. Miles, Lieutenant-
General, United States Army (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911). 
6 Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War (Boston: Little Brown, 1958). Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit: A Study of 
Our War with Spain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931). 
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muckraking tradition of the time, Millis and Freidel worked to scandalize the War Department’s 
performance during the war. These authors highlighted the dysfunctional command relationship 
between Alger and Miles, the logistical debacle that was the Santiago campaign, and the near 
destruction of the Fifth Corps by disease. Despite their criticisms of the U.S. Army’s execution 
of the campaign, they still did little to expose the less-than-selfless causes of the conflict. Traces 
of the persistent imperialist myth of the Americans intervening in Cuba to take up the “White 
Man’s Burden” by saving the helpless Cubans from the tyrannical oppression of the Spaniards in 
order to civilize them in American democracy remain in these two works.7  
In An Army for Empire (1971), Graham A. Cosmas, an official Army historian, wrote a 
somewhat defensive account of the war in response to Millis and Freidel’s narratives. Relying 
primarily on War Department records and personal memoirs, Cosmas explains the causes behind 
the U.S. Army’s logistical and organizational difficulties during the war. Furthermore, he 
demonstrates how America’s domestic politics and military strategy and the War Department’s 
archaic organizational structure account for why the U.S. Army entered the War with Spain 
unprepared for foreign conquest and occupation. Despite these difficulties, Cosmas concludes 
that by 1899 the War Department had overcome its pre-war deficiencies through a process of 
“improvisation, trial, and error” to become an army capable of administering an empire.8  
In 1981, David F. Trask published what most historians consider the definitive history of 
the conflict from the perspective of the United States.9 In The War with Spain in 1898, Trask 
																																																								
7 Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” McClure’s Magazine 12 (February 1899). 
8 Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1971), 326.  
9 Anne Cipriano Venzon, America’s War with Spain: A Selected Biography (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 
50. 
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provides a detailed and impeccably researched account of the war from its origins to the Senate’s 
ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Given the length and scope of Trask’s monograph, it is 
understandable that he did not analyze the subsequent occupation of Spain’s former colonies. 
Trask does, however, provide the most comprehensive account of the immediate aftermath of the 
fighting in Santiago de Cuba.10 Trask fully acknowledges that the War with Spain created an 
American empire, but refutes the notion that President William McKinley wanted a war with 
Spain or had any intention acquiring overseas possessions. Instead, Trask believes that McKinley 
did everything possible to avoid the war, “and was most reluctant to support annexation of the 
Philippine Islands” or to violate the Teller Amendment and acquire Cuba.11 
American military historians have focused their investigations of the War with Spain on 
an analysis of the U.S. military’s performance during the war and examined the causal factors 
that explain the Army’s poor performance compared to the U.S. Navy. Most of these military 
historians see McKinley as being reluctant to go to war and pragmatic when dealing with Spain’s 
former overseas possessions. Historians outside the field, however, have used the construct of 
imperialism as the causal determinant to explain United States motives for going to war in 1898, 
as well as to explain the actions of American politicians, civilians, and soldiers towards the 
people in Spain’s former colonies after the war ended. Influenced by the works of Charles and 
Mary Beard, Julius W. Pratt, William Appleman Williams, and Walter La Feber, revisionist 
historians see economic interests and expansionist ideology driving American imperialism. 
These historians blame United States overseas expansion in 1898 on business interests that 
wanted to open new markets in China and Latin America to sell the excess goods produced by 																																																								
10 David F. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). 
11 Ibid. 
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American farms and factories, and a powerful clique of navalists who advocated for a “large 
policy” of American overseas expansion. Later, “New Left” historians accepted the economic 
motivations for overseas expansion, but they argued that race was also an important factor in 
explaining United States imperialist expansion, disenfranchisement, and oppression.12  
The economic, expansionist, and ideological variables assumed under the construct of 
imperialism remain the standard scholarly tools to analyze United States foreign policy at the 
twilight of the nineteenth century. When applied to specific case studies, however, imperialism is 
usually inadequate to account for the complex domestic factors involved in specific American 
foreign policy decision-making. For example, David Trask and Gerald F. Linderman both give 
very specific evidence to support the argument that McKinley continuously sought a peaceful 
resolution with Spain over the Cuban crises until political pressure generated by the American 
public, Congress, and the press finally compelled him to intervene, demonstrating the limits of 
presidential power. Furthermore, many historians rule out economic motives for going to war 
against Spain and argue that the majority of influential businessmen were actually against 
waging a costly war.13 Leftist historians simply counter these assertions by arguing that deep-
																																																								
12 Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard. The Rise of American Civilization, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1927), 2:369-382; Julius William Pratt, Expansionists of 1898; the Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
(Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959); and Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of 
American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963). Also see Ernest R. May, American 
Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York: Atheneum, 1968); Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, 
Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and Andrew 
J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2002). Julius Pratt introduced the U.S. Foreign policy concept known as the “large policy” in his 
article “The ‘Large Policy’ of 1898,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 19, no. 2 (September 1932): 219-42.  
13 David F. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 508-509; Gerald F. 
Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1974), 24-36; Tom E. Terrill “An Economic Aspect of the Spanish-American War,” Ohio History 
76 (Winter-Spring, 1967): 73-75; David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and 
the Search for Policy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963); and Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little 
Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
 	10	
seated imperial impulses within American society overwhelmed McKinley’s better judgment. A 
detailed study of why the United States went to war with Spain is outside the scope of this 
dissertation. Moreover, historians who are firmly entrenched on either side of the ideological 
divide over the nature of U.S. foreign policy are unlikely to change their views without 
compelling new evidence. 
Racial views varied among the members of the U.S. Army occupying Santiago. The 
majority of Americans held strong prejudices against Cubans, especially those of African 
descent, but a minority of soldiers held progressive views favoring racial equality. By 
comparison, a belief in America’s cultural superiority among the U.S. Army’s soldiers over the 
Cubans was ubiquitous. Even African-American officers and soldiers, who composed nearly half 
of the troops occupying Santiago, felt that the customs and culture of the United States were 
superior to those of the Spanish and Cubans. Army officers also believed that United States 
institutions were superior to those of Western European countries, perhaps with the exception of 
Britain, and that the Cubans were not ready for self-government. The exceptionalist beliefs of the 
American soldiers in Cuba gives credence to William Appleman Williams’s thesis that 
Americans typically intervene in foreign countries for perceived humanitarian motives and 
believe in the right of each nation’s people to self-determination, but that foreign “people cannot 
really solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the 
United States.”14 Such beliefs strongly influenced the actions of the U.S. Army officers in 
Santiago. 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
2009); James L. Abrahamson, American Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power (New 
York: Free Press, 1981). 
14 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 13-14. 
 	11	
Although the Army’s officers had gained experience in occupation duty and controlling 
civilian populations in the thirty years before the occupation, they had not been asked to 
administer a military government since Reconstruction. The wide range of proposed government, 
business, and social reforms in the United States gave the Army’s officers in Santiago many 
options for organizing their military government and reforming Spanish institutions and laws. 
Unfortunately, while implementing these American-style reforms, the Army’s officers generally 
disregarded Cuban cultural norms, which made many of their changes unpopular and short lived. 
Besides ethnocentrism and nationalism, U.S. Army officers shared other contemporary 
values with the larger American society. The occupation of Cuba coincided with the Progressive 
Era. Military historians examining the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century have 
argued that the bureaucratic reforms and professionalization in the U.S. Army during these 
decades were directly influenced by the larger reform impulses occurring across the United 
States.15 In America Arms for an New Century, James L. Abrahamson contends that the reform-
minded officers who fought for organizational reforms, institutional modernization, and 
professionalization in the U.S. Army from 1880-1920 came from the same social class and 
maintained close intellectual and social ties to the middle-class professionals who Richard 
Hofstadter and Robert Wiebe contend drove the search for order in the turn of the century.16 
Abrahamson’s middle-class reforming officers shared many of the characteristics with Wiebe’s 
																																																								
15 John M. Gates, “The Alleged Isolation of US Army Officers in the late 19th Century,” Parameters 10 (Spring 
1980): 33-37, 40-42; Edward M. Coffman, “The Long Shadow of The Soldier and the State” The Journal of Military 
History 55, no. 1 (January 1991): 69-82; Jack C. Lane Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael: 
Presidio Press, 1977); Abrahamson, American Arms for a New Century; and Timothy K. Nenninger, The 
Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States 
Army, 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978). 
16 Abrahamson, American Arms for a New Century, xiii-xv. 
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Progressives, who tried to apply their professional expertise and scientific management 
techniques to the problems created by modern industrialization.17 
Although an increasing number of historians no longer view Progressive Era reformers as 
a homogeneous group, scholars continue to discern underlying impulses common to the era’s 
diverse reform campaigns. Peter Filene’s 1970 article, “Obituary for the ‘Progressive 
Movement’” convincingly refutes the Hofstadter-Wiebe notion of a homogeneous group of 
Progressives or a unified reform movement.18 Twelve years later, Daniel T. Rodgers agreed with 
Filene’s arguments, but offered an alternative explanation. Rodgers viewed the progressive 
reformers as a pluralistic array of politically active interest groups, each attempting to rally a 
coalition to support their varied interests in a period that saw American society rapidly changing 
in response to industrialization and the decay of the of the old party patronage system.19  
Rodgers’s pluralistic model of the Progressive Era’s reform impulses actually strengthens 
Abrahamson’s thesis in some ways. Rogers’s notion of a wide variety of distinct reform 
movements obviates the need to insist that reform-minded Army officers originated from the 
middle class and formed close ideological ties to the other middle-class reformers with whom 
they frequently associated. Instead, Rodgers’s emphasis on clusters of reformers bolsters 
Abrahamson’s central thesis that the military reformers sought popular support for intra-service 
technological, professional, and organizational reforms that the officers thought necessary to 
																																																								
17 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. (New York: Knopf, 1955), 5-10; Robert H. 
Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 111-113. 
18 Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary for 'The Progressive Movement'," American Quarterly 22, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 20-
34. 
19 Daniel T. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism" Reviews in American History 10, no. 4 (December 1982): 113-
32. 
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modernize their services to face the challenges of industrial warfare.20 His pluralistic model 
explains why the officers in the Department of Santiago, and later, the rest of Cuba, adopted 
some reform ideas but remained disinterested in others. For example, the Army’s officers sought 
to institute the civil service, education, tariff, anti-monopoly, railroad, and judicial reforms 
proposed by various interest groups in the United States. They did not, however, adopt other 
initiatives being proposed in the United States, such as those advocating a more participatory 
democracy, temperance, or support for labor unions.  
The current scholarly debate on the War with Spain among diplomatic and Latin 
American historians centers on the reasons and motivations for the United States’s entry into the 
conflict. Scholarship by military historians tends to examine the competence of the senior 
leaders, the role of new technologies, or the modernity of the struggle. Regardless of the sub-
discipline of the historian, scholars have generally failed to cover the U.S. Army’s occupation 
after the war. Typically, authors either end their narrative after the capture of Santiago de Cuba 
and the evacuation of the diseased army to Long Island, or they continue their narratives with the 
fighting in Puerto Rico and the Philippines.   
There are only three major English-language monographs that cover the Army’s 
occupation of Cuba from 1898 to 1902. All these works focus on the dynamics of policy 
formulation in the United States and Cuba that resulted in the Platt Amendment. In The United 
States in Cuba, 1898-1902, David F. Healy avoids making overt associations with the 
contemporary Cuban Missile Crisis, but it is clear that he sees the origins of the Cuban 
Revolution and the deterioration in U.S.-Cuban relations in the implementation of the Platt 																																																								
20 Abrahamson, American Arms for a New Century, xiv. Also see Peter Karsten, “Armed Progressives: The Military 
Reorganizes for the American Century,” in Building the Organizational Society: Essays on Associational Activities 
in Modern America, ed. Jerry Israel (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 197-232 
 	14	
Amendment. He argues that in 1898 the United States went to war with Spain over Cuba 
burdened by an internal disagreement on the purposes of the intervention and no policy 
concerning what to do with Spain’s former colonies. As a result of this contentious debate, 
American legislators, War Department officials, and Army generals all implemented separate 
and often conflicting policies toward Cuba. The compromise that ensued with the creation of the 
Cuban constitution, Platt Amendment, and Reciprocity Treaty of 1902 gave Cuba domestic self-
rule and a reduced sugar tariff in return for limited national sovereignty and the granting of a 
naval station at Guantanamo Bay. The compromise agreement failed to satisfy the 
annexationists, anti-imperialists, War Department, or the Cubans, but all were mollified 
temporarily.21 
Soon after Healy published his work, the Vietnam War brought a cultural and academic 
backlash against American foreign wars and U.S. imperialism. Historians began reexamining the 
United States’ first overseas occupations within the framework of racism, economic interests, 
class, and American hubris. In The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American 
Imperialism, 1895-1902, Philip S. Foner applied a Marxist economic and class-based 
interpretation of history to the U.S. occupation of Cuba. He contended that racist statements by 
War Department officials, which included the argument that Cubans were incapable of self-
government, were made to support moneyed interests that were lobbying for Cuba’s annexation 
to exploit the island and to ensure continued dominance by the wealthy white ruling class. These 
American interests acceded to limited self-rule by the Cuban plutocracy, but only after the Platt 
																																																								
21 David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963).  
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Amendment and discriminatory voting laws guaranteed American economic and political 
hegemony.22  
Seeing similar economic and racist motives for American intervention in the Cuban War 
of Independence, Louis A. Pérez Jr., argues in Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902 that the large 
majority of American politicians and generals who were responsible for administering the Cuban 
interim government believed in the unfitness of Cubans, as racial inferiors, for self-government. 
Pérez also asserts that century-old desires to annex the island, exploit its economic resources, and 
prevent Cuban independence motivated the U.S. intervention far more than the American desire 
to assist the Cubans in gaining independence from Spain. 23 While Trask and Gerald F. 
Linderman make good arguments against Foner’s and Pérez’s assertion that McKinley went to 
war for the explicit purpose of acquiring an overseas empire, Pérez is still right to maintain that 
at no point in American history would United States policymakers allow Cuba to be transferred 
to or controlled by another world power other than the United States. Moreover, his assertion 
that almost all American policymakers and officers maintained “doubts about Cuban fitness for 
self-government” still holds true after a careful examination of primary sources.24 Most recently, 
John Lawrence Tone, in War and Genocide in Cuba, challenged Foner’s and Pérez’s arguments 
that Spain’s army in Cuba was essentially defeated before the U.S. intervened militarily in the 
war. Despite these challenges to some of Pérez’s assertions, Cuba Between Empires still 
																																																								
22 Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902. 2 vols. 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).  
23 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983). 
24 Ibid., 271. 
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provides the best narrative account of the Cuban War for Independence, the subsequent U.S. 
occupation, and the Cuban perspective of U.S. imperialism.25 
Revisionist historians and non-specialists of these conflicts writing in the years following 
the Vietnam War focus on the savagery of American overseas conquest and occupation after the 
War with Spain, especially in the Philippines. Recent scholarship on the Philippine War and 
subsequent insurrection by Brian McAllister Linn and other specialists of the conflict has 
challenged this myth. While all admit that many atrocities occurred in the Philippines, Linn 
meticulously documented how the U.S. Army carefully balanced conciliation and government 
programs with both violent and non-violent coercion of the insurgents to win over the Filipino 
population.26 The U.S. occupation of Cuba provides a more compelling case against the 
revisionist image of the American soldier as a brutal occupier. Throughout the four-year 
occupation, there are very few instances of U.S. soldiers fighting or violently repressing Cubans 
outside of ordinary criminal acts by both Americans and Cubans. The revisionist history of 
American imperialistic foreign policy that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s successfully 
destroyed the absurd notion of selfless American soldiers arriving to liberate the Cubans from 
their tyrannical Spanish oppressors and to guide the local inhabitants, unfit for self-government, 																																																								
25 John Lawrence Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2006). Tone convincingly argues that the Cubans were far from defeating the Spanish at the time of the U.S. 
intervention, and that the War had reached a sort of stalemate with both armies severely weakened form three years 
of fighting. Gerald F. Linderman The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1974). Linderman portrays President McKinley as being seriously committed to 
avoiding a war with Spain, and he argues that the war was a reaction to domestic tensions rechanneled into a 
populist moral crusade to liberate Cuba. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898. Trask also downplays the importance 
of imperial motivations for the United States’s War with Spain. He asserts that President William McKinley 
attempted to avoid starting a war with Spain until at the last moment he gave into overwhelming political pressures 
at home. Cosmas and Healy echo Trask’s portrayals of President McKinley’s motives for going to war. 
26 Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1997). Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2000). Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 
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on their path to emulate American democracy and civilization. However, the admirable moral 
outrage over U.S. overseas imperialism has, in many cases, unfairly stereotyped the U.S. Army 
and its soldiers as brutal and racist killers.27 The truth is far more complex than either of these 
simplistic interpretations suggest. The U.S. Army and its heterogeneous soldiers were neither 
completely violent oppressors nor entirely selfless humanitarians. 
None of these published works adequately investigate the five months that the Army was 
in Santiago before the formal occupation of the entire island began. The gap in the historical 
coverage is troublesome because the initial occupation campaign by the U.S. Army to establish 
civil and military control over the Province of Santiago significantly shaped how the U.S. Army 
later occupied the rest of the island. The methods established by the Army in Santiago to 
monopolize military force, control revenue, and govern gave the War Department and the 
McKinley administration the necessary time to formulate a policy. Without already having the 
military power to control the Cuban population, the United States would not have been in the 
position of power necessary to impose the Platt Amendment on Cuba in 1902. By ignoring the 
operational history of the initial occupation of Santiago by the U.S. Army in favor of 
investigations on the formulation and imposition of U.S. imperial policy, historians have 
neglected essential questions as to how the Army occupied and controlled Cuba.  
The lack of an operational history on how the U.S. Army occupied Cuba highlights a 
glaring deficiency in the field of military history. Historians in this field naturally focus their 
studies on wars and conflicts in which armies engage in combat. For example, there are hundreds 
of English-language military histories on the relatively short hundred-day War with Spain but 																																																								
27 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 
1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000). Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture 
of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
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only three books on the subsequent four-year occupation of Cuba; of those, none is written by 
authors who would identify themselves as specialists in military history. Likewise, there have 
been hundreds of books and articles written on the U.S. Army counterinsurgency operations in 
the Philippines, which occurred simultaneously with the U.S. Army’s occupation of Cuba. The 
lack of an operational study of the Army’s role during the occupation of Cuba has led historians 
to ignore the role that all but the top generals played or simply to assume that the Army’s officers 
and soldiers were motivated by the same economic and political interests as leading 
policymakers and executives in the United States. 
Although military historians continue to focus their studies on investigations of wars, and 
more recently counterinsurgency operations, they have produced only a relatively small body of 
quality monographs on the U.S. Army’s overseas occupations and operations on the American 
frontier. In 1975, Earl F. Ziemke published an excellent work for the Army Historical Series on 
the U.S. Army’s planning and execution of the occupation of Germany from 1944-1946.28 The 
two best works describing the problems the U.S. Army faced occupying the South during 
Reconstruction are Mark L. Bradley’s Bluecoats and Tar Heels and James E. Sefton’s The 
United States Army and Reconstruction.29 Brian Linn’s Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army in 
the Pacific, 1902-1940 provides the best example of a historian combining a cultural history of 
																																																								
28 Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington D.C.: Center for Military 
History, United States Army, 1975).  
29 Mark L. Bradley, Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina (Lexington, 
Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2011). James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). 
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the U.S. Army’s soldiers and officers with a strategic study of national defense and occupation 
policy.30  
For the second occupation of Cuba by the U.S. Army, which lasted from 1906 to 1909, 
Allan Millett produced an excellent study demonstrating that the decision to intervene into 
Cuba’s domestic political turmoil was unpopular with President Theodore Roosevelt and his 
advisors. Millett examines how the Army’s officers effectively established order, thwarted 
Cuban annexationists, and maintained an efficient administration. While Roosevelt and Henry 
Cabot Lodge were eager to implement the minimum reforms and stability necessary to withdraw 
before the elections, the Army officers wanted to stay much longer to root out the culture of 
corruption and anarchy that they believed was at the heart of Cuba’s domestic problems. 
Millett’s The Politics of Intervention shows how problematic it is for scholars to assume that the 
U.S. Army’s officers share the same ideological motivations as U.S. policymakers, or that ardent 
imperialists like Roosevelt were always driven toward expansion or annexation.31 
There are no studies equivalent to those done by Millett, Linn, or Cosmas that 
specifically investigate the operational history of the U.S. Army’s role during the initial 
occupation of Cuba. Consequently, a host of important questions remain unanswered. How did 
the Army deal with the humanitarian and security crises it inherited in and around Santiago de 
Cuba? What, if any, guidance did the Army receive from the War Department and the McKinley 
Administration? If there was no long-term American policy for the initial occupation, what 
factors determined how the Army dealt with the Cubans and the Spanish in Santiago Province? 																																																								
30 Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
31 Allan R. Millett, The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 1968). 
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The constructs of race and imperialism alone are insufficient to answer these questions. An 
operational study of the occupation will reveal that the Army’s officers and soldiers were also 
working within the framework of their unique institutional norms as well as contemporary 
American societal values. 
To understand the U.S. Army’s institutional culture during the occupation, I will depend 
on the historical studies of the Army’s culture and experiences in the thirty years preceding the 
War with Spain. The most commonly referenced works providing insight into the U.S. Army’s 
interaction with Native Americans are Robert M. Utley’s Frontier Regulars and Robert 
Wooster’s The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903.32 Both authors provide 
excellent accounts of the U.S. Army’s “peacetime” experience living among, and sometimes 
fighting, the Indians in the American West during the thirty years following the Civil War. In his 
social history, The Old Army, Edward M. Coffman provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
U.S. Army’s institutional culture from the founding of the Republic to the eve of the War with 
Spain.33  
Expanding on the work of Coffman and Utley, Michael L. Tate’s The Frontier Army in 
the Settlement of the West, explores the wide range of other activates the U.S. Army performed 
that helped settle the American West besides their traditional role as an Indian-fighting 
constabulary.34 One of the many roles of the multipurpose army that Tate examines is the U.S. 																																																								
32 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 
1974).  
33 Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). Also, see Don Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier 
Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963). The best study of the Navy’s institutional 
culture before the War with Spain is Peter Karsten’s The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the 
Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972). 
34 Michael L. Tate, The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999). 
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Army’s work as the first managers and protectors of the United States’ fledgling national parks. 
In Nature’s Army, Harvey Meyerson provides a more detailed study of how the cavalry of the 
United States acted as stewards of Yosemite by protecting it from herders and land prospectors 
alike.35 In the process of administering the national parks, the U.S. army built roads, mapped the 
country, and set the precedent for the National Park Service. Utilization of the works by these 
scholars to understand the how the U.S. Army’s institutional culture developed before 1898 
provides the best contextual framework to understand the decisions and choices made by the 
U.S. Army’s officers and soldiers during the occupation. 
Most of the regular Army officers who conducted the occupation of Cuba spent years, if 
not decades, in the Army serving on the frontier as a constabulary force. The U.S. Army 
established the regulations, behavioral norms, and organizational and administrative structures 
for garrisoning territory and self-administration throughout the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. To a large degree, the institutional culture that the U.S. Army developed in the decades 
following the American Civil War patterned its behavior during the occupation of Cuba. 
In Absolute Destruction, Isabel V. Hull examines the imperial German military from 
1870 to 1918 to understand why it developed a military culture of extremism with genocidal 
tendencies. Hull defines military culture as the “habitual practices, default programs, hidden 
assumptions, and unreflected cognitive frames” that drive a military’s practices.36 Wayne E. Lee 
clarifies how Hull’s definition of military culture allows for change and individual agency by 
explaining that “military behavior is strongly patterned by culture, but culture leaves room for 																																																								
35 Harvey Meyerson, Nature’s Army: When Soldiers Fought for Yosemite (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2001). 
36 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 2. 
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improvisation.”37 Using Hull’s and Lee’s definitions of military culture, it logically follows that 
to understand the decisions of the U.S. Army’s officers and soldiers, one must first understand 
the doctrine, training, shared experiences, and other basic organizational assumptions for 
appropriate behavior that the Army brought to Cuba in 1898 and used as its framework to 
administer its internal affairs and execute its assigned mission.38 
 
Methodology 
 
This work is an operational military history of the U.S. Army’s initial occupation in 
Cuba. It examines the U.S. Army’s operations and policies at the provincial level and provides 
an analysis of the factors that influenced the Army’s officers’ and soldiers’ actions in Santiago. 
Fortunately, many of the American soldiers who participated in the initial occupation of Cuba 
documented their experiences in memoirs, diaries, and letters. Most of the high-ranking officers 
and civilian officials wrote memoirs and many collections of their personal papers and official 
correspondence are located at the Library of Congress. The U.S. Army Military History Institute 
(MHI) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, is an invaluable repository of papers, diaries, and rare published 
memoirs of a number of subordinate officers and soldiers who either fought with the Fifth Corps 
or conducted the subsequent occupation of the Department of Santiago. In the 1950s, MHI sent 
out questionnaires to surviving veterans of the Spanish-American War and Philippine 
Insurrection. The archivists at MHI filed the responses to these surveys by regiment and attached 
additional correspondence or records that the veterans sent in with their questionnaires. MHI also 
holds the most extensive collection of records of published orders, circulars, and annual reports 																																																								
37 Lee, “Mind and Matter,” 1119. 
38 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 94-95. 
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concerning the Spanish-American War and subsequent occupation. Finally, the unpublished 
records of the War Department and U.S. Army forces in the Department of Santiago are located 
in Record Group 395 at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The official correspondence 
in this record group provides an extensive and detailed look into the occupation of Santiago. 
 Even though this work primarily focuses on the initial occupation from the U.S. Army’s 
perspective, it is still necessary to understand how Cubans viewed the American occupation. 
Unfortunately, there are very few published contemporary Cuban accounts of the initial 
occupation of Santiago. My status as an active-duty U.S. Army officer still prevents me from 
traveling to Cuba on an ordinary student visa to search archives, despite recent improvements in 
U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. Most scholars studying the occupation rely on two Havana 
newspapers, El Diario de la Marina and El Mundo, to gain insight into the Cuban discourse over 
the American occupation. The issues available in the United States are outside the scope of the 
dissertation because El Mundo did not start publishing until 1901 and no library in the United 
States has issues of El Diario de la Marina before September 1, 1899. To give at least some 
insight into the Cuban perspective of the U.S. Army and its actions, I used the newspaper La 
Lucha from Havana, and located the few surviving issues of The Times of Cuba and The 
Santiago Herald found in the Library of Congress. Due to my minimum access to Cuban 
sources, I have relied heavily on the excellent work of American scholars of the U.S. Army’s 
occupation, such as Louis A. Pérez, who have thoroughly researched Cuban sources. 
 Any time an author works with sources in two languages, he must make decisions on 
what spellings to use for proper nouns with conflicting spellings. In an effort to avoid confusion, 
I have referred to Cuban organizations and terms by their English names, which appear in the 
majority of contemporary American sources. In an exception to this rule, I use the Spanish 
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spelling for personal names and towns in Cuba, with the exception of Havana. Hopefully, this 
will help the reader to locate the city names on modern maps and eliminate confusion caused by 
the multiple spellings of geographic locations and personal names that appear in contemporary 
American accounts. Readers should note, however, that while this dissertation focuses on the 
initial occupation of Oriente Province, the U.S. Army referred to both the province and the 
military department they created to administer it as Santiago. As the analysis in this dissertation 
is from the U.S. Army’s perspective, I will refer to it as the Department of Santiago or Santiago 
Province unless I am quoting directly from a Cuban or Spanish source.  
Similarly, I refer to the war between the United States and Spain from April 25, 1898, to 
August 12, 1898, as the War with Spain, the contemporary name used by the U.S. Army. By 
using this name for the war, I avoid the more familiar, but increasingly unpopular Spanish-
American War. Latin American scholars are right to point out that the Cubans and Filipinos had 
fought the Spanish for years before the United States entered these wars for independence. The 
Cuban War for Independence (1895-1898) is the best name to describe the conflict from the 
Cuban and Spanish perspective; however, to the members of the United States armed forces who 
went to war with Spain across the globe in order to punish them for their alleged sinking of the 
Maine and the atrocities the Spanish army committed against Cuban civilians, the War with 
Spain remains appropriate. Using the contemporary American name for the conflict is also more 
preferable than using the most inclusive, but far too cumbersome, Spanish-Cuban-Filipino-
American War. I have, however, elected to deviate from using some contemporary U.S. Army 
terms that are clearly derogatory toward Cubans. For example, I call the Cuban military force 
that the U.S. government refused to recognize the Cuban Liberation Army or simply the Cuban 
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army, and I call the members of this army mambises or soldiers, instead of insurgents or 
insurrectos. 
Examining the occupation of Santiago through the lens of a traditional operational 
military history is the most coherent way to explain sequentially the process of how the U.S. 
Army physically occupied and controlled the province of Santiago after the Spanish surrender, 
ended the humanitarian crises, dealt with the Cuban Liberation Army, and established a military 
government. To explain why, and not just how, the U.S. Army conducted the occupation in the 
manner that it did, I will blend traditional military history methods with the approaches used by 
social, cultural, and political historians to understand the motivations, values, and philosophies of 
the members of the U.S. Army.39 American officers and soldiers made crucial choices every day 
in Cuba that determined the nature of the occupation. Their decisions did not occur within a 
vacuum. Instead, individual officers and soldiers acted sometimes within and sometimes outside 
the accepted norms of the U.S. Army’s institutional culture, their experience of constabulary 
duty on the American frontier, American foreign policy, domestic politics, the material 
conditions on the ground in Cuba, and the social predispositions of Army officers and soldiers. 
Only by blending several different historical forms of analysis can I begin to understand how 
these complex factors interacted during the occupation. 
In writing on a topic as controversial as American empire, I am mindful of my own 
perspective and background. As an army officer who served two tours in Iraq, I understand how 
the paradoxical humanitarian and self-interested agendas of American foreign policy only 
indirectly influence the actions of all but the most senior officers sent overseas to occupy foreign 																																																								
39 For a concise historiography on the field of military history and explanations on the adoption of social and cultural 
historical methods into the field, see Wayne E. Lee, “Mind and Matter: Cultural Analysis in American Military 
History, A Look at the State of the Field,” Journal of American History 93 (2007): 1116-1162. 
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countries. It is perfectly reasonable for soldiers who are improvising an occupation and 
conducting nation-building operations after the termination of conventional fighting to act with 
little or no consideration of the imperialistic motivations of policymakers, even while acting as 
agents of empire. It is quite likely that my own experiences, and my heavy reliance on the U.S. 
Army records and the personal recollections of American soldiers, have influenced my 
perceptions. Nonetheless, I have found little evidence that the majority of officers and soldiers 
conducting the initial occupation of Santiago were driven primarily by an imperialistic agenda. 
Just as today, the American occupation forces in Cuba were motivated to neutralize possible 
military threats quickly in order to ensure their own safety, establish an efficient logistical 
system to make their day-to-day living tolerable, and stabilize the occupied nation so they could 
return home as soon as possible. Although this work argues that the U.S. Army responded to the 
difficulties inherent to an occupation by acting on limited policy directives and with respect to its 
own legal, experiential, and institutional norms, this dissertation should not be interpreted as a 
justification for the Platt Amendment, which severely infringed on Cuban sovereignty and 
subjugated the fledgling country to a neo-colonial relationship with the United States. Nor should 
this work be taken as justification for the paternalistic and ethnocentric decisions of many U.S. 
Army officers, or their almost complete disregarded for Cuban cultural norms and rightful claims 
for real sovereignty. 
Finally, in the aftermath of the U.S. military’s recent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, it 
became evident to both the military and the American public that there was not an adequate or 
comprehensive plan to occupy the countries once the invading forces defeated the opposing 
combatants. The administration’s and the military planners’ failure to think past the conventional 
fighting had obvious long-term political and strategic consequences. An examination of Cuba 
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after the fall of Santiago should provide significant insight into how, in the absence of clear post-
conflict objectives, occupying soldiers and an occupied people will shape future events and 
policy through their own daily interactions, sometimes with serious lasting consequences. 
 
Organization 
The first chapter begins with a survey of the Cuban War for Independence and a brief 
examination of the complex reasons why the United States decided to intervene in the war. 
Spanish diplomatic insults and their alleged sinking of the Maine combined with genuine 
humanitarian concerns over harsh Spanish policies and reprisals against Cubans to provide the 
catalyst for the American people to push a reluctant president to war. Yet that is not to say that 
imperialist ambitions and long-term machinations to annex Cuba did not also play a role in the 
desire to go to war with Spain—a diverse array of causes pushed a people with a diverse array of 
values and viewpoints to agree upon the need for war. The chapter concludes with an 
examination of the reasons for the U.S. Army’s poor performance during the Santiago 
Campaign. During the decades preceding the War with Spain, the Army’s planning and thinking 
about possible future conventional conflicts focused on the threat of an invasion of the United 
States by a European power. This defensive mindset, combined with both a dysfunctional 
command structure and the lack of a planning staff, hindered the Army’s preparation for and 
prosecution of the War with Spain. The consequences of the War Department’s institutional 
weaknesses and its faulty strategic assumptions about the nature of its future wars with European 
powers were evident in the Army’s weak performance during the war. Strong commanders, like 
Major Generals Wesley Merritt and Nelson A. Miles, overcame the War Department’s 
deficiencies to wage efficient campaigns in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Major General 
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William R. Shafter, on the other hand, had neither the presence nor the health to overcome the 
War Department’s inefficiencies to manage the Santiago campaign effectively, and he deserves 
most of the blame for its poor execution. 
The second chapter begins to examine the difficult military situation in which the U.S. 
Army found itself in the immediate aftermath of the fighting. The surrender terms charged the 
Army with securing and caring for 24,000 Spanish prisoners. Because of the War Department’s 
slowly improving staff work and the cordial treatment of its prisoners, the U.S. Army 
successfully transported the Spanish prisoners back to Spain without incident. All the while, the 
U.S. Army’s relationship with the Cuban Liberation Army was tenuous at best, mostly because 
of Major General William R. Shafter’s disrespectful behavior toward the Cubans, McKinley’s 
refusal to recognize the Cuban Liberation Army or the Cuban government, and uncertainty over 
what McKinley’s long-term policy toward Cuba would be. 
 The third chapter examines why, despite its best efforts, the U.S. Army failed to check 
the malaria and yellow fever epidemics that decimated Shafter’s Fifth Corps in Santiago de 
Cuba. Medical science had not yet confirmed the causes of these two diseases, and the Army’s 
preventative measures provided no relief to the suffering soldiers. In the end, the War 
Department had to evacuate the over 19,000 soldiers in the Fifth Corps back to the United States 
to prevent their decimation from disease. 
The next chapter examines how the U.S. Army dealt with the severe humanitarian crises 
in the department of Santiago after the Spanish surrender. With little guidance from the War 
Department and no long-term policy directives from the McKinley administration, the U.S. 
Army’s soldiers diligently worked to assist the tens of thousands sick and starving Cuban and 
Spanish civilians and soldiers under their care. The U.S. Army and the American Red Cross 
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acted primarily in response to humanitarian necessity during this crisis to provide for the needy 
in Santiago, even while they worked to return prisoners of war to Spain. Meanwhile, most of the 
U.S. Army’s own soldiers and officers were suffering from disease.  
 The Fifth chapter begins after the humanitarian crises had subsided and examines how 
the U.S. Army began to establish garrisons in the villages and towns in the Department of 
Santiago to control the Cuban population. Furthermore, it investigates how the Army’s officers 
incentivized jobs and rations to disband the Cuban Liberation Army peacefully and establish a 
monopoly of force within Cuba. Without a long-term directive from the War Department or 
McKinley, officers in Santiago patterned their decisions and actions after the organizational 
structures and institutional culture that defined the U.S. Army at that time. They relied on the 
same methods for controlling civilian populations that they had learned acting as a constabulary 
on the American frontier.  
 One of the methods of control the U.S. Army imported from their experience in the West 
was the use of local auxiliary forces to self-police native populations. The sixth chapter examines 
how the U.S. Army worked with its conservative Cuban allies to hire former Cuban soldiers to 
police Santiago in a manner that would support the military government and the propertied class. 
Cubans offered several advantages over American soldiers when it came to policing the 
department. The Cuban police understood the culture and customs, spoke the language, and were 
generally resistant to the tropical fevers that devastated American soldiers. The Cuban police 
could use harsh or extra-legal methods to capture alleged criminals that, if used by Americans, 
would lead to outrage in the United States and possibly insurrection in Cuba. Most importantly, 
by leaving American forces in their garrisons to drill unless needed to support the local police in 
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an emergency, the U.S. Army was not seen often enough to be a constant reminder of the 
unpopular occupation. 
 Chapter seven looks at how U.S. Army officers created the necessary logistical 
infrastructure to support their dispersed garrisons. The fiscally conservative McKinley 
administration had no intention of financing the entire occupation with American taxpayer 
money and quickly reestablished and modified the former Spanish tariff schedule to finance the 
infrastructure required to support the Army’s garrisons controlling the Cuban population, and to 
pay the salaries of the Cubans and Americans working for the provisional military government. 
McKinley’s economic policies indicate that, at least in 1898, his administration had no intention 
of creating a mercantile colony of Cuba. 
 The eighth chapter investigates how the U.S. Army established a military government in 
the Department of Santiago after its garrisons established control and the Cuban Liberation 
Army was disbanded. An interesting dichotomy existed within the U.S. military government in 
Santiago. On one hand, the military officers maintained absolute authority over the government, 
acting in a dictatorial fashion in enforcing federal policy and their discretionary laws and 
regulations. On the other hand, the military officers were deeply influenced by the various 
progressive reform movements occurring in the United States. While maintaining ultimate 
authority, Army officers simultaneously sought to establish mechanisms of efficient government 
administration, reform the civil service, create a social welfare system, and, when convenient, 
break the control of existing special interests over the Cuban economy and politics. 
Unfortunately, the ethnocentrism of the American officers led them to conclude that the 
American institutions of governance were always superior to Latin American models. Instead of 
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trying to make small reforms to the existing government structure, they too often tried to 
transform Cuban society into a replica of the United States. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
THE WAR WITH SPAIN AND THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 
 
Introduction 
The U.S. Army was unprepared when President McKinley decided to intervene in the 
Cuban War for Independence. Before the War with Spain in 1898, the U.S. Army was a small, 
constabulary force of 25,000 soldiers distributed among small garrisons across the United States. 
The War Department had a dysfunctional command structure and an archaic organization 
without a general staff for planning. War and Navy Department officials envisioned that the U.S. 
Army’s primary purpose in a war against a European power would be to defend the coast of the 
United States against attack in order to allow state militias time to mobilize and repel an 
invasion. American military leaders did not envision sending a large expeditionary force 
overseas. Furthermore, War Department officials assumed that if the President ordered the Army 
to deploy forces beyond the North American continent, they would be limited to small auxiliary 
commands supporting naval actions. When Congress declared war on Spain April 25, 1898, the 
War Department’s organizational structure and its pre-war strategic planning assumptions left it 
ill prepared to react effectively to President William McKinley’s decision to mobilize a large 
volunteer Army and send an expeditionary force to Cuba before the fall of 1898.  
The U.S. Army performed much worse than the U.S. Navy during the campaign to 
capture Santiago de Cuba, thoroughly botching the logistical aspects of the campaign and 
struggling to defeat a demoralized and inferior Spanish Army. The rapid mobilization of the U.S. 
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Army, the influx of volunteers, and poor and changing guidance from the McKinley 
administration partly explain the poor performance of the U.S. Army during the Santiago 
campaign. However, much of the blame falls to the commander of the expedition, Major General 
William R. Shafter, who poorly led and terribly mismanaged the campaign. Perhaps the War 
Department could have saved Shafter from himself had the War Department not misread the 
political run-up to American intervention, getting caught flat-footed when the war began. 
 
The Cuban War for Independence 
The long build up to the American intervention into the already three-year-old Cuban 
revolution should have given the War Department ample time to at least develop a strategy for 
how it would intervene in Cuba if asked. Seventeen years after the first Cuban war for 
independence, known as the Ten Years’ War (1868 – 1878), ended, fighting again erupted in 
Eastern Cuba. In the interlude between the two wars, political authorities in Spain implemented 
few of the political reforms they had promised in the negotiated peace. Then in 1894, the Cuban 
economy collapsed and the Cuban Revolutionary Party’s (PRC) leadership under José Márti 
decided the conditions were right for the struggle for independence to begin anew. On February 
24, 1895, the “Grito de Baire” announced the opening of the Cuban War for Independence. 
Spanish authorities, under Captain General Emilio Calleja Isasi, quickly arrested the instigators 
in Havana and in the western provinces of the island. Only in the rural eastern provinces of 
Matanzas and Oriente (Santiago) provinces did the armed insurrection gain momentum.
The Spanish further escalated the conflict in March after an attempt by conservative 
military officers to silence the liberal press in Madrid escalated into a political movement that 
forced Spain’s Liberal government to relinquish power to the Conservatives. The new 
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Conservative government replaced the conciliatory Calleja Isasi in Cuba with General Arsenio 
Martínez Campos, the Spanish military hero of the Ten Years’ War. Determined to uphold 
Spain’s honor and prestige and not to lose the crown jewel of its once mighty empire, the new 
government ordered Martínez Campos to consider no reforms until the Spanish army in Cuba, 
which quickly grew from 14,000 to 140,000 soldiers, defeated the rebels. Just as the new Spanish 
government brought back its former champion to end the new conflict, so too did the Cuban 
Revolutionary Party’s (PRC). In April Márti and the other exiled Cuban military leaders from the 
Ten Years’ War, including Generals Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, landed in eastern 
Cuba to join the separatists. After a heated conference at La Mejorana, the leaders agreed to 
establish a revolutionary government under Salvador Cisneros and gave command of the newly 
formed Cuban Liberation Army to Gómez, with Maceo, the “Bronze Titan,” as his second in 
command.1 
Short of rifles and ammunition, and with very few heavy weapons, the Cuban Liberation 
Army generally avoided large battles with Spanish troops, unless under extremely favorable 
circumstances.2 Instead, Maceo and Gómez relied on guerilla tactics and the destruction of 
plantations in order to weaken Spanish authority by degrading the Cuban economy.3 A pillar of 
Gómez’s strategy was to deny the Spanish treasury the duties from Cuban sugar and hurt Spanish 																																																								
1 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 44-47, 99-100. John Lawrence Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 48-56.  
2 For examples of how short the Cuban Liberation Army was on rifles and ammunition, and how the need to capture 
or secure war material drove Cuban operations and tactics, see Ricardo Batrell, A Black Soldier’s Story: The 
Narrative of Ricardo Batrell and the Cuban War of Independence, trans, and ed. Mark A. Sanders (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 3-118. 
3 The Cuban Liberation Army did receive five medium and light artillery pieces, and a dynamite gun from the Junta 
in the U.S. and used them to help capture, but not hold, the towns of Victoria de las Tunas and Guaimaro. For 
information on the Cuban use of artillery and their tactics, see Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars: Cuban 
and Philippine Experiences (London: Constable & Co., 1912), 59-97, 116-139, 142-45. Even The Cuban victory at 
the Battle of Peralejo, was really just a large-scale ambush. See Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 75-80. 
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merchants, since Cuban planters would not have the money to purchase their goods. But Gómez 
hoped to do more than deny the Spanish government the riches of its empire; he also wanted to 
demonstrate that the Spanish government could not protect property or feed the refugees created 
by his strategy of economic devastation. Besides discrediting the government in Madrid, his plan 
forced neutral pacíficos to choose sides. With their property destroyed and agricultural jobs no 
longer available, thousands of Cubans either fled to the cities or joined the revolution.4  
In December of 1895, Gómez and Maceo left the security of Oriente Province in a 
campaign designed to bring economic devastation to the entire island and demonstrate the 
inability of the Spanish army to protect its supporters or their property. After ambushing and then 
defeating a Spanish column of 1,500 soldiers at the Battle of Mal Tiempo, the Cuban Liberation 
Army began to devastate the sugar and tobacco industry in the provinces of Havana, Matanzas, 
and Pinar del Río. General Martínez Campos set out in pursuit of the Cuban Liberation Army 
and inflicted a heavy defeat on Maceo’s column at Colesio. After the battle, Gómez and Maceo 
feigned a retreat toward the security of Oriente Province only to countermarch once Martínez 
Campos rushed his forces east to block the Cuban army’s escape. Martínez Campos took the 
bait, and the path to the three western provinces of Cuba lay open. Unopposed for a time, Maceo 
and Gómez devastated the countryside and small towns and attacked small garrisons that could 
be taken without a prolonged siege. Martínez Campos could never move quickly enough and 
with sufficient secrecy to catch the rampaging Cuban Army. The Spanish general returned to 
Spain in disgrace.5 																																																								
4 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 126-37. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 57-68.  
5 Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902. 2 vols. 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 1:52-73. Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 49-53, 116-119. Tone, War and 
Genocide in Cuba, 123-126, 137. Batrell, A Black Soldier’s Story, 54-55. 
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The Conservative government in Madrid sent Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau’s to replace 
Martínez Campos as Governor General in February 1896. The five foot tall Weyler, known as 
“the butcher,” had earned a brutal reputation for the heavy-handed tactics he used during the Ten 
Years’ War, as well as against anti-Spanish uprisings in the Dominican Republic, Mindanao, and 
Catalonia. On arrival in Havana, Weyler implemented a new strategy. First, he ended Martínez 
Campos’s policy of protecting small towns and large plantation with vulnerable garrisons, thus 
enabling him to create large field armies to pursue the rebels vigorously. Second, to prevent 
insurgents from exacting protection taxes from wealthy plantation owners and supplying tobacco 
to the cigar makers in Florida whose generous donations filled the PRC’s coffers, Weyler 
ordered an end to the production of sugar and the export of tobacco. His policy has the 
unintended consequence of forcing many once loyal landowners to favor intervention by the 
United States. Third, Weyler started clearing the Cuban provinces one at a time from west to east 
in the hopes of isolating the Cuban Liberation Army in Oriente Province behind a rebuilt 
trocha—a continuous line of fortifications running across eastern Cuba from Móron to Júcaro. 
By June 1896, Weyler had succeeded. In the westernmost province of Pinar del Río, Weyler 
vigorously pursued the remnants of Maceo’s command and isolated them behind a newly built 
western trocha, running from Mariel to Majana. Low on supplies, what was left of Maceo’s army 
fought its way to the Spanish Mariel-Majana defensive line. Maceo found the trocha impregnable 
and had to take small boats around it. Soon after he landed, however, Spanish forces caught up 
with Maceo’s survivors and killed the Cuban general.6 
																																																								
6 Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1:73-97. Pérez, Cuba Between 
Empires, 53-55. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 153-185. 
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The most controversial and sinister portion of Weyler’s strategy to end the rebellion was 
his effort to deny the insurgents support from civilians in the countryside by relocating around 
500,000 people into large defendable towns. At least 100,000 Cuban civilians died of 
malnourishment and diseases in these “reconcentration” camps. Weyler had intended for the 
relocated Cubans to produce enough food to feed themselves. In practice, however, the women 
and children had neither the necessary tools nor the experience to cultivate the land. The Cuban 
Liberation Army exacerbated the problem by blockading the towns and preventing much-needed 
supplies from entering, and by stealing from the cultivation zones to feed the Cuban soldiers. 
Even after the Spanish government bowed to international pressure and ended the practice of 
reconcentration in November 1897, Cuban civilians could not return to the countryside 
devastated by both the Spanish Army and by the Cuban Liberation Army, as both tried to deny 
the countryside’s people and resources to the other. Most Cubans, especially women and 
children, remained in the garrisoned towns and continued to perish by the hundreds each week.7 
Although Weyler’s reconcentration policy succeeded in separating the rebels from the 
Cuban population, the inhumane policy fueled a public relations campaign in the United States. 
Members of the Cuban Junta either wrote their own stories for the American press or fed 
reporters stories of Spanish slaughtering Cuban women and children. Some of these reports were 
genuine; some were exaggerations or fabrications. Regardless of veracity, the stories reached a 
wide readership within the United States. Weyler did little to counter the propaganda. While he 
had much to hide from foreign reporters, he did little to refute some of the more outlandish 
claims by the PRC. By refusing to talk to reporters and placing stringent restrictions on the 																																																								
7 Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1:76-77, 110-118. Pérez, Cuba 
Between Empires, 55-56, 124-25. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 193-216. Batrell, A Black Soldier’s Story, 54-
65. 
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foreign press, Weyler left journalists to get their information from the Cuban rebels. Very few 
American reporters traveled to Cuba to verify the PRC information campaign. Those who did, 
like Henry Sylvester Scovel and James Creelman, marched with the Cuban Liberation Army and 
wrote gruesome accounts of Spanish atrocities for the “yellow press,” already known for 
publishing sensational stories with little fact checking.” The editors of the New York World and 
New York Journal capitalized on the grizzly accounts of human suffering in the reconcentration 
camps and lowered paper prices to more than double the circulation of their papers during the 
three year Cuban War for Independence. By 1898 the PRC’s representatives and the yellow press 
had convinced the majority of Americans of the virtue of the Cuban cause and the barbarism of 
the Spanish Army. American support came just in time for the floundering Cuban Liberation 
Army.8 A stalemate had developed in 1897 between Gómez’s Cuban Liberation Army and 
Weyler’s Spanish Army, and Gómez desperately needed American assistance.9 
The Cuban Liberation Army controlled only the countryside of Cuba’s eastern two 
provinces and was capable of little more than small guerilla attacks in the rest of the island. The 
Spanish army had generally pacified western Cuba, but held the only large towns and cities in 
Oriente and Puerto Príncipe Provinces. Even with 140,000 soldiers in Cuba, Spain struggled to 
mount a major offensive against the remnants of the Cuban Liberation Army. In the rainy season, 
more than half of the Spanish soldiers became incapacitated with tropical diseases. Twenty-two 																																																								
8 Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1:163-76. Tone, War and 
Genocide in Cuba, 193-216. 
9 While Tone believes that the Cubans both desired and needed U.S. intervention to achieve military victory, Foner 
and Pérez both dismiss the idea. They believe instead that the U.S. intervened to rob the Cubans of their imminent 
victory and independence. Foner believes that the U.S. intervened primarily for economic and imperialist reasons, 
The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1:229, 248-253, 280-310. Pérez believes 
the PRC in the U.S. thought that American intervention was the only way for Cuba to achieve independence, but 
that the Cuban military leaders questioned the intentions and necessity of U.S. intervention, Cuba Between Empires, 
111-114. 
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percent of Spanish soldiers died of malaria, yellow fever, dysentery, and other diseases. Those 
lucky Spanish soldiers healthy enough to remain on duty quickly became overworked and more 
susceptible to illness. Even seemingly easy tasks, like foraging for firewood and fresh water, had 
to be conducted by large units because of constant harassment by Cuban guerillas. Frederick 
Funston, an American volunteer fighting with the Cubans who later became a U.S. Army 
general, recalled how the Spanish soldier “ceased to leave the protection of his forts and 
blockhouses in columns of less than three or four thousand men.”10 When the Spanish army did 
mount offensive campaigns, “large convoys escorted by formidable bodies of Spanish troops 
moved slowly along the main roads … and were harassed and fought from the time of starting 
until their return” to their garrisons.11 The excellent Cuban intelligence network, the cumbersome 
Spanish marching columns, the poor road conditions, and the insufferable heat prevented the 
Spanish from catching the more mobile Cuban forces.12 
The Cuban Liberation Army suffered from its own problems. Gómez and his new 
second-in-command in the east, General Calixto García, could not adequately feed or supply the 
remnants of their army. Funston remembered how he and the other members of Goméz’s army 
were “barefooted and clothed in rags and tatters, and were always hungry.”13 Some starving 
soldiers buried their weapons and deserted to scavenge for food, while others fell ill to disease.14 
By 1897, Goméz had only a few thousand men under arms in all of Cuba. There was an ample 
supply of willing recruits, but only a very limited supply of ammunition, food, and clothing. 																																																								
10 Funston, Memories of Two Wars, 116. 
11 Funston, Memories of Two Wars, 98. 
12 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 74-82. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 9-10, 72. 
13 Funston, Memories of Two Wars, 99. 
14 Batrell, A Black Soldier’s Story, 82-4, 117. 
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Furthermore, without heavy weapons and ammunition, or the ability to manufacture them, the 
Cuban Liberation Army could not hold large towns and had to rely on supplies being delivered 
by undependable filibustering expeditions from the United States.15 Increasingly, American 
intervention seemed the only way for the revolutionaries to gain independence.16 
 
The United States Intervenes in Cuba 
The United States intervened in the Cuban War for Independence for complex reasons 
that are still hotly debated among historians. The immediate context of the decision for war lies 
in events in Cuba and perceptions in the United States. Harsh policies and reprisals against 
Cubans as the Spanish suppressed insurrections on the island produced genuine and widely held 
humanitarian concerns across broad segments of American society. Popular support in the 
United States in favor of intervention into the Cuban War of Independence grew over the course 
of the three-year conflict largely due to the news stories placed in the “yellow press” by the 
Cuban Revolutionary Party’s (PRC) New York junta, led by Tomás Estrada Palma. Even though 
Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World and William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal often 
embellished or even made up the stories, there were enough actual atrocities committed in Cuba 
to justify public outrage. The high death toll and widespread human suffering caused by 
Weyler’s policy of “reconcentrating” rural populations in urban zones to deny the revolutionaries 
the support of the Cuban people especially enraged the concerned American public. American 
																																																								
15 Funston, Memories of Two Wars, 13-26, 117. Batrell, A Black Soldier’s Story, 77-80, 88-89, 95, 103-4,110. 
16 Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 81-87. See note 9 for a list of authors who do not believe that the Cuban army 
wanted or needed U.S. intervention. 
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popular opinion grew strongly in favor of intervening to end the suffering of the Cuban people, 
and, to a lesser degree, to help Cuba gain independence from Spain.17  
The USS Maine exploded and sank in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898. The 
explosion probably occurred when a coal fire ignited the ammunition magazine. Americans 
assumed Spanish culpability. Widespread moral concern, fueled by a provocative yellow press, 
quickly turned into nearly universal nationalist outrage. This was the spark that ignited the war.  
But the kindling that allowed the spark to catch had been laid earlier. Popular 
humanitarian concern about Spanish policies to suppress indigenous discontent in Cuba and furor 
over the sinking of the USS Maine may not have led to war in the absence of expansionist 
ambitions, long-term American machinations to annex Cuba, widespread feelings of racial and 
ethnic superiority in the United States, and a desire in some quarters for expanded overseas 
markets.18 Expansionist tendencies within the United States were fueled by fears of increasing 
European imperialism in both the Far East and the Western Hemisphere, which many believed 
could threaten the ability of American manufacturers and farmers to sell their surpluses in these 
potentially growing markets.19 Fervently nationalistic, many people in both Europe and the 																																																								
17 Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War (Boston: Little Brown, 1958), 3. Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: 
American Society and the Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 25, 28, 153-
173. Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 16-17. David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1981), 30-1. For an exceptional study on Weyler’s policy of reconcentration, see Tone, War and 
Genocide in Cuba, 193-224. 
18 Louis A. Pérez argues that the United States had coveted Cuba for over a hundred years and that the United 
States’ ultimate goal for intervention in 1898 was eventual annexation. See Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 57-72. 
Louis A. Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2008), 24-42. Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 18-19. In contrast, Frank Freidel 
argues that the United States went to war as part of a “popular crusade to stop a seemingly endless which was 
shattering Cuba.” See Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War (Boston: Little Brown, 1958), 3. 
19 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 
1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 15-49, emphasizes how many nineteenth-century Americans 
perceived that opening foreign markets in the Far East and Latin America would ease the surplus of industrial and 
agricultural goods created by overproduction in the United States. Jacobson also argues that the American quest for 
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United States were driven by a Social Darwinian worldview, believing that their nations’ 
institutions, race, and cultures were inherently superior to all others and that it was their duty to 
“civilize” and “uplift” the rest of the world by converting them to Western values and 
institutions.20 American advocates for an expansionist “large policy” coveted several strategic 
locations across the globe. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and his fellow expansionists, including 
Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, eyed potential routes in Central America for a 
isthmian canal, sought overseas coaling stations to project American naval power across the 
Pacific, and viewed with concern any European designs on Latin America that could threaten 
American hegemony in the region and compromise the approaches to a future canal.21 As anger 
over Spanish conduct towards the Cuban population spread among the American populace, 
expansionists within the United States saw an opportunity to seize control of Cuba and increase 
American hegemony in the Caribbean and Pacific.22 
Although President McKinley had close and frequent contact with Lodge, Roosevelt, and 
other expansionists and business advocates in the Republican Party, it is unclear how much their 																																																																																																																																																																																		
new markets drove the creation of American Empire. Also see, Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 19-
20. 
20 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 10th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1895), 58. Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues, 47-55, 139-172. Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 20-21. 
21 Philip A. Crowl "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to 
the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986) 460-68. Mahan, The Influence of 
Sea Power upon History, 34. Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic, 19-20. 
22 For an excellent analysis of the economic and cultural influences that influenced American expansion in the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, see Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American 
Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982). Although she argues that the end 
of American westward expansion on the North American continent influenced the creation on an overseas American 
empire at the conclusion of the War with Spain (pg. 14), Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis or the idea that America 
needed a new frontier across the Pacific probably had little to no influence on McKinley’s decision to go to war. 
Frederick Jackson Turner introduced his frontier thesis only in 1893 at the World’s Columbian Exposition in 
Chicago, and it is unlikely that the thesis had the same influence on the American public’s desire to go to war in 
1898 as it later had on historians of American westward expansion and U.S. imperialism. Turner, Frederick Jackson 
Turner, Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: The Significance of the Frontier in American History, and Other 
Essays (New York, N.Y.: H. Holt, 1994). 
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ideas influenced him. He was above all a cautious, opportunistic, and pragmatic president. At 
times Lodge and Roosevelt seemed extremely frustrated by the President’s opposition to a war 
with Spain. McKinley tended to confide in no one, keeping his own counsel. To outside 
observers, he frequently seemed to agree with all his advisors and visitors before carefully 
plotting his own political course. The president’s personal correspondence gives sparingly little 
insight into his thought process, and his untimely assassination in 1901 ensured that historians 
would never know with certainty whether or not McKinley intended to create an American 
empire.23 Most evidence suggests that he did not. McKinley, a veteran of the Civil War, knew 
that war was a bloody and nasty affair, which he approached with great caution and reluctance. 
McKinley’s decision to go to war was primarily motivated by political pressure. Popular 
humanitarianism, the sinking of the Maine, expansionism, and economic opportunism could not 
independently push McKinley to war. When they combined in 1898, however, he finally became 
convinced that a large majority of Americans, and consequently Congress, demanded immediate 
action against Spain. Ever the pragmatic politician, McKinley chose to heed their call.24 
																																																								
23 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and 
Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 104-5. 
24 Russell A. Alger, The Spanish-American War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1901), 1-5. Funston, Memories of 
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It would take more than humanitarian concerns and sympathy for the Cuban cause to 
convince the American people, Congress, and President McKinley to intervene. Political affairs 
in Spain and Cuba provided the necessary catalyst. After the anarchist Michele Angiolillo 
assassinated Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Spain’s Conservative Party leader, the Liberal Party 
under Praxedes Sagasta took power in October 1897. Sagasta immediately relieved Weyler, 
ended reconcentration, and granted limited autonomy to Cuba. Estrada Palma and the PRC 
reacted vigorously against autonomy, which weakened support for independence among some of 
the more conservative members of the Cuban Liberation Army and officials in the McKinley 
Administration. However, Sagasta’s liberal reforms also infuriated loyalist Cubans and Spanish 
army officers in Cuba. Conservative Cubans formed militias, threatened violence, and protested 
the arrival of the new, liberal governor-general of Cuba, Ramón Blanco. Fitzhugh Lee, the U.S. 
counsel in Havana, became concerned by the growing unrest in the city and requested a naval 
vessel be sent to Havana harbor to ensure the safety of American citizens and their property. The 
U.S.S. Maine arrived in Havana with Blanco’s permission on January 25, 1898. Three weeks 
later the battleship exploded. In the United States, the yellow press helped to convince the 
American people that Spanish saboteurs were responsible for the loss of the ship and 266 of its 
sailors. Political meddling by Secretary of the Navy John D. Long and a superficial investigation 
ensured that the official investigation blamed an external explosion, implying that a Spanish 
mine had been placed against the ship.25 
 As late as April 1898, two months after the explosion of the U.S.S. Maine, McKinley still 
hoped either to purchase Cuba from Spain, or to resolve the conflict by intervening as a neutral 																																																								
25 Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1:225-31, 237-48. Pérez, Cuba 
Between Empires, 143-63. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 225-243. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 239-43. 
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arbiter. Secretary of War Russell A. Alger wrote that despite the “growing opposition of public 
sentiment throughout the country” to the President’s position of neutrality, he and his advisors 
were “profoundly adverse to war.”26 Even General Nelson A. Miles, the irascible commanding 
general of the U.S. Army, who viewed the Secretary of War more as a rival than as a superior or 
a partner, agreed with his assessment. Reflecting on the cabinet’s pre-war sentiments, Miles 
wrote later that among “President McKinley and his Cabinet” only “one of the latter was in favor 
of war” and that “Secretary of State John Sherman . . . was decidedly opposed to it.”27 But the 
calming voices in the cabinet were drowned out by an American public still outraged by a 
message from the Spanish Minister to the United States, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, which had 
been leaked to the press on 9 February. De Lome made disparaging and humiliating remarks 
about President McKinley and admitted that the Spanish were not negotiating in good faith for 
the sale of Cuba.28 The De Lôme Letter and the sinking of the Maine generated a loud clamor for 
war with Spain among a majority of American people, congressmen, and newspapers. For liberal 
proponents of war, its purpose would be to assist the Cubans in gaining their independence and 
to end needless human suffering. For expansionists, the reason for going to war was to gain 
access to lucrative markets and to create an American empire. Regardless of their motives and 
political orientation, almost all Americans were eager to defend the honor of the United States 
from perceived Spanish aggression and treachery. Under mounting political pressure, the 
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pragmatic and cautious McKinley anticipated possible action against Spain, but still tried to 
resolve the crisis peacefully.29 
 On March 27, 1898, McKinley instructed William R. Day to have American Ambassador 
Stewart Woodford give Spain new terms in a last ditch effort to avoid conflict. Meanwhile, the 
President tried to keep the people calm. In a speech delivered in Pittsburg in March, he reminded 
his audience that “we are not a warlike people,” and that the American people should “never 
permit themselves to be carried away by the tempest of feeling or the torrent of menace.”30 On 
the diplomatic front, McKinley asked that Spain agree to an “armistice until October 1” to allow 
negotiators time to find a final peace between the Cuban insurgents and the Spanish government, 
providing the Spanish immediately revoke the reconcentrado order and that the United States be 
allowed to distribute relief supplies.31 If the negotiators did not reach an agreement by October 1, 
Woodford was to have the Spanish accept “the President of the United States” as “the final 
arbiter.”32 With the public and Congress demanding war, the President was relieved when, on 
April 10, Spain accepted the ultimatum and ceased combat operations in Cuba. McKinley’s 
hopes were quickly dashed when he realized that Spain would grant only autonomy, not 
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independence.33 No Spanish government could politically survive if it gave up the jewel of the 
Spanish empire. The United States had also promised Spain that it would convince the Cubans to 
honor the ceasefire. Horatio S. Rubens, the Cuban revolutionary government’s representative in 
Washington, refused to agree to a ceasefire, arguing that it could only benefit the beleaguered 
Spanish army during the approaching rainy season. With McKinley’s diplomatic attempts 
frustrated by the Cubans and the Spanish, the President reluctantly asked Congress for a war 
resolution. McKinley’s efforts to negotiate a peaceful compromise left him little time to develop 
an alternative policy on Cuba.34 
 McKinley’s message to Congress on April 11, 1898, set limited goals for a war with 
Spain. The President asked Congress to declare war in order to end the suffering of the Cuban 
people, protect the lives and property rights of all who lived or owned property on the island, and 
reestablish American commerce with Cuba. McKinley was reluctant to go to war. His principal 
motivations for committing his administration to these limited goals were to satiate congressional 
demands for action, to end the suffering of the Cuban people, and to satisfy the business interests 
that demanded intervention to protect their property and investments. Nowhere in the message 
did the President address the future of Cuban sovereignty. Additionally, he shrewdly asked 
Congress for authorization to intervene as a neutral and refused to recognize the weak Cuban 
revolutionary government. This caveat not only gave McKinley more time to develop a long-
term Cuban policy, but also gave him maximum latitude to craft a Cuban policy on his own 
terms—relatively free from the pressures that pushed him to decide for war. Clearly, the 																																																								
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President wanted his administration alone to determine the fate of the island, not the Cuban 
people.35 
In the days that followed, both houses debated a war resolution. In the Senate, the 
Republican majority was divided on the future of Cuban independence and the goal of the 
proposed intervention. Enough Republicans sided with the anti-imperialist Democrats to pass the 
Turpie Amendment to the war resolution, which disclaimed any intention by the United States to 
annex Cuba. During debate on the amendment, Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado introduced 
an additional article. This fourth article, commonly called the Teller Amendment, reinforced the 
language of the first three articles by overtly guaranteeing Cuban independence. The article 
stated “that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for pacification thereof, and asserts 
its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to 
its people.”36 Pro-annexation Republicans in the House rallied in the joint committee to delete 
this provision, but the Senate did not back down. On April 20, a joint war resolution that 
included the Teller Amendment became law.37 
Several interests combined to ensure the passage of the Teller Amendment. First, most 
congressmen rightly perceived that the majority of their constituents believed that the only 																																																								
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justification for going to war was to assist the Cubans in their fight for independence. Many of 
these same congressmen and their voters were repulsed by the idea of annexing and considering 
for statehood a Catholic territory with blacks or mulattos comprising more than half the 
population. Many other congressmen were persuaded by the fledgling sugar beet industry, which 
feared cheap Cuban sugar being imported without a tariff.38 Also, Estrada Palma, leader of the 
Cuban Junta, passed out several million dollars in Cuban bonds to “persons of influence” 
redeemable only when Cuba gained its independence.39 Regardless of the various motivations 
driving its members’ decisions, Congress had shaped the direction of America’s foreign policy 
toward Cuba. The Teller Amendment emboldened Cubans to insist on independence and forced 
the annexationists and business interests to pursue their goals in Cuba using means short of 
outright annexation. 
 
The War Department’s Strategy during the War with Spain 
Well before the war, senior leaders in the War Department and the Department of the 
Navy both agreed that the Army’s role in future conflicts with European powers would be 
limited to the defense of the United States home territory and support of naval operations. With 
every change in the naval situation during the war, the McKinley Administration also altered the 
Army’s mission and operational objectives. This put the War Department into a reactive mode, 
and precluded any attempt at long-range planning. Only after the fall of Santiago de Cuba, on 
July 17, 1898, would the Army realize it had to plan for and then conduct an occupation. 
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On June 1, 1896, the Naval War College had completed its first plan for a possible War 
with Spain. Still operating under the influence naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Navy 
planners understood that their three major objectives were to destroy Spain’s fleet, then to 
destroy its merchant ships, and finally to harass and bombard its coastline and foreign colonies. 
In planning, the Navy assumed that neither Spain nor the United States would attempt to invade 
the opposing nation’s mainland and that the U.S. war effort would focus primarily on assisting 
the Cuban insurgents to defeat the Spanish Army and thereby gain independence. These were 
both accurate planning assumptions, but they did not account for the expansion of the war to 
Spain’s other colonies. The Naval War College’s plans called first for a blockade of Cuba to 
draw out Spain’s Atlantic fleet and then a naval attack on Manila Harbor to destroy Spain’s 
Pacific fleet. Once Spain’s Atlantic fleet arrived in the Caribbean, the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic 
Squadron would destroy it. After the destruction of the Spanish fleets, the U.S. Navy’s blockade 
of Cuba would quickly force the Spanish to ask for an armistice and to submit to American 
demands. The Navy’s plan did not change much over the course of the next two years and was 
executed almost exactly as it was originally envisioned.40 
After the mysterious destruction of the USS Maine, war with Spain seemed certain. In 
early March, Secretary of War Russell A. Alger and Secretary of the Navy John D. Long created 
a joint board to coordinate Army and Navy strategies for the looming conflict. The board 
accepted that the war would be primarily a naval conflict and agreed upon the Navy War 
College’s 1896 plan. Commanding General Miles agreed with the service secretaries and joint 
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board, arguing, “The war was strictly a naval problem at first.”41 He then went on to practically 
parrot Mahanian dictums about naval power: “Should the Spanish navy prove superior to ours it 
would sweep the seas, thus rendering it impossible for us to move” to Cuba, and if our Navy had 
proven “superior, the withdrawal of the Spanish forces from those islands would have been 
impossible.”42 Alger and Miles, on the recommendation of both the joint Army-Navy board and 
the spokesmen for the Cuban rebels, suggested that in the pending conflict with Spain, the Army 
could seize a port in eastern Cuba in order to supply weapons and ammunition to the Cuban 
rebels. The joint board, the commanding general, and the Secretary of War all discouraged any 
invasion of Cuba during the “rainy, or ‘sickly,’ season,” since the increased risk of yellow fever 
and malaria made any campaign in Cuba next to impossible.43 
The War Department received little guidance from McKinley during its initial strategy 
deliberations. Shrewd, cautious, and pragmatic, McKinley never rushed into a major policy 
decision. He initially allowed the service secretaries to develop joint strategy with minimal input, 
and he refused to formulate a wartime strategy or to consider a long-term policy on the possible 
fate of the Spanish colonies until he fully understood the political ramifications for each of his 
policy decisions.44 
Since the War Department was certain that in the imminent war with Spain its function 
would be to protect the eastern seaboard of the United States, it spent the majority of its pre-war 
congressional funding on coastal defenses. On March 9, 1898, the Senate unanimously passed a 
House bill known as the Fifty Million Bill, which appropriated $50 million for the President to 																																																								
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spend at his discretion in order to prepare for the impending war. The Navy spent its portion of 
these funds purchasing additional capital ships from foreign navies and hiring additional support 
ships.45 The War Department rushed to arm and complete the coastal defenses recommended by 
a joint Board of Fortification in 1886, commonly known as the Endicott Board, which had 
remained incomplete due to a lack of congressional funding.46 As Secretary Alger explained, 
“out of the 2,362 pieces of ordnance contemplated in the project of 1885, only 151 were in 
position April 1, 1898. In thirteen years Congress had appropriated for this great national work 
less than one-fourth of the sum required for its completion.”47 Secretary Alger did not spend any 
money preparing to field a large volunteer army because he did not anticipate the need to deploy 
one, and under his “interpretation of the act,” he did not believe that any “part of the sum was 
available for offensive preparation.”48 Of course, the Navy spent much of its share of the Fifty 
Million Bill on offensive capital ships, suggesting that they did not interpret the bill to put any 
restrictions on purchasing ships for offensive operations. Alger may have concocted this 
explanation after the War with Spain to defend himself against criticisms for not properly 
																																																								
45 Trask, The War with Spain, 82-86. 
46 Miles, Serving the Republic, 269.  Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army, 435. 
47 Alger, The Spanish-American War, 10. Congress had good reason not to complete all the recommendations made 
by the Endicott Board. The price tag was astronomical, and there was no clear military threat in 1885. Part of the 
Endicott Board recommendations involved weapon technology that did not actually exist until the mid-late 1890’s. 
Also, the manning system of fortifications recommended by the Endicott Board would have needed three times as 
many soldiers as were in the entire Army. See Robert S. Browning III, Two if by Sea: The Development of American 
Coastal Defense Policy (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1983), 167-178; and David A. Clary, Fortress America: 
The Corps of Engineers, Hampton Roads, and United States Coastal Defense (Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press, 1990), 130-138.  
48 Alger, The Spanish-American War, 8. 
 	53	
preparing the War Department to receive thousands of volunteers and then transport them 
overseas.49   
The full extent of the War Department’s pre-war operational planning was to send a small 
expeditionary force to northeastern Cuba to secure a port where ammunition, weapons, and food 
could be sent to the Cuban armies under Máximo Gòmez and Calixto García.50 However, when 
Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, commander of the United States Naval Squadron in the 
Caribbean, persuaded McKinley and Alger two weeks before Congress formally declared war on 
Spain that his battleships and cruisers could destroy the harbor defenses guarding Havana with 
only minimal risk to his own ships, Alger ordered the War Department to send all available 
regiments immediately to ports along the Gulf of Mexico because they were closer to Cuba and 
to prepare an expedition to storm the fortifications protecting Havana’s harbor. This was just the 
first of four times when naval developments convinced the McKinley Administration to 
significantly alter the operational objectives of the Army.51 
Commanding General Miles opposed any major invasion of Cuba during the summer 
rainy season and was fiercely resistant to the cabinet’s plan to seize Havana. He was convinced 
that either yellow fever and malaria or the large Spanish army in Havana would destroy an army 
sent in the summer. Miles had at most 25,000 soldiers trained and equipped in April and he 
explained “that there were within a short distance of Havana 125,000 Spanish troops with over 
100 field guns, besides the 125 heavy guns in strong, fortified positions” and “that the policy of 																																																								
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storming heavily fortified positions had long since become obsolete.”52 Miles fumed over 
Alger’s foray into campaign planning. He believed that the direction of the Army in theater fell 
under his purview, not the Secretary’s. 
Later, writing that the President had been “misinformed” of the “real military conditions” 
by the Secretary of War, Miles argued for reverting back to the original strategy of supporting 
the Cuban insurgents, while the Navy continued its blockade and attempted to destroy the 
Spanish fleet.53 Miles thought that these actions would likely compel Spain to surrender. If not, 
he proposed that in the fall a large invasion force, reinforced by the 125,000 volunteers that 
McKinley had asked the states to provide on April 23, could land and secure Havana.54 A joint 
Army-Navy committee agreed with Miles’s proposed course of action and convinced McKinley 
to reverse his decision to attack Havana. On April 29, four days after Congress formally declared 
war on Spain, Miles ordered Brigadier General William R. Shafter to assemble in Tampa a force 
of 6,000 regulars. The Navy planned to drop them off at Cape Tunas, a port city on Cuba’s 
southern coast, for a few days, where Shafter and his expedition would conduct “a 
reconnaissance in force” by linking-up with General Máximo Gómez’s forces in order to “to 
send arms and supplies to the insurgents,” so that the Cubans could “render the Spanish forces as 
much injury as possible.”55 In a letter to Generals García and Gómez delivered by Lieutenant 
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Andrew S. Rowan, Miles communicated his operational plan to supply the Cuban Revolutionary 
Army at Cape Tunas.56 
 Only a day after Miles ordered Shafter to Tampa, news reached the War Department that 
Admiral Pascual Cerverá y Topete’s Caribbean squadron had departed the Cape Verde Islands. 
The squadron’s departure undermined Shafter’s plan.57 As the War Department waited for the 
naval situation to unfold in the Caribbean before resuming its expedition to Cape Tunas, it 
floundered in attempting to supply and equip the 125,000 volunteers flooding into mobilization 
camps around the United States. While the War Department waited and dithered, Commodore 
George Dewey, commanding the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic Squadron, defeated the entire Spanish 
Pacific Squadron in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898. The city of Manila was not Dewey’s objective; 
it was the Spanish fleet. On the same day that Spain declared war on the United States, Secretary 
of the Navy Long ordered Commodore Dewey’s squadron in Hong Kong to “proceed at once to 
[the] Philippine Islands” to “commence operations … against the Spanish fleet.”58 Dewey 
steered a course not for Manila, but for the Spanish fleet’s anchorage at Subic Bay on the west 
coast of Luzon. It was only after Admiral Patricio Montojo withdrew to Manila, where he could 
use the harbor’s coastal batteries to fight “under less unfavorable conditions,” that Dewey altered 
his course for Manila.59 After the defeat of the Spanish fleet, Dewey cabled that he could “reduce 
the defenses [of Manila] without difficulty, but that he considered it useless to do so until the 
																																																								
56 Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War, 2:344. Trask, The War with Spain, 174-75. 
57 Alger, Spanish-American War, 44-46. Cosmas, An Army For Empire, 103-104, 184-86.   
58 Long to Dewy, April 24, 1898, Series 1, Reel 3, William McKinley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 
59 Alger, The Spanish-American War, 319. 
 	56	
arrival of land forces sufficient to retain permanent possession.”60 Miles endorsed Dewey’s plan 
to secure a naval station in the Philippines, but wrote later that he “did not suppose we would 
ever assume to acquire territory against the will of the people thereof.”61 A U.S. Army expedition 
to the Philippines became an unexpected possibility.62 
After pondering his options following Dewey’s victory, McKinley surprised the War 
Department when he decided to send a U.S. Army expedition to seize Manila. The United States 
had been at war with Spain for only a week for the professed purpose of liberating Cuba from 
Spanish tyranny. While the Joint Army and Navy Board’s war plan always envisioned the 
destruction of the Spanish fleet in the Pacific, it never considered an Army expedition to seize 
and occupy the Philippines. Before the war, the War Department had anticipated sending only a 
small expedition to Cuba, but now it found itself preparing for a major invasion of Cuba, the 
capture of Manila, and possibly the occupation of the entire Philippine archipelago.63 
McKinley’s emerging strategy was to exert as much pressure as possible on Spain to bring about 
a quick peace settlement favorable to the United States.64 To accomplish McKinley’s directive, 
the War Department created the Eighth Army Corps in San Francisco and assigned it 20,000 
soldiers.65 On May 12, 1898, Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin cabled the second highest-																																																								
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ranking officer in the Regular Army, Major General Wesley Merritt, that President McKinley 
had assigned him to command the “expedition being sent to the Philippine Islands.”66 That same 
day Merritt met with McKinley to discuss the operation. Four days later, Merritt cabled 
McKinley for clarification of his instructions. Was it the President’s “desire to subdue and hold 
all the Spanish territory in the islands, or merely to seize and hold the capital?”67 Merritt added 
astutely, “It seems more than probable that we will have the so-called insurgents to fight as well 
as the Spaniards.”68 McKinley did not provide Merritt immediate clarification on the purpose of 
his expedition. 
McKinley’s failure to articulate his strategy plagued the War Department’s planning 
throughout the war and in its post-war military occupations. Three full days passed before 
Merritt received any clarification on the purpose of his expedition. Finally, on May 19, only six 
days before the Eighth Corps began steaming for the Philippines, McKinley gave Merritt specific 
instructions to guide his actions in the Philippines. He gave Merritt two missions, “completing 
the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and…giving order and security to the islands 
while in possession of the United States.”69 The War Department, which started the war 
believing it would only defend the American coastline and possibly conduct small incursions 
into Cuba to assist the insurgents, now found itself fielding a large volunteer force and preparing 
for operations on opposite sides of the globe. 
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At the May 2, White House conference in which the President announced his decision to 
send troops to the Philippines, he also ordered the Army to seize the port of Mariel, near 
Havana.70 Secretary of War Alger, Secretary of the Navy Long, and his chief uniformed advisor, 
Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, again convinced McKinley to begin the investment of 
Havana. The Navy demanded that the War Department seize Mariel, so that the Navy’s ships 
could resupply, take refuge from storms, and fix damage without returning to the United States.71 
Only General Miles stubbornly disagreed with this plan, asking that it be postponed until the 
rainy season passed and more of the new volunteers could be equipped and trained. Secretary 
Alger overruled Miles and ordered Shafter, still in Tampa, to prepare to support the Navy’s 
plan.72 While Shafter’s Fifth Corps was still in the early stages of preparation for the capture of 
Mariel, the Spanish squadron was sited “off the island of Martinique, a few hundred miles 
southeast of Cuba. This suggested an attempt to relieve Havana.”73 As the Navy consolidated all 
of its warships to meet this new threat, the War Department suspended the assault of Havana. For 
the second time, the Spanish navy postponed Shafter’s departure.74 
The arrival of Cerverá’s squadron in Santiago de Cuba, and not Havana as supposed, on 
May 19, 1898, changed the War Department’s planning and preparations for the invasion of 
Cuba for a third time. Sampson, commanding the U.S. Navy’s North Atlantic Squadron, 
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determined that the Spanish squadron’s position, protected by robust defenses and a narrow 
mouth leading into Santiago Bay, was unassailable by sea. He cabled Secretary Long to ask for 
10,000 soldiers, arguing that the city of Santiago de Cuba and the Spanish fleet “would be ours 
within forty-eight hours” if he was supported by an Army ground force.75 
Another joint Army-Navy council of war met with McKinley on May 26 to discuss 
Sampson’s request. Attending were members of the Naval War Board, including Captain Mahan, 
and both Secretary Alger and General Miles. The council decided to abandon the proposed attack 
on Havana in favor of two Army campaigns to weaken control the sea lanes into the Caribbean, 
the first against Santiago de Cuba and the second against Puerto Rico.76 Based on McKinley’s 
decisions made at the White House meeting, the War Department ordered Shafter on May 31 to  
take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of 
Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your 
judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto the high 
ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or the interior, as shall best enable you to 
capture or destroy the garrison there; or with the aid of the Navy capture or destroy the 
Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago.77 
 
Evidently, the prospect of destroying the Spanish squadron in Santiago caused the board to 
overrule or ignore Miles’s earlier admonitions to avoid large incursions during the rainy, “sickly” 
season. 
Despite giving Shafter specific operational objectives, the War Department did not 
provide him with any long-term, strategic guidance. It is unlikely that Miles or anyone, including 																																																								
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the President, knew exactly what the United States’ policy toward the Cuban army or people 
would be if the Spanish were defeated. Miles allowed Shafter to utilize “any insurgent forces,” 
but “cautioned against putting too much confidence” in them.78 Additionally, Miles did not 
expect the Santiago Campaign to be the terminal operation in Cuba, since he advised Shafter 
that, if possible, he should “reembark [his] troops and proceed to the harbor of Port de Banes.”79 
This final order to move Shafter’s corps to a Cuban-held port on the northeastern coast of Cuba 
demonstrates that the War Department had decided to revert to its original plan to aid the Cuban 
insurgents once the Spanish fleet was destroyed and Santiago de Cuba captured. 
The Spanish squadron’s arrival in Santiago de Cuba created a situation in which Miles 
was able to convince McKinley to adopt his strategy of attacking eastern Cuba and Puerto Rico 
before the 200,000 volunteers summoned by the president in his two recruitments could be 
equipped and readied to capture Havana.80 Not only did Miles’s new strategy support the Navy’s 
desire for a naval base on Puerto Rico to control the approaches to a future isthmian canal, but 
Miles argued that it followed the “well known” Jominian “principle of cutting the enemy's force 
in two and overpowering the weaker wing first.”81 Most importantly for Miles, it delayed a direct 
attack during the summer season. 
But the administration was not inclined to listen to Miles. His constant disagreements 
with the President on strategy and his service secretaries considerably eroded his authority within 
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the administration and the War Department, so much so that when he “telegraphed for authority 
to go with the expedition” his request went unanswered.82 Later, Alger defended his silence, 
noting that “Miles had been explicitly informed by the President, as well as by myself, before he 
went to Tampa, that he was at liberty to go in command of the Santiago expedition, or to 
organize the force for the invasion of Puerto Rico.”83 The official correspondence suggests that 
telegraphic requests were always answered. Alger’s silence in this case does appear deliberate, 
likely meant to prevent his hated rival from participating in the decisive campaign of the conflict. 
Alger also wanted Shafter, his close friend and fellow Michigander, to lead the expedition. 
Shafter was also a close friend of Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin, and the adjutant disliked 
Miles. The Secretary of War and the Adjutant General were even willing to overlook Shafter’s 
obesity and gout, which ultimately prevented him from leaving his headquarters during most of 
the Santiago Campaign.84 For the remainder of the war and subsequent occupation, the civilian 
and military chiefs were barely on speaking terms. After the war, Alger devoted fourteen pages 
of his memoir to ridiculing General Miles’s Puerto Rico strategy and giving examples of Miles’s 
incompetence.85 While the two petulant chiefs feuded, the War Department’s outdated and 
inadequate supply systems and staff organizations buckled under the constantly changing war 
plans. 
McKinley grew wary of the senior leadership in the War Department. Anxiety over its 
feuding chiefs’ apparent inability to manage the Army’s war effort led him to intervene in the 
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War Department’s day-to-day operations. For help, he increasingly relied on the advice and 
abilities of Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin. Acting in a manner that anticipated the post-war 
establishment of a Chief of Staff in lieu of the Commanding General, Corbin’s professionalism 
and ability to coordinate the disjointed staff bureaus kept the War Department functioning under 
the stress of mobilization and campaigns on opposite sides of the world.86 
Despite the poor behavior of the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, much 
of the blame for the War Department’s difficulties lay with the inability of its underdeveloped 
staff to adjust to the changing military developments and McKinley’s shifting strategic 
directives. Before the war, it was widely understood in the War Department that the Army’s role 
in any conflict with a European power would be a limited one, based largely on the conjecture 
that the United States would not seize and hold territory in any such conflict. In the absence of 
clear guidance from the President, the War Department and the Army formulated their initial 
plans based on these pre-war assumptions. Moreover, the War Department did not yet have a 
general staff to coordinate the different staff bureaus. Because McKinley failed to communicate 
well-defined strategic objectives clearly until after the war began, the War Department found 
itself reacting to military developments in real time.    
McKinley’s faults do not absolve the War Department’s leadership of its own 
shortcomings. The department willingly subordinated itself to the both the naval situation and the 
Navy’s planning. This, when combined with the President’s fluctuating and poorly articulated 
objectives, led to a reactionary strategy that unintentionally compelled the Army to wage three 
major campaigns rather than the one supporting campaign for which it had anticipated and 
planned. Overcoming such a sharp change in course required skilled leadership and coordinated 																																																								
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staff work. Unfortunately, neither Secretary of War Alger nor Commanding General Miles 
provided that leadership, opting instead to engage in petty, distracting, and destructive political 
maneuvering. Leadership failures at the highest levels of the War Department and the McKinley 
Administration, and a dysfunctional staff system, left the U.S. Army in disarray as Shafter and 
his Fifth Corps boarded transports for Santiago. 
 
The Santiago Campaign 
 The decision to go to Santiago began when an informant in the Havana telegraph office 
secretly notified the U.S. Army’s Signal Corps that Cerverá’s squadron had arrived in Santiago 
de Cuba on May 19, 1898. Sampson ordered Commodore Winfield Scott Schley—then searching 
for the Spanish fleet around Cienfuegos, Cuba—to rush his Flying Squadron to Santiago to 
prevent Cerverá’s squadron from escaping. Schley disregarded his superior’s orders and did not 
leave Cienfuegos for days after convincing himself that Cerverá’s fleet was in that harbor, 
despite much evidence to the contrary. Four days passed before Schley arrived at Santiago and 
then he decided to leave for Key West for coal without searching the harbor for the Spanish fleet. 
After Secretary Long and Admiral Sampson implored their wayward subordinate to return to 
Santiago as ordered, Schley finally confirmed that Cerverá’s fleet was in the Bay of Santiago de 
Cuba on May 29. Schley’s ten days of vacillation and delay nearly cost the U.S. navy the chance 
to bottle up Cerverá’s squadron, causing a controversy that embarrassed the Navy for years. 
Sampson soon arrived off Santiago with the rest of the U.S. Navy’s North Atlantic Squadron. In 
order to maintain a constant, close blockade of the harbor entrance, Sampson sent U.S. Marines 
to secure Guantánamo Bay for use as a coaling station and as an emergency shelter from any 
approaching tropical storms. After combining his fleet with Schley’s squadron at Santiago, 
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Sampson elected not to run his squadron through the narrow straights guarded by a floating 
minefield because he overestimated the strength of the Spanish fortifications in and around Moro 
Castle and the batteries or artillery defending the entrance of the bay. With no mechanism to 
force the Spanish fleet out of Santiago de Cuba to do battle, Long asked Alger to send an 
expeditionary ground force to Santiago, but the two secretaries did not clearly define its mission. 
The Navy believed the Army’s force should take the Spanish forts protecting the entrance of the 
harbor, so Sampson’s fleet could enter the bay unimpeded and defeat the smaller Spanish fleet. 
The War Department planned on capturing the city and the Spanish force inside.87 
Over the next week, Shafter received a series of orders giving him leeway on how the 
Fifth Corps should attack Santiago de Cuba. On May 30, the War Department told Shafter to 
land west of Santiago de Cuba “under the protection of the Navy” and to move his command 
“onto the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or the interior, as shall best enable you 
to capture or destroy the garrison there … or with the aid of the Navy capture or destroy the 
Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor.”88 The War Department clearly intended 
Shafter to cooperate with Sampson but did not specify if the Fifth Corps’ primary objective was 
Cerverá’s squadron or the Spanish garrison, a lapse that caused confusion between the two 
services for the rest of the campaign. Meanwhile, Miles ordered the other regular Army units in 
Mobile, Alabama, and the most prepared volunteer regiments mobilizing at Camp Thomas on the 
old Chickamauga battlefield in Tennessee to join Shafter’s expedition.89 																																																								
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Although he had over thirty-seven years of experience, Shafter was a poor choice to 
command the Fifth Corps during the expedition against Santiago de Cuba. He began his Army 
career as lieutenant in the 7th Michigan Volunteers during the Civil War. During that conflict, he 
earned the Medal of Honor for heroism at the Battle of Fair Oaks. By the end of the war, he had 
risen to the rank of brigadier general of volunteers and commanded the 17th Regiment of U.S. 
Colored Troops. Despite being reduced to his regular army rank of lieutenant colonel, Shafter 
decided to remain in federal service after the Civil War. He proved to be an effective commander 
at the battalion level in another segregated unit, the 24th Infantry Regiment, and at the regimental 
level in the 1st Infantry Regiment during campaigns in Texas against the Cheyenne, Comanche, 
Apache, and other southern plains Indians. Through his seniority and exemplary record, he 
earned command of the Department of California and the rank of brigadier general in 1897. But 
the 66-year-old Shafter was not in good shape for a rigorous campaign in the tropics. Weighing 
over 300 pounds and suffering from gout, the general was essentially immobile and would have 
to exercise command from the confines of his headquarters. When he did leave his headquarters 
he often traveled, as a private remembered, “in a buckboard that bent beneath the weight of its 
single passenger, for he drove it himself. Nor was there room for another beside him on the 
seat.”90 With poor health and an obvious lack of experience commanding large formations, 
Shafter most likely received command of the Cuban expedition over Miles and Merritt because 
of his close professional ties with Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin. Of course, McKinley may 
have favored the appointment in part because Shafter’s physical appearance made him an 
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unlikely presidential challenger if success in Cuba were to tempt him to enter the political 
arena.91 
In contrast to Shafter, Miles had courageously and successfully commanded a regiment, 
brigade, division, and briefly a corps during the Civil War. Due to his outstanding reputation, 
Miles received the reduced rank of colonel in the downsized postwar regular U.S. Army. Miles 
outshone his peers in almost every one of the Army’s campaigns against the plains Indians. His 
talents were particularly on display when he led the 5th Infantry Regiment on a forced march of 
140 miles to capture Chief Joseph’s Nez Percé and his band in the winter of 1877, as well as in 
1886 when he oversaw an expedition that pursued Geronimo’s Chiricahua Apaches over 3,000 
miles, eventually forcing their surrender. Most impressively, Miles deployed and maneuvered 
half of the Regular Army to put down the Ghost Dance in the winter of 1890-91.92 
Similarly, Merritt, who commanded a cavalry division in the Civil War under Philip 
Sheridan, ably leveraged years of operational and administrative experience both during and 
after the Civil War to wage a brilliant campaign as commander of Eighth Corps in the 
Philippines. Upon receiving the mission to take Manila, the veteran commander spent days 
consulting with Alger, Miles, and McKinley to ensure he understood their intent and 
coordinating myriad administrative and logistical arrangements with the War Department’s 
byzantine bureaucracy. Merritt quickly assembled an experienced team of excellent staff 
officers, hand-picked from across the Army. He and his staff cooperated extensively with their 
counterparts in Major General Henry C. Merriam’s Department of California in order to 
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efficiently supply, train, and embark the regiments arriving in San Francisco for the Manila 
expedition. Merritt assigned Major General Elwell S. Otis the mission of chartering and 
outfitting troop transports to ferry the Eighth Corps across the Pacific, a task at which Otis and 
his robust staff excelled. As regiments were trained and equipped and transports outfitted, 
Merritt shipped brigade-sized contingents across to Dewey’s fleet. The well-planned movement, 
training, and equipping of the Eighth Corps demonstrated that an experienced commander and 
staff could transport an expedition across the globe, despite some of the War Department’s 
inefficiencies.93 
 Shafter’s inexperience in planning or leading large military operations quickly became 
apparent as the Fifth Corps scrambled to embark for Cuba. The War Department did not yet have 
a general staff to coordinate its staff bureaus’ overlapping efforts to sustain Shafter’s corps in 
Tampa. Each individual bureau chief in Washington sent his own independent staff officers and 
whatever supplies they believed necessary to arm and equip the 25,000-man expedition leaving 
from Tampa. Neither the War Department nor Shafter’s staff produced a master plan for 
coordinating the plethora of details, orders, and movements required to marshal, organize, and 
equip the Fifth Corps in Tampa. Shafter and his miniscule personal staff proved unable to handle 
the chaotic situation and provided next to no guidance to synchronize and supervise the efforts 
and operations of the different units and staff agencies joining and supporting his command. To 
make matters worse, the port of Tampa was not capable of handling the arriving men and 
material. Just one rail line ran to the port, and the small harbor allowed only a few ships to be 
loaded at any one time. With over a thousand railroad cars jammed into the city in no particular 
order, no facilities to store the unloaded supplies, and still more trains waiting further down the 																																																								
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line to unload, the confusion and congestion quickly overwhelmed Colonel Charles F. 
Humphrey, Shafter’s chief quartermaster officer. With an ineffective commander and staff, poor 
port facilities, and little help from the War Department, the process of supplying and embarking 
the Santiago expedition was chaotic, inefficient, and incomplete.94  
 Shafter’s poor physical condition, lack of energy, and inexperience in large-scale 
maneuvers and operations also prevented him from preparing his corps to fight as an integrated 
unit. Because Shafter had never trained or led a unit above the regimental level, he had no 
experience conducting a brigade attack with multiple regiments, let alone coordinating the 
simultaneous movements of the three divisions in his corps.95 Before and after arriving in 
Tampa, the U.S. Army regulars trained daily at company and regimental drill, perfecting the 
Army’s recently adopted, open-order tactics, which attempted to magnify the effects of rifle fire 
on attacking units by having one squad of soldiers lay prone and fire rapidly “to cover the 
alternate squad in its forward rush.”96 But the training never progressed beyond this relatively 
elementary foundation. Shafter did not have his subordinate commanders conduct any training at 
the brigade or division level. Captain John Bigelow observed that after arriving in Florida, “the 
regiments were not united for a single parade, review, drill, inspection, field-exercise, or 
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anything else.”97 The regiments of his brigade “never formed into the same line of battle until 
they came under the fire of Spanish rifles.”98  
Shafter and his few inexperienced staff officers had neither the requisite knowledge nor 
experience to transform their collection of trained regiments into a cohesive and efficient 
expeditionary fighting force. The selection of Tampa as the port of embarkation and the 
uncoordinated movement of soldiers and supplies to the town were to a large degree beyond 
Shafter’s control, but his command’s combat effectiveness was not. At a minimum, he should 
have trained his regiments to work with artillery and other regiments as part of a combined-arms 
team.99 
 Shafter even failed to load the ships properly. His staff officers and sailors carried out an 
unsystematic embarkation, burying equipment that would be needed immediately after landing in 
Cuba deep in the hull under less important supplies. The thirty-two transports that eventually left 
Tampa had only enough space for 16,000 of Shafter’s 25,000 soldiers—even after much of the 
essential horses, wagons, and medical supplies the Fifth Corps would later need in Santiago were 
taken off the ships to make room for troops. Soldiers haphazardly crammed whatever equipment 
they deemed most important into any available space rather than carefully planning to maximize 
the limited space on the freighters. Bigelow of the 10th Cavalry lamented how “no one seemed to 
be in charge” during the loading. He could find no words to describe the “confusion which 
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characterized the work of putting the stores and baggage of the sixteen troops, two bands, and 
brigade headquarters aboard” the Leona.100   
Moreover, there was limited space on the transports for the regiments of the Fifth Corps.  
Ignoring the ambiguous and loosely-enforced orders issued by the chief quartermaster, regiments 
raced to the port to seize space aboard transports so that they would not be left behind. 
Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders twice waited by the railroad, but to no 
avail, for their assigned train to take them to the Port of Tampa. After finding that “nobody knew 
anything” about the plan to get troops to the harbor, the Rough Riders seized a train carrying coal 
and arrived at the port “covered with coal-dust, but with all [their] belongings.”101 It took 
Roosevelt and his commander, Colonel Leonard Wood, an hour to sort through “the swarming 
ant-heap of humanity” to find Colonel Humphrey and receive word that they were assigned to 
sail on the transport Yucatan. Since the overwhelmed quartermaster officer had assigned three 
regiments to a ship that could carry only one, the Rough Riders raced off their coal train to seize 
the ship first. The Fifth Corps resembled a mob more than an orderly army. Even before his 
departure from Tampa, Shafter had lost control over his commanders and corps.102 
The problems in Tampa did not end once the troops were aboard their troop transports. 
Those of Shafter’s regiments that raced to be the first to load the ships had expected immediate 
departure to Cuba. But the soldiers had to endure six days idling in port aboard the cramped and 
poorly ventilated ships while the Navy investigated false rumors that Cerverá’s ships had 
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escaped from Santiago or that another Spanish squadron was in the Caribbean.103 On June 14, the 
Fifth Corps finally departed Tampa to join Sampson at Santiago de Cuba.104 
The U.S. Army’s amphibious landings and subsequent campaign were as muddled as 
their departure from Tampa. After the Fifth Corps and its naval escorts arrived off Santiago de 
Cuba on June 20, Sampson asked Shafter to capture the forts at the entrance to the bay, so his 
fleet could enter and destroy Admiral Cerverá’s Spanish fleet. Sampson considered the city of 
the Santiago de Cuba of little importance, and believed that the destruction of the Spanish ships 
would prove decisive in bringing American victory over Spain in the Atlantic theater. The 
habitually self-promoting Shafter pursued a different course. Carrying vague orders from the 
War Department that allowed him to determine his own course of action, Shafter decided not to 
support the Navy by storming the heavily defended Spanish harbor defenses and instead moved 
his corps inland to capture Santiago and General Arsenio Linares y Pombo’s 12,000-man 
garrison from the weaker eastern flank.105 
Shafter’s plan to attack Santiago de Cuba from the east was sound in theory, but was 
predicated upon resources that he did not have. He required robust transportation assets to unload 
his cargo ships and move supplies, ammunition, and heavy guns inland. The War Department 
sent only three small steam lighters and a tug with two barges to move the Fifth Corps ashore. 
One lighter suffered from mechanical difficulties before leaving Tampa; the tug deserted the 
convoy on the first night of the voyage; one barge sank en route; and one of the two remaining 																																																								
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lighters was damaged soon after arrival. Despite Shafter’s unwillingness to help the Navy reduce 
the forts defending the entrance to Santiago Bay, Sampson still willingly ordered all of his large 
ships to “send all their steam-cutters and all their pulling-boats, with the exception of one 
retained on board each ship, to assist in the landing.”106 Without Sampson’s fleet of small boats 
unloading over three-quarters of the invasion force, Shafter’s one remaining lighter, the Laura 
would have proven utterly unequal to the task.107 Clearly, neither Shafter nor the War 
Department had put adequate thought into carrying out an amphibious landing and conducting 
ship-to-shore sustainment operations at Santiago until after the Fifth Corps arrived in Cuba.108 
Despite the slow progress in unloading poorly-stowed transports, a backlog of supplies 
built up on the landing beaches due to a lack of transport from the beaches to the front lines. In 
the rush to leave Tampa and cram all available troops on the transports, many mules, horses, and 
wagons had been left behind. In most transports, the few wagons brought to Cuba were buried 
deep inside ships’ hulls under other supplies. To compound Shafter’s logistical problems, the 
wagons that did make it ashore could not move down the narrow trails without engineers 
widening the path before them. Only the overworked mule trains could move material in these 
conditions, slowing the pace of distribution of critical supplies. Over the course of the entire 
campaign, the Fifth Corps never found a way to move enough provisions and ammunition to 
keep their soldiers adequately fed and supplied, or to bring their heavy siege guns up to the front 																																																								
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lines. Shafter’s unfortunate decision to attack the city of Santiago de Cuba instead of the forts at 
the mouth of the harbor ensured that the Fifth Corps would fight hungry and lacking heavy 
artillery, shelters for the soldiers, cooking gear, and adequate hospital facilities.109 
In consultation with Cuban General Calixito García and with the assistance of his troops, 
Shafter decided to land at the small town of Daiquirí on June 22.110 Fire from García’s Cuban 
soldiers drove the 300 Spanish soldiers from their defenses, preventing them from placing a 
devastating fire on the exposed soldiers of the Fifth Corps during their poorly-coordinated 
landings. The naval bombardment commenced with more “noise and fury” than effectiveness 
after the Cubans had already captured the town, wounding two Cuban soldiers.111 Daiquirí had a 
small dock extending from the shore that the Army’s remaining lighter and the Navy’s steam-
launches used to offload troops and equipment. Since horses and mules could not be loaded on 
these small boats, they were pushed off the transports to swim ashore, “where buglers were 
blowing the calls to which the horses had been trained.”112 Many horses and mules drowned in 
the process. About 6,000 soldiers came ashore on the first day. Within hours of landing, a Cuban 
force under Brigadier General Demetrio Castillo Duany led the 2nd Division of the Fifth Corps 
under Brigadier General Henry Lawton to the small port of Siboney, eight miles closer to 
Santiago, which the Spanish gave up without a fight. With the landing beach at Daiquirí and the 
small port of Siboney secure, Shafter ordered his lead elements to hold their positions. The 
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commanding general wanted to wait for more soldiers to land and to stockpile supplies before 
advancing towards the heights east of Santiago.113 
 Disregarding Shafter’s specific order not to advance, Major General Joseph Wheeler’s 
cavalry division launched a successful but costly attack against the Spanish rearguard entrenched 
at Las Guásimas. Despite Wheeler’s 61 years of age, McKinley asked the Ex-Confederate 
cavalry commander and Democratic congressman to accept a commission as a major general of 
volunteers in order to unite the political parties and the country in common cause for the war 
against Spain.114 Castillo’s Cuban scouts informed Wheeler of approximately 2,000 Spanish 
soldiers digging in at Las Guásimas, a point along the trail to Santiago de Cuba. Despite the fact 
that the scouts reported that the Spanish planned to abandon the position the next day, Wheeler 
ordered Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young to bypass Lawton’s division and reconnoiter Las 
Guásimas in force on the morning of June 24. Lawton recognized that in the rush to be the first 
to fight the Spanish, Wheeler was directly violating Shafter’s order. He tried to notify Shafter of 
Wheeler’s planned attack, but in another display of Shafter’s physical incapacity to command, 
the obese and immobile corps commander was still ensconced aboard the Segurança and did not 
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get the message in time.115 
 The next morning, Young deployed the dismounted troopers of the 1st and 10th Cavalry 
Regiments along the main road to Santiago while the third regiment of his brigade, Wood’s 
Rough Riders, protected the eastern flank by advancing along a small trail through the jungle one 
mile east of the main road. The two columns converged toward the Spanish rifle pits hidden in 
thick undergrowth and protected by barbed wire. General Antero Rubín’s 1,500 Spanish soldiers 
fired on the advancing troopers with several volleys from their Mauser rifles, but the same dense 
undergrowth that concealed the Spanish positions also obscured their fields of fire. Foliage and 
poor marksmanship combined to prevent the Spanish from stopping the American attack. As in 
the battles that followed, Young’s brigade attack at Las Guásimas succeeded because of the U.S. 
Army’s superior marksmanship, élan, and small-unit tactics, despite the demonstrated inability of 
inexperienced commanders above the regimental level to coordinate and support their assaults. 
After suffering thirty-five casualties, the Spanish executed their planned withdrawal before the 
dismounted cavalrymen closed on their position.116  
 The Americans suffered 16 killed and 52 wounded in their assault, most of them Rough 
Riders who had been pinned down by Spanish fire before the Buffalo Soldiers of the 10th 
Cavalry enfiladed the Spanish line and forced the defenders to retreat.117 Later in the campaign, 
the 10th Cavalry would again come to the aid of the Rough Riders on their charge up Kettle Hill. 
With his troops too exhausted to pursue, Wheeler halted the advance as the Spanish retreated to 																																																								
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their main line of defense running from El Caney in the North across the ridge line on San Juan 
Ridge down to the coastal fort of El Morro.118 
 After forcing the Spanish rear guard to retreat from Las Guásimas, and while waiting to 
stockpile sufficient supplies and await reinforcements to arrive across tenuous supply lines, 
Shafter ordered a reconnaissance of the Spanish defenses. Based on intelligence gathered by U.S. 
scouts and García’s Cubans, Shafter decided on a plan of attack. He ordered Brigadier General 
Jacob Ford Kent’s 1st Division and Wheeler’s dismounted Cavalry Division to launch an attack 
against the Spanish blockhouses and trenches on the crest of San Juan Heights on July 1. By 
taking the heights, Shafter could either storm or besiege the city in a subsequent operation. 
Shafter’s plan also incorporated two recently arrived regiments from Michigan in a feint down 
the coastal road, designed to keep the Spanish defenders’ attention focused on protecting the 
harbor defenses. While the Michigan regiments fixed the Spanish defenders, Shafter intended 
Brigadier General Henry W. Lawton to storm the Spanish defenses at El Caney. After taking the 
small town, Shafter hoped Lawton’s Division could quickly envelop the exposed flank of the 
Spanish defenses on San Juan and Kettle Hills at the same time as the main assault.119 
 Shafter’s physical limitations prevented him from being present on the battlefield, 
coordinating the two sequential attacks, and ensuring that the two available light field artillery 
batteries properly supported the assault. He did not issue a written order to clarify this 
complicated tactical plan, preferring instead to attempt to command from his sickbed through his 
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aides, Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. McClernand and Lieutenant John D. Miley.120 As at Las 
Guásimas, the attack was uncoordinated and confused, and it lacked proper artillery support. 
Only the initiative of regimental officers and the courage of the soldiers who were well trained in 
open-order tactics and individual marksmanship overcame the dismal command and control 
problems endemic in Shafter’s brigade, division, and corps headquarters.121 
 The 2nd Division’s attack at El Caney suffered from the same command-and-control 
issues that plagued the Fifth Corps throughout the Santiago Campaign. First, Lawton placed his 
four 3.2-inch Model 1885 field guns too far back from the front and did not provide instruction 
where he wanted the battery to concentrate its fire.122 He deployed his division poorly, believing 
it could easily overwhelm the 500 defenders in El Caney in two hours or less. He underestimated 
the amount of damage a few hundred defenders firing with modern breech-loading bolt-action 
rifles from the protection of blockhouses and slit trenches could inflict on troops attacking across 
open ground. Only after fighting for most for most of the day did Lawton’s 5,400-man division 
eventually take the defenses at El Caney by finally launching a well-coordinated infantry-and-
artillery, combined-arms assault against the El Viso blockhouse, the centerpiece of the Spanish 
defenses. Lawton’s failure to take the town quickly prevented his division from flanking the 
Spanish defenses on the San Juan Heights before the main assault began.123 
 Like Lawton’s attack at El Caney, the assault on the San Juan Heights suffered from both 
ineffective artillery support and poor command and control. The two senior officers responsible 																																																								
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for the assault, Shafter and Wheeler, both suffered from fever, and neither was physically present 
to direct the attack. McClernand, Shafter’s adjutant general, did the best he could to keep Shafter 
informed of the progress of the battle and to coordinate the different assaulting elements. 
Realizing that Lawton would take more time then expected to take El Caney, McClernand 
received permission from Shafter to begin moving Wheeler’s Cavalry Division, now commanded 
by Colonel Samuel S. Sumner, and Brigadier General Jacob Ford Kent’s 1st Division to their 
assault positions at the base of the heights. The artillery battery at El Pozo was too far away to 
provide effective fire on the Spanish positions, and the smoke from its black powder charges 
made it an easy target for counter-battery fire. As the two divisions approached the heights, a 
Signal Corps observation balloon reconnoitered the Spanish position. Unfortunately, as an 
infantryman watching from below remarked, “it was a beautiful range marker for the Spanish 
artillery and infantry, and they promptly used it as such.”124 The Spanish shot the balloon down 
to the “infinite satisfaction of everyone, except perhaps the officers occupying it.”125 Before 
falling to Earth, the balloon did discover a trail that allowed Kent’s Regiments to deploy 
efficiently. While moving down this trail in column of fours the 71st New York Volunteer 
Regiment crossed the San Juan River at what became known as the Bloody Ford. The regiment 
became the focus of Spanish fire. Private Charles J. Post of this regiment hunched close to the 
ground as his comrades all around him “just sank down, crumpled and wilted, and lay still if 
dead, or crawled to one side” of the road if wounded.126 The Spanish fire killed or wounded over 
four-hundred men in the vicinity of the ford, the New Yorkers “became demoralized and refused 
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to move forward,” as the rest of Kent’s Division passed them.127 
 As Kent’s 1st Division and Wheeler’s Cavalry Division (dismounted) waited in vain 
behind the tree line below San Juan Heights for Lawton to take El Caney, they received a 
tremendous volume of fire from the 600 Spanish soldiers in trenches and a blockhouse on the 
crest of the heights. Confined to his headquarters, Shafter was in no position to adjust his plan of 
attack for Lawton’s delayed arrival. Meanwhile, the U.S. soldiers at the base of San Juan and 
Kettle Hills grew restless as they continued to suffer casualties from the effective Spanish 
Mauser fire. The disciplined U.S. Army regulars began to put a steadily increasing volume of 
accurate fire on the Spanish positions with their Krag-Jörgensen rifles. Captain John H. Parker 
also rushed three of his four Gatling guns to the firing line and “ensured that the Spaniards were 
unable to stay with their heads above the trenches to fire at the charging-line, because of the 
missiles of death poured in by the machine guns.”128 After consulting Sumner and Kent, 
Lieutenant Miley, Shafter’s aide-de-camp, authorized the attack “in General Shafter’s name.”129 
Other regiments took the initiative and followed junior officers like First Lieutenant Jules G. 
Ord, attacking without direct orders. The soldiers of the Fifth Corps assaulted up the exposed 
heights in “a broad swarm,” with individual men stopping “to fire over the heads of men and 
officers in front of them.”130 Roosevelt did great work pushing the men of his regiment and 
others up Kettle Hill on the American right and led part of the attack from horseback. The 																																																								
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Spanish placed their trenches on the top of the ridge, instead of the military crest, and could not 
place effective fire on the advancing Americans below. Suppressed by Parker’s Gatling guns and 
unable to see the Americans charging up San Juan Hill until they were within thirty feet of their 
lines, the Spanish could not hold. They soon broke, and as tired American infantrymen and 
dismounted cavalrymen consolidated their positions atop the heights, the surviving Spanish 
defenders hastily retreated to their main line of defenses surrounding the city.131 
 From those defenses, the Spanish placed effective rifle and artillery fire on the recently 
captured crest of San Juan, forcing the U.S. soldiers to dig in. The Spanish increased their rifle 
fire and moved skirmishers forward in several halfhearted attempts to force the Americans off 
the ridge, but well-aimed American rifle fire and devastating fire from Parker’s Gatling guns 
quickly checked these futile attempts. The Fifth Corps suffered 1,385 casualties in the attacks on 
San Juan Heights and El Caney. Shafter and his commanders were appalled by the losses and 
decided against any further attempts to take Spanish defenses by frontal assault. Observing that 
the seriously wounded General Arsenio Linares y Pombo did not have sufficient forces to break 
out, the Fifth Corps began digging trenches and investing the city. The siege of Santiago de Cuba 
had begun.132 
 A stalemate developed as neither the Spanish nor Americans wanted to risk an attack 
across open ground and neither army had the firepower to reduce the enemy’s defenses. Shafter 
and his division commanders all agreed that a frontal assault against either the land or harbor 																																																								
131 Bigelow, Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign, 120-29. Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 216-218. Miley, In 
Cuba with Shafter, 111-13. Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba, 127-29. Parker, History of the Gatling Gun Detachment 
Fifth Army Corps, 126-38. Post, The Little War of Private Post, 179-186. Roosevelt, The Rough Riders, 100-114. 
Trask, The War with Spain, 238-43. Wagner, The Report of the Santiago Campaign, 83-88. Ewers, When the Army 
Still Wore Blue, 129-30. 
132 Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 218. Parker, History of the Gatling Gun Detachment Fifth Army Corps, 140-46. 
Roosevelt, The Rough Riders, 117-119. Trask, The War with Spain, 244-46. 
 	81	
defenses around Santiago would be both risky and costly. Furthermore, both armies suffered 
from worsening logistics crises, and the exhausted soldiers on both sides increasingly fell victim 
to tropical diseases. Inside Santiago de Cuba, most of Linares’s men were sick, and ammunition 
and food supplies fell critically low. Linares soon came to the realization that unless other 
Spanish forces lifted the siege, Santiago de Cuba either would fall to an assault or his soldiers 
would succumb to starvation. Feverish and consternated, Shafter considered withdrawing his 
exhausted soldiers “about 5 miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the 
San Juan River and Siboney,” so he could be closer to his supply bases along the coast.133 In a 
council of war that met on July 2, Shafter’s more resilient commanders unanimously voted to 
remain on the heights around Santiago de Cuba and continue to besiege the city. Indecisive, 
Shafter telegrammed the War Department about his desire to withdrawal towards Siboney. 
Minutes later, Alger replied that Shafter should, if at all possible, hold his present position 
because “the effect upon the country would be much better than falling back.”134 Alger promised 
his Corps commander immediate reinforcements.135 
 The War Department immediately ordered a division from Major General John R. 
Brooke’s First Army Corps, another brigade, and Miles to depart for Santiago.136 Additionally, 
the Quartermaster Department purchased new transports to ship soldiers and supplies to the 
Caribbean, and contracted and dispatched a fleet of lighters and tugs, dockworkers, and 
engineering equipment out of New York to alleviate Shafter’s unloading problems. The War 
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Department reacted adequately to meet Shafter’s needs, but with better initial planning and by 
selection of a commander who was more fit—both physically and professionally—it could have 
avoided most of the difficulties it faced during the Santiago Campaign.137 
The Cuban Liberation Army now helped to seal the fate of Linares’s men. Most 
importantly, approximately 6,000 Cuban soldiers under Calixito García prevented 
reinforcements from reaching Santiago de Cuba. There were over 24,000 Spanish soldiers 
dispersed throughout eastern Cuba. If they had all marched to the city, they probably could have 
lifted the siege. Unfortunately for the Spanish, García’s Cuban soldiers surrounded each of the 
Spanish garrisons in the province. Only one Spanish relief column from Manzanillo, under the 
command of Colonel Frederico Escario, outmaneuvered and outfought the determined Cuban 
blocking force to reach Santiago. But the arrival of 3,500 reinforcements on July 3 only 
exacerbated Linares’s situation. The additional Spanish soldiers taxed the limited quantities of 
food and ammunition and they did not provide enough strength to alter the tactical situation. 
Although the Cuban Liberation Army was involved in little fighting at the battles of Las 
Guasimas, El Caney, and San Juan, their ability to keep the other Spanish troops in the province 
from lifting the siege removed any hope the Spanish army and navy had of breaking the 
blockade. This was a vital contribution to the campaign.138 
By July 3, Admiral Cerverá realized that remaining in Santiago Harbor meant the 
eventual capture or destruction of his ships in anchorage, but he also knew that he had little 
chance of slipping out of the narrow mouth of the harbor and outrunning the faster American 
ships. Under direct orders from the Governor General Ramón Blanco y Erenas to attempt an 																																																								
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escape to Havana or Cienfuegos, the fatalistic Cerverá in the cruiser Infanta María Teresa led his 
three other armored cruisers and two destroyers out of the harbor in a single file on the morning 
of 3 July. The Spanish caught Sampson’s fleet at a vulnerable moment. Three ships, including 
the battleship Massachusetts, were steaming to Guantanamo for coal, and three other ships, 
including the New York, with Admiral Sampson aboard, were underway to meet with Shafter at 
Siboney.139 
Although startled by the sudden appearance of Cerverá’s fleet, the four remaining U.S. 
battleships and two armored cruisers sprang into action and began to fire on the Infanta María 
Teresa before it cleared the narrow channel. Cerverá’s flagship headed straight for the Brooklyn 
in an attempt to ram the most westerly American ship. The Brooklyn, Schley’s flagship, avoided 
the Infanta María Teresa by steering east, but in the process of avoiding the collision Schley 
created a westerly escape route for the Spanish squadron. American fire damaged the Infanta 
María Teresa and forced her to run aground. While the Infanta María Teresa distracted the 
American ships, the Spanish Cruisers Vizcaya and the Cristóbal Colon attempted to escape 
through the gap in the American line created by the Brooklyn’s maneuver. After forcing the 
Infanta María Teresa ashore, Sampson’s ships again concentrated their fire on the slow-moving 
Spanish vessels steaming in single file out of the harbor’s narrow mouth, destroying each of the 
remaining three Spanish ships in turn. Only the Vizcaya and the Cristóbal Colon escaped the 
area. The two Spanish cruisers raced to the west, but the faster U.S. Navy ships with longer 
ranged guns quickly caught and destroyed them. Of more than 2,000 Spanish sailors who 
steamed out that morning, almost 500 were killed or wounded. Only one American sailor died, 
one was wounded, and three American ships suffered minor damage. As at Manila, the U.S. 																																																								
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Navy performed brilliantly and annihilated the enemy forces. Unfortunately, the U.S. Navy’s 
victory was tarnished by Schley’s faulty maneuver and the lasting controversy between Schley 
and Sampson over who deserved the most credit for the victory.140 
With Cerverá’s ships destroyed and his ground forces cut off from relief by the Cuban 
Liberation Army and the U.S. Army, Linares faced a desperate situation. He had received a 
severe arm wound in the fighting at San Juan Hill, forcing him to turn command over to his 
subordinate, General José Toral. The new Spanish commander abandoned all his exterior 
defensive positions and concentrated his remaining soldiers on the city’s last line of inner 
defenses. Surrounded, low on ammunition and food, and cut off from fresh water, Toral cabled 
Blanco in Havana that the garrison could not hold out for long. Blanco placed little value in 
holding Santiago now that the Spanish squadron was no more than wreckage. Still wanting to 
maintain Spain’s honor, he ordered Toral to defend Santiago for as long as possible before 
attempting to escape with his garrison.141  
Like Toral, Shafter seemed concerned about his ability to continue to hold his positions. 
Shafter did not believe his force “sufficient to warrant an assault on the city” and believed his 
corps would suffer “a fearful loss” in another frontal assault against entrenched Spanish 
positions.142 He suggested the Navy force the entrance of the harbor on its own. Sampson refused 
to run the harbor defenses without the Army’s support. Furthermore, Miles questioned the 
importance of continuing to press the siege against a city that held no strategic importance after 
the U.S. Navy destroyed Cerverá’s squadron. But McKinley and the War Department were 
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adamant that the Fifth Corps capture Santiago. Such a signal victory would pressure the Spanish 
government to capitulate, maintain public resolve in the United States, and ensure that the United 
States could determine the future of Cuba in armistice negotiations. To assist Shafter’s 
beleaguered command, the War Department continued to send additional reinforcements and 
supplies. Shafter used the newly arrived units to extend his lines around the city, completely 
encircling it with U.S. and Cuban forces on July 9. The Fifth Corps steadily improved its 
defenses and artillery positions in the heights surrounding Santiago and maintained a constant 
harassing fire on the Spanish positions below.143 
As the sniping and cannonading between the two lines continued, Shafter and Toral 
engaged in negotiations to end the fighting. Shafter sent his first request for Toral to surrender 
his army and the city soon after the destruction of the Spanish fleet. On July 8, Toral offered to 
give Santiago to Shafter, if Shafter allowed the Spanish commander to march his army “with 
arms and baggage and not to be molested until he reache[d] Holguin,” but Shafter hoped to 
convince Toral to surrender his army unconditionally before political pressure forced him into 
launching another costly frontal attack.144 Shafter changed his mind later that day. Shafter 
informed the War Department that he and his division commander thought that the War 
Department should accept Toral’s proposal to avoid the needless loss of further American lives. 
McKinley quickly refused Shafter’s proposal since it did not force the Spanish to concede 
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defeat.145 Alger insisted that when the Fifth Corps was “strong enough to destroy the enemy and 
take Santiago that [it] do it.”146 On July 10, Alger suggested to Shafter that if the Spanish 
surrendered the U.S. government would transport the Spanish garrison back to Spain, allowing 
the Spanish to avoid the humiliation of languishing in American prisons. U.S. Navy command of 
the Atlantic would ensure that they did not return to Cuba.147 On 12 July, Toral repeated his offer 
to abandon Santiago on his own terms, but once again, Alger and McKinley refused the 
recommendation of Shafter and Miles to accept the Spanish offer.148 
While the negotiations were under way, both the Spanish and American armies continued 
to suffer from the elements, tropical diseases, and a lack of supplies. The Spanish soldiers, with 
access to only rice and dirty water, suffered from dysentery, fever, and trench foot. These 
hardships combined with a severe shortage of ammunition, robbed Toral of all hope of fighting 
his way through the Fifth Corps’ lines. Although initially healthier than their Spanish foes, the 
condition of the soldiers in the American trenches sharply deteriorated. The combination of 
tropical fevers, debilitating heat, afternoon monsoons, and continuing supply shortages took a 
harsh toll on the besiegers. Forced by the administration to break the stalemate and settle the 
matter quickly, Shafter, Miles, and Sampson gave Toral a final ultimatum on July 13 to surrender 
both the city and his army by noon of the following day. If the Spanish failed to surrender, Miles 
planned to land recently arrived reinforcements and storm the harbor defenses, allowing 																																																								
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Sampson’s fleet to enter the harbor and bombard the Spanish positions from the rear while 
Shafter assaulted them from the front. Seeing the hopelessness of his situation, Toral asked and 
received permission from Blanco in Havana to capitulate if the Americans would honor their 
earlier promise to return Toral’s army to Spain. After two days of further negotiations on the 
details of the capitulation, the Fifth Corps finally marched into Santiago and received Toral’s 
surrender on July 17, 1898.149 
 
The Puerto Rico and Philippine Campaigns 
After ensuring that Toral surrendered at Santiago, Miles left Santiago for Puerto Rico 
with the 3,400 soldiers still aboard the transports. The McKinley administration hoped to secure 
at least part of Puerto Rico with over 15,000 soldiers being sent from both the United States and 
Santiago to put additional pressure on the Spanish commissioners in Washington to sue for 
peace. Miles originally intended to land at Cape Fajardo and quickly seize San Juan. The Spanish 
expected the landings at Fajardo and prepared to contest the Americans there. Not wanting to 
face a strong Spanish force in well-prepared defensive positions, Miles diverted his transports 
and Navy escort to the harbor at Guánica and the large port city of Ponce on the Southern coast 
of Puerto Rico, seizing the lightly defended cities on the 25th and 28th of July respectively. The 
American expeditionary force efficiently unloaded the troops and supplies in the captured deep-
water harbors and was welcomed by friendly Puerto Ricans. Four mutually-supporting and well-
supplied columns marched from the southern coast of Puerto Rico toward San Juan in the north 																																																								
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along good roads. When the U.S. Army met Spanish blocking positions, as it did at Aibonito, on 
the road to San Juan, they enveloped the positions and forced the Spanish soldiers to abandon 
their defenses, avoiding costly frontal attacks. Only the signing of the armistice on August 12, 
1898, stopped Miles’s rapid advance toward San Juan.150 
On the other side of the world, Merritt’s Eighth Corps had begun to land on 30 June at 
Cavite, a small peninsula that jets out into Manila Harbor, 27 miles from the old colonial city. En 
route to the Philippines the cruiser Charleston and the troops on board captured the Spanish 
island of Guam without a shot being fired by its sixty-man garrison. The defenders did not even 
know that a war between the United States and Spain existed. Under the protection of Dewey’s 
guns in Manila, the Eighth Corps built a camp close to the city, secured storehouses and draft 
animals, drilled, and consolidated supplies while it awaited the second and third convoys of 
troops to arrive from San Francisco. Despite arriving in the monsoon season and facing their own 
logistical difficulties, Merritt and his staff kept the Eighth Corps healthier and better supplied 
than Shafter’s in Santiago through exceptional organization and by maintaining good relations 
with the U.S. Navy. Merritt also had to deal with a local insurgent force that was much less 
friendly than the Cuban army around Santiago. An indigenous, insurgent army under Emilio 
Aguinaldo had besieged Manila for weeks, and it wanted to capture Manila before the U.S. Army 
occupied the city. It obstructed the U.S. Army at every opportunity. Merritt used the Spanish fear 
of Aguinaldo’s insurgents to his advantage. In secret negotiations with the Spanish commander 
of Manila, Governor-General Fermin Juadenes, Merritt arranged for the Spanish to surrender the 
city after putting up token resistance in exchange for Merritt not shelling the city or allowing the 
Aguinaldo Filipinos into the city. Following Merritt’s detailed written plan, the U.S. Army 																																																								
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attacked Manila’s entrenchments from the south on the morning of August 13 with carefully 
coordinated artillery and machine gun support after Dewey’s squadron had completed its 
preliminary bombardment. Soon after the assault began, Juadenes raised a white flag above the 
citadel’s walls as planned. Upon receiving the surrender signal, Merritt and his staff, with six 
companies of the 2nd Oregon Volunteer Infantry Regiment, landed on the city docks aboard the 
Zafiro and secured the citadel and Old City, while two brigades attacking form the south rushed 
to occupy the Spanish positions and keep the insurgent army out of the city. The Eighth Corps’ 
campaign to take Manila showed that with careful planning by experienced staff officers, a 
competent commander, political savvy, and cooperation with the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army 
could execute a competent campaign half way around the world despite the War Department’s 
antiquated bureau system and dysfunctional leadership. Following President McKinley’s 
December 1898 decision to annex the Philippines, fighting broke out in Manila on February 4, 
1899, beginning the long and bloody Philippine Insurrection.151 
 
Conclusion 
Following its decisive victory in the War with Spain, the United States dictated the terms 
of peace, and Spain was forced to give up the last vestiges of its overseas empire, including the 
Philippines, Guam, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.152 The U.S. Navy performed well during the brief 
war, demonstrating its ability to develop an effective strategy and project power across the globe 
to crush two Spanish fleets. However, the Spanish had only a second-rate navy and the vastly 
superior U.S. Navy nearly missed its chance to blockade Cerverá’s squadron at Santiago due to 																																																								
151 Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 237-243. Trask, The War with Spain, 409-21. 
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Schley’s negligence. Furthermore, Schley nearly allowed the Spanish fleet to escape during the 
naval Battle of Santiago by his poor tactical decisions. The U.S. Navy achieved its superiority 
over its sister service during the 1880s when it began to modernize itself into the “New 
American Navy,” while the U.S. Army remained a frontier constabulary force. In contrast, the 
unexpected mobilization of a large volunteer army, constantly changing strategies, and a 
dysfunctional command and staff structure hampered the War Department throughout the War. 
However, there were some things the U.S. Army could be proud of. The Army performed well in 
combat from the regimental level down to the individual soldier. At the same time, Generals 
Merritt and Miles proved that exceptional operational talent and pre-war experience could be 
leveraged to mitigate the bureaucratic inefficiencies and structural deficiencies within the War 
Department and produce successful, even brilliant campaigns. Therefore, Shafter must share the 
blame with the War Department for the poorly executed campaign in Cuba. McKinley needed 
new leadership in the War Department and in Cuba for the post war occupation to succeed.  
After the war, the Army occupied a new overseas empire. To control Spain’s former 
Pacific and Caribbean colonies, the regular Army quadrupled in size by 1900. The poor 
performance of the U.S. Army in Cuba created a backlash that cried out for reform and 
marginalized Miles, Alger, and Shafter for the brief remainder of their tenures. McKinley took 
the first step to reform the dysfunctional War Department by replacing the largely incompetent 
Secretary of War Alger with Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer from New York. The cries for 
reform, installment of Root as Secretary of War, and new Republican majorities in both houses 
of Congress after the election of 1900 collectively set the conditions needed for legislators to 
pass the Army Reorganization Act of 1901, the General Staff Act of 1903, and the Dick Militia 
Act of 1903. Within a few years of defeating Spain, the United States had “an army for empire,” 
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capable not only of expeditionary warfare of the kind it attempted haphazardly and inefficiently 
during the Spanish-American War, but also—and more immediately—of conducting and 
sustaining the occupations of Cuba and Puerto Rico while fighting the Philippine Insurrection on 
the opposite side of the world.153 
But that was still over the horizon when the war ended and the not-yet-reformed War 
Department and Army wrestled with the problem of occupying and administering postwar Cuba. 
The Teller Amendment prevented outright annexation of Cuba, but McKinley did not set any 
timetable for American withdrawal. He simply gave Shafter specific guidance on how to 
administer and finance the occupation of Santiago in the near term.154 The U. S. Army in Cuba, 
itself ravaged by tropical fevers, faced the difficult task of caring for and evacuating tens of 
thousands of Spanish prisoners, leading a humanitarian effort to help the many Cubans suffering 
from disease and starvation, reestablishing the rule of law, and trying to revitalize an economy 
devastated by three years of continuous conflict. 
																																																								
153 Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 326.  The Army Reorganization Act of February 1901 expanded the regular Army 
to 100,000 soldiers and enforced rotation to many staff bureau billets. However, the bureaus retained many long-
serving personnel and most of their power until 1918. The General Staff Act created a 45 officer general staff and 
replaced the Commanding General with a Chief of Staff subordinate to the Secretary of War with coordinating, but 
not direct authority, over the staff bureaus. Representative Charles Dick, a general in the Ohio guard, introduced the 
Dick Militia Act of 1903. The act appropriated federal funds to train and equip organized state militia units. In return 
the Army gained control over how the state militias trained, equipped, and organized their state militias. The Act 
also clarified and slightly expanded when the President could activate the National Guard. Under the Dick Act, all 
males ages 18 to 45 maintained service obligation in emergencies. See Allan R. Millet, and Peter Maslowski, For 
the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1994), 310, 327-
330. 
154 William McKinley to the Secretary of War, July 18, 1898, Department of War, Correspondence, 1:159-161. 
 	92	
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
THE FIRST CRISES: THE U.S. ARMY’S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH THE SPANISH 
AND CUBAN ARMIES AND THE ORDERLY RETURN OF THE SPANISH PRISONERS 
BACK TO SPAIN 
 
You have complied exactly with all the laws and 
usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most 
civilized nations of the world; have given honorable 
burial to the dead and vanquished; have cured their 
wounded with great humanity; have respected and 
cared for your prisoners and their comfort; and lastly, 
to us whose condition was terrible, you have given 
freely of food and of your stock of medicines, and 
have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for 
after fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost 
harmony. 
 
- Pedro Lopez De Castillo, Soldier of Infantry, to the 
Soldiers of the American Army (August 21, 1898) 
 
Introduction 
On July 17, 1898 at 9:30 a.m. General José Toral agreed to formally surrender his 
soldiers and the city of Santiago de Cuba. That morning the emaciated soldiers of William R. 
Shafter’s Fifth Corps crawled out of their trenches surrounding the city. In sweat-stained 
uniforms, they stumbled into regimental formations under the tropical sun. Shafter, his ten 
general officers, their staffs, and a squadron of one hundred mounted troopers from the U.S. 2nd 
Cavalry rode toward the gigantic ceiba tree where the surrender negotiations had taken place. 
Under the ceiba’s shade, Toral and his staff waited patiently. To their rear, an honor guard of one 
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hundred Spanish infantrymen stood at attention in white canvas uniforms. After an exchange of 
salutes, Shafter presented Toral with the saber and spurs of General Joaquín Vera de Rey, who 
perished along with two of his sons defending El Caney from the attack by General Henry W. 
Lawton’s division. Next, the Spanish honor guard marched to the right of their officers. “With 
trumpets sounding on both sides,” the Spanish officers raised “their swords high, points up,” 
while the American officers lifted their hats to return the salute.1 The Spanish soldiers seemed 
“indifferent and happy” to General Adelbert Ames as they stacked arms and marched off under 
the guard of the 13th U.S. Infantry Regiment.2 With that, Toral formally surrendered the 24,000 
Spanish soldiers garrisoning the Province of Santiago.3 
The Spanish and American officers then paraded to the governor’s palace under the 
escort of the 9th U.S. Infantry. At the palace, they met the mayor, the archbishop, and other city 
officials. At exactly twelve noon, Captain Allyn Capron’s battery fired a twenty-one-gun salute 
and the 9th Infantry’s band played the Star-Spangled Banner while Shafter’s and General Joseph 
Wheeler’s aides slowly raised the American flag over the palace. As a crowd of several thousand 
civilians looked on, the U.S. infantry and cavalry were ordered to present arms to salute the flag 
and the officers uncovered. General Samuel B. M. Young’s aid-de camp, First Lieutenant James 
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H. Reeves, remembered “A very impressive sight;” however, there was some tarnish on an 
otherwise polished ceremony.4 
Sylvester Scovel, the bold and unprincipled reporter for the New York World, placed 
himself on the palace roof to appear in photographs of the ceremony and to take his own picture 
of the flag raising ceremony. With the reporter spoiling the perfect panorama, Shafter became 
angry after Scovel refused to leave the roof. Irate at Scovel’s refusal, Shafter told his aid, First 
Lieutenant John D. Miley, to “throw him off.” Following the ceremony, an enraged Scovel took 
a swing at Shafter. The punch only nicked the general, so that “Shafter’s skin was scratched, and 
showed a streak of blood.”5 Soldiers quickly seized Scovel and escorted him to a prison cell. He 
remained there until he was deported from Cuba. General Demetrio Castillo represented the 
Cuban army during the ceremony, and like Scovel, he was visibly upset with Shafter. His 
superior, General Calixto García had already angrily departed Santiago de Cuba with his loyal 
soldiers after Shafter had not allowed the Cuban army to enter Santiago de Cuba and had left the 
city’s Spanish officials in their positions.6 
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Toral’s surrender marked the end of hostilities for Shafter’s Fifth Corps in Santiago, but 
the U.S. Army still faced many difficult problems. The Army’s quartermasters needed to feed 
approximately 24,000 Spanish prisoners, 4,000 Cuban soldiers, tens of thousands of Cuban 
refugees, and the over 20,000 U.S. soldiers, all desperate for food.7 To complicate matters, 
dysentery, yellow fever, and malaria rapidly spread through the city, the refugee camps, and the 
ranks. Over the next two chapters the methods used by the U.S. Army to deal with the 
humanitarian crisis and epidemic of tropical diseases will be addressed. The present chapter 
explores the War Department’s successful transportation of Toral’s soldiers back to Spain 
without incident because of increasingly efficient staff work and because of the professional 
treatment of the Spanish prisoners by their sympathetic captors. In stark contrast to the treatment 
of their erstwhile enemies, however, U.S. Army soldiers increasingly regarded the Cubans as 
inferiors and potential adversaries. The Americans looked down on the Cubans because of their 
unprofessional appearance and the fact that the large majority of Cuban soldiers were of African 
descent. Most American soldiers and observers felt that the Cubans shirked from directly 
confronting the Spanish during the fighting to take Santiago. Likewise, the Cubans grew angry 
because the U.S. Army refused to recognize them officially or their significant contributions to 
the campaign. Shafter’s unwillingness to allow armed Cubans to enter Santiago further insulted 
and outraged García and his Cuban soldiers. 
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The Deteriorating Relationship between the Cuban and American Allies 
 During the fighting around Santiago de Cuba, most U.S. Army soldiers increasingly 
viewed the soldiers of the Cuban Liberation Army, known as mambises, in a disparaging 
manner. Romantic portrayals of Cuban soldiers by the American press led the U.S. soldiers to 
believe that they would encounter a conventional Cuban army composed of soldiers of European 
ancestry. Upon landing at Daiquirí, American soldiers were surprised to find that Cuban 
Liberation Army was almost entirely composed of poorly equipped black soldiers who lacked 
uniforms and were exhausted by three years of guerilla warfare. Racial prejudices against people 
of African descent were nearly ubiquitous among the white officers and soldiers of the U.S. 
Army and greatly contributed to their negative perception of the black mambises. Furthermore, 
American war correspondents and soldiers, without fully understanding the Cuban contribution, 
observed that the Cuban Liberation Army had shirked from directly confronting the Spanish 
army, being more concerned with pilfering American supplies.  
 The pro-Cuban press and expansionists within the United States used metaphorical 
images that Americans could relate to in order to justify intervention in the Cuban War for 
Independence. The American press portrayed Cuban women as pure and virtuous victims of 
Spanish cruelty and misrule on an island in such close proximity to the United Sates that honor 
dictated America’s immediate involvement. Furthermore, Cuban men and Uncle Sam appeared 
as patriotic fighters who virtuously defended Cuban women from being tormented and ravished 
by wicked Spaniards.8 Newspaper sketches and political cartoons depicted Cuban soldiers as 
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dashingly uniformed heroes that chivalrously fought conventional battles with their cruel 
Spanish opponents.9  
 The romantic notions of the Cuban Liberation Army held in the minds of the American 
soldiers shattered immediately after the U.S. Army landed. Cuban soldiers had almost no 
uniforms to speak of, let alone shoes. Upon landing at Daiquirí, Lieutenant Colonel Theodore 
Roosevelt of the Rough Riders was shocked to find the Cuban soldiers dressed like “utter 
tatterdemalions… armed with every kind of rifle in all stages of dilapidation.”10 Besides a 
machete, a few lucky Cubans carried captured Spanish Mausers, but most were armed with 
Winchesters and Remingtons smuggled in from the United States. A private with a favorable 
view of the mambises’ fighting prowess remembered the Cubans had weather-worn straw 
sombreros, wore “jackets and breeches that were a mere lacework of tatters,” used Pillsbury flour 
or sugar sacks for their haversacks, and had tethered cognac bottles for canteens.11 A reporter 
commented on how García’s soldiers looked more like “a horde of dirty Cuban beggars,” but 
conceded that they still may be good soldiers.12 He was more disappointed because he had 
“pictured them…as a better dressed and better disciplined body of men, and had not made 
allowances enough for the hardships and privations of an insurgent’s life.”13 Most went barefoot 
and only put on their rawhide or fiber-soled sandals when traversing especially rough terrain. 
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Three years of guerilla warfare and the difficulty of living off the land had emaciated these 
hardened fighters.14 
The American leadership immediately made assumptions about the fighting capabilities 
of the ragtag Cuban soldiers from mental constructs created from their experiences on the 
American frontier. U.S. Army officers serving in the trans-Mississippi West believed that 
irregular Indian fighters made good scouts, but did not trust them to do serious fighting against 
their kinsmen. Shafter immediately relegated the Cuban mambises to the role of scouts and 
laborers after he observed their condition. Like Shafter, Roosevelt concluded “at first glance” 
that the Cuban soldiers “would be no use in serious fighting, but … hoped that they might be of 
use in scouting.15 Captain John Bigelow, who fought in the Apache Wars with both the 9th and 
10th Cavalry, also profiled the fighting capabilities of the Cubans based on his experiences on the 
American frontier. Upon first observing the Cuban soldiers at Daiquirí, Bigelow “thought from 
their appearance that they would probably prove useful as guides and scouts, but that we would 
have to do practically all the fighting.”16 Based on their experience using Native Americans as 
scouts in the Indian Wars, most U.S. Army officers lost any hope of the Cuban Liberation Army 
providing any meaningful assistance in direct fighting with the Spanish upon first observing the 
condition of their allies on the landing beaches. Senior U.S. Army officers typically asked the 
Cuban soldiers to assist them as laborers and as a reconnaissance force. 
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur L. Wager was one of the few U.S. Army officers not to 
immediately dismiss the Cuban soldiers’ ability to fight because of their ragged attire.  While 																																																								
14 Charles Johnson Post, The Little War of Private Post: The Spanish-American War Seen up Close (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1999), 126-32. 
15 Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders: An Autobiography (New York: Library of America, 2004), 65. 
16 John Bigelow, Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1899), 84.  
 	99	
conferring with García at the camp of the Cuban Liberation Army, Wagner adopted a favorable 
opinion of the mambises’s “ready obedience of their officers, and their manifest good care of 
their arms” and thought that this “more than neutralized the unfavorable impression created by 
their ragged attire and general tatterdemalion appearance.”17 Wagner hoped that the discipline 
the Cuban soldiers showed toward their officers and in caring for their weapons would translate 
into excellence in conventional warfare. After observing and hearing reports of their 
performance in battle from others, he concluded that “whatever their merits as bushwhackers 
might be, they were practically useless in battle.”18 Wagner, like most American officers, 
perceived that the Cubans could not be relied upon to directly confront the Spanish. 
During the first major engagement of the campaign at Las Guasimas, the performance of 
the Cuban Liberation Army reinforced the American perception that the Cuban soldiers could 
not be depended on to defeat entrenched Spanish forces. A detachment of Cuban fighters under 
General Demetrio Castillo led the initial attack against the Spanish positions at Las Guasimas 
and was soundly repulsed with significant casualties.19 Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young 
complained that the Castillo promised to provide 800 mambises for a follow-on attack, but the 
troopers of his cavalry brigade recalled that the Cubans did not show until after the Americans 
had captured the Spanish trenches. Attacking from the right of the American line, Roosevelt 
recalled that his Cuban guide ran away as soon as the Spanish began firing.20 The observations of 
the Cuban fighters by U.S. Army soldiers during the first skirmish of the campaign reinforced 
the U.S. Army’s preconceived notions that irregular soldiers could not fight conventional battles.  																																																								
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Although the Cubans did play an important role in the Santiago Campaign, the soldiers of 
U.S. Army did not observe units of the Cuban Liberation Army successfully attacking Spanish 
defensive positions. The soldiers of the U.S. Army did witness a few cases of individual Cubans 
acting bravely. Witnesses recalled watching in amazement as a lone Cuban mambise in a soiled 
white uniform outpaced the charging Americans up San Juan Hill, waving his straw hat as 
encouragement.21 Still, the majority of U.S. Army personnel agreed with Shafter’s aid-de-camp 
that the Cuban troops sent to assist the Americans take San Juan Heights on July 1 “did nothing,” 
or that “they disappeared suddenly when the battle had begun.”22 Usually outgunned and 
undersupplied, the Cuban insurgents learned early in their war for independence to avoid 
attacking fortified Spanish positions unless they could surprise an isolated outpost with 
overwhelming force.  
As the Spanish positions around Santiago were alert and well manned, the Cuban 
Liberation Army avoided direct assaults against the Spanish trenches and blockhouses and 
limited their role during the assault on Santiago to skirmishing and reconnaissance. For instance, 
on June 29, García’s forces advanced in front of the U.S. Army and provided a screen of outposts 
to observe the Spanish positions and to prevent the Spanish from launching a surprise attack 
against Shafter’s Fifth Corps. The Americans looked despairingly at this indirect way of fighting, 
but soon learned the wisdom of avoiding frontal attacks against entrenched positions and the 
importance of careful reconnaissance after the battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill. 
Furthermore, Shafter blamed the Cuban Liberation Army for failing to stop Colonel Federico 																																																								
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Escario’s relief column of 2,800 Spanish soldiers from marching from Manzanillo to reinforce 
the Santiago garrison.23 Despite some observed episodes of Cuban bravery, the important 
reconnaissance the Cubans provided, and the success the Cuban army had in preventing all but 
one Spanish garrison from marching to relieve Santiago, the members of the U.S. Army never 
witnessed Cuban units directly attacking fortified Spanish lines during the Santiago Campaign 
and consequently condemned all Cuban fighters as cowards.24 
The Cuban Liberation Army’s guerilla tactics did not seem an honorable way of waging 
war to American officers. The U.S. Army’s officer corps held the virtues of honor and bravery in 
high regard. They believed that honorable officers directly confronted their enemies and were 
fearless in battle. U.S. Army’s institutional culture demanded that officers lead from the front, 
and that soldiers aggressively follow their officers and take individual initiative in a fight. From 
their very first combat at Las Guasimas the American officers and soldiers displayed this 
aggressive and direct method of fighting. The Spanish shot Major James M. Bell of the 1st 
Cavalry Regiment and two of his officers as they encouraged their men forward. The Rough 
Riders had another four officers wounded in the battle as Roosevelt and his fellow officers 
directed the attack from exposed positions.25 Days later, the “smoked Yankees” of the 10th 
Cavalry received praise for their gallantry as they followed Captain Ayers up Kettle Hill, but the 
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heralded regiment lost eleven of their twenty-two officers during the charge.26 In all, General 
Joseph Wheeler’s Cavalry Division had over a quarter of all its officers killed or wounded during 
the assault up Kettle Hill.27 To their left, Brigadier General Jacob F. Kent’s Division attacked 
San Juan. Lieutenant Jules "Gary" Ord led the First Brigade’s assault, consisting of the regulars 
from the 6th and 16th Infantry and a portion of the 71st New York Volunteer Infantry, up San Juan 
Hill. Ord was the first American to reach the heights before being shot down by a wounded 
Spaniard.28 The division’s Third Brigade had its commander killed during the attack, and the 
subsequent two officers who assumed command of the brigade during the charge were both 
wounded.29 Thus, the culture of the U.S. Army expected officers to expose themselves to danger 
while directly attacking the enemy.  
Even in the defense, as their soldiers fired from the prone, officers typically stood directly 
behind the firing line and exposed themselves while giving orders to their men.30 Captain G. H. 
Palmer gained the admiration of his men and other onlookers as he calmly strode behind the 
firing line of the 16th Infantry. Before leading the 10th Cavalry up Kettle Hill, Bigelow wanted to 
lie down to avoid the volleys of Spanish fire. His honor would not allow it, so he “compromised 
between standing up and laying down” by sitting.31 A wise sergeant convinced Bigelow to lie 
down after several of his prone black troopers took Mauser bullets to the head. American soldiers 																																																								
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and officers alike considered it unmanly to duck or flinch at the sounds of bullets whizzing by, 
despite considering it wise to seek cover from them. Several soldiers, like Corporal John Walker 
of the 10th Cavalry, earned Medals of Honor for demonstrating their bravery at the Battle of San 
Juan Hill by continuing the charge after their officers fell.32 A Spanish staff officer was shocked 
“by the courage and dash” of the American soldiers assaulting El Caney, and how they “never 
retreated or fell back an inch” even as the Spanish “fire mowed them down by the hundreds.”33 
The Cuban Liberation Army avoided directly attacking Spanish positions and relied on surprise, 
ambush, and skirmishing as most guerilla armies do during protracted wars. The U.S. Army’s 
institutionalized norm for directly confronting the enemy did not align with the Cuban’s indirect 
method of fighting, and these differences in methods further alienated the allied armies. 
Another reason that the U.S. Army’s personnel lost faith in the Cuban soldiers was 
because of the belief that the Cubans pilfered and stole from them while they were fighting the 
Spanish. The Cuban mambises had little food and even less ammunition and were in awe of the 
vast stocks of food and equipment being unloaded at Daiquirí and Siboney. Cubans from all 
walks of life hovered around the landing beaches in the hopes of acquiring food by any means.34 
In such a desperate state, they bartered, begged, and sometimes stole from American soldiers. 
Private Charles Post knew exactly what the Cuban soldiers wanted when they rubbed their 
stomachs and said they were “‘Hambre.’” He traded his hardtack, bacon, and corned beef for 
mangoes, sugarcane, and plantains, but never acquired a taste for the latter.35 The Cubans also 
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collected the equipment cast aside by overheated U.S. soldiers as they trudged toward Santiago 
in the summer heat. An American officer remembered passing Cubans “driving donkeys loaded 
with cast-off U.S. blankets.”36 More upsetting to the American officer was that some Cubans 
reportedly plundered the stacked haversacks of the U.S. soldiers as they fought for San Juan Hill. 
The perception among the Americans that the Cubans stole their personal belongings as they 
shirked from battle, further soured American soldiers’ opinions of the Cubans.37 
Racial prejudices against people of African descent, common among the white members 
of the U.S. Army in Santiago, significantly contributed to the rapidly growing anti-Cuban 
sentiment. Misled by press reports and their own imaginations, Americans were surprised and 
disappointed that García’s Cuban army was almost entirely composed of black soldiers. George 
Kennan, reporting for a weekly magazine out of New York, observed that over eighty percent of 
the mambises were black or mulatto.38 Miley believed that about half were black, “the rest 
mulattoes, with only “a small number of whites.”39 Kennan, Miley, and other American 
observers described the racial composition of the mambises to their American readers to do more 
than just show their surprise, but also to allude to race as an explanation for the Cuban Liberation 
Army’s poor performance. Most white Americans in Cuba accepted the commonly held racist 
view that white Americans were naturally of a better ethnic and national stock than black 
Cubans, and more than equal to the Cubans and Spanish of European decent. Lieutenant Reeves 
spoke for nearly all white soldiers in the U.S. Army when he said that, among other factors, “the 																																																								
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individuality of our race…[had] won the day for us.”40 Some American reporters were more 
overtly bigoted, calling the black Cuban soldiers “cave dwellers or something quite forsaken.”41 
Perhaps because of the superb performance of African Americans serving in the 24th Infantry, 
25th Infantry, 9th Cavalry, and 10th Cavalry Regiments, U.S. officers tended to be less malicious 
in their racism, preferring a more paternalistic view. Commonly held racial prejudices, the 
perception that the Cubans did not do their share of the fighting, and observed instances of 
Cubans picking up abandoned or unguarded military equipment and food led most U.S. soldiers 
to view the mambises with contempt. 
While the large majority of white American officers and soldiers discriminated against 
the black mambises and dismissed their contributions to the Santiago Campaign, a minority of 
officers did not share these views.42 Nelson A. Miles, Lawton, and Ludlow were among the U.S. 
generals who openly lauded the contribution the Cuban army made toward the victory over the 
Spanish in Santiago. In Miles’s memoir, Serving the Republic, he reflected on the important role 
the Cubans played throughout the Santiago campaign and acknowledged the spirited attempts the 
outnumbered Cuban forces made to halt the advance of the Spanish relief column from 
Manzanillo.43 He concluded, “it will thus be seen that the Cuban troops took an active and most 
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important part in that campaign, and are entitled to credit accordingly.”44 These complimentary 
remarks made thirteen years after the war closely echoed the sentiments he expressed in 1899 in 
his article summarizing the War with Spain for the North American Review. Here he stated that 
the “Cubans are entitled to at least a good share of the credit” and “their part in obtaining the 
results should not be thus lightly be dismissed.”45 
Of the three American generals who wrote positively about the Cuban participation 
immediately following the Spanish surrender, none matched the sincerity and eloquence of 
Ludlow’s letter to García dated July 15. Ludlow congratulated their “combined forces” for their 
success in Santiago, and he extolled the Cubans for their invaluable and “notable service” as both 
auxiliaries and as fighters who shared a flank with his troops as equals in the investment of 
Santiago.46 Ludlow thanked García for the Cuban officer’s “innumerable personal courtesies” 
and signed the letter with the valediction, “I beg to remain your obedient servant.”47 Lawton’s 
praise for the Cuban soldiers under Castillo, who fought with him at El Caney, was less heartfelt 
than Ludlow’s, but he reported that the Cubans “did fairly good service” under him, losing “67 
killed and wounded.”48 Lawton, like most American officers, thought that the Cubans only added 
value to the campaign when they directly confronted the Spanish and lost soldiers in the process.  
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Clearly, these generals did not show the same contempt toward the Cuban soldiers as the 
majority of American officers, soldiers, and correspondents. Why not? Miles’s memoirs and 
correspondence show that, despite his eccentricities, he was an extremely progressive proponent 
of racial equality, while Ludlow consistently showed deference towards Cuban officers and other 
upper class Cubans. Lawton’s past showed that he was always diplomatic towards his enemies 
and allies. Ludlow and Lawton, like most American officers, respected Cuban officers who acted 
within the norms of late-nineteenth-century Victorian gentlemen. Most, but not all, of the Cubans 
who met this criterion for American officers to treat them with respect were wealthy Cubans of 
European decent. Although Ludlow, Lawton and Miles all viewed the Cubans with respect and 
deference for their contributions, their views were not prevalent among the other U.S. officers in 
Santiago. However, they certainly comprised a significant and high-ranking minority and thus 
challenged the idea that the highest military authorities all viewed the Cubans with contempt. 
Several field grade officers also showed respect for the achievements of the Cuban Army 
and avoided labeling the Cubans with typical racial stereotypes. In April, Miles dispatched 
Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan to Cuba to locate García, obtain information on the Cuban forces 
in Santiago, and establish good relations.49 For his intrepid work, Rowan received a temporary 
commission as a colonel and command of the 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry Regiment recruited 
from Americans supposedly immune to tropical fevers. The close relationships he formed with 
the Cuban officers during his time in Cuba led Miles later to ask him to conduct an interview 
with García in September 1898 and write an official report to shed a positive light on the Cuban 
Liberation Army’s role in the fighting in Santiago. Miles and Rowan both sought to reveal the 
Cubans’ important role in the fighting. Although Rowan feverishly took on this assignment out 																																																								
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of respect for his Cuban officer friends, perhaps Miles did it more to publicly undermine 
Shafter’s condescending view of the Cuban army; the two were bitter rivals and represented 
different factions within the U.S. Army’s officer corps.50 
Had Shafter dealt as amicably with García and the other Cuban officers as Ludlow and 
Lawton did, much of the tension between the U.S. Army and the Cuban Liberation Army could 
have been avoided. Shafter held strong racial prejudices against the Cubans, but his decision to 
exclude them from the peace negotiations, capitulation ceremony, and occupation government 
had as much to do with his egotistical personality and orders from the War Department as it did 
with his racist views. Shafter received specific guidance from President William McKinley to 
avoid any recognition of the Cubans as formal belligerents or to give them an official role in the 
occupation government, but his decision to deny them even symbolic representation in the 
surrender negotiations and ceremony had more to do with Shafter’s personality. Selfishly 
denying that either the Cubans or the U.S. Navy played a significant role in the Spanish 
capitulation, Shafter also denied Rear Admiral William T. Sampson’s repeated request to have a 
representative from the U.S. Navy present during the peace negotiations or to sign the articles of 
capitulation or attend the surrender ceremony.51  
The desperate state of the Cuban mambises forced them to beg for food and clothing and 
steal unguarded American supplies. However, it was Shafter’s decision to assign the Cuban 
soldiers primarily to auxiliary roles––scouts, laborers, and guides––that not only angered the 
proud Cubans, but also created a perception among the U.S. soldiers and American 
correspondents that the mambises were nothing more than ungrateful scroungers watching the 																																																								
50 Rowan to Miles, November 2, 1898, Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 5, Spanish American War, 
Preparations and Cuban Campaign, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
51 David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 320-22. 
 	109	
fighting on the sidelines. This American perception was reinforced by the fact that the typical 
U.S. soldier and officer had no knowledge of the significant fighting the Cubans did to help the 
U.S. Marines hold a defensive position on a hill overlooking Guantánamo Bay from a large 
Spanish attack; the successful effort by García’s forces to clear the Spanish from the U.S. 
Army’s landing sites at Siboney and Daiquirí; the shared fighting the Cubans did with Lawton at 
El Caney; or the numerous skirmishes the Cubans fought to prevent the Spanish garrisons in 
eastern Cuba from reinforcing the besieged Spanish garrison. Instead, Shafter and the news 
correspondents focused almost entirely on the inability of García’s Cuban soldiers to stop a relief 
column of 3,500 Spanish soldiers under Colonel Frederico Escario from entering and reinforcing 
Santiago during the siege, despite the determined efforts of a much smaller Cuban force to block 
it. Furthermore, racial prejudices devalued the meaningful role the Cubans played in the fighting 
and created an unfair estimation among the majority of Americans in and out of Cuba that the 
Cubans did not significantly contribute to the joint victory over the Spanish in Santiago.52 
 
The Spanish Army: From Foe to Friend  
 While American views of the Cuban Liberation Army quickly soured upon arrival in 
Cuba, the U.S. Army increasingly regarded the Spanish as an honorable and worthy adversary as 
the campaign progressed. Soon a bond of mutual admiration formed between the one-time 
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enemies. In the eyes of the majority of the U.S. Army’s soldiers, their Spanish opponents fought 
gallantly and within the conventional norms of late-nineteenth century warfare. Both American 
and Spanish officers maintained elitist and late-Victorian notions of how gentlemen should 
behave. These officers held the virtues of honor, courage, and manliness in high regard. Most 
Western military officers only considered other men to be their peers when they displayed 
similarly masculine virtues. During the fighting around Santiago and after their surrender, 
Spanish officers demonstrated behaviors that aligned closely with how their counterparts 
believed gentlemen should act, and the American officers treated the Spanish as professional 
colleagues during their internment. Cuban officers that similarly demonstrated gentlemanly 
behaviors that were consistent with the norms of the U.S. officer corps—usually wealthy, white, 
and educated in the U.S.—were similarly treated with dignity and respect. Later, the U.S. Army 
gave these privileged Cubans leadership positions in the occupation government. 
 Before the war, Cuban sympathizers and American newspapermen convincingly 
portrayed the Spanish officers either as brutish men who ravished women and committed other 
dishonorable atrocities against helpless Cubans, or as effeminate children incapable of masculine 
behavior. Americans labeled the Spanish as unmanly and cruel because they were convinced the 
Spanish fought dishonorably by resorting to trickery and by targeting Cuban civilians. The 
images used to portray the Spanish soldiers showed that either their chivalric tradition had 
degenerated from Reconquista or they alluded to the long tradition of Spanish cruelty in the New 
World, known as the Black Legend. Reports from Valeriano Weyler’s reconcentration camps, 
whether exaggerated or true, confirmed these images to a believing American public.53 																																																								
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As the U.S. Army landed near Santiago, its soldiers still imagined their Spanish foes to be 
cruel and pusillanimous, but after their first bloody encounters with the Iberians, the American 
soldiers’ perception of the Spaniards began to change. Following the battle of El Caney, Kennan 
believed that both armies left with a “feeling of deep respect for the bravery of the other.”54 Even 
after taking the fortified positions on San Juan by frontal attack, one American soldier 
commended the Spaniards for their bravery and placed most of the blame for their defeat on the 
faulty positioning of their defenses.55 Lieutenant Colonel Wagner, perhaps the foremost tactician 
in the U.S. Army and head of the Military Information Division, concurred with the soldier’s 
assessment. He described the Spanish defense as “characterized by courage rather than skill.”56 
He commended the bravery of the Spanish soldiers but faulted the Spanish generals for not 
disrupting the advance of the Fifth Corps along the road from Siboney to Santiago and for not 
placing their blockhouses and trenches on the military crest of San Juan ridgeline.57 As the 
fighting continued, the U.S. Army came to view the Spanish as not only a brave opponent, but 
also an honorable one. 
During the campaign, American and Spanish officers increasingly treated each other with 
dignity and respect. They tried to behave within the norms expected of late-Victorian gentlemen, 
and in many ways followed the same chivalrous code of conduct found on an eighteenth-century 
battlefield. After Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson and his crew failed to sink the U.S.S. 
Merrimac in the mouth of Santiago Harbor, the Spanish treated the captured sailors courteously, 
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and Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete sent a personal letter to Admiral William T. Sampson to 
inform him that Hobson’s crew was safe and to commend them for their “courage and devotion 
to duty.”58 This act surprised the officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army, who did not believe that 
the Spanish would act in such an honorable manner. 
 Similarly, the Spanish also initially thought that the American soldiers were barbaric and 
inhumane. The first Spanish soldiers captured by the U.S. Army believed that their captors 
would quickly execute them. Spanish officers spread this rumor among their soldiers, probably 
in the hopes of preventing their hungry and sickly soldiers form deserting and to steel their 
resolve. The captured Spaniards believed their worst fears would be realized when they saw a 
detail of soldiers marching toward them. Believing that the squad of soldiers was a firing squad, 
the Spanish prisoners “dropped down on their knees and awaited their death.”59 It took the 
American interpreters quite some time to convince the Spanish prisoners that they would be well 
taken care of and were in no danger of execution.60 Seeing how fearful the Spanish prisoners 
were of their U.S. Army captors, and wanting to convince Toral to surrender all his forces, 
Shafter decided to return wounded prisoners to the Spanish. He hoped that the prisoners would 
tell of their good treatment in captivity and engender a more favorable attitude among the 
Spanish toward their American foes. On July 5, ambulances carrying 28 wounded Spanish 
officers and soldiers rumbled across no-man’s-land under the flag of the Red Cross. Shafter 
asked for nothing in return for the prisoners. Shafter’s move created “an excellent impression 
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upon the Spaniards,” who now saw the Americans as trustworthy and honorable adversaries.61 
Soon thereafter, Toral agreed to exchange Hobson and his crew and seriously begin surrender 
negotiations. Now that both the U.S. and Spanish realized that the other was adhering to chivalric 
European military conventions harkening back at least to the eighteenth century, a trusting 
relationship began to form between the two belligerents. 
 The mutual trust between the Spanish and U.S. Army helped to facilitate the surrender 
negotiations. The Spanish sought to avoid any language in the official terms that degraded their 
honor. Toral wanted to find a way to give up Santiago “under conditions honorable to the 
Spanish arms and trusted that General Shafter’s chivalry” to find a solution that would “leave the 
honor of his troops intact.”62 Understanding the importance of maintaining one’s honor, the U.S. 
Army’s negotiators willingly replaced the word “surrender,” with “capitulation,” and the 
American commissioners officially endorsed a letter officially “recognizing the chivalry, 
courage, and gallantry” of the Spanish officers and soldiers in the hopes that the War Department 
would allow them to return to Spain with their rifles and artillery, a request that was later 
denied.63 Since Toral had to receive permission from Madrid for each clause of the capitulation 
terms over rerouted telegraph wires, the negotiations dragged out. The U.S. Army almost 
stormed the city on the July 16. Only the U.S. Army commissioners’ trust in Toral as a “fair 
dealing” and “courtly gentleman” and a last minute telegraph from Spain acquiescing to the 
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surrender prevented the assault.64 The mutual respect found between the commissioners extended 
to the officers and soldiers of both armies as well. 
Following the surrender, their seemed to be a mutual respect between the Spanish and 
American soldiers and according to most witnesses there seemed to be “no hatred on either 
side.”65 Lieutenant Colonel Marion P. Maus observed how “after the surrender it was remarked 
that the admiration of our men for the Spanish was very pronounced, as was that of the Spanish 
for our troops; they were good friends at once, and the hateful idea of the Yankee … was soon 
dispelled.”66 An American newspaper correspondent recorded how it gladdened “the heart of the 
impartial observers to see the many demonstrations of comradeship continually expressed by the 
victor and the vanquished as they meet either in the city streets, in the cafés or outside in the 
camps.”67 In an effort to maintain their dignity, Spanish officers were allowed to keep their 
personal side arms and remain in their living quarters in Santiago until evacuated to Spain.68  
Moreover, the Spanish were “anxious to have it understood” that they only surrendered to 
the “‘brave, courageous, noble and generous’” U.S. Army and not the “cowardly Cubans,” a 
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feeling shared by the American soldiers and officers.69 The U.S. Army posted sentries around the 
perimeter of the prisoner camps on San Juan Heights, but did not meddle with the daily routine 
within the camps. The U.S. Army avoided treating the Spanish as jailed convicts, because, as one 
officer noted, the idea is “to avoid humiliating the enemy as much as possible.”70 The U.S. 
soldiers found the Spanish hungry and eager to trade their insignia and other military 
accouterments for their much-despised hardtack and sowbelly bacon. Spanish officers sold their 
horses and other personal items that they would no longer need to eager American officers who 
had lost most of their personal items.71 This trading slowed once the U.S. Army was able to 
regularly deliver food to the prisoner camps.  
Although the Spanish and American soldiers were on good terms, both sides were careful 
not to allow their former foes to catch them looking weak or disheveled. Before Captain 
Malcolm Rafferty of the 71st New York marched a detail of men through the recently captured 
city of Santiago, he mounted a mule and acquired a cavalry saber and a British pith helmet to 
look more like a professional officer. He also marched his ragged-looking men at strict attention 
every time they passed Spanish soldiers, explaining to his men that the Spanish “‘have an idea 
we’re the better men. And, goddammit, we are going to keep up that impression!’”72 An 
American observer noted how a group of Spanish prisoners also tried to maintain their dignity as 																																																								
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they were escorted to the rear. They “held their heads high” even as “Cuban women hung over 
the railings of the porches pointing and jeering at them.”73 While both diseased and ragged 
armies tried to keep up their disciplined appearance in front of their foes, they could not help but 
increasingly view each other as comrades in arms. 
By the time the U.S. Army began transporting the Spanish prisoners back to Spain the 
soldiers of the two armies had built a strong relationship. The Spanish felt more ties of kinship 
with the Americans than their former Cuban countrymen, just as the Americans seemed closer to 
the Spaniards than their former allies. Before leaving Cuba for Spain, Toral told a U.S. Army 
officer in an interview that he had no “hard feelings against the Americans” because of the 
“chivalric politeness displayed in all our conferences.”74 Toral was also thankful for being 
“treated humanely” during the fighting and “nobly after the surrender.”75 Officers in the U.S. 
Army thought equally highly of Toral and his soldiers. Reeves believed Toral to be an 
upstanding and educated gentleman, and the American lieutenant was sure the Spanish were “by 
far the best people” in Cuba.76  
An open letter written by a Pedro Lopez de Castillo, a private in the infantry, as he 
departed for Spain, illustrates the goodwill that formed between the Spanish and American 
soldiers. He began by expressing how his Spanish comrades held “no resentment against the men 
who fought us nobly and valiantly,” and by thanking them for complying “with all the laws and 																																																								
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usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations in the world.”77 More 
specifically, Lopez thanked the American soldiers for “giving freely of food and of your stock of 
medicines,” caring for the Spanish wounded, providing “honorable burial to the dead,” and 
treating the Spanish prisoners with “distinction and courtesy.”78 In contrast to the Americans, 
Lopez wrote despairingly of Cuban soldiers. He described the Cubans as a people “without a 
religion, without morals, without conscience, and of a doubtful origin,” who murdered their 
enemies from ambush instead of confronting them directly.79 Both the U.S. and Spanish armies 
looked down on the Cuban soldiers for their use of guerilla tactics. 
Also like the U.S. Army, Lopez and his fellow Spanish soldiers spoke despairingly about 
the Cubans because of their race and hoped that the Americans could civilize them. Lopez 
described the Cubans as the “descendants of the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of 
unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors,” and he contrasted the Cubans to the “well-born” Spanish 
soldiers.80 Lopez acknowledged that the Americans fairly conquered Cuba from Spain, and 
warned the Americans that the Cubans were “not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they 
will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized humanity.”81 Lopez’s letter 
illustrates how the armies of Spain and the United States shared similar cultural norms on how 
officers and soldiers should behave and conduct warfare as “civilized” nations. Moreover, the 
Spaniards believed in the same Social Darwinian values that implied that it was the duty of the 																																																								
77 John D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899), 226. Shafter to Adjutant-
General of the Army, July 24, 1898, For text of letter, also see Shafter to H. C. Corbin, Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box 
Number 6, Official Correspondence relative to Santiago and Porto Rico Campaigns, the U.S. Army Military 
History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 250-51. 
78 John D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899), 226. 
79 John D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899), 226 
80 John D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899), 224-26 
81 John D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899), 226. 
 	118	
Western nations to bring civilization and uplift the “inferior” races in the name of humanity. The 
same values held by American expansionists and many U.S. Army officers were used to justify 
keeping the colonies won from Spain. 
Clearly the U.S. Army’s officers and men respected their Spanish counterparts more than 
their Cuban allies, but while the Americans may have dismissed the Cuban soldiers as inept in 
conventional fighting and racially inferior, they still treated most Cuban officers as professional 
peers and fellow gentlemen. At the first meeting between Shafter, Sampson, and García to share 
intelligence and strategy at the camp of General Jesus Rabi, the Cubans greeted the American 
officers with an honor guard. The American officers were pleasantly surprised to find that García 
acted like a gentlemen and “spoke English fairly well,” and that several of his staff officers were 
educated in the United States and “spoke it excellently.”82 Other officers that dealt with García 
found that he treated them with “great courtesy” and gave them “full and unreserved 
information” on the Spanish army.83 Seeing most of the higher-ranking Cuban officers as fellow 
gentlemen, the American officers also began to treat them with a professional respect. Shafter 
ensured that the Cuban Liberation Army received supplies at Siboney, but he ordered his 
logisticians to act discretely when giving handouts to García’s officers in order to avoid their 
“embarrassment.”84 For Cuban and American officers alike, it was considered ungentlemanly to 
accept charity. The U.S. Army officers never respected or recognized the Cuban Liberation 
Army, but they did treat the better-educated and wealthier class of Cuban officers with 
professional respect. Only after Shafter prevented García from entering Santiago with his 
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victorious Cuban army and Cubans started to question the American motives did the relationship 
between the Cuban and American officers began to deteriorate. Even then, they still treated each 
other as fellow officers and gentlemen. 
U.S. Army officers’ experiences on the American frontier prepared them for dealing with 
the Cuban and Spanish officers they worked with in Santiago. From 1865 to 1898 the U.S. Army 
maintained a significant presence along the national borders where American officers frequently 
worked with Mexican and Canadian officers under trying circumstances. At the conclusion of the 
Civil War, General Ulysses S. Grant sent a large portion of the U.S. Army under Major General 
Phillip Sheridan to Texas to pressure the French forces under Emperor Ferdinand Maximilian to 
abandon Mexico and to supply the insurgent forces commanded by Benito Juárez. Partly in 
response to a sharp spike in the number of Native American raids, and partly due to a federal 
government that was increasingly apathetic about Reconstruction, U.S. Army garrisons moved 
from the most significant population centers in Texas to the southern and western borders of the 
state, where they frequently interacted with Mexican army officers. While pursuing Indian 
raiders in the southwest, U.S. and Mexican officers had frequent contact.85 
Despite the fact that the American and Mexican soldiers had many tense standoffs and 
occasionally clashed during pursuits of hostile Native Americans, the officers still maintained 
cordial relations and made a point to invite each other to dances and other social events. 
Brigadier General Edward O. C. Ord, commander of the Department of Texas, dispatched 
several columns under Ranald Mackenzie and William R. Shafter deep into Mexico after Indian 																																																								
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raiders. These overt violations of Mexican sovereignty generated strong protests from the 
Mexican government and confrontations between Mexican and American soldiers. Even so, Ord 
maintained amicable relations with his Mexican counterpart, General Jeronimo Trevino, even 
allowing his daughter to wed the Mexican General. Other instances showed that Mexican and 
American troops could work together. In 1880, American and Mexican soldiers crossed the 
international border often in pursuit of Victorio’s Apaches until the Mexican army finally 
surrounded and killed the Apache leader at Tres Castillos. Five years later the State Department 
negotiated a reciprocal crossing agreement with the Republic of Mexico that allowed for the 
armies of both countries to continue pursuits of hostile Indians across the international 
boundary.86 Even with the agreement in place, Captain Emmet Crawford was killed in a skirmish 
with Mexican militia while chasing Geronimo’s Apache band deep into Chihuahua, Mexico, in 
1887. On the border with Canada, Miles and other officers worked closely with the North-West 
Mounted Police in an attempt to prevent Sitting Bull from returning to the United States. Many 
of the U.S. officers who saw service in Santiago, including Colonel Charles Crane, Shafter, 
Lawton, and Miles had extensive dealings with foreign officers along the borders. In these 
encounters, U.S. Army officers found it advantageous to treat their foreign counterparts with 
dignity and respect.87   
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Over the course of the Santiago campaign, the U.S. Army increasingly came to respect 
their Spanish adversaries as noble and worthy foes. Likewise, the officers of the Spanish army 
also showed increasing admiration for the chivalrous behavior of the American officers. These 
reciprocal feelings created trust among Toral, Shafter, and their subordinates, and set conditions 
for the two belligerents to find acceptable terms that allowed the Spanish to surrender Santiago 
while still maintaining their honor. Although American observers thought poorly of the Cuban 
Liberation Army and its soldiers, the U.S. Army’s officers treated the upper-class Cuban officers 
with much of the same professional courtesies that they afforded to their Spanish counterparts. 
The professional relationship between American and Cuban officers began to fray only after 
Shafter’s refusal to allow the Cuban Liberation Army to enter Santiago after the Spanish 
surrender, and his refusal to immediately replace the Spanish civil officials with representatives 
from García’s army. The good relations between the U.S. and Spanish armies could have quickly 
deteriorated if the War Department had not overcome the logistical obstacles that plagued the 
invasion and efficiently returned their prisoners to Spain. 
 
The Managerial War Department and the Evacuation of the Spanish Prisoners 
 After the surrender of Santiago, the soldiers of the Fifth Corps suffered from hunger, 
disease, and lack of supplies. The ships anchored off the coast contained an abundance of 
supplies, but the lack of lighters, able bodies, and ground transport continued to hamper the 
ability of Shafter to deliver the needed stores to his troops. To compound the War Department’s 
logistical problems, it was now responsible for supplying approximately 23,000 Spanish 
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prisoners.88 Toral began serious negotiations to surrender his entire command and eastern Cuba 
only when the War Department made the generous offer to transport his army back to Spain and 
provide for the prisoners’ basic needs at the expense of the United States.89 At the time of their 
capitulation, the Spanish army had already been decimated by disease, malnutrition, and 
exposure, just like their American captors. While analyzing the difficulty of supplying and 
transporting Toral’s army, one American staff officer came to the simple conclusion that it was 
“going to be an enormous job.”90 Even though the Spanish and U.S. armies maintained cordial 
relations after the surrender ceremony, the mutual feeling of respect and goodwill could not be 
expected to last if the War Department could not overcome its dysfunctional logistical situation 
and begin to provide adequate food and medicine to both its own soldiers and the Spanish 
prisoners. 
 Fortunately, the War Department rectified much of its bureaucratic and logistical 
inefficiencies and successfully shipped Toral’s army back to Spain. Much of the credit for the 
increased effectiveness of the War Department belongs to McKinley. He sidelined the bickering 
and egotistical Commanding General Miles, worked around the ineffectual Secretary of War 
Russell A. Alger, and personally took charge of the conduct of the war and subsequent 
occupation. Furthermore, McKinley relied more and more on Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin 
to administer the War Department. Corbin brought order to the War Department by coordinating 
the disparate staff bureaus, which were independently capable of professional work, but lacked 																																																								
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direction. Within weeks, the War Department overcame the logistical obstacles necessary to feed 
and then efficiently transport the Spanish prisoners home.  
The fact that all the officers who commanded the U.S. forces in Santiago during the 
movement of the Spanish prisoners from their garrisons to Spain had previous experience in 
caring for large numbers of detainees certainly contributed to the success of the operation. 
Following the winter fight between Miles’s command and the Sioux warrior Crazy Horse and his 
five hundred followers at the Battle of Wolf Mountain on January 8, 1877, thousands of 
northern-plains Indians surrendered to Miles. Captain Ezra P. Ewers cared for many of the 
Northern Cheyenne captured during the campaign and soon won a reputation among them for 
being a compassionate captor who looked after his prisoners’ best interest. Thirteen years later, 
Miles again captured thousands of Native American prisoners. This time, thousands of Sioux 
fled the Pine Ridge Agency upon hearing the sounds of battle echoing from Wounded Knee 
Creek. After some fighting, Miles’s 3,500 soldiers surrounded the fleeing Sioux and escorted 
them back to the Pine Ridge Agency, where he again ordered Ewers to secure and care for the 
5,000 prisoners. Just eight years later, Ewers would care for thousands of Spanish prisoners of 
war as a Brigadier General at Guantanamo, Cuba. When Colonel William R. Shafter arrived at 
the Pine Ridge Agency later in January 1891 to assume overall responsibility for the control and 
care of the Sioux prisoners of war, Ewers separated the Pine Ridge Cheyenne from the Sioux and 
escorted the Cheyenne back to their kinsmen’s reservation at Tongue River, Montana. 
Meanwhile, Shafter and his soldiers issued the Sioux rations and blankets, and ensured that the 
Indians received enough clothing and shelter to survive the rest of the winter. Shafter, Ewers, and 
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Miles all gained valuable experience dealing with captured Sioux that they would serve them 
later when dealing with Spanish prisoners of war in Cuba less than a decade later.91  
After Shafter departed with the Fifth Corps to the United States, Lawton assumed 
command of the recently arrived U.S. occupation troops. One of Lawton’s first tasks was to ship 
the remaining prisoners back to Spain. Fortunately for the U.S. Army, Lawton had overseen the 
care and transportation of Indian detainees on at least two occasions during his over thirty years 
of service on the American frontier. As a first lieutenant in 1877, Lawton relocated about 1,000 
Northern Cheyenne to the agency near Ft. Reno after their earlier surrender at Ft. Robinson. The 
famous warrior Wooden Leg knew Lawton as Tall White Man, and recalled that he “was a good 
man” who was “always kind to the Indians.”92 Lawton allowed the elderly and sick to ride in the 
Army wagons and provided them sufficient food and shelter during the journey.93 In 1886, 
Captain Lawton led a small expedition that included Assistant Surgeon Leonard Wood on a five-
month pursuit of Geronimo and his small band of Chiricahua Apaches deep into Mexico’s Sierra 
Madre Mountains. After Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood convinced Geronimo’s exhausted band 
to surrender, Lawton again showed sympathy to his exhausted opponent by protecting the 
Apaches from both vengeful American officers and a detachment of Mexican Infantry led by the 
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hostile Jesús Aguirre, the Prefect of Arispe.94 The U.S. Army was fortunate that Shafter, and 
each of the three general officers left to occupy Santiago, all had experience handling and caring 
for large numbers of detainees. 
Shafter and his other officers had to rely on their frontier experience in dealing with 
prisoners because they had little to no time to prepare themselves to receive and care for 
approximately 23,000 prisoners after Toral’s surrender. The U.S. Army took control of the 
12,000-soldier garrison of Santiago de Cuba immediately following the ceremony by the ceiba 
tree. The remaining 11,000 Spaniards garrisoned other towns in the province. All around the city 
of Santiago de Cuba, Spanish regiments and battalions left their posts to turn in their weapons to 
the U.S. Army. The U.S. soldiers who entered the city to receive the Spanish arms realized that 
the city was well fortified and that the Spanish were not short on ammunition, with over six 
million rounds collected. Relieved that they did not have to assault the city, Shafter’s soldiers 
also received the surrender of the surviving Spanish ships and sailors. Details of American 
artillerymen took control of the batteries protecting the harbor and worked diligently with the 
Spanish to detonate the electric mines protecting the mouth of the harbor. Four mines failed to 
detonate, so their positions were marked with buoys, the electrical cables leading to the mines 
were cut, and the detonators removed. With the batteries and mines neutralized, the American 
transports could now enter Santiago Harbor and use the city’s docks to quickly unload supplies.95 
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U.S. soldiers collected the Spanish Mausers and Remington rifles at the Santiago Arsenal 
and escorted the disarmed Spanish to camps in the open areas in front of the American 
entrenchments on the San Juan Heights. The Santiago Arsenal was a large stone building 
covering several acres of the city’s center. Shafter’s ordnance officer, Lieutenant William 
Brooke, inventoried the weapons.96 A troop from the 1st U.S. Cavalry Regiment secured the 
compound until the War Department determined if the Spanish would be allowed to return home 
with their weapons or if they would become the property of the U.S. government.97 In the 
meantime, the U.S. occupation forces continued to move Spanish weapons from all over the 
newly named Department of Santiago to the arsenal. After a few weeks of deliberation, the War 
Department decided not to allow the Spanish to return with their rifles or cannons.  
The prisoners captured at Santiago de Cuba were in poor health. Disease and hunger had 
taken its toll on the Spanish. Despite the poor conditions of the American soldiers, they were still 
astonished at the poor health of their captives. Lucy Graves, an assistant of Clara Barton working 
in Santiago, felt “very sorry” for the passing prisoners and described them “as poor ragged and 
miserable a lot of human beings as could be collected anywhere.”98 Of the 12,000 Spanish 
soldiers in Santiago de Cuba, U.S. officials estimated that roughly 4,000 were incapacitated by 
illness at the time of Toral’s capitulation.99 Those capable of marching to the detainment camps 
on the San Juan Heights begged and bartered for food from the American soldiers. Many Spanish 																																																								
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prisoners were reduced to eating their horses until the U.S. Army could provide them full rations 
about two days later.100 Ewers issued rations to the Spanish prisoners held at Guantanamo from 
his own commissary, which was against regulation, until they departed for Spain. Ewers wanted 
confirmation from Shafter that he could continue this practice without being prosecuted. The 
War Department and Shafter insisted that he continue issuing government rations, as the Spanish 
had no means to feed themselves.101 
While under the care of the U.S. Army, the health of the Spanish prisoners continued to 
decline, though not due to neglect. The Spanish prisoners had gone on limited rations during the 
siege and had no shelter from the sun or the daily afternoon thunderstorms while camped in front 
of the American positions on the San Juan Heights.102 The U.S. Army soldiers had no shelter 
either and were still waiting for their own tents to be unloaded from the transports. On July 24, 
seven days after their surrender, the already suffering Spanish prisoners only had tarps and other 
bowers the Spanish collected and put up for shade.103 Once the transports were offloaded, the 
U.S. Army had plenty of food and tents to offer the Spanish prisoners. 
There were very few instances when soldiers of the U.S. Army intentionally denied the 
Spanish available shelter. In one such instance, Colonel Charles F. Humphrey, Shafter’s chief 
quartermaster officer, ordered Major Summers to stop erecting a large tarpaulin to provide shade 
for the Spanish prisoners waiting by the docks to board ships destined for Spain. Humphrey, 
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largely responsible for the loading fiasco in Tampa, used profane language and suggested that 
the Spanish prisoners could “die if they wanted to.”104 Summers worked around his incompetent 
and malicious superior by having the Red Cross direct the erection of the tarp, while he provided 
the manpower.105 
It was disease, not exposure or hunger, which decimated the Spanish ranks. By August 2, 
there were 2,181 prisoners being cared for in the Spanish hospital in Santiago.106 Many more 
were not dire enough to be committed. Just two days later another 500 Spaniards entered the 
hospital for treatment.107 And by the end of the week, the hospital with a capacity for 2,000 was 
overflowing with over 3,000 patients.108 Despite the best efforts of the medical staff in the 
hospital, Spanish soldiers were dying at a rate of about fifty a day.109 Captain Matthew F. Steele 
and most other U.S. Army officers observed that the Spanish prisoners were “daily dying like 
sheep” from fever and attributed their high death rate to the fact that their camp was located near 
“foul sloughs” found in the “low ground,” and also because the Spaniards drank “deadly 
water.”110 In an attempt to slow the fever epidemic in the Spanish camp, those Spanish prisoners 																																																								
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healthy enough to clean their own camp and the city of Santiago de Cuba were mandated to do 
so.111 Furthermore, Wood accompanied Toral and his staff on a reconnaissance to locate 
healthier ground to relocate the Spanish prisoners. The two hoped the elevated ground three 
miles south of the city would be healthier, both still believing that malaria and yellow fever were 
contracted from filthy living conditions and a pestilence found in contaminated ground and 
diseased air.112 In their new camp, the Spanish continued to sicken and die of tropical fevers at 
the same rate. The Spanish had lost approximately 4,000 soldiers to disease within forty days of 
their capitulation. Toral lamented that even though his soldiers were well fed in captivity, those 
that survived their fevers looked like “electrified corpses.”113 He believed that the U.S. Army had 
done its best to stop the epidemic and that the sick and wounded had “been cared for with the 
utmost kindness.”114 After spending two years in Cuba, he likely accepted that malarial and 
yellow fever could not be prevented during the rainy season. 
Receiving the surrender of the isolated Spanish garrisons along the coast of the province 
and in the interior of the province proved a difficult task. Shafter and Toral agreed to each send a 
staff officer to notify the garrisons of the capitulation. Shafter detailed his most trusted aid, 
Lieutenant Miley, for the mission, and provided him an escort of two troops from the 2nd U.S. 
Cavalry under Captain Thomas J. Lewis and a pack train of mules with ten days of supplies. 																																																								
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Toral sent Captain Ramus and a pack train with medical supplies with Miley’s detachment. 
Ramus carried a letter from the Spanish general informing the garrison commanders of the terms 
of capitulation and ordering them to surrender their forces and adhere to orders given in Shafter’s 
name. The expedition left Santiago on the July 19, two days after Santiago surrendered, and 
followed a Cuban guide along a single-track trail high into the mountains north of the city. Once 
a road, the trail was now overgrown and washed out in many places. After reaching the railroad 
line at Dos Bocas, the expedition decided moving over the track was quicker than taking the 
nearly impassible trail network. Miley observed that the many plantations that once thrived in the 
interior plateau had “disappeared except the ruins of dwellings in two places.” After struggling 
through the mud and daily-afternoon downpours, Miley’s expedition reached El Cristo, the first 
Spanish garrison north of Santiago de Cuba. 
 Miley’s column stopped short of the two Spanish blockhouses guarding the approach to El 
Cristo. Ramus and a cavalryman rode forward carrying a white flag and presented Toral’s letter 
to the garrison commander. The Spanish soldiers were delighted to find out that they would 
return to Spain soon and the local Cuban insurgents were jubilant not only to hear that the war 
was over, but also at the possibility of receiving meaningful sustenance. Miley and Ramus 
repeated the process of notifying the Spanish garrisons of Toral’s capitulation at Moron and Dos 
Caminos without incident. At each town they found a small-cultivated zone protected by the 
local Spanish garrison to feed the women, children, and elderly living in the town. All the able-
bodied men belonged to the insurgency and besieged the towns subsisting on mangoes and any 
other food they could scavenge. Fearing retribution against disarmed Spanish soldiers, Miley 
decided to allow the Spanish soldiers to keep their weapons until they could be escorted safely 
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back to Santiago. The Spanish comandante at Dos Caminos warned Miley’s expedition that the 
commander of the garrison at San Luis “would not surrender as long as he had a man to fight.”115 
 After riding the twenty miles from Dos Caminos to San Luis, it seemed that the Spanish 
would defend the town. The Spanish soldiers rushed to their trenches as Miley’s expedition 
approached. Captain Ramos spurred his horse forward and convinced the defenders not to shoot. 
The comandante did not order his men to fire, but refused to surrender San Luis, believing the 
“whole affair was a ruse of war and that the Captain was a traitor.”116 The garrison “had not 
heard of [the] loss of Cervera’s fleet or Toral’s surrender.”117 The standoff continued until Miley 
consented to the comandante’s request to escort officers from the San Luis garrison to Santiago 
de Cuba to see for themselves if the Spanish army in Santiago de Cuba had in fact surrendered. 
When the party returned the next evening with confirmation of Toral’s capitulation, the San Luis 
garrison surrendered. One troop from the 2nd U.S. Cavalry stayed behind to disarm the garrison 
and safeguard them from an attack by the local Cuban insurgents. The Spanish signaled a 
message from San Luis to Palma Soriano by means of heliograph to inform the garrison of the 
situation. They received the reply that “if the American column came there it would be fired 
upon.” Miley dismissed the threatening remark and the expedition departed at once.118 
 Ramus rode ahead to Palma Soriano with Toral’s letter and easily convinced the garrison of 
its authenticity. When Miley’s column arrived they were warmly received, and the Iberians were 																																																								
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“all apparently greatly delighted at the prospect of returning home.”119 Before surrendering, the 
600 Spanish regulars who were not too sick marched to San Luis with their weapons for 
protection from the Cubans. The battalion of 350 Spanish volunteers in Palma Soriano, 
composed of Cuban loyalists, held a formation and their commander read them the terms of their 
parole. After they all verbally agreed to adhere to the conditions, the volunteers deposited their 
arms in large two-wheeled ox carts called carretas and were released to their homes. The 
volunteers were very concerned about their safety because of the intense feeling of hatred and 
the many atrocities committed between the Cuban mambises and the Cuban volunteers that 
remained loyal to Spain. Fortunately for the Spanish volunteers, the local Cuban forces 
composed entirely of blacks and mulattoes and commanded by General Sobreco had already 
received word from García informing them of the Toral’s capitulation and ordering his forces to 
cease all hostilities against the Spanish. Sobreco promised to control his soldiers, and no attacks 
ever occurred against the volunteers. Even so, Miley left his second troop of cavalry in Palma 
Soriano to keep the peace and assuage the fears of the volunteers before returning with the 
Spanish garrison to San Luis. The 3,500 Spanish soldiers consolidated at San Luis, Songo, and 
El Cristo remained armed until garrison regiments arrived at Santiago from the United States to 
disarm and escort the Spanish soldiers safely to Santiago for transport back to Spain.120 
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 Two weeks after returning from San Luis on July 29, Miley—recently promoted to major—
departed on the Spanish transport San Juan with fifty tons of Red Cross supplies to notify the 
garrisons of Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo of Toral’s surrender and deliver much needed food 
and medicine. Accompanying Miley on the San Juan were a Red Cross doctor, a journalist, an 
interpreter, and four Spanish officers. After dropping twenty tons of supplies to the Spanish 
interned at Guantanamo, the San Juan steamed for Baracoa. The situation in the town was 
similar to San Luis and Palma Soriano. The Spanish had not heard of Toral’s capitulation but 
were easily convinced by the four Spanish officers accompanying Miley that this was indeed the 
case. The Spanish remained fearful of the local Cuban guerillas that had built breastworks 
surrounding Baraco’s land approaches within four hundred yards of the town. Miley received 
assurances from the local Cuban commander that he would not attack the town, but he still 
allowed the Spanish garrison to keep their weapons until the War Department sent U.S. Army 
troops to garrison the town. The Cubans also decided to maintain their positions and weapons 
until they received official new order and just compensation for their services. The San Juan left 
half the remaining supplies for the Spanish garrison and steamed for Sagua de Tanamo.121 
 The San Juan anchored at Esteron, a small Spanish outpost at the mouth of a perfectly calm 
bay. Using a steam launch Miley and his party went ashore and used the small garrison’s 
telephone to call the commander of Sagua de Tanamo, several miles inland. The Spanish forces 
there accepted the fact that their war was over and seemed “delighted at the prospect of returning 
to Spain.”122 The Spanish used a schooner to unload the supplies from the San Juan and then a 																																																								
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pack train carried the supplies inland to Sagua de Tanamo. While the unloading took place, 
Miley ate dinner with the Spanish lieutenant who commanded the small outpost at Esteron and 
his wife. To Miley’s surprise, the Spanish officer had a propaganda bulletin posted describing a 
“great victory” over the U.S. Navy at Manila.123 Miley did not record whether or not he told his 
gracious hosts the truth about the Battle of Manila Bay. The Spanish garrison did not surrender 
their weapons or themselves until U.S. soldiers under General Ewers arrived later to garrison the 
town.124 
 The Spanish soldiers that garrisoned the smaller inland towns in the province were often in 
worse shape than their countrymen in Santiago de Cuba because local Cuban guerillas had cut 
off the garrisons from regular resupply. Miley reported that the Spanish soldiers in the interior 
garrisons “were on the verge of starvation’ when he found them.”125 Corporal W. T. Goode, an 
African American soldier of the 8th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment, remembered with 
disbelief the sickly state of a 900 man Spanish battalion arriving in Santiago to be shipped back 
to Spain. He described the “half-naked, half-starved” Spanish soldiers as having sunken eyes and 
jaws and were the “most miserable looking specimens of humanity” that anyone would care to 
see.”126 Major Thomas S. Wylly had a similar reaction when his newly arrived 3rd U.S. 
Volunteer Regiment marched past 2,000 Spanish prisoners making their way to Santiago harbor. 																																																								
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He remembered that most of the Spaniards were “hollow cheeked” boys who limped and 
hobbled along, many without shoes, and some “with faces so scarred that they actually looked 
more like wild beasts than human beings.”127 Wylly did not expect most of the Spanish prisoners 
to survive the journey home. Another soldier in the 3rd Volunteer Regiment became gravely 
concerned for his own health after passing the emaciated and sickly Spanish. He imagined 
himself already “in a Spanish cemetery,” and when he came down with a fever a few days later 
he concluded the “‘jig was up.’”128 But his fever soon passed.  
Once Spanish garrisons surrendered to the U.S. Army, American soldiers disarmed the 
Spanish soldiers and transported them back to Santiago or Guantanamo for shipment back to 
Cadiz, Spain. In every instance, the disarmament process went without incident. The peripheral 
towns in the Santiago Province were all garrisoned by newly arrived regiments composed of 
African American soldiers and so called immunes because the War Department believed these 
soldiers would be resistant to tropical diseases, since they were believed to be either naturally 
resistant or to have been previously exposed to malaria and yellow fever and therefore immune 
to the diseases. Both of these assumptions proved to be false. In the town of San Luis, the 
soldiers of the all-black 8th Illinois Volunteer Regiment collected the machetes, Mausers, and 
other military accouterments from 5,000 soldiers and turned them over to the regimental 
quartermaster to be inventoried at the town’s arsenal. The soldiers of the 8th Illinois kept the 
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arsenal under close guard until they could ship the weapons and ammunition to Santiago.129 The 
3rd U.S. Volunteer Infantry Regiment (Immunes), commanded by Colonel Patrick H. Ray, was 
ordered to secure all the captured Spanish arms in Guantanamo.130 Meanwhile, the recently 
arrived 9th U.S. Volunteer Infantry of African American “Immunes” replaced the 9th 
Massachusetts Regiment’s soldiers guarding the prisoners outside Santiago so these last soldiers 
belonging to Shafter’s Fifth Corps could return to the United States. The 9th Immunes continued 
guarding the prisoners until they embarked for Spain.131 The newly arrived regiments were not 
securing the stored Mauser rifles from their former Spanish owners. Instead, the American 
soldiers guarded the weapons and ammunition from the Cubans because they were fearful that 
the alliance between the Cuban Liberation Army and the United States might not hold.  
Similarly, American guards were more concerned about protecting the Spanish prisoners 
from vengeful Cubans than trying to prevent the Spaniards from escaping. Shafter worried that 
because the “feelings between Spaniards and Cubans [was] very bitter,” that great “care will 
have to be taken to avoid collision.”132 Major General John C. Bates, completing his duty as 
officer responsible for the Spanish prisoners, told his replacement, Colonel Charles Crane of the 
9th Immunes, that the prisoners “needed no guards except to prevent some mean Cubans from 
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illtreating them.”133 Taking the general’s advice, Crane placed his sentries on the road leading to 
the Spanish camp to protect the prisoners from unwanted Cuban incursions.134 Although there 
were some confirmed reports of Cubans taking the horses of Spanish officers, there were no 
reported incidents of Cuban officers or mambises harming the Spanish prisoners.135 The absence 
of attacks may have been the result of the U.S. Army’s precaution or the discipline of the Cuban 
Liberation Army. Regardless of the reason, the Cuban soldiers never attacked their hated 
enemies. 
Even if no attacks occurred, the Spanish still feared the Cuban Liberation Army and 
seemed very happy to be returning to Spain and under the protection of the U.S. Army. Brigadier 
General Adelbert Ames observed that the Spanish prisoners seemed “perfectly happy” with their 
predicament.136 With plenty to eat and their transports home on the way, the Spanish behaved 
extremely well in captivity. Shafter reported that they were “the most orderly, tractable, and 
generally best behaved men that I have ever known.”137 Private Paul Andrew, a Scottish 
immigrant and a bookbinder from Savannah, remembered guarding the Spanish as they boarded 
the ships for home on his eighteenth birthday. He recalled that “they did not need a guard, they 
were to[o] darn glad to be going.”138 
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In addition to these efforts, staff officers also had to consider how to transport captured 
Spanish troops and their weapons from remote outposts back to Santiago de Cuba. The 
individual staff sections worked diligently to transport the weapons, but still struggled to 
coordinate their work. In the headquarters in Santiago, the chief ordinance officer formally 
requested that the adjutant general order the quartermaster department to ship all the captured 
arms in San Luis, El Cristo, Songo, and Guantanamo to the Santiago Arsenal on August 24. 
Once the adjutant published the order the quartermaster could then allocate government funds for 
the transportation of the weapons and accouterments. Even within the Department of Santiago, 
the staff bureaus did not communicate well. The quartermaster officer was already shipping 
Spanish weapons and ammunition to the Santiago Arsenal, and the ordnance officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Henry D. Borup, had no idea where the weapons were coming from.139 Eventually, 
Borup and his successor accounted for almost all the Spanish small caliber weapons and 
ammunition in the Department of Santiago before it departed to the United States for storage.  
Although the staff bureaus working for the Department of Santiago during the initial 
occupation still struggled to coordinate their work with each other, they performed well within 
their individual staff sections. The War Department contracted four ships to transport the Spanish 
small arms and ammunition to the United States. Once the vessels arrived in Santiago, the 
Ordnance staff section—consisting of Borup, a clerk, and one Sergeant—supervised the 
counting, oiling, and packing of 13,326 Mauser Rifles, 11,292 Remington rifles, and over 
10,000,000 rounds of ammunition.140 After all of this was crated, the quartermaster department 																																																								
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took responsibility for loading the captured Spanish arms on to the waiting transports. The three-
man ordinance section also oversaw the loading of 130 artillery pieces that were either captured 
from the Spanish or surplus American guns onto eight ships contracted by the War Department. 
Additionally, they maintained and accounted for all the small arms, ammunition, accouterments, 
and 27 modern field pieces required by the occupation troops.141 
Shipping the captured Spanish troops and sick American soldiers home was a greater 
priority for the War Department. Until the prisoners departed or fresh garrison troops arrived, the 
sick soldiers of Shafter’s Fifth Army Corps had to remain in Santiago de Cuba. And with each 
passing day, more soldiers succumbed to malaria and yellow fever. Fortunately, the War 
Department was already working on moving regiments of “Immunes” to garrison Santiago and 
contracting ships to return the prisoners to Spain before the outbreak of tropical fevers reached 
epidemic proportions. On July 18, just one day after the formal surrender, Shafter asked Corbin 
to rush ships to transport the Spanish prisoners home as soon as they became available. Shafter 
wanted to reduce the number of U.S. Army troops needed in Santiago to guard the prisoners, and 
did not want the Fifth Corps to have to wait until all the transports were ready.142 Perhaps for the 
first time in the conflict, the War Department effectively planned and executed the mission to 
move the Spanish back to Iberia. Alger announced to shipping lines as soon as Toral formally 
surrendered that the War Department would be accepting bids on July 20. That morning in New 
York, ten companies submitted their best offers to the War Department. The German and British 
transatlantic shipping companies colluded in rigging their prices, all asking $110 for officers and 																																																								
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$55 for soldiers. The one Spanish steamship company to make a bid asked only $55 for officers 
and $20 for enlisted men. The following day the War Department awarded a contract to the 
Spanish company spending only $513,860 to ship the 22,864 prisoners home.143  
As ships began to arrive to remove the Spanish prisoners from Santiago de Cuba, Toral 
and Lawton worked on a plan to send small coastal steamers to Sagua de Tanamo and Baracoa to 
pick-up the Spanish garrisons and bring them to Guantanamo’s port at Caimanera. Once there, 
they would join the Brigade of Spanish soldiers from Guantanamo for shipment to Spain.144 The 
waters were too shallow at Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo for large ocean going steamers. 
Moreover, the contract with the Spanish shipping line only obligated them to pick up prisoners in 
the bays of Guantanamo and Santiago.145 Lawton and his staff came up with a plan to send Major 
James H. McLeary and Colonel Ray on the captured coastal steamers Reina de los Angeles, San 
Juan, and Bessie to retrieve the coastal garrisons. The ships departed Santiago with 30,000 daily 
rations to be divided between the destitute populations of Sagua de Tanamo and Barracoa. 
Additionally, they carried enough rations to feed the Cubans on the return voyage to Caimanera. 
Not wanting to repeat the trip, Lawton ordered his two officers to collect and transport all the 
Spanish ordnance and weapons at these two towns and bring them to the Santiago Arsenal at the 																																																								
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conclusion of the voyage. In one round trip Lawton and his staff delivered humanitarian aid, 
collected captured arms and ammunition, and brought the prisoners to Guantanamo Bay for 
shipment to Spain.146 
Two administrative complications arose during the movement of the Spanish army back 
to its homeland. First, many of the Spanish officers had their families in Havana and wanted to 
return to them before leaving Cuba. After hostilities between Spain and the United States 
concluded on August 12, this became a possibility. General Toral submitted the names to Lawton 
of the eight officers who wished to return to Havana on August 28.147 The War Department had 
no issue accommodating these Spanish officers, but did not want to pay for their travel to 
Havana and then to Spain from Havana.148 Once Spain agreed to pay for the eight officers’ travel 
expenses on September 14, the issue was resolved.149 Second, doctors did not want to transport 
Spanish infected with malaria and yellow fever for fear that the prisoners would infect others. To 
solve this problem the War Department contracted the Alicante to transport a thousand Spanish 
patients separate from the healthy prisoners.150 By September 18, there were only eight Spanish 
soldiers remaining from Toral’s original command, and all had yellow fever (seven in 
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Guantanamo and one in Baracoa).151 The War Department did an excellent job working through 
administrative issues to transport almost all the Spanish prisoner home within two months of the 
capitulation. 
The War Department accomplished the monumental task of collecting and transporting 
the prisoners without much of the confusion and inefficiencies that occurred during the Fifth 
Corps’s embarkation in Tampa and landings at Siboney and Daiquirí. From August 9 to 
September 17, the War Department contracted nine Spanish vessels to carry prisoners out of 
Santiago de Cuba and six transports departed from Guantanamo. These 15 ships carried 22,137 
officers and soldiers, 331 women, 348 children, 21 priests and monks, and 27 charitable nuns.152 
General Toral left Santiago on 31 August aboard the Leon XIII with the last Spanish soldiers 
from the city and briefly stopped in Caimanera to load additional soldiers before continuing to 
Spain, only to be greeted by stone throwing civilians and a court-martial.153 Staying behind in 
Santiago were about 3,000 Cuban loyalists who had volunteered to fight for Spain.154 
 
Conclusion 
 The Spanish belief that the Americans would treat them as gentlemen and would protect 
them against revenge attacks by vengeful Cubans probably did more to ensure the Spanish 
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surrender than the strength of Shafter’s army or the destruction of Cervera’s fleet. The U.S. 
Army may not have had the strength necessary to capture Toral’s large and entrenched garrison, 
had it decided to fight to the last man. Moreover, with the health of Shafter’s soldiers quickly 
deteriorating, it is unlikely that the U.S. Army could have mustered the strength to capture the 
remaining Spanish garrisons in Eastern Cuba for months, and without great loss of life. The 
officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army, drawing upon their experiences in dealing with Mexican 
and Canadian officers on the frontier, had built a trusting relationship with their Spanish 
prisoners based on a mutual understanding of how armies should conduct themselves and a 
shared concept of being comrades in arms. The mutual respect that quickly formed between the 
Spanish and American armies helped to facilitate the capitulation of Toral’s forces in Santiago de 
Cuba, ensured that the remaining Spanish garrisons in the surrounding province surrendered as 
well, and influenced Spanish prisoners, once disarmed, to behave exceptionally well for their 
sympathetic captors.  
 With the Spanish capitulation, however, the U.S. Army was left to deal with an armed 
insurgent army justifiably outraged after Shafter refused to offer formal recognition, did not ask 
for their input in the surrender negotiations, barred their armed entry into the city, omitted them 
from the glory of victory celebrations and ceremonies, and left Spanish officials in their 
positions. Soon after landing, most of the Americans became disillusioned with the irregular 
Cuban fighters because of their appearance and tactics. Furthermore, Shafter relegated the 
Cubans to serve as scouts and laborers. Racial prejudices further complicated the relationship 
between the largely black mambises and most of the American soldiers. Soon after the egotistical 
Shafter departed, Lawton set about to repair the relationship with the Cuban Liberation Army. 
Lawton and the other American officers gave positions in the new occupation government to 
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officers in the Cuban army that troops respected and trusted. Not surprisingly, the Cuban officers 
they selected were almost entirely wealthy, white, and educated in the United States. 
 Most impressively, McKinley seized control of the War Department from Miles and 
Alger, and had Corbin implement his strategy and coordinate the disparate staff departments. 
The War Department finally began to function in a coordinated fashion. Ships were soon 
contracted, and within a few months, all the Spanish garrisons in Eastern Cuba had been 
transported back to Spain. Corbin ordered fresh regiments of soldiers that he believed would be 
largely immune to the tropical fevers decimating the Spanish prisoners and the soldiers of 
Shafter’s Fifth Corps to garrison Santiago. Fortunately for these ill soldiers, McKinley and 
Corbin got the War Department functioning somewhat smoothly again just in time to evacuate 
Shafter’s soldiers from Cuba before the majority of them perished. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
AN ARMY OF CONVALESCENTS: YELLOW AND MALARIAL FEVER EPIDEMICS 
AND THE EVACUATION OF THE FIFTH CORPS  
 
In my opinion there is but one course to take, and that 
is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and the 
detached regiments that came with it to the United 
States. If that is not done, I believe the death rate will 
be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every 
medical officer present. I called together to-day the 
general officers and the senior medical officers and 
telegraph you their views. 
 
- Shafter, to the Adjutant-General, U.S.A. (August 3, 
1898) 
 
Introduction 
The uniform lines of the 9th U.S. Infantry and the motionless horsemen of the 2nd U.S. 
Cavalry formed in the plaza beneath the governor’s palace during the surrender ceremony at 
Santiago de Cuba on July 17, 1898, made an impression on the Cuban and Spanish spectators. 
Beneath their disciplined veneer, however, all was not well with the soldiers of Major General 
William R. Shafter’s victorious Fifth Corps. First Lieutenant Matthew F. Steele was one of the 
American staff officers attending the ceremony. He was so sick with malarial fever that he could 
barely hold himself up in his saddle, but he “stuck it out to the bitter end by taking a pull at the 
brandy flask of one good friend.”1 Another officer attending the ceremony considered the army 
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extremely blessed that the Spanish surrendered because the recent outbreak of yellow fever in the 
town of Siboney threatened the health of the entire American army.2  
Just three weeks after landing at Daiquirí, most of the American soldiers suffered from 
some combination of dysentery, typhoid, malaria, and yellow fever. Still, the War Department 
hoped that moving Shafter’s army to a healthier encampment, enforcing stricter sanitation 
measures, and quarantining the infected soldiers could ameliorate the epidemics. By taking these 
measures, Commanding General of the Army Nelson A. Miles hoped that some regiments of the 
Fifth Corps remain to garrison eastern Cuba, while the remainder participated in further 
campaigning against the Spanish. Within two weeks of the Spanish surrender, however, Shafter 
informed the Secretary of War Russell A. Alger that over three quarters of his men were ill, 
leaving him with an “army of convalescents.” 3 Shafter’s general officers and their chief 
physicians joined their commanding officer in petitioning the War Department to immediately 
evacuate the Fifth Corps to the United States in order to avoid a terrible loss of life. After 
receiving what became known as the “Round Robin” telegrams, the War Department sprang into 
action and spared no expense in rushing ships, doctors, and medicine to Shafter’s moribund 
army. Between the 7th and 24th of August, the War Department quickly, if somewhat 
haphazardly, evacuated the over 19,000 Fifth Corps soldiers.4 
Throughout the initial occupation, the U.S. Army’s experience on the American frontier 
proved invaluable in dealing with most of the problems they encountered in Santiago, Cuba. 
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When it came to dealing with the malaria and yellow fever epidemics that decimated the 
invasion forces, however, the Army’s frontier experience did not provide any solutions. As the 
proportion of soldiers afflicted with malaria and dysentery increased to over seventy-five percent 
and fear of yellow fever spread, Shafter and his medical officers continued to battle against the 
tropical fevers in the same manner that they dealt with all contagious diseases. They sterilized 
their facilities, quarantined sick soldiers, and tried to move their camps to healthier locations. 
When these preventative measures failed to halt the malaria and yellow fever epidemics, the 
American officers simply redoubled their efforts. A few scientists had already hypothesized that 
mosquitos might carry the two deadly diseases, but U.S. Army physicians did not confirm this 
theory until well after the diseased soldiers of General William R. Shafter’s Fifth Corps departed 
Cuba for Long Island, New York. Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin sent regiments to replace 
the Fifth Corps that he hoped might be immune to tropical fevers. They were not. Only the end 
of the summer rainy season brought relief to American troops left to garrison eastern Cuba. 
 
The Outbreak of Disease 
 By the time of the surrender ceremony, the soldiers in Shafter’s army suffered from 
malnourishment and many were already infected with various diseases. Dysentery, typhoid, and 
malaria were the most prevalent illnesses; but the War Department was most concerned about the 
first cases of yellow fever among soldiers encamped at Siboney because of the lethality of the 
disease. The end of the fighting allowed supply ships to unload in Santiago harbor and soldiers 
soon received their personal items, tents, and cooking equipment. Army officers and physicians 
began implementing sanitation measures and moving their encampments to what they hoped 
would be healthier locations. The instances of soldiers falling ill to typhoid and dysentery 
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decreased, but recurrent malarial fevers continued to affect most of the soldiers and prevented 
them from doing the most basic duties. 
The War Department, Miles, and Shafter still hoped that the epidemics could be quickly 
halted and the soldiers in Santiago used elsewhere. Miles wrote to Shafter, soon after arriving off 
the coast of Santiago de Cuba, with instructions to quarantine all soldiers with yellow fever and 
move his soldiers to healthier elevations and to “improve the sanitary condition” of the new 
camps.5 By taking these preventative measures, Miles hoped that the epidemics would end and 
that the majority Shafter’s soldiers would “be available for service with another expedition.”6 
Miles preferred to have some of the veteran regulars in the Fifth Corps to accompany his army of 
volunteers to Puerto Rico, but also considered employing them in a planned fall campaign on the 
north coast of Cuba to capture Havana. The persistent epidemic eventually eliminated any hopes 
Miles had of using the cream of the American army in the Puerto Rican campaign.7 Observing 
the growing outbreak of malaria, Miles wisely decided to keep the reinforcements he brought 
from Tampa on board their transports, and both Alger and Miles made peace with the fact that 
Shafter and his men would remain in Santiago until the “fever has had its run.”8 
The malarial fever that devastated Shafter’s soldiers occur after an infected female 
Anopheles mosquito injects a Plasmodium parasite into the human body while feeding. Once 
inside its victim, the parasite moves into the bloodstream and travels to the liver, where the 																																																								
5 Miles to General Shafter, July 14, 1898, Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 5, Spanish-American War, 
Preparations and Cuban Campaign, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
6 Miles to General Shafter, July 14, 1898, Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 5, Spanish-American War, 
Preparations and Cuban Campaign, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
7 Miles to Alger, July 14, 1898, Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 5, Spanish-American War, Preparations and 
Cuban Campaign, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
8 Alger to Miles, July 14, 1898, Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 5, Spanish-American War, Preparations and 
Cuban Campaign, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
 	149	
parasite asexually reproduces for eight to ten days before reentering the bloodstream. Fever-like 
symptoms in the human host occur after the enlarged parasites reenter the circulatory system to 
feed and reproduce on red blood cells. The recurring fever, pounding headache, muscular pains, 
and skin chills characteristic of malaria are known as a paroxysm, and are a biological reaction to 
white blood cells digesting the parasites. Depending on the specific species of Plasmodium 
infecting the person, the high fevers—accompanied by severe fatigue and an enlarged spleen—
reoccur every two to three days, and the malarial parasite can continue to affect the patient for 
months. In severe cases, malaria can lead to seizures, failures of the liver or kidney, and comas. 
The worst cases of malaria are caused by the Plasmodium falciparum species, which can cause 
death to its host.9 
By the time of the Spanish surrender, a large number of Shafter’s suffering soldiers had 
the Plasmodium parasite in their blood stream and were subjected to malarial fevers. Because 
malaria incubates in the liver for about nine days before the infected person shows any 
symptoms, most of the American soldiers did not start to become ill with the disease until after 
the battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill. Most soldiers began to feel the effects of the fever 
during the siege of Santiago de Cuba. While conducting the siege, Theodore Roosevelt worried 
about his feverish soldiers “lying on their blankets, if they had any, and if not then simply in the 
mud.”10 The soldiers blamed the fact that “half the army [was] sick from exposure and want of 
the right kind of food.”11 Since the fighting began, the soldiers lived off a few pieces of hardtack 
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each day and the occasional piece of salt pork, and they had no shelter from the midday sun or 
afternoon rains. The soldiers did not suspect that it was the mosquitos, and not hunger or 
exposure, which caused the outbreak of malaria.12 
Lieutenant Steele explained in a letter to his wife how suddenly the symptoms of malarial 
fever appeared and then dissipated just to return a few days later. He told her that when the fever 
hit, it felt as “if his eyes are going to pop out, your head is going [to] pop open, your stomach and 
abdomen are going to explode, [and] the small of your back is being ground to pieces.”13 
Similarly, Lieutenant James H. Reeves suffered from a pounding headache and from “pains in 
back and legs.”14 The fevers caused by malaria usually dissipated after two to three days, and the 
partially recovered patient could do some work, but “after a little time he would be again struck 
down.”15 Private Ed Kroupa suffered from repeated bouts of the fever until one day his mates 
noticed that his “feet seemed to be in the same position, sticking out of the little tent, that they 
had been the day before. Kroupa was dead and cold.”16 
Fortunately, most soldiers did not share Kroupa’s fate because doctors came to Cuba with 
an effective treatment for most malaria symptoms. For centuries doctors used quinine, found in 
the bark of the cinchona tree of Peru, to treat malaria.  The U.S. Army’s physicians distributed 
thousands of quinine pills to the afflicted soldiers. By doing so, the doctors prevented most 
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malarial cases from becoming lethal. The bitter quinine pill could cause vomiting, blurred vision, 
and ringing in the ears, and other more serious side effects, including permanent hearing loss and 
even death. Steele complained that his doctor was keeping him “loaded to the brim with quinine 
still, so I hear a thousand sounds in my ears all the time.”17 Despite the many popular myths held 
by the officers and men in Shafter’s corps, the Army physicians knew that a parasite caused 
malaria, but they thought that it entered the body through infected water or from disturbed earth. 
The doctor and later commander of the Department of Santiago, Leonard Wood, believed the 
Spanish and American soldiers had been infected in the trenches during the siege, where “they 
lived in freshly upturned earth, deadly with the germs of malignant tropical malaria.”18 They 
continued to hope that living in cleaner conditions, boiling water, and dispensing quinine pills 
would stop the epidemic.19 
Another disease that caused fevers among the soldiers of the Fifth Corps was typhoid. 
The symptoms were so similar to malaria that Civil War doctors believed that they were the 
same disease. Typhoid spreads when flies touch human waste contaminated with a specific type 
of Salmonella bacteria and then land on food or water consumed by the soldiers. The soldiers 
brought the typhoid causing Salmonella with them from camps in the U.S. The disease affected 
the men besieging Santiago from the unsanitary American trenches, where they did not have the 
ability to boil their water and where the heavy rains washed their contaminated feces downhill 
into their water supply. The difficult logistical situation exacerbated the situation. 																																																								
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An unimproved trail led to the siege lines from the American supply depot at Siboney, 
and heavy rains made the streams temporarily impassable and turned the already poor road into a 
quagmire. The quartermasters could barely keep the soldiers supplied with enough ammunition, 
making it impossible for soldiers to receive their personal baggage with their cooking equipment 
to boil their food and water. Soldiers did not start receiving their mess kits to cook their food or 
pots to boil their water until July 18, and some had to wait until August 1.20 The fact that the 
civilians contracted by the War Department to pack the mules and drive the wagons were the 
first group to be debilitated by the fevers further complicated matters. The lack of kettles forced 
the soldiers to drink water directly from streams. Both Captain John Bigelow and Private Charles 
J. Post complained that soldiers filled their canteens, bathed, and washed their clothes in the 
same location on the San Juan River as the mules drank. An order was disseminated that men 
had to boil all the water they drank, but no one had cauldrons or pots. Many men tried to boil 
water in their tin cups, but rarely had time to do it. Bigelow and his soldiers tried to obey the 
order, but “soon gave it up as impracticable.”21  
Not only did soldiers become infected with typhoid by drinking unfiltered and un-boiled 
water from contaminated sources, but they also became infected with dysentery. Like typhoid, 
dysentery infected American soldiers after they consumed contaminated food or water, causing 
their intestines to become inflamed as their immune systems fought the pathogens. The soldiers 
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suffered from stomach cramps, dehydration, and severe diarrhea after becoming infected. One 
brigade commander noted that many of his soldiers suffered from “bowl complaints” during the 
siege.22 A soldier in another brigade knew that dysentery had arrived to the camp because “the 
shallow latrines were spattered with blood.”23 By improving the sanitary conditions, dysentery 
usually dissipated within a week, but if left untreated dysentery could be deadly, and it made the 
soldiers more vulnerable to the other serious ailments plaguing the army. 
The arrival of supplies, plentiful food, and the implementation of sanitation measures 
greatly diminished the number of soldiers suffering from dysentery and typhoid. Malaria 
continued to affect a large number of soldiers, but the physicians and soldiers of Shafter’s Fifth 
Corps were most concerned about the first confirmed case of yellow fever on July 6 by an 
American soldier camped at Siboney. The soldier was immediately taken across the bay to 
prevent the disease from spreading, but to no avail.24 Further occurrences of yellow fever 
remained confined to American soldiers in Siboney and some Spanish soldiers in Santiago, and 
did not affect the majority of Shafter’s army camped in the hills outside Santiago.25 When strict 
hygiene and sanitation measures failed to stop further cases of yellow fever in Siboney, Miles 
ordered all the buildings identified by the yellow fever expert, Juan Guiteras, to be burned. 
Guiteras hoped to destroy the unknown germs infecting the seaside town, but to no avail.  
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The U.S. Army’s biggest fear was the spread of yellow fever from Siboney to the Fifth 
Corps camps and the annihilation of the soldiers already weakened by malaria, dysentery, and 
typhoid fever. 26 The reason that yellow fever cases generally remained confined to Sanitago and 
Siboney was that the species of mosquito that carries the deadly virus prefers to lay its eggs in 
calm clear water, the kind typically found in the water containers and gardens found in urban 
settings. The Fifth Corps camps fell outside the habitat of yellow fever-carrying mosquitos, but 
they camped in the open fields preferred by the Anopheles mosquitos carrying the malaria 
parasite.27 
Yellow fever was an especially terrible disease. After being bitten by an Aedes aegypti 
mosquito carrying the single-stranded RNA Flavivirus, the victim felt no symptoms for three to 
six days as the virus incubated. The symptoms of the disease varied, but the infected person 
typically suffered from sudden and severe pain in the upper abdomen and back, and fatigue in 
the muscle and joints across the body. Next, high fevers brought on a rapid increase in the 
victim’s pulse, persistent headaches, swollen eyes and tongue, and intense chills. All that a 
physician could do was comfort the patient and let the disease run its course. After the victim 
was completely incapacitated by the fever for three to five days, the symptoms began to 
diminish. The fortunate had no further symptoms and recovered. The third of those that relapsed, 
however, suffered an excruciating but quick death as the virus attacked the victim’s organs. As 
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the liver failed, the skin and eyes turned a yellowish hue, giving the disease its name. In the last 
stages of the disease, the sufferer bled out of their mouth, eyes, and nose and regurgitated 
coagulated blood that turned the vomit black. Only death brought relief from the afflicted 
person’s suffering.28 
Many of the physicians struggled to diagnose the specific illnesses plaguing their 
soldiers, and there was much disagreement among the doctors as to how many of their patients 
suffered from the more lethal yellow fever.29 One brigade commander complained, “The doctors 
don’t know what kind of fever it is.”30 The difficulty diagnosing the different diseases resulted 
from the fact that malarial, yellow, and typhoid fevers shared many of the same initial symptoms, 
and the physicians in the field did not have lab equipment or microscopes to diagnose the 
diseases more exactly. Moreover, many of the contract surgeons hired to fill vacancies in 
Shafter’s corps were of questionable quality or did not have any experience treating or 
diagnosing these diseases, which were not prevalent in most parts of North America. Eventually, 
the doctors realized that the vast majority of the American soldiers suffered from malarial fever, 
also known as the “slow fever” or “dengue fever,” and that there were very few instances of the 
more lethal yellow fever.31 
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After the surrender of Santiago, the number of soldiers suffering from malarial fever 
grew at an alarming rate. Brigadier General Adelbert Ames reported on July 21 that in his 
brigade “many men are sick, many others are ailing, while comparatively few are in first class 
condition.”32 Two days later, he noted that over thirty-five percent of his soldiers were too ill for 
any duty, primarily because of malaria.33 By August 5, Ames still reported that just less than 
forty percent of his brigade’s soldiers were on the doctor’s sick roll, and the rest were too 
exhausted after recovering from the fever to drill or perform any hard labor.34 Meanwhile, 
Roosevelt reported that in the Rough Riders “the percentage actually on the sick list never got 
over twenty,” but “there were less than fifty per cent. who were fit for any kind of work.”35  
Shafter was slow to realize the extent of the malarial epidemic in the ranks. He reported 
to War Department on July 22 that most units had less than ten percent of their soldiers suffering 
from fever, and thought that total loss of fifteen soldiers to fever and two to dysentery was about 
the normal rate for a campaigning army. That very same day, Ames observed that nearly half his 
command was debilitated. Shafter acknowledged that the 17th and 25th Infantry Regiments had 
close to thirty percent of their soldiers suffering from malaria, but he did not realize that the rate 
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of disease in these regiments was the norm and not the exception.36 Shafter grew alarmed as he 
began to realize the extent of the epidemic. On July 24 Shafter’s medical officer informed him 
that four soldiers had died of their fevers and 396 more soldiers suffered from them, and the next 
day over a hundred more had acute fevers and were added to the sick roles.37 Then the number of 
seriously ill began to rise exponentially. 
The War Department and Shafter grew alarmed at the large number of soldiers now 
suffering from disease. During the last week in July, Shafter’s surgeons reported an average of 
4,000 soldiers on their sick rolls each day, with about 3,100 of them suffering from fever. Each 
day around 650 soldiers recovered enough from their acute fevers to return to duty, but about the 
same number of soldiers became sick enough with malaria or yellow fever to be added to the 
sick rolls. Moreover, each day about eight soldiers died from their fevers or dysentery. Everyone 
in Washington and in Santiago began to realize that Shafter’s army was not gaining any ground 
in the attritional battle against disease.38 
The numbers on the sick roll did not reflect the seriousness of the epidemic. Medical 
officers placed on this report only soldiers too sick to perform any duty or hospitalized, meaning 
the large number of exhausted soldiers still recovering from their bouts with malaria did not get 
reported. A private remembered that most feverish soldiers avoided reporting to sick call because 
most believed that “if anyone was well enough to report sick he was well enough for duty and 																																																								
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detail.”39 Well over seventy-five percent of Shafter’s army was too sick to perform guard duty, 
labor, or drill. The 9th U.S. Infantry went twenty-four hours without water because “the men did 
not did not have strength to go for it.”40 Similarly, the 71st New York struggled to find men 
healthy enough for the chore.41 Few buglers remained to play the tunes that regulated Army life 
and units struggled to find enough healthy men to pull guard detail.42 The officers and doctors in 
the Fifth Corps took all the traditional sanitary precautions that they had used since the Civil War 
to stop the epidemics, but they failed because the doctors fundamentally misunderstood the 
origins of malaria and yellow fever and how they spread. 
 
Dealing with Disease in the Post-Civil War U.S. Army 
 The U.S. Army Medical Department learned many important lessons during the Civil 
War that its surgeons took to with them when they returned to their constabulary role on the 
American frontier. Most importantly, they learned that enforcing strict sanitation measures in 
encampments radically reduced the number of soldiers inflicted with communicable diseases, 
such as cholera, typhoid, and dysentery. On the frontier, Army physicians enforced cleanliness in 
their outposts, issued quinine to treat the malarial fevers, vaccinated soldiers for smallpox, used 
morphine and alcohol to alleviate pain, and reduced the instances of scurvy by trying to add 
																																																								
39 Charles Johnson Post, The Little War of Private Post: The Spanish-American War Seen up Close (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1999), 249. 
40 Adelbert Ames to mother, August 5, 1898, Adelbert Ames Papers, Box Number 1, Correspondence, April 26 to 
August 9, 1898, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2. 
41 Charles Johnson Post, The Little War of Private Post: The Spanish-American War Seen up Close (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1999), 249. 
42 Charles Johnson Post, The Little War of Private Post: The Spanish-American War Seen up Close (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1999), 261. Leonard Wood, “Santiago Since the Surrender,” Scribner’s Magazine 25, no. 5 
(May 1899): 518. 
 	159	
vegetables to their soldiers’ diet. All of these practical measures served the U.S. Army well on 
the frontier, but still its doctors knew nothing about the organisms that caused diseases.43 
All of that begin to change in the late-nineteenth century as physicians in Europe began 
to understand that tiny germs, unseen by the human eye, could live within the human body, cause 
disease, and be transmitted from one human to another. John Snow’s study of London’s 1854 
cholera epidemic first informed scientists that unobserved microorganisms might cause most 
diseases. His insight led to a medical revolution in epidemiology and surgery. After reading a 
paper published by Louis Pasteur on methods to kill microorganisms, Joseph Lister began to use 
antiseptics on surgical tools and bandages to prevent patients from becoming infected during 
surgery and published a series of groundbreaking journal articles in 1867 describing his success. 
Lister’s work led to a dramatic increase in the number of surgeries, as the chance of survival 
dramatically increased as the likelihood of infection diminished. Later in the nineteenth century, 
other European medical researchers like Robert Koch used the knowledge that larger microbes, 
which could be removed with a filter, caused disease to begin identifying the species of bacteria 
that generated specific illnesses. About the same time scientists developed better microscopes 
and staining procedures to identify the microbes. Many American scientists remained skeptical 
of germ theory, but the notion began to gain acceptance in the Army Medical Department by the 
early 1890s, as was evident when the bacteriologist George M. Sternberg—who first 
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photographed the bacteria responsible for tuberculosis—became the eighteenth Surgeon General 
of the Army in 1893.44  
Army physicians devoted a tremendous amount of time and research to the study of 
yellow fever in the decades preceding the War with Spain and ensured that doctors familiar with 
the disease accompanied the Fifth Corps to Cuba. Sternberg had studied the disease in Florida 
after the Civil War and even fell ill to yellow fever while stationed at Pensacola in 1869. Now 
immune to the disease, Sternberg represented the Army Medical Department on the Havana 
Yellow Fever Commission sent to Cuba in 1879 to investigate the cause of the disease and to 
determine possible measures that the U.S. government could take to prevent the future epidemics 
from reaching the United States, like the ones in 1873 and 1878. With no understanding of 
viruses or bacteria, the commission made little progress.45 Understanding of bacteria and 
scientific procedures increased over the preceding decade, and Sternberg made great progress in 
ruling out different bacteria as the cause of yellow fever in his second trip to Cuba in 1888. 
Sternberg concluded that their scientific methods failed to “demonstrate the constant presence of 
any particular microorganism in the blood and tissues of yellow-fever cadavers.”46 The evidence 
proved that the unknown organism did not spread through drinking water. Sternberg 
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hypothesized that the disease may spread through infected fecal material and recommended 
quarantine, sanitation, and evacuation to stop the spread of the yellow fever.47  
The Fifth Corps’ chief surgeon, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin F. Pope, did not have much 
familiarity with yellow fever or malaria. To help him, Sternberg sent Juan Guiteras, a Cuban-
born physician and an expert on yellow fever and malaria. Guiteras had worked with Sternberg 
earlier on the Havana Yellow Fever Commission and through careful observation had noted that 
yellow fever was not transmitted directly between patients. He was skeptical whether quinine 
could prevent malaria, but recommend its use for those suffering from a malarial fever. Later, 
Sternberg selected Major William C. Gorgas to be Havana’s chief sanitary officer when the U.S. 
Army’s occupation troops arrived to the city in January 1899, because Gorgas had spent years 
studying the disease at Fort Brown during the 1882 yellow fever outbreak in Texas, several 
episodes in Florida, and an outbreak in Ocean Springs, Mississippi, in 1897. Sternberg’s 
knowledge of the life cycle of yellow fever led him, along with Commanding General of the 
Army Nelson A. Miles, to warn President William McKinley against invading Cuba in the 
summer and advise that the expedition be postponed until fall.48 
Still not knowing the origin of yellow fever, the physicians relied on two basic 
postulations on how disease spread in their attempts to combat the sickness. The first theory 
traced its origins to Hippocrates’s Airs, Waters and Places, and suggested that diseases 
originated from poisonous air and noxious vapors, known as miasmas, that emanated from 
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decaying organic debris or inorganic substances under certain atmospheric conditions. Therefore, 
to eliminate disease one needed to clean one’s surroundings to eliminate the unspecified source 
of the disease or move to a healthier climate. The advantage of the miasma hypothesis is that a 
physician could use it to explain any outbreak of an otherwise inexplicable disease, but the exact 
determinant in the atmosphere was impossible for nineteenth-century science to uncover. 
Medical observers in the United States researching the yellow fever epidemics in the Southeast 
in 1878 and 1897 validated the earlier observations by the European epidemiologists Francois 
Mélier and George Buchanan that disproved that miasmas caused the disease. The scientists 
studying the outbreaks in the American South noted that the disease spread along travel corridors 
and not within certain environments, and that quarantine could stop the spread of the disease. 49 
For lack of a better explanation, many doctors and laymen continued to believe that 
miasmas caused yellow fever during the initial occupation of Cuba. The reporter George Kennan 
and many other American officers were adamant that miasmas caused the yellow fever outbreak 
in the town of Siboney. They blamed the “number of stagnant, foul-smelling ponds and pools, 
half overgrown with rank tropical vegetation, and so full of decaying organic matter” that “the 
very air from them seemed poisonous.”50 Most medical officers at Siboney understood germ 
theory and dismissed the thought of miasmas causing yellow fever. They believed that the 
buildings used by the Fifth Corps as warehouses for their supplies should be fumigated or burned 
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because their walls were likely the source of the yet to be identified germ that caused the yellow 
fever outbreak.51 
Ironically, the Army Medical Department’s own experiments after the 1878 Yellow 
Fever epidemic killed over 20,000 people and caused one hundred million dollars in economic 
damages in the United States showed that germs passed between people did not cause the 
disease. The U.S. National Board of Health created the Havana Yellow Fever Commission to 
determine the cause of the illness after the epidemic and to determine measures to prevent the 
disease from again spreading to the United States. Carlos J. Finlay, a Cuban doctor employed by 
the commission, observed that sanitation workers had lower rates of yellow fever compared to 
the rest of Havana’s population, suggesting that yellow fever was not transmitted through the 
germs in human waste like cholera and typhoid, but the commission left Cuba without solving 
the yellow fever mystery. With neither miasmas nor germ theory adequately explaining the 
transmission of yellow fever, the U.S. Army surgeons who accompanied Shafter’s expedition to 
Santiago could only hope that basic sanitation and other preventative measures would keep the 
dreaded “yellow jack” at bay.52 
The cause of malaria similarly baffled the U.S. Army’s physicians, even though the 
disease infected almost one in every ten soldiers each year. Fortunately, the introduction of 
quinine to the U.S. Army in 1843 to treat malaria helped to reduce the number of deaths to the 
disease.53 British medical doctors identified the parasite that caused malaria before the War with 																																																								
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Spain, and they even suspected that mosquitos might somehow carry the disease. U.S. Army 
physicians had some knowledge of the British army’s theories and issued warnings to troops 
leaving to Cuba and the Philippines to avoid mosquitos if possible.54 U.S. Army bacteriologists, 
including Sternberg and Assistant Surgeon Walter Reed, wondered whether the malaria parasite 
discovered by the British might be transmitted thorough the water found in hot and moist 
climates. The association between wetlands and the disease had already been established. 
Medical Department experiments at Fort Meyer, Virginia—where over half the soldiers suffered 
from malarial fevers each year—disproved the hypothesis that malaria spread through the 
drinking of contaminated drinking water, leaving Reed to assume that perhaps miasmas 
emanating from the Potomac transmitted the disease. Reed struggled again to understand the 
cause of malaria while treating Geronimo’s Chiricahua Apaches for the “shaking sickness” and 
other diseases while they were being held as prisoners of war at Mt. Vernon Barracks in 
Alabama from 1887 to 1890.55 In addition to outbreaks of malaria at Fort Meyer and Mt. Vernon, 
large numbers of soldiers sent to maintain order in the Sacramento rail yards during the Pullman 
Strike of 1894 came down with malarial fever. The doctors treating the cases were baffled when 
new cases developed among the soldiers even after they arrived back to the healthier climate at 
the Presidio in San Francisco.56 With neither germ theory nor miasmas explaining the spread of 
yellow fever or malaria in the, U.S. Army doctors hoped that zealous cleanliness and sanitation 																																																								
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could somehow thwart the fevers as these measures did when practiced against other 
communicable diseases.57 
Army physicians advised their commanding officers to deal with fever epidemics by 
evacuating the area and by enforcing sanitation measures.58 While stationed at Ringgold 
Barracks, Texas after the Civil War, Shafter dealt with a yellow fever epidemic that killed two of 
his assistant surgeons and his quartermaster clerk, along with half the population of Rio Grande 
City. To deal with the outbreak of yellow fever and epidemic of severe diarrhea, Shafter first 
secured a cleaner water supply, and then temporarily shuttled his infantry unit away from the 
epicenter to Fort Brown, Texas, near Brownsville.59 Then Lieutenant Henry W. Lawton 
experienced a malaria epidemic in 1877 while escorting the Northern Cheyenne to Indian 
Territory. Lawton blamed the outbreak on the lack of adequate food and the poor quality of the 
rations. He also criticized the Indian Bureau for not providing the Indians quinine. Moreover, 
both Lawton and the War Department pleaded with the Department of the Interior to move the 
Cheyenne to a healthier climate.60 Lawton again encountered malaria when chasing Geronimo 
through Sonora, Mexico. Confounded by the disease, Assistant Surgeon Wood could only 
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evacuate the soldiers of Lawton’s command back to Arizona after they fell ill.61 While 
evacuating the epicenter of yellow fever and malaria outbreaks was the U.S. Army’s best 
defense, sanitation seemed to prevent most other diseases. 
The discovery that cholera, typhus, and dysentery spread through the bacteria found in 
infected excrement led to a public health movement to eliminate these diseases across the United 
States before the War with Spain. Medical professionals, to include those in the U.S. Army, 
thought that all communicable diseases might be eliminated by regular garbage collection, the 
establishment of modern sewer systems, and by setting up water filtration plants or boiling water. 
Army surgeons worked with post commanders to improve the sanitation infrastructure on posts 
and the hygiene of soldiers. As smaller garrisons closed with the end of the Indian Wars, post 
commanders had the resources to build healthier barracks with modern plumbing. Army medical 
officers continued to rely on sanitation and evacuation as the best preventative measures to fight 
the outbreak of disease during the Santiago campaign.62 
 
Losing the Battle against Epidemic Fevers 
Almost all medical professionals in 1898 believed that evacuation was the best way to 
stop a malaria or yellow fever outbreak. Upon hearing of the outbreak of the two diseases in 
Santiago during the siege, both Surgeon General Sternberg and Commanding General Miles 
advised Shafter to abandon the trenches and move to a cleaner and higher elevated campsite as 																																																								
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soon as the Spanish surrendered. Miles arrived to Santiago de Cuba with reinforcements from 
Tampa on July 16. Upon landing he advised Shafter to have his soldiers “change camps almost 
daily occupying fresh ground until free from the fever.”63 Furthermore, Surgeon-General 
Sternberg sent word to Shafter that moving his troops to encampments in the foothills above the 
800-foot fever belt and then changing camps every three to five days would protect the soldiers 
from yellow fever. Miles and Sternberg also recommended a strict quarantine of any infected 
soldiers.64  
Miles’s reasonable guidance that Shafter follow the Surgeon General’s advice and move 
his command to the hills north of Santiago met with a curt reply from Shafter that set off an 
unfortunate squabble for authority between the two generals in the midst of the fever epidemic. 
Shafter responded to Miles that he would comply with all his “requests and direction,” but had 
been told by Alger that Miles was “not to supercede [him] in command here.”65 Despite the fact 
that Alger had indeed told Shafter that he would retain an independent command, and that 
Shafter attempted to remain professional in his rebuke of his superior, Shafter acted 
insubordinately. The same egotism and selfishness that led Shafter to deny the Navy and the 
Cubans any part in the surrender ceremony led him to attack his commanding officer who by law 
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and by order of the President commanded all the field forces in the U.S. Army, including those in 
Santiago.66  
Miles took the slight personally, especially after he had gone out of his way not to 
threaten the autonomy of Shafter’s command in his correspondence and interactions with the 
general after arriving in Cuba.67 The Commanding General responded politely but authoritatively 
that he had “no desire” to and had “carefully avoided any appearance of superseding” Shafter. 68 
Then Miles pointed out that Shafter and his soldiers belonged to the U.S. Army, which he “had 
the honor to command.”69 After referencing orders from the Alger and McKinely that gave him 
the authorization to do with Shafter’s command as he saw fit, Miles chided the corps commander 
by concluding that he “should regret that any event would cause either yourself or any part of 
your command to cease to be a part of mine.”70 After being reprimanded, Shafter said nothing 
else to his superior and obeyed all his orders until Miles departed for Puerto Rico on 21 July.  
Shafter did complain, however, to Adjutant-General Corbin about Miles giving him 
orders. Shafter wrote to Corbin that he did not “wish to be small about anything,” even as he 
acted small, and said that he did not “care to be raising questions,” even as he did; Shafter 																																																								
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wanted Corbin to affirm that he was in the right.71 In what was likely a masterful bureaucratic 
sleight-of-hand, Corbin seems to have purposefully misplaced Shafter’s letter until August 11, 
the day before hostilities ended with Spain, so as to avoid getting caught up in the feud. A 
confidential investigation conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Marion P. Maus on behalf of Miles 
into the affair found that Shafter’s dispatch appeared to be “insubordinate, highly unmilitary and 
uncalled for,” but Maus also concluded that “the manner in which instructions had been given, 
regardless of military courtesy and procedure would, perhaps, serve as an excuse, to some extent, 
for General Shafter’s action.”72 With that the War Department let the issue drop, but the two 
feuding generals continued their row for years after the war.  
Meanwhile, Shafter’s division commanders acted on the advice of Miles and the Army 
Medical Department and searched for high ground to encamp the Fifth Corps in the afternoon 
following the Spanish surrender. Major General Joseph Wheeler sent the physician and acting 
brigade commander, Brigadier General Wood, and his aide Lieutenant James H. Reeves to 
conduct a reconnaissance of the surrounding hills to find a camp with clean-open ground, healthy 
breezes, and clear water. Wheeler ordered his Cavalry Division to occupy the camp Wood and 
Reeves selected two miles northeast of the city the next morning.73 By the morning of June 19, 
the majority of Shafter’s army had abandoned the trenches on the San Juan Heights and occupied 
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new camps. During the short march nearly half the soldiers in the Cavalry Division fell out due 
to fevers and heat exhaustion.74  
In the short term, the move temporarily reduced the number of sick by moving the 
soldiers away from the contaminated water supply and overflowing toilet sumps, and the 
presence of cooler temperatures in the hills and breezes coming of both the mountains and sea 
led to the “noticeable” absence of mosquitos.75 Furthermore, the new camps were better 
organized, cleaner, and the soldiers now had access to canvas tents, a clear stream, their cooking 
supplies, and quality rations, including fresh meet and canned food.76 Unfortunately, the breezes 
soon subsided and the mosquitos returned, and Steele complained that the flies became “so thick 
in here they are nearly driving me crazy” and “everyone has diarrhea most of the time.”77 Later, 
Steele wrote his wife that there were “four hundred and seventy-five thousand flies pestering” 
him as he penned the letter.78 Roosevelt reported that the number suffering from malaria in his 
regiment actually increased after moving to the new camp.79 The move failed to stop dysentery 
and malaria from plaguing the Fifth Corps. 
Most physicians did not believe that foul air and miasmas found in the low grounds 
caused malarial and yellow fever; rather, a strict quarantine of those suffering from the illnesses 
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was the best means to stop the spread the unknown germs that caused the diseases. Medical 
officers tried to quarantine the few confirmed yellow fever patients to Siboney, but met with 
minimal success due to the difficulty of distinguishing between the two diseases. Physicians 
could only distinguish yellow fever from typhoid and malaria when a patient relapsed to the 
lethal and easily identifiable final stage of the illness. The yellow fever patient had already been 
contagious for some time by this point. Yellow fever spread to “almost every regiment 
throughout the command” and over a hundred soldiers fell ill to the virus.80 Similarly, with close 
to eighty percent of the soldiers infected by intermittent outbreaks of malarial fever, isolation of 
the disease became impossible. Shafter tried to quarantine newly arrived units by isolating them 
from the both Cubans and American soldiers. Shafter and his physicians were baffled when 
soldiers in the newly arrived 8th Ohio fell ill despite being in complete isolation. Quarantine 
failed to check the spread of fever.81 
Fortunately, the improved cleanliness at the new camps did reduce, but did not eliminate, 
the number of soldiers inflicted with of dysentery and typhoid. The distribution of new uniforms 
increased the health and morale of the troops. Most soldiers had not changed their clothing since 
they packed their baggage in the hulls of their transports back in Tampa in early June. Lice 
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infested the soldiers’ hair and dirty clothes.82 Besides the daily soaking of their clothes by the 
afternoon thunderstorms, the American soldiers had not washed their uniforms since landing at 
Daiquirí. One officer commented on how “all the clothes were in rags; even the officers had 
neither socks nor underwear.”83 Army regulations dictated that soldiers should buy their own 
replacement uniforms, but Miles asked and received permission from Alger to issue the soldiers 
replacement uniforms free of charge. The soldiers received lightweight canvas uniforms to 
replace their blue wool ones, just in time to leave Santiago.84 
In mid-July, the War Department decided to evacuate the most seriously wounded and ill 
to New York and Fortress Monroe, Virginia aboard the Concho, Seneca, and Olivette. In many 
cases, officers used their rank or political connections to get themselves and their kin out on 
these two transports filled with the most serious cases. Brigadier General Ames sent his ailing 
son, who served as his aide-de-camp, out on July 22 aboard the Concho with soldiers wounded 
during the attack up San Juan Heights.85 The fact that Ames’s son, Shafter’s son-in-law, and 
others fled the epidemic made many soldiers angry with these “coffee coolers” for escaping 
Santiago as the rest of the sick continued to suffer.86 Most of the soldiers aboard the three ships, 
however, were in desperate condition, including William Paulding. The now eighty-pound 																																																								
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captain suffered from both malarial and yellow fever and drifted in and out of a coma. Making 
matters worse for the patients, the Concho, later known as “the death ship,” left Santiago without 
adequate food, water, medicine, or medical personnel. When the War Department and the 
American press saw the conditions of the Concho and Seneca upon their arrival to the U.S., they 
were dismayed that Shafter and his quartermaster allowed the ships to leave in such a state. 
McKinley ordered an immediate investigation, and wanted assurances that it would not happen 
again.87 Those aboard the Olivette fared much better on their journey to Fortress Monroe and 
New York City fared much better because the hospital ship was built especially to care for the 
sick and wounded and had a robust medical staff.88 Back in Santiago, the situation continued to 
worsen. 
 
The Decline and Evacuation of the Fifth Corps 
Despite its best efforts to sanitize camps and move soldiers to healthier locations, the 
Fifth Corps continued to suffer from high rates of fever. Of the approximately 19,000 soldiers in 
the Fifth Corps, physicians treated an average of 2,732 soldiers for acute fevers each day, with at 
least three times more suffering from feverish paroxysms in any three-day period. Despite this, 
Shafter reported for the first time that more soldiers left the hospital than entered it. Most of the 
soldiers were still sick, but they stopped reporting to the hospital, most likely because there was 
little that could be done for them there. Furthermore, Shafter and his medical officers may have 																																																								
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played with the number to give the impression that the situation was improving. Probably for the 
same reasons, the number of reported sick soldiers in the corps fell slightly from the last week of 
July, but the number of soldiers dying of disease each day increased to twelve. Also, by this 
point almost all soldiers had been affected by the fevers and still suffered from their lingering 
effects.89  
The example of the 7th U.S. Infantry demonstrates how the different diseases affected 
each regiment. The Cavalry Division Surgeon, Major Valery Havard, reported that that 300 of 
the 740 soldiers in the regiment were on the sick rolls. Of those, 250 had malaria or severe 
diarrhea, probably caused by dysentery. The other 50 had yellow fever, of whom six later 
perished. Most of the remaining 400 soldiers in the regiment had recently recovered from earlier 
bouts with malaria and were still exhausted.90 With about fourteen soldiers succumbing to 
disease in Shafter’s army each day in early August, the gravediggers, ceremonial firing squads, 
and buglers became overworked performing burial services. The constant playing of “Taps” so 
demoralized the men that Shafter ordered that it no longer be played during the services.91 The 
large number of deaths forced Shafter to ask the Adjutant General that “150 large, 250 medium, 
and 100 small size” coffins be sent “to meet demand from time to time.”92 Even more than he 
needed coffins, Shafter needed the War Department to send more doctors. 
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The surgeons treating feverish soldiers became infected at an alarming rate, leaving the 
increasing number of sick soldiers without proper medical attention. At any one time, as many as 
fifteen percent of the physicians in the corps were incapacitated by fevers and a growing number 
became so ill they were evacuated to the U.S.93 Captain William Paulding complained that in his 
ward of the Yellow Fever Hospital there was only a single Cuban doctor their treating over fifty 
patients. The officers in Paulding’s tent started their own mess to cook their food because the 
orderlies were too busy. The doctor had no nurses or hospital corpsmen to assist him, and he had 
to rely on a few untrained soldiers who volunteered for the job. The Cuban doctor became so 
overworked that he threatened to “give up,” but was placated after three Army doctors and some 
volunteer nurses arrived to help.94  To find more physicians, Shafter pulled the “medical students 
and young doctors out of the ranks of the volunteer regiments” to care for his thousands of sick 
soldiers, including Harry Thorpe, a Rough Rider from New York.95 
With such a shortage of healthy medical personnel, Shafter pleaded to the War 
Department to send more doctors and nurses to Santiago as soon as possible. Shafter made his 
first request for more medical personnel on July 19. Seeing that the “case is one of such 
importance,” Shafter and Havard—who acted as corps surgeon after Colonel Pope became 
incapacitated by his fever—requested the immediate dispatch of “500 hospital attendants, 100 																																																																																																																																																																																		
relative to Santiago and Porto Rico Campaigns, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania, 217. 
93 Mary C. Gillett, The Army Medical Department, 1865-1917, Army Historical Series (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, 1995), 150. 
94 William Paulding Memoirs, William and Grace Paulding Papers, Box Number 1, The U.S. Army Military History 
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 85-87. 
95 Shafter to Adjutant-General, U.S.A., July 29, 1898, Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 6, Official 
Correspondence relative to Santiago and Porto Rico Campaigns, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania, 187. Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders: An Autobiography (New York: Library of 
America, 2004), 158. 
 	176	
immune nurses, and a large number of immune doctors” to Santiago, regardless of cost.96 Even 
after the Olivette arrived in Santiago with surgeons, nurses, and medical supplies on July 24, 
Shafter still pleaded with the War Department to rush fifty more physicians “within a week.”97 
Corbin replied the next day that an additional 129 nurses and 65 doctors were already on the way 
to Cuba, and that Sternberg understood the severity of the situation and was sending further 
immune nurses and doctors as quickly as he could.98 The Red Cross nurses and doctors also 
pitched in and Clara Barton provided cots, bedding, comfort items to the soldiers.99 Even after 
the Fifth Corps began evacuating Santiago, Shafter requested another 70 doctors and nurses, 
because of the high rate in which his medical personnel continued to fall ill.100 
With so many doctors, nurses, and hospital stewards falling ill with fever and the delays 
sending replacements, Colonel Charles R. Greenleaf, in charge of the Yellow Fever Hospital, 
requested that Shafter detail a company of soldiers to serve as attendants. Shafter dismissed the 
Colonel’s request. With that, Greenleaf appealed to Miles, who asked the 24th Infantry for 
volunteers. Miles and Greenleaf went to this African American regiment for several reasons. 
First, racial attitudes in the U.S. Army toward African Americans led to black soldiers being 
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picked over their white colleagues to serve as stewards and do more menial labor. Second, most 
officers and physicians, including Miles and Greenleaf, still assumed that African Americans had 
a natural resistance to tropical fevers, despite observations to the contrary.101 
The Army Medical Department knew that diseases such as smallpox, dysentery, and 
cholera affected all races of people the same, but centuries of observations had led most people 
to believe that certain races had immunity to many tropical ailments. The War Department 
naively assumed that African American soldiers still had a genetic safeguard against malaria and 
yellow fever, despite the fact that Army Medical Department statistics showed that malaria rates 
were equal, if not greater, among black soldiers.102 Ordinary observations also destroyed the 
myth of black immunity, as Roosevelt noted the “curious” fact that “colored troops seemed to 
suffer as heavily as the white” from fever.103 The assumption that late-nineteenth century African 
Americans had immunity to the disease was based on observations that enslaved sub-Saharan 
Africans brought to the American South beginning in the seventeenth century suffered far less 
from yellow and malarial fevers than their Anglo-American masters. A large portion of the 
slaves brought to the American South came from West Africa, where many people carried the 
inherited sickle-cell trait. Although some children born with the trait died in childhood from 
sickle-cell anemia, the majority had no complications and carried partial immunity to the malaria 
Plasmodium, especially the deadly falciparum variety. Many more of the enslaved Africans 
carried antibodies to the parasite passed to them from their exposed mother’s blood before birth, 
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making it easier for them to battle early exposure to malaria and develop their own immunity to 
the disease.104 
 Like malaria, yellow fever caused only mild symptoms in children whose mother’s 
carried the antibody to the virus. Slaves arriving to the United States from parts of Africa where 
yellow fever was endemic typically had antibiotic immunity to the disease. Because of the rarity 
of yellow fever epidemics in the United States, almost no Americans of African descent had 
immunity to the disease by 1898. Their enslaved ancestors from sub-Sahara Africa may have 
been immune to yellow fever if exposed as a child, but if the descendants of these slaves were 
not exposed to the disease as children, then they were just as vulnerable to the disease as any 
other adult. In contrast, most native-born Cubans, regardless of race, were exposed to both 
malaria and yellow fever as children and probably had some antibodies already in their blood 
stream passed to them from their mothers to help them survive early infection and develop a 
lifelong immunity. With most native Cubans developing childhood immunity to the yellow 
fever-causing Flavivirus and the malaria-producing Plasmodium parasite, Cubans did not suffer 
anywhere near the same rates of infection to the fevers as immigrants to the island or Spanish 
and American soldiers of any race.105 
The black soldiers of the 24th Infantry went to work burying the dead, erecting tents, and 
performing nursing duties in the Yellow Fever Hospital with little complaint, much to the 
surprise of Greenleaf, and suffered heavily performing their duties. Believing that “colored 
people…will go to pieces like children and become absolutely useless” when faced by a plague, 																																																								
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Greenfield was stunned when every single man in the regiment volunteered.106 With no natural 
immunity to malaria or yellow fever, the black soldiers and their officers quickly fell ill.107 In 
one company of the regiment, all but four members came down with fevers. The regiment of 456 
men only had three officers and twenty-four soldiers escape sickness altogether. Nearly twenty 
percent of the 24th Infantry died of disease, by far the highest rate of any regiment.108 Miles, one 
of the few officers who believed in racial equality, praised the men of the 24th Infantry for 
fighting with “such heroism as well as sacrifice” in their assault up San Juan Hill, and for having 
“voluntarily engaged in nursing yellow-fever patients.”109 Greenleaf and Miles did not need to 
ask additional units, since every soldier and officer of the 24th volunteered for duty at the Yellow 
Fever Hospital.110 
Not only did the thousands of sick soldiers overwhelm the limited number of health care 
providers, but they also stretched the capacity of the permanent and temporary hospitals in 
Santiago. The temporary hospitals set up by the Medical Department upon arriving in Santiago 
were already overcrowded with the approximately 1,400 battle-wounded soldiers when the fever 
epidemic started. The surrender of Santiago alleviated the crisis, as buildings in Santiago were 
converted to hospitals, tents and medical supplies were quickly unloaded onto the docks, and 
hospital ships arrived from the United States. The Yacht Club of Santiago was one of the many 																																																								
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buildings converted into a makeshift hospital, where an observer noted how at random a “half-
naked and delirious soldier would crawl out aimlessly, and try to walk away, stumbling feebly,” 
while others “just lay inert, or waiving their…hands in the delirium of fever.”111 The doctors did 
put mosquito nets over the crowded cots in this hospital to provide comfort to the patients, and 
by doing so unknowingly prevented the further spread of malaria and yellow fever. A small 
launch took confirmed yellow fever cases to the Yellow Fever Hospital in the harbor for 
quarantine.112 By August 10, Doctors Wood and Havard decided that the War Department did 
not need to build a new hospital from scratch, as proposed. The hospital would take far too long 
to build and the carpenters and wood would have to be shipped in from the United States. More 
importantly, the existing hospital in Santiago had excellent cooking facilities and a sanitation 
plant, and it could accommodate 2,000 men comfortably. By mid-August, the War Department 
had a sufficient number of hospitals in Santiago to accommodate all the seriously ill patients.113 
The War Department hoped to keep the Fifth Corps in Santiago until the fever ran its 
course, the Spanish prisoners departed, and replacement troops arrived from the United States to 
garrison Eastern Cuba. The War Department worked quickly to meet those three conditions in 
order to evacuate Shafter’s soldiers. Corbin had two replacement regiments already in route to 
Santiago on July 23 and asked how many more he should send, so he could “bring the entire 
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Fifth Corps north for rest and recuperation.”114 With reinforcements on the way and the Spanish 
prisoners waiting for the contracted transports to arrive to take them to Spain, Alger informed 
Shafter that all that remained before his army would be evacuated to Montauk Point, Long 
Island, was for the fevers to subside. The War Department did not want to bring the infected 
soldiers back to the United States because it feared that their arrival would cause a yellow fever 
outbreak, and they picked a port north of Delaware because the people in the Southern states 
dreaded another yellow fever epidemic.115 Their fears were not unreasonable, as Cuban refugees 
arriving in New Orleans had caused a yellow fever outbreak and widespread panic across the 
Southeastern U.S. less than a year earlier.116 Alger hoped the news that the army would sail to 
Long Island after the fevers receded would encourage the men to recover like a “tonic.”117 
Shafter informed the soldiers of the news in a published circular letter on 29 July.118 
The War Department’s decision to delay the evacuation until the fevers subsided did not 
go over well with the troops. The soldiers now realized that they could not survive their 
persistent spells of malaria through the rest of the rainy months of August and September.119 
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Lieutenant Steele told his wife “if the President doesn’t get us out of this place, we shall all die 
sooner or later.120 Similarly, Roosevelt believed that “every officer, from the highest to the 
lowest realized” that if the corps “spent the summer in their sick camps” they would lose “half 
the men and [shatter] the health of the remainder.”121 Ames knew that the division he now 
commanded was “quite unfit for further campaigning,” and it soon became apparent to the other 
senior officers that the Fifth Corps was no longer fit for subsequent campaigns in Puerto Rico or 
Cuba and must be evacuated back to the United States.122 
The War Department still hoped that the Fifth Corps could recover from the malaria and 
yellow fever epidemics simply by moving the corps by rail to the presumably healthier highlands 
inland from Santiago de Cuba. Sternberg also wanted the corps to shift camps every two to three 
days, an idea Roosevelt and other thought utterly absurd due to the lack of transportation and the 
condition of the men.123 Shafter wrote the War Department on 3 August, in what became the first 
of the three “Round Robin” letters, to explain the infeasibility of their plan. He reported to 
Corbin that the rail line was in a state in disrepair, and even after they completed the repairs the 
following week, it would take a month to ferry the entire corps due to the small capacity of the 
trunk line. Furthermore, a reconnaissance conducted by Shafter’s aid, Lieutenant John D. Miley, 
found that area ill-suited for a camp because of the six-foot-tall grass, the lack of a nearby water 
source, and the loamy soil. Even if the campsite had been a good one, Shafter’s soldiers “were 
now really an army of convalescents,” and with “at least 75 per cent of the men having malarial 																																																								
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fever,” they were incapable of performing any major movement. Shafter concluded that the only 
remaining course of action was “to immediately transport the Fifth Corps…to the United States. 
If all the soldiers remained in Cuba until the fever season passed, Shafter believed that in the fall 
“there will then be very few to move” back home.124  
Shafter came to the conclusion that the Army could not stay in Cuba sometime before 
August 3, but knew he could not insist upon the evacuation of his entire corps until he reached a 
consensus with all his senior officers, so that no one would receive all the criticism for the 
monumental decision, especially himself. Shafter held a meeting at 10:00 AM on August 3 with 
every senior medical and general officer except two who were too ill.125 During the meeting 
Colonel Theodore Roosevelt and Brigadier General Ames spoke the most openly as volunteer 
officers, while Wheeler, the only other volunteer officer present, “saw fit to pipe low” as a 
“political aspirant.”126 The remaining officers present were Regulars and were less forceful when 
recommending for the evacuation of the army because they feared for their careers, “had been 
brought up to life-long habits of obedience without protest,” and “had the dread of the War 
Department before their eyes.”127  
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Even if the Regulars tended to be reserved when giving their recommendations, all those 
present accepted that the army must be evacuated immediately to save it from destruction.128 
Major Havard and all of his subordinate division surgeons expressed concern that the malarial 
epidemic could not be stopped and that the number of yellow fever cases continued to rise. 
Furthermore, they expected the mortality rate from both diseases to increase. After reaching 
these conclusions, “they unanimously recommended that the only course to pursue to save the 
lives of thousands of our soldiers is to transport the whole army to the United States as quickly as 
possible” and signed the first of two circular letters.129 The general officers echoed the medical 
opinion of the surgeons and added that the Fifth Corps was incapacitated by malaria and 
incapable of moving to the interior. They concluded that the army must be moved north 
immediately “or it will perish,” and all the brigade and division commanders signed their names 
to the second circular telegram stating their unified opinion.130  
While acting prudently, if belatedly, to save his corps, Shafter erred by giving his consent 
for the Associated Press to send dispatches back to New York with published copies of the three 
Round Robin letters. He even agreed that “he would remove the censorship on any cablegrams” 
the generals sent to “their friends on this subject” in order to put pressure on the War Department 
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to act quickly.131 The War Department did not need the prodding and would have acted sooner if 
it had understood the severity of the situation, but before August 3, Shafter’s correspondence had 
constantly suggested that the situation was improving and not dire.132 Alger, Corbin, and the 
President were all surprised by Shafter’s sudden sense of urgency, and they were embarrassed 
and upset that the press published the contents of the Round Robin telegrams at the same time 
the War Department received them, not giving them any time to react. Alger considered “the 
publication of the ‘Round Robin’ at that time” as “one of the most unfortunate and regrettable 
incidents of the war,” because it breached army discipline, threatened the peace negotiations in 
Paris, forced the War Department to rush the Fifth Corps home before Camp Wikoff was ready 
to receive them, and embarrassed the administration.133 Alger insisted that all future official 
reports only be released to the press under his authority, and thought it “strange” that Shafter 
released the telegram to the Associated Press without permission or even awaiting a reply.134 
Shafer dishonestly suggested that a draft of the telegram was leaked to the press without his 
consent.135 
Despite being circumvented, the War Department officials did not hesitate to begin 
planning the rapid withdrawal of the Fifth Corps. Corbin needed information from Shafter in 
order to plan and coordinate the War Department’s response. He asked how many additional 																																																								
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transports were required to evacuate the entire corps. Corbin instructed Shafter to use any 
transports already unloaded in Santiago to begin immediately shipping soldiers to Long Island. 
“Sparing no effort,” Corbin diverted all available transports form Puerto Rico and Tampa.136 
Next, the War Department determined how many regiments were needed to occupy the area of 
Eastern Cuba surrendered by General José Toral. Shafter believed that two brigades were 
needed, so Corbin issued orders to a total of eight regiments to report to Santiago. When 
designating units to relieve the Fifth Corps, Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin, with one 
exception, sent regiments he hoped would be at least partially immune to the tropical ailments 
that plagued the Fifth Corps. Five of the replacement regiments sent to Santiago were called 
“Immunes,” for their supposed resistance to tropical diseases due to previous infection. The 9th 
Immune Regiment consisted of black soldiers and junior officers, while the other four were 
white regiments. Corbin understood that most of these men probably had no immunity, but had 
no better options. Corbin also sent two state volunteer regiments selected from Kansas and 
Illinois that consisted entirely of black officers and soldiers, because the Adjutant General hoped 
that African Americans had some natural genetic resistance to the ailments found in warmer 
climes. Lastly, Corbin also sent the Fifth U.S. Infantry to bolster the less disciplined volunteers 
with the presence of regulars.137   
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When making his recommendation on which regiments from the Fifth Corps should be 
the last to leave, Shafter decided to keep three of the four black regiments under his command in 
Santiago. Despite obvious evidence to the contrary, he still believed they had a greater immunity 
to malaria and yellow fever. The 24th Infantry continued to assist at the Yellow Fever Hospital 
until relieved by select members of the 2nd Tennessee Volunteer Regiment, thought to be 
immune from yellow fever. Thomas O. Sommers arrived with the volunteers, a doctor who had 
treated over 1,500 cases of yellow fever during the 1878 and 1879 epidemics in the United 
States.138 Similarly, the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments guarded the last of the Spanish prisoners 
and garrisoned the city until the full contingent of Immunes regiments arrived. Someone had to 
be the last to depart, and the black soldiers had the fewest patrons acting on their behalf.139 Even 
the prejudiced white officers in the U.S. Army thought that the black soldiers had been singled 
out for racial reasons. Steele confessed he was “opposed to nigger regiments as strongly as 
anyone can be,” but he “felt so sorry for the officers and the men of the 9th and 10th” because 
“they not only didn’t show themselves any better adapted to the climate than the whites, but in 
fact had more sickness and more deaths.”140  
With the obvious exception of the three black regiments, the soldiers became jovial on 
receiving news that they would immediately begin departing for the United States.141 Even so, 
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they struggled to muster the strength to march the seven miles from their camp to the harbor to 
board ships bound for home. The heavy rains that occurred daily in Santiago during the first 
week in August turned the roads into a sticky mud that came up to men’s knees in some 
places.142 The 71st New York entered Santiago in column of fours in their brilliant new khaki-
colored uniforms with their colors flying, but many “men struggled to keep themselves in the 
ranks, and were braced by the men on either side of them.”143 Half the men collapsed on their 
backs from exhaustion as soon as they arrived on the wharf. The slenderness of the soldiers and 
their gaunt expressions as they trudged through the mud toward the docks led Lieutenant Reeves 
to conclude that “everybody, or almost everybody, would have died in a short while if left in 
Cuba very long.”144 
The first troops began loading ships to depart Cuba on August 7. Lieutenant Colonel 
Charles F. Humphrey and his other quartermaster officers still struggled to coordinate and plan 
the loading of the Fifth Corps, but the effort was considerably better than the embarkation at 
Tampa and the landing at Daiquirí because of the arrival of additional lighters and tugs from the 
United States and the ability to use Santiago de Cuba’s docks. The quartermaster officers still 
loaded units on a first-come, first-serve basis, and the Rough Riders once again stormed a better 
ship, the Miami, than the one assigned to them.145 After the Concho fiasco, the War Department 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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did not want any transports leaving Cuba without adequate medical personal, rations, and clean 
water. Havard had Surgeon Frank J. Ives work with the quartermaster officers to inspect each 
transport before it departed Santiago to ensure “all necessary medical supplies were put on board 
each transport and that all suitable preparations were made for the sick.”146 Shafter took other 
precautions to ensure the health of the soldiers on their voyage home. 
Still believing that malaria and yellow fever might be caused by germs on the soldiers, 
Shafter followed the advice of his medical doctors and ordered the soldiers to burn all their 
clothing and bedding and leave their tents standing in Cuba.147 The War Department also insisted 
that no yellow fever patients leave with the Fifth Corps until they recovered, but allowed all but 
the most critical malarial patients to be shipped home, since the War Department only feared the 
more lethal yellow fever being brought back to the U.S.148 A board of medical officers inspected 
every sick soldier for any signs of yellow fever before they allowed them to board transports. 
The inspections, however, caused almost every member of the committee to become ill, and the 
members were replaced several times over.149 
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Within four days of the Round Robin telegrams being sent to Washington, sanitized 
transports with adequate provisions and medical staff began regularly departing Santiago for 
Long Island. The Cavalry Division, with the exception of its black regiments, had departed by 
August 10, and half the regiments from General Jacob F. Kent’s Division departed on the 12th 
aboard the St. Paul and Morteno.150 With the arrival of the first two regiments of “Immunes,” the 
War Department allowed the first companies of African American cavalry troopers to leave 
Santiago with elements of the corps artillery, just a week after the main body of Wheeler’s 
Cavalry Division.151 With the exception of the 24th Infantry, which did not leave until September, 
and the 1,400 still too ill to travel, the last soldiers of the Fifth Corps and its commanding general 
boarded transports on August 25 and arrived in Montauk on September 1. Surgeons cleared 
1,200 of the patients to travel within two weeks of the Fifth Corps departure, and only 200 acute 
malarial and yellow fever patients remained for the occupation troops to care for. The War 
Department’s evacuation of the over 19,000 soldier-strong Fifth Corps in about three weeks was 
probably the most efficient work it did during the entire campaign in the Caribbean.152 
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Conclusion 
 The inability of the U.S. Army and the medical community to determine the specific 
causes of malaria and yellow fever led observers to blame a wide variety of factors for the fever 
epidemics. Although some believed that fever epidemics were simply the natural result of 
campaigning in the tropics during the summer months and could not have been mitigated, the 
sanitary measures ordered by Havard, Wood, and other Army doctors did reduce the number of 
soldiers infected with typhoid, dysentery, and other communicable diseases caused by unsanitary 
conditions. Most, however, believed that the number of soldiers suffering from malaria and 
yellow fever could have also been drastically reduced if proper tentage, clothing, shelter, and 
medical attention had been provided by the War Department. Miles even blamed the canned beef 
provided to the soldiers for the fever. Because these perceived causal factors could have been 
mitigated with proper planning, most people blamed Shafter, the Army Medical Department, and 
the War Department for neglecting the soldiers. Surely, Shafter and the War Department could 
have done a better job of planning and sustaining the Santiago campaign, but the conclusion of 
fighting and the arrival of adequate food, tents, and medical care did nothing to resolve the fever 
epidemic in Shafter’s Fifth Corps. Finally, the soldiers sent to relieve the Fifth Corps and 
garrison the Province of Santiago did not endure the hardships of campaigning and had adequate 
food, supplies, and shelter, but still suffered from the same rates of malaria. Even so, the 
criticisms against the War Department for neglecting the Fifth Corps and other mobilized 
soldiers in stateside training camps led to an executive investigation, known as the Dodge 
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Commission, the sidelining of Miles and Shafter for their rest of their careers, and eventually the 
resignation of Secretary Alger.153 
In all, 427 of Shafter’s men died of disease in Santiago, including 46 from yellow fever, 
and another 87 died in transit to Long Island. Another 257 soldiers perished from the diseases 
they acquired in Cuba while at Camp Wikoff. A total of 771 soldiers died of disease before the 
Fifth Corps disbanded on October 3, 1898, so that the Regulars could return to their frontier 
posts and the volunteers could go home.154 Typical of wars before the twentieth century, the 
number of soldiers from the Fifth Corps that perished from disease far surpassed the 260 killed in 
combat.155 
The Army Medical Department continued its research into yellow fever and malaria, and 
by the end of the occupation of Cuba, Army surgeons confirmed that mosquitos were the vector 
of the two diseases and implemented preventive measures to reduce the chance of infection. 
British research into malaria allowed the Army Medical Department to mitigate the chances of 
soldiers becoming infected by the disease, but the information had arrived a few weeks too late 
to benefit Shafter’s Fifth Corps. As the last of the last of the emaciated soldiers departed 
Santiago for Montauk in August 1898, British scientist Ronald Ross wrote Sternberg with his 
findings showing that mosquitos did in fact carry the malaria Plasmodium. With this 																																																								
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information, Major Jefferson R. Kean advised the occupation troops arriving in Havana in 
January 1899 to use mosquito netting. At first soldiers and officers ignored his advice, but as the 
evidence became overwhelming, the use of mosquito nets became standard. By December 1900, 
a general order finally directed their use. The regulation plus a mosquito eradication campaign in 
Cuban cities produced dramatic results. The number of deaths attributed to malaria dropped by 
fifty percent by 1901, and dropped another fifty percent by 1902. The number of people in 
Havana infected by the disease plummeted by seventy-five percent.156 
The U.S. Army’s determination to eradicate yellow fever also eventually paid off, largely 
due to the efforts of Carlos Finlay. After the Havana Yellow Fever Commission departed Cuba 
in 1880, the Cuban physician continued to research the disease. In 1881, Finlay presented a paper 
asserting that because yellow fever attacked the victim’s blood and caused hemorrhaging it must 
be transmitted from one victim’s bloodstream to another by a vector. He deduced that because 
the lifecycle of the mosquito mirrored yellow fever outbreaks it likely transmitted the disease 
between people. Finlay even postulated correctly that the Aedes aegypti species of mosquito 
transmitted the disease. Most of the scientific community discounted Finlay’s findings because 
he conducted his experiments in Havana where his subjects could have been exposed to the 
disease by other means and his test subjects did not regularly contract yellow fever as he 
predicted.157  
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Surgeon General Sternberg sent a second yellow fever commission to study the disease in 
1900. Major Walter Reed headed the commission that included other respected bacteriologists, 
including: Jesse W. Lazear, James Carroll, and the Cuban-born Arítides Agramonte. The 
physicians focused on validating the claim by the Italian researcher, Giuseppe Sanarelli, that 
Bacillus iceteroides caused yellow fever. Experiments by the Yellow Fever Board at Columbia 
Barracks, outside Havana, concluded that the bacterium was not the culprit. Frustrated, Lazear 
corresponded with a Dr. Henry R. Carter whose own research on yellow fever in the American 
South indicated that the disease required about two weeks to mature in a victim before it could 
be transmitted. Carter believed that Finlay did not wait long enough before allowing his infected 
mosquitos to bite his test subjects, thus explaining his inconclusive results. With mosquitos 
donated by Finlay, Lazear tested Carter’s hypothesis. Carroll and Lazear both allowed 
themselves and other volunteers to be bitten by mosquitos that had fed on infected patients two 
weeks earlier. Both doctors become infected with yellow fever; Carroll recovered and Lazear 
died. Reed rushed back to Cuba from Washington and used Lazear’s detailed notes to publish a 
paper and conduct more thorough experiments that substantiated Carter’s and Finlay’s 
theories.158 
With this information in hand, Major William C. Gorgas led the sanitation department’s 
effort to destroy the mosquito breeding grounds in Havana starting in December 1901. Despite 
some resistance, the sanitation workers ruthlessly enforced new regulations to destroy mosquito 
populations, especially in wells and containers that caught rainwater and in the homes near a 
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patient diagnosed with yellow fever. The year 1901 saw the fewest cases of yellow fever in 
Havana’s history and Gorgas’s methods were applied across Cuba. By the time the U.S. Army 
withdrew from Cuba on May 9, 1902, the policies enacted by the occupation government had 
almost completely eradicated the disease in Cuba.159 
The dedicated work of British, Cuban, and American physicians to find the causes of 
yellow and malarial fever eventually succeeded. While success came too late to save Shafter’s 
Fifth Corps or benefit most of the U.S. Army’s occupation troops in Cuba, it paved the way for 
the U.S. Army’s subsequent tropical operations, including successful completion of the Panama 
Canal—where Gorgas managed the vital sanitation effort—and allowed for the long-term 
occupation of Panama, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines by U.S. forces. In addition to fighting 
the diseases harming their occupation troops, the U.S. Army also worked diligently to provide 
humanitarian relief to the Cuban population suffering after three years of civil war. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE HUMANITARIANS: THE U.S. ARMY AND THE RED CROSS PROVIDE RELIEF 
ACROSS EASTERN CUBA  
 
It is gratifying to all of us to know that this has never 
ceased to be a war of humanity. The last ship that 
went out of the harbor of Havana before war was 
closed was an American ship that had taken to the 
suffering people of Cuba the supplies furnished by 
American charity. (Applause) And the first ship to 
sail into the harbor of Santiago was another ship 
bearing food supplies for suffering Cubans.  
 
- President William McKinley at the Auditorium in 
Chicago (October 18, 1898) 
 
Introduction 
Even while the majority of soldiers in Major General William R. Shafter’s Fifth Corps 
became afflicted with some combination of malaria, dysentery, or yellow fever, they worked 
with the Red Cross to assist tens of thousands of Cubans suffering from malnourishment and 
disease. The people of Eastern Cuba suffered from three years of continuous fighting during the 
Cuban War for Independence and the American War with Spain. Governor General Valeriano 
Weyler’s policy of reconcentracion forced civilians to move from their farms into larger towns 
where the Spanish failed to provide adequate shelter and food, causing many Cubans to die from 
malnourishment and related afflictions. The already vulnerable population of Santiago de Cuba 
faced another crisis after the U.S. Navy blockaded the harbor and the Cuban and American 
armies invested the city, cutting the city off from resupply by land or sea. To make matters worse 
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for the civilians in Santiago de Cuba, the U.S. Army destroyed the pipeline bringing the city its 
drinking water. At the request of several foreign consuls, Shafter and General José Toral agreed 
to allow civilians to evacuate the besieged city to prevent them from being shelled and starved to 
death.1  
 Beginning on the night of July 4, 1898, and continuing for several days, somewhere 
between 18,000 and 20,000 men, women, and children walked through the American lines to El 
Caney. Brigadier General Henry W. Lawton wrote his wife that the terrified droves of helpless 
refugees fleeing the city were “one of the most distressing sights [he] ever witnessed.”2 There 
was not enough food, shelter, or clean water in El Caney, despite the efforts of the Red Cross and 
the U.S. Army to feed them. Toral did not allow the civilians to take any food with them, 
believing his army would need it to last out the siege, and the U.S. Army could not carry enough 
food to the front to keep its own soldiers fully fed, although it gave what it could to the refugees. 
The Red Cross managed to get a mere six tons of food to El Caney by borrowing scarce U.S. 
Army wagons. Hundreds of Cubans died of exposure and disease while at El Caney, especially 
the young and the old. Only a few died of starvation, but all were hungry. The Cubans crowded 
into the few buildings in the small town, but most sheltered in hastily fashioned tents made from 
cloth and vegetation.3 
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On July 17, immediately following the surrender ceremony, the refugees returned to 
Santiago de Cuba. The wealthy class trudged side by side on the muddy roads with the poorest 
residents “all carrying bundles of some kind,” and Lieutenant James H. Reeves remembered “the 
awful site” of people “half starved and so sick they could hardly walk.”4 Similarly, Adelbert 
Ames wrote to his wife that he “never saw such sorry specimens of humanity as the 
Santiagoians,” whom he described as “emaciated, colorless, [and] feeble.”5 Many of the old and 
young collapsed on the side of the road from exhaustion, and their loved ones carried them under 
the shade of trees to either recover or die.6 
Upon their return to Santiago de Cuba, the surviving refugees found that conditions in the 
city were not much better than the ones that they had left at El Caney. The stress of the 
populations’ exodus during the heat of summer without proper nourishment or shelter caused 
hundreds more civilians to fall seriously ill. On July 20, Shafter assigned Brigadier General 
Leonard Wood—who was still officially an Army surgeon—as the military commander of the 
city of Santiago de Cuba because Shafter perceived the problems the civilian population faced 
there as primarily humanitarian and medical in nature.7 Wood described the situation as “serious 
in the extreme,” with about thirty percent of the civilians sick and an estimated 180 civilians 
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succumbing to hunger or disease each day.8 Lawton heard a rumor that 50 children succumbed 
each night.9 Reeves approximated the number of civilians dying each day to be 50 out of an 
estimated population of 30,000—but as commander of the city, Wood was in a better position to 
know the extent of the terrible situation.10 
One lieutenant recalled the “very gruesome” memory of men plodding with “black 
coffins balanced on their heads” on their way to the city’s cemetery during all hours of the day.11 
The number of dead quickly overwhelmed the ability of city officials and family members to 
bury them, and American soldiers entering the city for days after the surrender commented on 
how “there were found many dead and decayed bodies, lying bloated in the streets, and in the 
Spanish hospitals.”12 The dead human bodies often rested next to the carcasses of rotting animals 
and decaying garbage, giving the city a hideous odor. Eventually, the people of the city stopped 
trying to bury all their dead. Fearing the diseases the bodies carried, they began cremating the 
bodies en masse. Local men stacked nearly a hundred corpses at a time on top of “gratings of 
railroad iron…mixed with grass and sticks” and covered the heap with “thousands of gallons of 
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kerosene,” reducing the burial pyre to ashes.13 Black clouds hovered over Santiago de Cuba for 
days.14 
Observing the magnitude of the humanitarian crises, the soldiers of the Fifth Corps 
immediately joined the Red Cross in providing assistance to the starving Cuban citizens, even 
before they received official guidance or policy directives from President McKinley and the War 
Department. Whatever the underlying political and economic motives were for the United States 
going to war with Spain, the McKinley administration sold the war to the American public as 
one to provide humanitarian relief to the Cuban people. The attention that McKinley gave to 
aiding the people of Cuba before the outbreak of hostilities and after the surrender of Santiago 
suggests that he was probably sincere in his concern for the plight of the Cuban people, so much 
so that sending food and medicines to the people Eastern Cuba took priority over sending 
soldiers to occupy towns for the War Department. With the assistance of local residents, the Red 
Cross distributed supplies to the destitute in and around Santiago de Cuba. At first, while the 
U.S. Army in Cuba focused most of its efforts on guarding the Spanish prisoners and alleviating 
disease within its own ranks, it still found the manpower to provide assistance to the Red Cross 
in helping the destitute Cubans. The two generally worked well together, although there was 
some friction over limited resources. Over the long term, however, those resources proved too 
limited for the Red Cross.  Relying on donations and the work of volunteers, it could not sustain 
its efforts in Cuba. After the problem became apparent and the McKinley administration granted 
the necessary legal authorization, the American occupation troops gradually took over the 
humanitarian efforts in Eastern Cuba. 																																																								
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A Legacy of Performing Humanitarian Missions on the American Frontier 
Fortunately for the starving Cubans, the U.S. Army’s officers in Cuba had experience 
providing humanitarian relief to destitute populations within the American continental empire 
and along its frontier. The War Department was the federal institution most capable of providing 
responsive relief to local authorities and civilians during a humanitarian crisis. At the end of the 
Civil War, Congress created the Freedmen’s Bureau within the War Department. In addition to 
protecting the rights of recently freed African Americans, organizing workers, and creating a free 
labor system, the Freedmen’s Bureau provided direct government assistance to needy former 
slaves and poor whites during Reconstruction in the South. When a locust infestation devastated 
farmers on the plains from Kansas to North Dakota in 1874, Brigadier General Edward O. C. 
Ord used the soldiers under his command to distribute food, clothing, and cots to destitute 
farmers. The Army also delivered humanitarian aid to local officials for distribution after the 
Chicago fire of 1871 and the Seattle fire of 1889; during the yellow fever epidemics of 1873 and 
1878; and after several floods in the Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio River Valleys. Just months 
before the War with Spain, the U.S. Army established forts in Southeast Alaska to provide law 
and order and distribute food to starving miners struggling to reach the Klondike.15 
The U.S. Army did not consider providing humanitarian relief its primary duty and 
officially mandated that officers gain permission from the War Department before expending 
government resources on humanitarian efforts. But in a crisis—such as the one following the 
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surrender of Santiago de Cuba—officers were expected to provide immediate assistance to 
civilians. As long as they acted in good faith, officers almost never faced any negative 
consequences for acting without official approval. The War Department could ask its field 
commanders to provide humanitarian relief unilaterally, but more often they worked with other 
federal, local, and non-governmental agencies in a crisis. During the locust crisis of 1874 the 
War Department received authorization from President Ulysses S. Grant for units assigned to the 
Department of the Platte to work with the Kansas Central Relief Committee and the Nebraska 
Relief and Aid Society in distributing Army uniforms and rations to the destitute farmers. 
Congress approved the President’s actions and further appropriated $150,000 to allow Ord to 
distribute over a million rations to 29,000 needy citizens.16 More common than these large-scale 
relief efforts, however, were the numerous acts by soldiers on the frontier to help travelers, 
miners, farmers, and Indians. 
One of the primary forms of humanitarian assistance the U.S. Army provided to white 
settlers and Indians on the American frontier was medical care. The responsibility to care for 
reservation Indians belonged to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, but as prisoners of war, 
Geronimo’s band of Chiricahua Apaches remained under the care of Army physicians. Similarly, 
Indians captured by the U.S. Army off the reservation remained under the care of its surgeons 
until they were escorted back. Often the only doctors available to settlers and Indians in remote 
locations, Army surgeons regularly provided medical services to local civilians even though they 
did not have official authorization from Congress to do so. As long as it did not interfere with 
their official duties, adequate medicines were available, and the situation was dire enough, 																																																								
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commanding officers did not mind that their surgeons provided care to civilians and even made 
money for their services.17 Like his fellow Army surgeons, Leonard Wood offered his medical 
services to locals while assigned to Fort Huachuca, Arizona Territory. Wood cared for the 
soldiers assigned to Captain Henry Lawton’s command as they pursued Geronimo’s Apaches 
across Arizona and Northern Mexico. Along the way, he cared for American and Mexican 
civilians, including a cross-eyed Mexican boy who became one of Wood’s surgical patients.18 
 In addition to Wood, Shafter and the other two generals from the Fifth Corps left to 
occupy Santiago in 1898 all had previous experience providing humanitarian assistance to Native 
Americans during the Indian Wars. Lawton had assisted the Northern Cheyenne suffering from 
hunger and malaria at Fort Reno in 1877, advocating for them when the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
failed to deliver adequate rations.19 In January 1891 after Shafter assumed command of all the 
soldiers guarding the Pine River Agency after the fighting at Wounded Knee, he issued rations, 
tents, clothing, and blankets to the 4,000 returning Indians suffering from hunger and exposure.20 
While Colonel Shafter oversaw the Pine River Agency, Captain Ezra P. Ewers escorted the few 
Northern Cheyenne at the agency during the Ghost Dance troubles to the Tongue River 
Reservation and served as “acting” Indian agent from Fort Keogh, Montana. Left in terrible 
conditions after the massacre at Wounded Knee, the Cheyenne lauded Ewers for meeting their 
humanitarian needs. Ewers had previously earned the trust and friendship of Hump’s band of 																																																								
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Northern Cheyenne when he oversaw the care given to the group for seven years after they 
surrendered to Nelson A. Miles in 1877.21 
Caring for the very Indians whose traditional way of life they were sent to destroy seems 
paradoxical; however, the humanitarian actions of the U.S. Army soldiers in the second half of 
the nineteenth century illustrate one of the characteristics of American imperialism. The 
aggrandizement of the American empire has almost always been justified by some humanitarian 
intention. As the agents of empire on the American frontier, the U.S. Army was expected to 
provide humanitarian relief to American civilians and Indians alike. Western settlers and their 
representatives in Congress demanded that the U.S. Army protect white settlers from what were 
perceived as “barbaric” attacks by Native Americans by removing them from the borderlands 
between Indian and American civilization. At the same time, liberal Christian groups from the 
eastern United States insisted that the Army work with the Indian Bureau to move Indians to 
reservations where they could assimilate Western economic and religious practices. Despite 
underlying economic, racial, and strategic causes, nineteenth-century Americans tended to justify 
the Indian Wars to themselves as humane for one of these two contradicting reasons. 
 
McKinley and his War for Humanity 
As during the Indian Wars, McKinley and the majority of the American people convinced 
themselves that the War with Spain was ultimately a humanitarian mission. There is no doubt 
that geopolitical aspirations, economic motives, support for Cuban independence, and revenge 
																																																								
21 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 
1974), 399. Robert M. Utley, The Last Days of the Sioux Nation (New Haven: Yale University, 1963), 131-32, 272, 
280. William L. Ewers, When the Army Still Wore Blue: The Military Life and Times of General Ezra P. Ewers 
(Glendale, AZ: 1996), 71, 83-95, 119-21. 
 	205	
for the alleged sinking of the Maine all contributed to the overwhelming popular support within 
the United States to go to war with Spain. Public opinion forced McKinley to end his opposition 
to conflict and ask Congress for a declaration of war on April 11, but he sold the war to the 
American people, and perhaps to himself, as a humanitarian one. Whatever his motives, there is 
no doubt that the President made relief of the suffering Cubans a priority before the opening of 
hostilities. In December 1897, he ordered the State Department to work with the Spanish 
government to allow the Red Cross to deliver supplies to the destitute reconcentrados in Havana.  
And immediately following the Spanish capitulation he again accelerated the humanitarian 
mission. 22  
McKinley’s decision to send the Red Cross—under the leadership of the Central Cuban 
Relief Committee, with Clara Barton as its president—fit into accepted gendered norms in 
American society as to who should provide charity. Most Americans at the time believed that 
charity was a feminine attribute and should be given out by charitable institutions, and only 
rarely by the government. Once the war began McKinley authorized the chartered steamer, State 
of Texas, loaded with 1,400 tons of Red Cross supplies, to join the invasion fleet off the coast of 
Santiago de Cuba, so that Barton and her volunteer doctors, nurses, and staff members could 
bring assistance to the starving Cubans immediately after U.S. forces landed on the island.  
 McKinley’s administration continued to support the Red Cross’s efforts to help captured 
Spanish ship crews and Cuban refugees in Tampa during the war, but it did not allow the Red 
Cross to deliver aid to the island once the U.S. Navy began its blockade.23 Once the invasion 
fleet sailed, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long allowed ships chartered by the American 																																																								
22 David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 22. 
23 George Kennan, Campaigning in Cuba (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1971), 10-12. 
 	206	
National Red Cross to receive coal from any naval station or coaler at the price paid by the 
government, as long as it did not interfere with operations.24 Otherwise, Red Cross ships would 
have had to make costly and timely detours when bringing relief supplies to Cuba. The Red 
Cross faced a financial predicament when the lease for the State of Texas expired of July 5 and 
the owner increased the rate for the ship to $400 a day. Stephen E. Barton, Clara’s nephew, sent 
a telegram to Secretary of State William R. Day on July 16, urging him to allow the transport to 
unload its relief supplies without delay. Day forwarded the request to the War Department, and 
the next day Corbin alerted Shafter to “enable the Red Cross steamer State of Texas to discharge 
cargo and leave the port as soon as possible.”25 Shafter allowed the State of Texas to be the first 
ship to dock in Santiago Harbor. This was a huge concession, given that the soldiers of Shafter’s 
Fifth Corps did not have adequate food, shelter, or transportation and needed to unload these 
supplies from their own ships.26 
 After the fighting between the United States and Spain formally ended with an armistice 
on August 12, McKinley began feeling out American public opinion on what to do with the 
Spanish colonies captured during the war. McKinley seemed to make up his mind fairly quickly 
to retain possession of Guam and Puerto Rico. As for the larger and more significant Spanish 
island possessions at stake, the Teller Amendment precluded the outright annexation of Cuba, 
but McKinley and his commissioners in Paris seemed uncertain as to the legality and how much, 																																																								
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if any, of the Philippines to annex.27 In October, McKinley decided to attend the Trans-
Mississippi Exposition in Omaha, Nebraska. He gave whistle-stop speeches as he traveled to and 
from the event, and carefully followed press reactions to his comments in order to gauge the 
level of public support for annexing the Spanish colonies. McKinley emphasized many themes 
during his speeches, including the growing strength of the U.S. economy, the end of the 
recession, the heroism of American soldiers and sailors, the unity of the country during the war, 
the need for continued harmony during the peace treaty negotiations in Paris, and the 
responsibility of the country to bring civilization and liberty to the areas brought under the 
control of the United States.28 
More than any of his other talking points, the President used the word “humanity” 
liberally in his October speeches. While passing through Cedar Rapids, Iowa on October 11, 
McKinley told the crowd that the United States had “accepted war for humanity,” and his words 
were greeted by applause when he conveyed to the audience that they could not accept a treaty 
unless it was “founded in right and justice and in the interest of humanity.”29 At the Trans-
Mississippi Exposition McKinley conveyed to the large crowd that the war had been fought for 
“humanity’s sake,” and how “humanity triumphed at every step of the war’s progress.”30 On his 
way home, the President stopped in Chicago, where he told the audience that this “has never 
ceased to be a war of humanity,” reminding them that the last ship to leave Havana was a Red 																																																								
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Cross ship that had taken to Cuba supplies “furnished by American charity” and that the first 
ship to enter “Santiago was another ship bearing food supplies for suffering Cubans.”31 Later that 
night, he told a banquet-hall audience “the war was undertaken not that the United States should 
increase its territory, but that oppression at our very doorstep should be stopped.”32 The President 
continued to tell crowds in Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana that the war was for “no purpose but that 
of humanity,” even as his commissioners negotiated to annex Spain’s former colonies.33 Back in 
Cuba, the Red Cross and the U.S. military worked together to show the world that providing 
humanitarian relief to the long suffering civilian population of Cuba was indeed a top priority of 
the United States. 
 
Providing Immediate Relief in Santiago de Cuba 
The plight of the Cubans around El Caney and in Santiago de Cuba deeply affected the 
American soldiers of every rank, and they worked to address the humanitarian crisis. Shafter 
unsuccessfully urged the War Department to allow Toral to march out of Santiago de Cuba for 
Holguín because it would immediately open the harbor to supply ships and allow for the “return 
of thousands of women, children, and old men” who were “suffering fearfully” in El Caney to 
return to their homes.34 Likewise, Miles insisted that the commissioners Shafter selected to 
negotiate the surrender of the city convince the Spanish to allow for the swift return of the 
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refugees to Santiago de Cuba and for the immediate removal of the mines blocking the entrance 
of the harbor, so ships could supply the people with food.35 The commissioners successfully 
negotiated for all of these humanitarian requirements in the final capitulation terms.36 After the 
surrender, hungry American soldiers gave some of their inadequate supplies of food to the 
starving Cuban refugees as they returned from El Caney. Theodore Roosevelt reported that they 
relieved the women of their heavy bundles and carried their youngest children for them. The 
soldiers continued to help the refugees for a day after the surrender until medical officers ended 
the practice, fearing that the bundles the refugees carried were contaminated by the diseases 
plaguing both the American soldiers and the returning Cubans.37 Without enough supplies to 
feed themselves and quickly falling ill to various types of fevers, the U.S. Army personnel were 
in no condition to lead the humanitarian effort to help the Cuban refugees. 
Following the Spanish surrender of Santiago de Cuba on July 17, 1898, the Red Cross 
took the lead in providing relief to the civilian population of the city. While the U.S. military 
assisted the Red Cross in its efforts, it primarily focused on supplying its own troops, fighting the 
outbreak of tropical fevers, and securing the Spanish prisoners. Without the help of the U.S. 
military and local volunteers, however, Barton and her Red Cross volunteers would not have 
been able to provide nearly the same level of support to the tens of thousands of destitute 
civilians. But before the Red Cross could begin providing relief, the U.S. Navy had to clear the 
way for the State of Texas to enter Santiago harbor. 
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Barton wanted to dock her ship in Santiago even before the surrender ceremony, but 
Captain Chadwick of the U.S.S. New York told her it was not safe to enter the harbor until they 
removed the remaining mines guarding its entrance.38 The Navy pulled seven contact mines 
ashore, and marked two with buoys that could not be cleared. Next, the Navy attempted to 
detonate the electrically activated mines, but two failed to explode, so the Navy cut the lines and 
removed the firing mechanisms.39 Shortly after three in the afternoon, a naval officer boarded the 
Red Cross ship to inform the crew that enough of the mines had been removed or deactivated to 
allow a local pilot to steer the ship to the docks. Many of the people aboard the ship had tears in 
their eyes, and everyone joined the chorus singing “Praise God from whom all blessings flow” 
and “My country, ‘tis of thee” as the ship passed under Morro Castle and the barrels of the 
batteries at the mouth of the harbor. Cubans lined the shore and waved handkerchiefs in joyous 
celebration of the ship’s arrival. The State of Texas anchored, and the Red Cross sent two 
representatives ashore to coordinate to use of a government-owned dock and to find warehouse 
space for the following morning. The people of the city struggled to wait another day and a 
crowd gathered on the pier and throngs of small boats surrounded the State of Texas, all yelling 
for bread.40 
Everyone aboard the ship was up by six the next morning to prepare for the day’s work. 
The ship glided in along the government wharf where one hundred stevedores—hired the day 
before at a rate of $2 a day to be paid in rations—waited to unload the State of Texas. The Vixen, 																																																								
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carrying Rear Admiral William T. Sampson and Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, arrived next  
and tied up next to the Red Cross ship. The naval commanders commented on the “wonderful 
rate” at which the stevedores unloaded the ship and conceded that Miss Barton did not need any 
“instruction or advice in that line of work.”41 Barton thanked the naval officers again for 
allowing the State of Texas to dock before their own ship. While the laborers carried crates on 
shore, Barton and her staff prepared to reopen a large soup kitchen to begin feeding thousands of 
people on July 19. The Spanish had closed the public kitchen during the siege after food became 
too scarce. A swarm of Cubans, including famished children with protruding bellies, surrounded 
the pier and eagerly waited for the contents of the ship to be unloaded. Any time a few beans or 
grains of rice escaped from a burlap bag, several kids scrambled forward, “collecting them 
carefully one by one, and putting them into their hats or tying them up in their shirt-tails and the 
hems of their tattered frocks.”42 Eventually the crowd became so great that soldiers had to clear 
the dock. Also on that day, Barton created a committee of three well-respected local residents to 
help advise her on how best to distribute the goods. She relied on the committee to prevent fraud, 
help her determine who most needed aid, and advise her where to open further food distribution 
centers.43 
The next morning, Barton set up headquarters in a house donated by a local merchant. 
From there they went to inspect the soup kitchen, feeding for the first time the hungry citizens of 
Santiago de Cuba. Barton’s secretary, Lucy Graves, saw at the kitchen the “most distressing 																																																								
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mass of human beings” she had ever witnessed, noting that every one of them had the most 
“unmistakable evidences of famine and misery.”44 The sound of the hungry people “uttering the 
word ‘hambre’ (hunger) over and over again, while they strove in vain to pull their miserable 
rags around” their exposed bodies were almost too much for her to bear.45 Crowds of desperately 
starving Cubans pressed forward and came to blows on many occasions to secure their place in 
line. After tallying the distributed rations, the Red Cross clerks estimated that over eight 
thousand people received food on the first day, and they expected many more the following 
day.46 
U.S. Army officers with details of soldiers arrived the next day to join the growing 
throngs of Cubans to ask for charitable items from the Red Cross. The officers most wanted 
malted milk, flour, and other food items that were easier for their feverish soldiers to digest than 
the Army’s hard tack and salted pork.47 They also hoped to borrow medicine and other hospital 
material until they could reach their own supplies buried in the hulls of steamers offshore. Barton 
made the decision to fill their requests in the hopes that anything given would be repaid in kind 
later. Likewise, the Red Cross also needed help from the Army to prevent the mass pilfering of 
its supplies by scavenging Cubans and American soldiers. Private Charles J. Post and his 
comrades from the 71st New York Infantry were particularly crafty thieves. They bayoneted 
sacks of Pillsbury flour and filled their mess tins with the white flour. Later, “they got bolder, or 																																																								
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more sagacious,” and started taking entire sacks.48 On 21 July, Barton asked if Shafter and Wood 
would provide a contingent of soldiers to guard her distribution points and warehoused goods. 
The generals readily agreed to her request. Soldiers sent to the feeding stations used “their rifles 
without bayonets and used only as bars” to keep control of the pressing crowds, form lines, and 
to protect those too weak to push to the front.49 The sentries guarding the warehouses were less 
formidable, and Post found that “a glass of jelly [could] establish a friendship of definite 
value.”50 Despite the small-scale pilfering, Barton had enough supplies to continue providing 
assistance to thousands of sick and wounded soldiers. Her organization fed an average of 15,000 
to 18,000 Cubans each day.51 
The U.S. military and the Red Cross continued their symbiotic relationship. The State of 
Texas finished unloading on July 22 and quickly steamed back to New York so the Red Cross 
could terminate its costly lease.52 The State of Texas was supposed to be replaced by the Red 
Cross, a yacht capable of delivering supplies to the shallow ports in Eastern Cuba, but a gale 
disabled her as she sailed to Santiago. The Chairman of the Red Cross Executive Committee, 
Stephen Barton, telegrammed Secretary Day for assistance. Secretary Long ordered the Niagra 
to take aboard the humanitarian supplies on the Red Cross and transport them to Santiago.53 																																																								
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When Barton, Shafter, and Wood realized that there were not nearly enough small boats to 
unload the donated ice aboard the schooner Morse and no place on shore to store it, Barton 
decided to donate approximately fifteen tons to each of the transports in the harbor waiting to 
take the sick and wounded of the Fifth Corps home.54 To assist the Red Cross in its clerical work, 
the War Department allowed Shafter to permit some volunteer soldiers to work directly for the 
Red Cross.55 
Barton and her committee of three local advisors divided the city into thirty districts, and 
had each district elect a single commissioner to “make all applications for relief in their behalf” 
and to personally superintend the distribution of all food allotted to them.”56 The local 
commissioner provided a list on a standard form of all the families and individuals in their 
assigned neighborhood that required provisions. The central committee reviewed the list for 
fraudulent claims before forwarding it to Barton’s staff to fill the orders. The commissioners 
picked up the requested rations each week and took them to their district’s distribution point, 
where a member of each needy household went between 7 A.M. and 4 P.M. to receive them.57 A 
Red Cross weekly ration generally consisted of five pounds of corn meal, a pound of rice, a 
pound of beans, a pound of bacon, a half-pound of codfish, a half-pound of soda bread, and a 
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half of a can of condensed milk.58 By distributing a week’s worth of uncooked rations at a time, 
the Red Cross Central Committee hope that the Cubans could return to their normal occupations 
and not spend their time waiting in line at the soup kitchen. While the soup kitchen had been the 
best means to provide quick relief to the refugees returning from El Caney, it now only served 
the homeless and the neediest in the city.59 
The Red Cross received some unsettling reports that many of the sub-commissioners 
chosen by the neighborhood leaders to distribute supplies to people who could not pick them up 
had been asking for a fee from those they delivered to in order to defray the cost of transporting 
them by cart. Worried that the press would accuse the Red Cross of selling donated food to the 
needy, Barton ordered that the practice be stopped. Wood found a solution to the problem of 
transporting rations to the destitute. The commander of the city knew that the Army needed 
every wagon and mule just to keep its soldiers fed and supplied, so he “seized every cart and 
wagon in the streets, rounded up drivers and laborers with the aid of the police, and worked them 
under guard.”60 The Cubans would probably have rebelled against the martinet, but the 
impressed workers were desperate for the fair salaries and food given to them for their services. 
Many Red Cross rations also appeared on the black market and in storefronts for sale. Given the 
size of the operation, it would have been virtually impossible to prevent all graft and fraud, but it 
seems that the rations continued to find their way to those most in need.61  																																																								
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Besides delivering food, the Red Cross also worked through its committee of local Cuban 
notables to create a second board responsible for supervising the distribution of clothing and 
medicine. “A committee of all the leading ladies in Santiago” took charge of ensuring that the 
most disadvantaged received the donated clothing. 62 The Cuban women representing the Red 
Cross went house to house to determine the needs of each family and then returned later with the 
specific items needed for that household from the large stores of donated clothing and other 
goods donated by private citizens and social groups in the United States. Similarly, Cuban 
doctors employed by the Red Cross, and later the occupation government, did house calls to 
distribute medicines and quarantine the homes of anyone suspected of carrying yellow fever. The 
system worked well because it aligned with how Cubans felt charity should be distributed, 
discretely and at home.63 
In addition to providing food and clothing to the destitute civilian population of Santiago 
de Cuba and supplementing the diet of Shafter’s sick soldiers, the American and Cuban Red 
Cross volunteers worked to provide free medical care to those in need. They established their 
own clinic and ran the Yellow Fever Hospital in Santiago. The Red Cross furnished medicines 
and supplies to the Spanish army hospital, the children’s hospital, and the civil hospital.64 
Arriving transports carried additional volunteer doctors and nurses sent by the Red Cross’s New 
York Central Committee. Local Cubans with Red Cross supplies, however, ran most of the 
clinics and existing hospitals. Three Cuban doctors who traveled to Santiago to help decided to 																																																								
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volunteer for the Red Cross instead of doing paid work for the U.S. Army. Clara Barton assigned 
them to Dr. Solloso’s clinic located on 15 Calle Alta where two Cuban nurses joined them to 
form an all-Cuban clinic.65 To accommodate all the volunteers, Barton had to rent a large house 
for lodging. The most notable of all the volunteers was Major General Joseph Wheeler’s 
daughter, Annie. She supervised six nurses in one of the smaller Red Cross hospitals, caring for 
about thirty patients. Her arrival created quite a stir among the soldiers because of her ladylike 
appearance and for the very un-ladylike act of riding eight miles to the Fifth Corps’ encampment 
to call on old friends during the fever epidemic.66 Despite her high status, other aid workers 
noted “Miss Wheeler is working like a Trojan and everyone is devoted to her.”67 Not all the 
nurses were received as well. The doctors dismissed a nurse named Miss Brooks because she had 
“made herself as disagreeable as possible, until the doctors could stand it no longer.”68 To get rid 
of her, Barton placed Brooks on board a transport to take care of the sick returning to the United 
States.69 
While distributing food and medicines and caring for the Cubans and the American 
soldiers, the Red Cross volunteers also fell ill to the endemic fevers. Mr. C. C. Bangs, who 
oversaw the distribution of Red Cross supplies to the Cuban refugees at El Caney, succumbed to 
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his fever on the morning of August 12.70 Similarly, Dr. A. M. Lesser, his pharmacist, and all four 
of his Red Cross nurses working in the Yellow Fever Hospital became ill with the deadly fever, 
but all managed to recover.71 The captain of the State of Texas became fearful that the Red Cross 
workers would carry yellow and malarial fever onboard and quarantined his ship. Most of the 
Red Cross workers on shore had to remain there and receive food at the Red Cross soup kitchen 
with the Cubans, but some went back to the pier and had food lowered to them in a bucket from 
the side of the ship.72 
Even with many of their volunteers falling ill, the Red Cross and the Cuban Central 
Relief Committee continued to work well with the U.S. Army to relieve the suffering in Santiago 
de Cuba. There was, however, some friction between the organizations as they competed for the 
same limited resources, such as small boats, wagons, and stevedores. In a study uniformly 
critical of the U.S. Army’s role in Cuba, historian Philip S. Foner highlights a single episode 
between the Red Cross and Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Humphrey to argue that the relief 
organizations “met with considerable opposition from U.S. Army commanders,” and that the 
government “placed obstacles in the way of these organizations when they tried to relieve 
suffering.”73 His anecdotal evidence fails to support his sweeping condemnations.  
Nonetheless, there was still some friction between the U.S. Army and the Red Cross. 
Barton did have many squabbles with the quartermaster officers in Santiago as they competed for 																																																								
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the limited transportation assets and storage facilities—especially Humphrey, who bungled the 
loading and unloading of the Fifth Corps. Tensions between the two came to a boil after the 
transport Olivette arrived carrying both government supplies and a hundred cots and seventy 
cases for the Red Cross, but no bill of lading. The quartermaster officers and a medical officer at 
the dock took the cots and other goods clearly marked with the words “American National Red 
Cross” and distributed most of them before Barton’s agents arrived.74 The situation was further 
confused by the fact that many of the marked goods were donations for soldiers given to the War 
Department, but other Red Cross crates were not.75 When Barton called on Humphrey to work 
out these kinds of issues or to receive help transporting supplies, he was always “too busy to see 
her,” so she went to his superior.76 Shafter did his best to meet Clara Barton’s requests, and she 
declared him to be “most obliging” and “General Wood [to be] kindness itself,” but she called 
Humphrey a “perfect porcupine.”77 When Barton complained to the generals about Humphrey, 
they rolled their eyes in a way to allude to the fact “that we are all in the same box” because the 
intricacies of the U.S. Army’s bureau system prevented them from superseding the 
Quartermaster General’s representative on the ground.78 Barton still steamed at Humphrey’s 
nastiness. Her accountant complained to Stephen Barton in New York that Humphrey had 
“inconvenienced us in every way he could by refusing facilities,” and had “declared in 																																																								
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conversation his opinion that the Red Cross is no good, and that it is doing great harm here by 
feeding men who will not work.”79 Clara Barton and her staff were delighted when they heard 
Humphrey was departing with the Fifth Corps, commenting that they hoped “a gentleman will 
relieve him.”80  
The main problem Barton faced was that she could not compete with the War 
Department’s bids to lease transportation assets, and Barton became frustrated at her inability to 
move her supplies ashore. After the State of Texas departed the Red Cross no longer had priority 
for the docking facilities in Santiago de Cuba. The War Department seized or purchased every 
lighter and small boat in the harbor. Clara told Stephen that she needed a large, shallow-draft 
boat “worse than anything else in the world,” and that with it, she could “do ten times the 
work.”81 She had only the tug Triton and the schooner Morse. Neither had a sufficiently shallow 
draft to bring supplies ashore, so she hoped to use them later to deliver aid to the ports of Gibara 
and Curacao. When Army officers reported the Triton sitting idle for a few days, Shafter ordered 
it seized. Although she appealed to Secretary Day, the War Department allowed Shafter to keep 
it to load sick soldiers and move supplies. Even when Barton convinced Shafter to transport 
some of her supplies ashore, she had no mules or wagons to move them inland.82 
She telegraphed Stephen Barton to send mules, harnesses, and ambulance wagons to 
Santiago as quickly as possible to provide a means of moving goods into the interior of the 																																																								
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province, beginning a darkly humorous episode of the Red Cross trying to get mules and wagons 
to Cuba. Stephen Barton rushed forty mules by train to Tampa from New Orleans at great 
expense. On the two-mile road from the railroad station to the Port of Tampa the Red Cross 
mules became intermixed with a team of government mules and three went missing. A further 
three mules had to be left behind after refusing to walk the gangplank and enter the steamer. 
Already short six mules, the Red Cross lost another after arriving in Santiago when the “tackle 
with which they were being hauled up broke and one mule fell into the hold and was killed.”83 
No doubt spooked after witnessing the death of one of their own kind and excited to be on dry 
land, the mules stampeded once ashore, and two more were lost. Stephen sent the ambulance 
wagons Clara Barton requested aboard the Port Victor, but they were buried in the hull under 
other supplies no longer needed in Santiago, and the ship returned with all six ambulances still 
on board when its contract expired. Similarly, Barton no longer needed the mules, as the Fifth 
Corps had begun departing and had left their surplus animals and wagons. She decided the only 
course of action left to take was for her to sell the mules and use the proceeds to fund further 
relief work.84 
Many officers and soldiers on the front lines resented the Red Cross, believing that the 
organization provided relief only to the Cubans while the Fifth Corps also suffered from hunger 
and disease. These men felt they were entitled to an equal share of the relief supplies. Brigadier 
General Adelbert Ames wrote to his wife that his staff officers had to compel the Red Cross to 
																																																								
83 Cottrell to S. E. Barton, August 5, 1898, Reel Number 95, Clara Barton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C., 318. 
84 Cottrell to S. E. Barton, August 5, 1898, Reel Number 95, Clara Barton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C., 318. Clara Barton to S. E. B., August 6, 1898, Reel Number 95, Clara Barton Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 327-8. American National Red Cross Relief 
Committee Reports, May 1898, March, 1899 (New York: Knickerbocker, 1899), 28-29. 
 	222	
provide them with certain luxuries at first, but he acknowledged that “her cargo was intended for 
the reconcentrados,” and that she had “been much more liberal” since then.85 The actual reason 
the troops on the front lines did not get many Red Cross supplies at first, or Army provisions for 
that matter, had nothing to do with Clara Barton’s stinginess, and had everything to do with the 
limited number of wagons and mules that plagued all supply efforts.86 Barton’s secretary, Lucy 
Graves, recorded in her journal that beginning on July 1, the Red Cross took charge of the fever 
hospital in Siboney, began operating on American soldiers wounded in the fighting for the San 
Juan Heights and El Caney, and provided comfort items, bandages, cots, clothing, blankets, and 
food for all the wounded in the forward and rear field hospitals. The Red Cross and Army 
doctors also worked together to care for captured Spanish soldiers and sailors. Once the Army 
hospital ship Relief arrived, the Army no longer needed Red Cross medical supplies and cots. It 
even returned the ones it had used so they could be used to take care of sick Spaniards and 
Cubans.87 
In general, then, the Red Cross and the U.S. military worked well together. Close 
personal relationships and the desire by the Army, Navy, and the Red Cross to end the 
humanitarian crisis helped them overcome the small issues they had with one another. Besides 
Barton’s personal relationship with the President and senior officers in Washington, many of the 
Red Cross volunteers were family members of the officers in Cuba and administration officials, 
including Ms. Annie E. Wheeler and Mrs. Amy E. Porter, respectively the daughter of General 																																																								
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Joseph Wheeler and the wife of the McKinley’s secretary, John A. Porter. Upon leaving Santiago 
de Cuba on August 24, 1898, Barton wrote to her sister Marriette Reed that “besides one instance 
perhaps of rare ignorance,” likely a reference to Humphrey, “all the general officers, from 
Shafter and Admiral Sampson down” had been respectful and attentive of her needs.88 
 
Extending Humanitarian Assistance to the Surrounding Province 
 Barton wanted to begin distributing supplies in the other towns in Eastern Cuba as soon 
as possible. If she did not, she knew that starving Cubans would leave their villages and come to 
Santiago for handouts, reducing the chance of them rebuilding their homes and farms. By 
keeping them on their farms working, Miss Barton could avoid charges of having made the 
Cubans idle and dependent on her charity. Most late-nineteenth-century Americans, including 
almost all military officers, believed in the moral necessity of providing public or private charity 
during humanitarian disasters, but that any assistance should be given only briefly to prevent 
dependency and idleness. Furthermore, officers recognized that freely distributing government 
goods prevented the economic recovery of the Cuban marketplace.  
Barton decided by July 24 that it was time to begin distributing aid in the other towns in 
the province, and she began identifying respectable Cubans in each town to help run their 
respective distribution centers.89 On 26 July, Barton called a meeting of her key staff members to 
develop a strategy to “get the people away from the crowded city where they had flocked to get 
food and clothing, and back to the country, where they could begin to…become self 																																																								
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supporting.”90 On Mr. Mason’s recommendation, Barton decided it was near time to end the 
mass distribution of uncooked food to the entire population and to only keep the soup kitchen 
running for the neediest in the city. She wanted to dispense the rest of her food and clothing 
supplies in the nearby towns, especially Guantanamo, where several thousand people were in 
desperate need of sustenance. Guantanamo had not received any aid since the Red Cross 
delivered 10,000 pounds of food to General Pedro A. Pérez’s Cuban soldiers on June 29.91 Clara 
Barton questioned her key leaders on how much food and medicine to leave for the people in El 
Caney and Santiago de Cuba, and how many supplies the civil and military hospitals in the city 
would need to last for the next month. She then made arrangements to have the last of their 
supplies delivered to the local commissioners and hospitals and to settle her last debts. She 
telegraphed Stephen Barton not to send anymore supplies to Santiago de Cuba.92 
The next problem Clara Barton faced was how to get her remaining stores to the inland 
and coastal towns recently surrendered by the Spanish. She called on the U.S. Army’s 
headquarters at the palace in Santiago de Cuba to seek assistance and happened to run into the 
captain of the Resolute. In a fortunate turn of events, he planned to steam to Guantanamo on July 
29 and volunteered to take her supplies with him free of charge.93 The same day that the Resolute 
departed for Guantanamo, three Cuban doctors working for the Red Cross departed the city on 
horseback to conduct a week-long reconnaissance of the towns and villages just inland from 																																																								
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Santiago de Cuba to determine their humanitarian needs and how best to move supplies to 
them.94 
The Cuban doctors found widespread need, and found that San Luis was the easiest place 
to deliver food aid to because a railroad ran the 22 miles to it, even though one of the warring 
armies had destroyed a railroad bridge on the line during the war. On August 7, Barton and a 
large entourage of staffers and dignitaries rode the train to the destroyed bridge, walked a quarter 
mile to the other side of the ravine, and then boarded a second train to San Luis. Miss Barton 
“received a number of handsome bouquets” and was generally welcomed in a “quite triumphal 
manner.”95 She coordinated with Mr. Jose Rousseau, a plantation owner in the town, to use his 
warehouse to store the supplies necessary to provide short-term relief to 10,000 people in San 
Luis and the surrounding area once a few days’ worth of repairs reopened the railroad bridge. 
Supplying aid to the province’s coastal towns proved to be a more difficult problem 
because of the shortage of shipping. The War Department had seized or chartered every available 
transport from New York to Santiago, except the Morse still unloading its relief supplies, making 
it impossible for the Red Cross to lease a ship to take food to the coastal towns of Eastern 
Cuba.96 Once again, Shafter and the U.S. military offered a solution. Clara Barton learned on the 
morning of August 10 that Shafter planned to send Major John D. Miley and a member of 
Toral’s staff aboard the S. S. San Juan to Baracoa and Sagua de Tánamo to inform the Spanish 
garrisons and Cuban soldiers of the Spanish capitulation and the ending of hostilities. When she 																																																								
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asked Shafter for permission to send about sixty tons of food on the San Juan under the care of 
Dr. Julian B. Hubbell to help the destitute there, Shafter “very readily” agreed.97  
The problem was all the more acute due to the internal displacement of locals during the 
war and locals’ lack of awareness that the war had ended. Although Hubbell dropped off forty 
tons of supplies with the mayor of Baracoa for distribution, aid could not be distributed until he 
crossed the insurgent lines surrounding the city and convinced the civilians who had fled from 
the Spanish to return to their homes. The San Juan next steamed into Tánamo Bay, where 
Hubbell disembarked with eighteen tons of supplies and received an escort of Spanish soldiers as 
he rode over seven miles inland to the town of Sagua de Tánamo. Neither the Cubans nor the 
insurgents “had heard of the destruction of Cevera’s fleet, the surrender of Santiago, or the 
cessation of hostilities,” and were all “filled with wonder when told that the Red Cross had 
brought food for the people and sick.”98 Once the Morse finally finished unloading in Santiago 
de Cuba it delivered 6,000 rations and about the same number sets of clothing to the people in 
Gibara, the furthest northwest port surrendered to the United States.99  
 By August 21, Barton believed she had adequately dealt with the immediate humanitarian 
crisis in the Province of Santiago. She left a single representative under Wood’s supervision to 
manage the remaining stores in the city, “including more cornmeal than they will ever know 
what to do with,” and loaded up the rest of her staff aboard the Clinton with supplies for the 
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suffering citizens of Havana.100 She still needed 450 bags of Red Cross oats, wagons, and 
harnesses buried deep in the hull of the recently returned Port Victor before she could depart. To 
avoid delaying her departure, Barton asked for two government wagons and harnesses to help 
her move the supplies once she arrived in Havana.101 The government could not legally give 
away non-perishable items like wagons and harnesses to the Red Cross, but Wood allowed her to 
load government-owned oats in exchange for those aboard the Port Victor and gave her 100 bails 
of hay at no cost.102 That was not the only gift from the government. With the President’s 
authorization, the War Department had furnished the Red Cross with the Clinton and provided 
all 2,000 tons of food aboard the steamer at no cost. McKinley authorized these gifts partly out 
of gratitude for all the help provided to the soldiers in Santiago de Cuba, but also because 
McKinley desperately wanted to help the reconcentrados in Havana.103 
 Arriving in Havana in late August, Barton was shocked when the Spanish authorities 
insisted that the Clinton pay exorbitant customs on all the charitable goods the ship carried to 
relieve the suffering of the people in the city. After fining the ship $500 in gold for some trifling 
irregularity in its manifest, customs officials demanded almost twice the value of each article 																																																								
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aboard the ship as a tariff. She told Stephen Barton that the Spanish were sending a clear 
message that the Spanish government “was abundantly able to take care of its people” and that 
no assistance was needed from the United States.104 While the Red Cross and the officers from 
another relief ship sent by the U.S. government tried to negotiate down the import duties, Clara 
Barton toured the nearby towns in Cuba to determine their need. She observed that Havana was 
better off than she had seen it during her last charitable mission, but that the outlying villages, 
such as Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, were in desperate need of humanitarian aid. 
Unwilling to pay the exorbitant rates or hand over the food to the Spanish for distribution, which 
was against her donors’ instructions, Clara Barton had the Clinton depart Havana. She noted that 
the cannon salute fired for the ship on its departure signaled the “knell of death to untold 
thousands of the doomed on that stricken island.”105 The government rations onboard were 
returned to Tampa and the ship to its owners in New Orleans.106 
Although frustrated by the incident, Barton did not let the Clinton affair deter her for 
long. On September 29, over a month after being denied entry into Havana and any other point 
still under Spanish control, she received a telegram in Washington from the U.S. Commission in 
Havana, consisting of Major General James F. Wade, Rear Admiral Sampson, and Major 
General Matthew C. Butler. They informed her that they had negotiated a deal with Spanish 
authorities to allow charitable goods to be brought in duty free to Matanzas. Once through 
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customs there, the humanitarian aid could be distributed to other points of Cuba.107 Clara and 
Stephen Barton made arrangements to send a large shipment of humanitarian aid on the San 
Antonio to Matanzas under the care of Mr. James K. Elwell and Dr. E. W. Egan from their staff, 
as Clara was too behind on her executive duties to go.108  
While still trying to get relief supplies to Western Cuba, the Red Cross continued during 
the fall of 1898 to deliver humanitarian aid to the towns in Eastern Cuba under control of the 
U.S. Army. On September 27, the Mary E. Morse, chartered by the Red Cross, brought a large 
shipment of humanitarian relief to Gibara on Cuba’s northeastern coast.109 The Red Cross also 
received a request from Wood in October for another large shipment of medicines and food to be 
delivered to Santiago on the now regularly departing steamers out of New York.110 The request 
surprised the Red Cross Committee because they had believed that they had dropped off enough 
supplies to end the humanitarian crisis there. Wood’s request and the report from Mr. Warner 
accompanying the Morse that much more was needed in Gibara made the committee begin to 
realize that solving the humanitarian crises in Eastern Cuba would be a long-term effort, one that 
its diminishing resources could not support. The Red Cross decided to stop sending chartered 
ships to small ports, and to meet any additional requests by sending relief supplies as freight on 
board the Ward Line vessels running regularly between Cuban ports. Fully understanding the 
limited resources available to her, Barton wrote McKinley on October 25 asking if he still 																																																								
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believed it necessary for the Red Cross to continue its work in Cuba, and if so, in what role. The 
President urged the Red Cross to continue to help, especially in providing clothes and medicines 
to the Cubans, but McKinley had the War Department shoulder the majority of the load for 
feeding the suffering in Cuba, especially the eastern part already under U.S. Army control. From 
November 1898 through most of the four-year occupation the Red Cross downsized its efforts in 
Cuba, focusing primarily on running and supplying charitable hospitals and clinics.111  
 
The Army Takes Over the Humanitarian Mission 
In the month following the Spanish surrender, the U.S. Army needed the Red Cross to 
take the lead in distributing food and medicines to the Cubans, while Shafter’s soldiers focused 
on evacuating the Spanish prisoners and caring for their sick. The Red Cross received 
$446,311.21 and supplies from individual donors, businesses, and social groups in the United 
States eager to assist the Cuban people.112 Even so, the charity did not have the means to provide 
long-term relief to the Cubans. By August the Red Cross was running low on funds and its 
American volunteers were eager to return home. Only the U.S. government had the resources to 
provide long-term relief to people of Cuba, and it gradually assumed that responsibility from the 
Red Cross in the fall of 1898. The Red Cross hoped that a few weeks of aid would end the 
humanitarian crises in eastern Cuba for good. With the countryside and economy devastated by 
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three years of war, however, it would take months before farmers cultivated crops and 
replenished their livestock. The Army found that despite its best efforts, it would need to 
continue providing food to the most needy Cubans for the foreseeable future.113 
Before assuming the humanitarian mission in Santiago from the Red Cross, the Army had 
to receive permission from the McKinley administration. Lawton took command of the newly 
formed Department of Santiago after Shafter departed with the last regiments of the Fifth Corps 
on August 25. He had over a million surplus rations left behind by the Fifth Corps and knew that 
the Red Cross’s stockpiles of food were running low. Knowing he needed official approval 
before giving away government-owned rations, Lawton asked the War Department the day 
following Shafter’s departure for authorization to distribute government meat, rice, and 
condensed milk to destitute Cubans and charitable institutions in the province. The Secretary of 
War approved the request “to issue fresh meat, condensed milk, and rice to sick and starving” 
Cubans on August 28 but was unsure of the legality of his order. The next day, Lawton’s aide 
forwarded the authorization to the Department of Santiago’s Chief Commissary, Lieutenant 
Colonel Henry B. Osgood, so that he could begin issuing the food. Henry Osgood’s son 
Winchester died fighting with the Cuban insurgents before the U.S. entered the war, and because 
of this his father seemed to have a great sympathy for the suffering Cubans.114  
After the War Department researched further the legality of donating government rations 
to foreign civilians, Alger clarified his previous authorization that government rations could be 
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issued to Cuban civilians under U.S. law, but only to those “who are destitute and in immediate 
danger of perishing.”115 Concerned about being reprimanded for violating regulations, Lawton 
and his subordinate officers closely followed the letter of the law by distributing only the types 
of rations specifically mentioned in the order and gave them only to the most impoverished 
Cubans. Each time they encountered a Cuban village that needed rations or medicines they 
cabled the War Department for written approval to help. Growing tired of the constant requests 
to provide humanitarian aid and reports that not all the needy were being taken care of, 
McKinley directed the War Department to tell Lawton that he could provide any “necessary food 
and medicines until otherwise ordered” to suffering Cubans, including “those who cannot earn a 
living.”116 
 McKinley’s humanitarian order gave the officers the freedom to give out government 
rations as they saw fit to any Cubans in need, and not just those on the brink of death. The 
President did qualify his order by saying that the Cuban “people should be encouraged to go to 
work and earn a living,” but he made it clear that all those in need should continue to receive 
government rations.117 The president wanted the American people and the press to know that the 
U.S. Army was doing everything it could to end the suffering in Cuba, thereby justifying the war 
and occupation, but he also seemed to genuinely care about the condition of the Cuban people. 
Another way that McKinley demonstrated his concern for the Cuban people was to lift 
the tariff duties on food supplies entering the island, so they would be cheaper for Cubans to buy 																																																								
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and so aid societies sending relief would not be taxed. Assistant Secretary of War George de Rue 
Meiklejohn left it to the discretion of local U.S. Army authorities to determine which imported 
luxury food items should still be taxed.118 The occupation government received all of its income 
from tariffs, and lifting the duties on some food products greatly reduced the government’s 
coffers. Only charitable items and official government supplies entered the country duty free. In 
August, the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Society sent supplies aboard the S.S. Alfred Dumois 
and in September they sent more parcels aboard the Barnstable to Santiago to be given free of 
charge to the soldiers for their care and comfort. The War Department authorized only containers 
marked with a red cross and listed on the official invoice to avoid paying duties and government 
charges.119 
When Barton left Santiago de Cuba on August 22 for Havana, she left the residents in a 
much better situation than when she had first encountered them on their return from El Caney. 
The local Cuban Red Cross commissioners still had a surplus of food, medical supplies, and 
clothing, and they continued to distribute it to the needy. Lawton and Wood reported to the War 
Department on 2 September that the death rate in Santiago de Cuba had fallen by 75% from 
where it had been in July, and that no one was starving as “food and medicines [were] being 
freely and systematically distributed” according to General Order No. 110.120 
In Santiago de Cuba the American soldiers used this order to determine the specific types 
and quantity of food to distribute to needy civilians and hungry Cuban soldiers. Those people in 																																																								
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need received a daily government ration consisting of eight ounces of bacon and either twelve 
ounces of flour or sixteen ounces of corn meal. Additionally, the Cubans received a small 
amount of unroasted coffee, sugar, salt, pepper, vinegar, and soap. They received their rations 
from the non-commissioned officers running the relief stations in rented buildings throughout 
Santiago de Cuba. The sergeants reported the number of rations distributed each day to the 
Commissary of Subsistence and placed their requests for the following day. Similar to the Red 
Cross model, two Cuban comisionados and one doctor employed by the military government 
determined who needed to receive rations in each of Santiago de Cuba’s six neighborhood 
barrios (Catedral, Dolores, Belen, Santo Tomás, Trinidad, and Cristo).121 
While the Army fed the needy, local doctors assigned to each neighborhood and the 
civilian hospitals continued to use Red Cross-supplied medicines. The occupation troops still did 
not have legal authorization to use Army medical supplies and medicine on sick Cubans. As the 
medicines left behind by the Red Cross began running low in mid-September, Wood asked 
permission to distribute to the civilian hospitals in Santiago de Cuba the medicines captured from 
the Spanish Army.122 In October, medical supplies once again started running low and Wood 
wrote to the Red Cross committee asking for more, which were sent.123 In December, Wood sent 
smallpox vaccinations donated by the Red Cross to the U.S. Army garrison commander in 
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Songo, a town fifteen miles north of Santiago de Cuba, to prevent an outbreak of the disease.124 
Eventually, however, Wood was forced to use money collected from tariffs at the port of 
Santiago to purchase a consistent supply of medicines for the civilian hospitals in the city. 
With the humanitarian crisis in Santiago de Cuba over and an effective system in place 
for distributing rations to those still in need, Lawton began sending rations to the surrounding 
towns and villages that begged him for assistance. The mayor of Songo, Jose F. Diaz, wrote a 
letter to Lawton summing up the problem faced by the people in these inland towns. He 
complained that “the fields, farms, and small plantings [were] entirely destroyed” by both the 
Spanish and Cuban armies and asked that the American government supply the 12,000 
inhabitants with food “to prevent their death, ruin, and desolation, helping them until they can 
gather their first crop.”125  
Similarly, 92 citizens of El Caney petitioned Lawton “in the name of charity and 
humanity” to send medicine and food because the town fell into a terrible state after Lawton’s 
division attacked it and refugees fleeing the siege of Santiago de Cuba subsequently overran it.126 
Lawton dispatched Second Lieutenant Jefferson D. Rooney from the 3rd U.S. Volunteer Infantry 
(U.S.V.I) to deliver food to El Caney. Within 72 hours he had issued rations to 1,158 people.127 
Rooney realized that there was still great need in the town and received permission to return at 
the end of September. He delivered another 5,000 rations to feed the 1,089 needy Cubans living 																																																								
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in El Caney and gave rations to another 458 people who had come down from their mountain 
farms on news of his arrival. He reported that there had been “quite a number of deaths since 
[his] last visit” and that people in that area desperately needed medicines and clothing.128 Rooney 
volunteered to return the next day with a doctor to provide for their medical needs. 
After completing his first trip to El Caney, Rooney received an order to proceed to El 
Cobre, 11 miles west of Santiago. His mission was to “report upon the condition of the 
inhabitants,” determine what humanitarian assistance they needed, and “report upon the best 
means of transporting supplies” there.129 Rooney learned that there were 632 people living in El 
Cobre and 600 more people in the farms surrounding the town. The roads were of such poor 
quality that Rooney determined he needed a pack train of mules to deliver the supplies.130 After 
providing his report, Rooney gathered rations from the Chief Commissary in Santiago and 
departed for El Cobre with a Cuban physician named Dr. Rico, who brought medicines for the 
sick.  
Rooney delivered five days of rations to 1,265 people from the area, while Dr. Rico 
treated 200 patients. The lieutenant admired the Cuban doctor because “he works hard and is 
willing to go.”131 Dr. Rico left his surplus medicines in El Cobre, so the people could take care of 
themselves until he returned. Rooney reported that to remedy the hunger situation the people 
needed farming tools and seeds. Also while in El Cobre, the lieutenant witnessed a religious 
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feast. The number of Cuban soldiers, especially officers, still armed that had not returned to 
peacetime pursuits perturbed Rooney because they admitted they had received the order to 
“disarm and get to work,” but instead he grumbled that they had decided to be a “burden on our 
government.”132 Disarming the Cuban Liberation Army was the next major task for the U.S. 
Army to accomplish. Rooney did so well on his humanitarian relief missions that on September 
22 the Adjutant General in Santiago permanently assigned him to the headquarters, so he could 
continue delivering supplies to the towns surrounding the city.133 
 Unlike El Cobre and Songo, the town of San Luis had received a large shipment of 
supplies from the Red Cross because a railroad ran to the city from Santiago de Cuba. The three 
regiments of African American soldiers that arrived to garrison the town still found the 6,000 
people in San Luis and the 4,000 residents twelve miles up the road in the town of Palma Soriano 
in dire straits and took charge of distributing the remainder of the rations sent by Barton. The 
Colonel of the 8th Illinois, John R. Marshall, a successful black contractor in Chicago, described 
to the Illinois Governor how the poor people of the town had “nothing to eat and no clothes to 
wear” and that the children up to the age of seven “go about the streets naked.”134 Some Cubans 
were so emaciated from hunger “they could not stand up,” and Marshall asked for the governor 
to have people send clothes and other charitable items to Cuba.135 
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Similarly, Captain W. B. Roberts of the 23rd Kansas Infantry, another African American 
regiment of volunteers with black officers, described the Cubans in San Luis as “merely 
skeletons, walking around” in nothing but rags, who besieged their camp each day “begging for 
something to eat.”136 He asked the readers of The Parsons Weekly Blade to send “clothes, food, 
and medicine” to be distributed in San Luis. Captain John L. Waller, an African American 
politician who secured a commission in the 23rd Kansas Infantry, observed that even two months 
after the fighting stopped thousands of Cubans were still returning to their homes from the jungle 
after fighting with the Spanish and the reconcentrado policy drove them from their villages and 
farms. The returning refugees were, according to Waller, “fed and cared for by our government 
as carefully as the soldiers of our own army.”137 Marshall’s 8th Illinois Regiment had 35,000 Red 
Cross rations to distribute but was going through thousands of rations each day in San Luis. 
Once the Red Cross rations ran out, the government sent another 20,000 rations by rail to the 
towns to continue feeding the destitute. In Palma Soriano about 500 needy Cubans received 
rations each day, but gave the black soldiers “oranges, bananas, cocoanuts, boniatos [sweet 
potatoes] or cigars” in thanks for their hearty rations and donated Red Cross clothing.138 Roberts 
probably only meant that the refugees received the same Army ration as soldiers did. 
Well east of Santiago de Cuba, Colonel Patrick H. Ray’s 3rd U.S.V.I. arrived to occupy 
Guantanamo and found the population in a desperate state, despite receiving earlier shipments of 
Red Cross rations from the State of Texas and the Resolute. Ray was a long-serving regular who 
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began his career in the Civil War. He had gained experience providing humanitarian relief during 
his time serving in Southeast Alaska during the Klondike Gold Rush. In October 1897, Ray 
seized the warehouses of the North American Transportation Company, Alaska Commercial 
Company, and the Trading Company under congressional authority and issued all their stores to 
the destitute people trying to reach the Klondike. The War Department compensated these three 
companies over $230,000 for their losses.139   
Less than a year later, Colonel Ray and his regiment of “immunes” distributed 
approximately 2,000 rations a day in Guantanamo. People lined up each morning to receive a 
ration ticket that entitled them to collect a day’s worth of food. The soldiers of the 3rd U.S.V.I. 
guarded the line and forcibly removed those who cut the line and “push[ed] their way into the 
office.”140 To implement a long-term solution to the hunger crises, Ray successfully worked to 
open the customs house in Guantanamo in order to reopen the city to international trade and 
allow for the speedy delivery of food items.141 But despite Ray’s best efforts to make the 
Guantanameros self-reliant, his unit requested another 100,000 rations on October 11.142 
With the towns and villages near Santiago de Cuba having all received government 
rations to alleviate the hunger and starvation, Lawton turned his energies to feeding the coastal 
towns of Eastern Cuba surrendered to the United States. Residents in these towns wrote Lawton 
with desperate pleas for food and told of the famine among the people. Jose H. Perez wrote to the 																																																								
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U.S. Army describing the “awful conditions of the inhabitants” of Baracoa and asked that 
immediate assistance be sent; no ship of any kind, with the exception of the San Juan carrying 
Red Cross food and clothes, had entered the harbor since the war began.143 Lawton received a 
similar letter from David del Riege in Sagua de Tánamo, asking for help because no merchant 
vessels had arrived at the port and the people had not received any kind of humanitarian 
assistance or outside goods since Hubbell arrived with aid aboard the San Juan.144 In October, 
the Los Angeles departed almost weekly from Santiago to make regular stops to the coastal 
towns of Eastern Cuba in order to deliver mail, soldiers, and humanitarian rations. Major Charles 
G. Starr and Lieutenant Edward C. Brooks supervised the distribution of the relief supplies. In 
one such trip in October, the Los Angeles carried 300,000 rations for these towns.145 In 
November, the Los Angeles again left the port of Santiago de Cuba with 250,000 rations: 30,000 
for Guantanamo, 50,000 for Baracoa, and 70,000 for Gibara. Captain A. E. Fatje had the 
authority to decide where to disseminate the remaining 100,000 rations.146 The number of rations 
distributed slowly decreased when the U.S. Army stopped feeding armed Cuban soldiers and 
working-age males, but left this decision to the discretion of the distributing officer. By 
December the Los Angeles carried only 75,000 and 100,000 rations respectively on its last two 
voyages to the north and east coasts of the province that year.147 																																																								
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The most difficult people to bring relief to were the many rural farmers who lived in the 
mountainous jungles in the deep interior of the province. Wood explained to a concerned 
McKinley that the people there had their homes and farms destroyed during the war, and that it 
would take time for them to clear the growth from their old fields, plant crops, and rebuild their 
homes. Rural Cuban farmers would need government assistance until they finished these life-
sustaining tasks. To get these people food, couriers rode into the interior each time the Los 
Angeles dropped supplies at the coastal towns to notify them to bring donkeys and mules down 
to carry food up to the needy.148 Wood hoped that by providing food for the interior in this way, 
the “idle element” would leave the seaport towns and begin cultivating their farms.149 
Of all the inland towns, Holguín provided Wood and the occupation troops with the most 
difficult humanitarian crisis during the initial occupation. A smallpox epidemic devastated the 
town and surrounding villages, including the port town of Gibara, killing thousands. Colonel 
Duncan N. Hood, son of Confederate General John B. Hood, landed at Gibara with six 
companies from the 2nd U.S.V.I. and eventually moved one company to Holguín as the Spanish 
army evacuated all of their soldiers healthy enough to move from the region on November 10, 
1898. On arrival he found a filthy town in complete chaos and a three-year-old smallpox 
epidemic that had killed thousands still raging. He felt sick to the stomach at observing “persons 
who do not seem to be human, with sores all oozing with blood and matter.”150 Many of the 																																																								
148 Leonard Wood to the President of the United States, November 27, 1898, Container 26, General Correspondence, 
Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  The Spanish-American War 
Veterans Survey Collection, Small Collections, Thomas S. Wylly Papers, Box Number 1, Scrapbook, “Our Flag at 
Manzanillo,” The U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
149 National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1504, Annual Report of Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U.S. Volunteers, 
Commanding Department of Santiago, 1899, 29, 4. 
150 Duncan N. Hood to Leonard Wood, November 17, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1487, Box 
4, 3413.  
 	242	
homes and villages, and all the government offices, were simply abandoned by their former 
inhabitants. Hood estimated that the smallpox virus infected well over 9,000 people in the entire 
district.151 Wood requested that the Army Medical Department expedite the shipment of 10,000 
smallpox vaccination kits, 10 tons of chloride lime disinfectant, and 5,000 sulfur candles to 
Gibara, so they could be moved to Holguín.152 The commanding general also asked the Red 
Cross to send on the next departing government ship from New York 200 additional bottles of 
vaccines, syringes, 1,000 cots with blankets, 500 pounds of sulfate, 4 refrigerators, 500 scrub 
brushes, 200 benches, and 2,000 sets of eating accouterments.153  
At first, the Red Cross denied Wood’s request because of an incident that occurred in 
Gibara. Hood and his head doctor, Assistant Surgeon R. S. Woodson, waited helplessly for the 
vaccines and disinfectants to arrive by ship to Gibara, so they could begin helping the people of 
Holguín. Mr. Warner, the Red Cross agent in Gibara, had smallpox vaccines and other medical 
supplies sitting in storage and refused to issue them because, according to Hood, Warner “feared 
some of it might be stolen by the Cubans.”154 Hood ordered Captain Woodson to seize the 
medical supplies, and he “considered the seizure an absolute military necessity owing to the 
grave situation.”155 When Mr. Warner vigorously protested, the soldiers detained him. The 
Central Cuban Relief Committee of the Red Cross complained bitterly about the theft and 																																																								
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imprisonment to the President through Secretary of State Day and demanded an explanation for 
the seizure before considering sending any more humanitarian supplies to Wood’s subordinates 
in Holguín.156 Stephen Barton sent telegrams directly to Wood asking for an explanation. 
Stephen accepted Wood’s assurances that there would be “no further friction” between the Army 
and the Red Cross in Gibara and Holguín.157 Wood alerted Hood that more supplies were 
forthcoming but to “avoid all further confliction with the Red Cross, especially his good 
acquaintance Mr. Warner.158 
Woodson led the U.S. Army’s medical efforts. He worked closely with Dr. Felipe 
Veranes, who represented the large team of doctors and nurses working for the Cuban Health 
Commission that assisted the soldiers of the 2nd U.S.V.I in quarantining Holguín, vaccinating the 
entire population, and isolating all the smallpox patients in guarded camps. Woodson used the 
confiscated Red Cross supplies to set up isolation hospitals in Gibara and Holguín, being careful 
to separate “white and colored, and male and female” patients.159 The Cuban and American 
medical teams treated 1,300 infected patients and vaccinated another 12,000 people. Even 
though American soldiers typically received a smallpox immunization upon entering the service, 
all the men of the 2nd U.S.V.I received a second vaccination.160 Not a single American contracted 																																																								
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the disease while combating smallpox in the district of Holguín. The American soldiers and 
Cuban workers disinfected every house with lime and burned thatched huts in the towns and 
surrounding villages that were believed to be contaminated with smallpox, but only after 
receiving Wood’s approval. They also burned over 8,000 cartloads of furniture, trash, and other 
potentially infected material. Within a month the soldiers and doctors had checked the spread of 
the disease, and within two months there were only 1,200 cases of smallpox left in the isolation 
camps.161 
Although the U.S. Army wanted to end its humanitarian mission in Eastern Cuba as 
quickly as possible, it understood that it would have to continue issuing food and medicine for 
the foreseeable future. The Chief Commissary officer for Santiago was still issuing over 500,000 
rations a month by December 1898, the final month of the initial occupation, to the civilians in 
the Department of Santiago.162 Major James H. McLeary, Wood’s Inspector General, conducted 
a tour of inspection and explained in his report why the distribution of rations must continue. He 
saw that many families had “lost their bread-winners in the struggle for liberty,” few adults had 
more than a single set of raggedy clothes, and the children “go entirely without clothing.”163 
Most people had grown enough sweet potatoes and wild fruit to survive, but McLeary thought 																																																								
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that “the dictates of humanity require that the issuance of indigent rations should be continued 
for at least a short time longer, in order to give everyone an opportunity to procure work or to 
plant crops.”164 
 
Conclusion 
 While dealing with an epidemic of fevers and guarding tens of thousands of Spanish 
prisoners, the U.S. Army’s occupation forces in Santiago de Cuba also had to deal with a 
humanitarian crisis among the civilian population in Eastern Cuba. Three years of fighting and a 
policy of reconcentracion devastated the countryside and left the people hungry and 
impoverished. The siege of Santiago and the evacuation of the civilian population caused 
hundreds of already weakened civilians to perish. The American soldiers did what they could 
within their limited means to help, but the Red Cross under Clara Barton provided the majority 
of the assistance during the first month of the occupation of Eastern Cuba. Justifying the war 
with Spain to the American people, and probably himself, as a humanitarian effort, McKinley 
asked the Red Cross to take the lead in providing food, medicine, and clothing to the suffering 
people of Cuba both before and immediately following the fighting.  
Because of the President’s emphasis, the War Department made providing relief to the 
destitute of Cuba its highest priority, save taking care of its own sick soldiers. The Red Cross 
could not have succeeded in relieving the immediate humanitarian crises in Eastern Cuba 
without the generous donations of American citizens, the work of its Cuban and American 
volunteers, and the assistance of the U.S. military. Even though there was some friction between 																																																								
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the U.S. Army and the Red Cross—especially with the incompetent quartermaster Humphrey in 
Santiago de Cuba and well-intentioned Hood in Gibara— overall these two organizations worked 
exceptionally well together to relieve the humanitarian crises they faced in Eastern Cuba during 
the initial occupation. With limited resources, however, the Red Cross could not provide the 
sustained relief that the Cubans required. The Red Cross shifted its focus to providing medical 
supplies and clothing to the reconcentrados in parts of Cuba still under Spanish control. After 
receiving legal authorization from the U.S. government, the War Department took over the 
humanitarian mission in Eastern Cuba, using Army rations to feed the needy and tariff revenues 
to buy medicines for civilian hospitals.  
As the U.S. Army began to occupy the rest of Cuba from December 1898 to February 
1899, the American soldiers found similarly deplorable humanitarian crises to the one in 
Santiago. Major General James H. Wilson found that the province of Matanzas had lost about a 
third of its populations during the three years of fighting, while Santa Clara lost about a seventh. 
Civilians continued to die of hunger in both central provinces because almost ninety percent of 
the livestock had disappeared during the war and almost all the farms and many of the 
plantations had been destroyed.165 Generals Fitzhugh Lee and William Ludlow found 
humanitarian conditions nearly as disastrous in Havana and western Cuba. 
The measures devised in Santiago to relieve the humanitarian crises were immediately 
emulated in the other provinces. Major General John R. Brooke, commanding the Division of 
Cuba, authorized the free distribution of U.S. Army rations to alleviate hunger until the military 
government collected enough customs revenue to purchase food for the poor. Army supply trains 																																																								
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distributed the rations to the interior. U.S. Army doctors worked with Cuban doctors to provide 
medical care for the diseased. Also similar to Wood’s efforts in the city of Santiago de Cuba, 
Ludlow divided Havana into wards for the distribution of emergency food and medicine. 
Furthermore, he adopted Wood’s method of creating a sanitation department to clean the city and 
conduct inspections of every building to ensure they adhered to the new sanitation regulations. 
By the summer of 1899 the humanitarian crisis was largely over in Cuba, and the U.S. Army 
turned its focus on the next important task of the occupation: controlling the towns and 
disarming the Cuban soldiers.166 
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE U.S. ARMY ESTABLISHES CONTROL IN SANTIAGO 
The President directs that you be informed that the 
United States is responsible for peace, and must 
maintain order in the territory surrendered and in your 
department, and must protect all persons and their 
property within said jurisdiction. Interference from 
any quarter will not be permitted. The Cuban 
insurgents should be treated justly and liberally, but 
they, with all other, must recognize the military 
occupation and authority of the United States and the 
cessation of hostilities proclaimed by this 
Government.  
 
- Adjutant General H. C. Corbin to Major General H. 
W. Lawton, Official Correspondence (August 16, 
1898) 
 
Introduction 
After two months of dealing with several emergencies that followed the capture of 
Santiago de Cuba on July 17, 1898, the U.S. Army slowly began to gain control of the province. 
On August 26, the last remnants of the disease-ridden 5th Corps finally embarked for Camp 
Wikoff at Montauk Point, Long Island. Although the eight regiments of soldiers who arrived to 
garrison the Department of Santiago continued to suffer from high rates of malaria and yellow 
fever until the end of the rainy season in late October, the worst of the epidemic had passed. 
Meanwhile, the Army finished the evacuation of all the Spanish prisoners in Santiago, freeing 
the American soldiers who had been guarding them. The Army and the Red Cross distributed 
over a million rations and large quantities of medicines to alleviate the disease and hunger 
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among the suffering Cubans. This American charity helped to lower the high death rate among 
the Cubans from malnutrition and preventable diseases like smallpox and dysentery. 
Unfortunately, after three years of war in which both the Spanish and Cubans waged campaigns 
of devastation against Cuba’s farms and plantations, compounded by a month-long U.S. 
blockade, many Cubans required at least some humanitarian assistance throughout the initial 
occupation. 
As officials in the War Department and the officers in Santiago slowly solved the major 
problems of disease, starvation, and the evacuation of the 5th Corps and the Spanish prisoners, 
they turned their attention to controlling the newly established Department of Santiago. The 
commanders of the department, Major General Henry W. Lawton and later Brigadier General 
Leonard Wood, understood that their purpose was to enforce President William McKinley’s 
policy decisions, and they closely followed his orders and those passed to them from the War 
Department. The department commander and his subordinates rarely made a major policy 
decision without careful consultation with and formal approval from the War Department. 
Before making policy decisions, however, the War Department still consulted frequently with 
field commanders and staff officers. In fact, officers on the ground in Cuba proposed many of the 
War Department’s policies. During the initial occupation, the McKinley administration’s policy 
concerning the future of Cuban independence remained uncertain and intentionally vague. 
Nonetheless, the President and the War Department made it perfectly clear that the garrison in 
Santiago must maintain order, protect individuals and property from harm, reestablish the rule of 
law under the old Spanish institutions, end the current state of violence, and avoid any formal 
recognition of the Cuban Liberation Army. 
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In order to provide the stability that McKinley wanted in Santiago, the U.S. Army 
understood that it had to gain control by garrisoning the population centers and securing a 
monopoly of military force by neutralizing and then disbanding the unrecognized Cuban 
“insurgents.” The U.S. Army had to do this in a manner that would not incite rebellion. Garrisons 
provided the threat of military force that compelled the Cuban Liberation Army and private 
civilians to accept, however reluctantly, the laws and policies of the U.S. military government. 
Not all the Cuban soldiers wanted to stand by passively while the U.S. Army garrisoned 
the province, and a few advocated resisting the American occupiers just as they had defied the 
Spanish Army. Yet most Cubans believed that the occupation would last only a short time and 
that the United States would follow through with its pre-war promise of granting Cuban 
independence. The hope of speedy independence, combined with the exhausted and destitute 
state of the Cuban Liberation Army and civilians, led the majority of Cubans to offer the U.S. 
military government their compliance in exchange for rations and jobs.  
The process of garrisoning the Department of Santiago did not occur uniformly across the 
province. It started on July 17, 1898, in Santiago de Cuba, Guantánamo, and the surrounding 
towns that the 5th Corps had held when General José Toral surrendered. For the first few weeks, 
Major General William R. Shafter and Major General Henry W. Lawton consolidated their 
control over this area and focused on alleviating the humanitarian crisis before they established 
garrisons in the rest of the department. In many cases, the Red Cross and U.S. Army sent 
humanitarian supplies to the more remote towns and villages in the province weeks and even 
months before American troops came to establish garrisons. In effect, the U.S. Army conducted a 
rolling occupation, shadowing the Spanish government’s withdrawal of its soldiers. The Army 
administered Santiago by using its existing organizational structure and bureaucracy. Although 
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the majority of regular officers in the U.S. Army departed with the 5th Corps, the generals, the 
staff officers, most of the regimental commanders, and some of the company and field grade 
officers who occupied the Department of Santiago had decades of experience acting as a frontier 
constabulary and enforcing federal policy on less than willing civilian populations. 
The War Department implemented a strategy for controlling Cuba, and also the 
Philippines, by monopolizing military force and placing garrisons at strategic points, an approach 
borrowed from the U.S. Army’s strategy to assert its dominance over its North American empire. 
Robert Utley, an eminent historian of the frontier U.S. Army, has described how the Army 
conquered the trans-Mississippi West by systematically advancing a series of forts that were 
“visible to the Indians” and “close enough to help prevent trouble and react to it promptly when 
it broke.”1 Besides intimidating and controlling Indian populations, Army forts on the West and 
in Cuba also guarded supply depots, settlements, lines of communication, and border crossings.2 
Additionally, Utley contends that the Army under Commanding General Nelson A. Miles had 
mastered how to use a “careful mix of diplomacy and the threat of force” to control Native 
Americans, deal with border conflicts, and police the nation’s two national parks and lawless 
territories.3 In his study of the Philippine War, historian Brian Linn observed that from their 
“experiences in the Civil War and the Indian Campaigns, the Regular Army had derived an 																																																								
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informal but widely accepted pacification doctrine that balanced conciliation and repression.”4 
Linn also commented how the American officers pacified the Philippines by first defeating the 
guerillas and then restoring “order through garrisoning towns, protecting the populace, and 
creating a working civil government.”5 Diplomacy, forts, and the threat of force were the tools 
the U.S. Army brought from the American West to control the Philippines and Cuba.6  
Within months of the formal occupation beginning in January 1899, Major General John 
R. Brooke, commanding the Division of Cuba, established garrisons in every major town and 
city in Cuba using the methods first developed by Lawton and Wood. Moreover, after much 
political wrangling, the McKinley administration convinced the commander-in-chief of the 
Cuban Liberation Army, General Máximo Gómez, to disband his army after receiving a 
guarantee that the U.S. government would pay its soldiers a total of three million dollars. With 
no Cuban army left to oppose their plans and garrisons controlling every town, the McKinley 
administration and War Department were free to take their time in developing a Cuban policy 
without facing serious military opposition from the Cubans.7 
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The Formation of the Department of Santiago 
Even before the U.S. Army could establish garrisons to control eastern Cuba, it first had 
to create a geographic command that fit within the Army’s existing administrative structure. To 
do this President McKinley and Secretary of War Russell A. Alger established the Department of 
Santiago, which was structured in the same manner as each of the eight geographical 
departments within the continental United States. The authority of department commanders 
extended over all the garrisons within their assigned geographical boundaries, and they ensured 
the implementation of the War Department’s orders and policies. Additionally, the department 
commander was responsible for the health, discipline, training, and supply of the troops under 
his command. To assist the commander in administering and supplying his forces the War 
Department assigned staff officers from each of the Army’s ten staff bureaus. Finally, the War 
Department assigned regiments to each department commander to accomplish their assigned 
missions. 
In early August 1898, Secretary of War Alger and Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin 
began consulting with Shafter, commander of the 5th Corps. The group needed to identify an 
officer among those already in Cuba to command the forces arriving to garrison eastern Cuba. 
The War Department sought to appoint one major general to command the soon-to-be-created 
Department of Santiago and two brigadier generals to command the two brigades of soldiers they 
intended to send there.8 The next day, Shafter cabled back to the War Department that he 
recommended Major General Lawton, commander of the Second Division of the 5th Corps, 
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Barracks, Pennsylvania, 206. 
 	254	
noting that Lawton “desires very much” to take command of the department.9 Shafter also 
reported that “General Wood is by far the best man to leave in command” of the city of Santiago 
de Cuba.10 Shafter also made a case for a third Brigadier General in the department, giving Wood 
command within the city, and then selecting two brigadier generals—either John D. Miley, Ezra 
P. Ewers, William Ludlow, or William H. Bisbee—to command four regiments of garrison 
troops.11 After a week of deliberation, the Secretary of War and President created the Department 
of Santiago with Lawton in command. Shafter temporarily remained in Santiago to continue 
evacuating his corps, while Lawton took control of the garrison and the convalescents from 
Shafter’s command who were too ill to make the trip back to the United States. Listening to 
Shafter’s advice, the War Department kept Wood “in command of the city” and also assigned 
Ewers to the department, but it did not assign a third brigadier general to Lawton’s command.12 
Lawton emerged for many reasons as the first choice of Shafter, McKinley, and the War 
Department to command the Department of Santiago. First, as the 2nd Division Commander of 
the 5th Corps, Lawton repeatedly distinguished himself as a capable leader during the Santiago 																																																								
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Campaign through his timely reinforcement of Major General Joseph Wheeler’s Cavalry 
Division at Las Guásimas and his less-than-impressive but still victorious capture of El Caney 
against the most stubborn of the Spanish defenses. Second, he had remained healthy, while most 
other senior commanders succumbed to fever and dysentery during the campaign. Finally, 
Lawton was a regular officer with more than 32 years’ experience. Boasting a tall and slender 
figure, as well as a bristly mustache, he cut a swath as a typically charismatic general, yet he 
exuded humility—a characteristic severely lacking among his peers in Cuba.13 
Assuming command on August 14, 1898, Lawton had to overcome the challenge of 
having practically no staff.14 In 1898, ten staff bureaus handled all the War Department’s 
administrative and supply needs. At the head of each staff bureau sat a brigadier general who 
assigned subordinates to the large field commands and geographical, administrative departments 
to provide necessary support. Without a staff, Lawton had no way to communicate with, receive 
orders from, or make requisitions to the War Department in Washington. Moreover, he could not 
manage the military government or efficiently administer humanitarian relief. For example, the 
Adjutant General in Washington issued all official orders and coordinated the actions of the 
others staff officers to meet the commander’s intent. In the ensuing occupation, the Adjutant 
General of the department also issued and published civil orders and laws, and he synchronized 
the different bureaucratic offices in the military government. Similarly, the Chief Commissary 
officer of the department not only requisitioned and issued rations to the soldiers, but also 
assumed the responsibility of distributing relief rations to destitute Cubans.15 																																																								
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After assuming command, Lawton continued to use the staff officers of his division. 
Unfortunately, his long-serving and experienced staff officers suffered from the same fevers and 
illnesses that plagued the rest of the invading army. On August 15, Lawton urgently wrote 
Adjutant General Corbin in Washington requesting an entirely new staff, stating that all of his 
“old staff [are] sick and not capable of further service here.”16 Less than a week later, Lawton 
repeated his request, noting that even “under most favorable conditions the administration of the 
Department would be difficult and trying,” and that therefore, “only able experienced and 
trustworthy staff officers should be sent me. It would be worse than folly to select them from the 
command now with me if untried officers of the volunteer staff.”17 Because the health of the U.S. 
Army and the occupation of Santiago were two of the War Department’s highest priorities, 
Corbin allowed Lawton to select the best officers from the 5th Corps to remain as his staff, urging 
him to “ask for anything you need it will be given you.”18 Corbin immediately assigned the most 
senior staff officers currently in Santiago de Cuba to Lawton’s staff until permanent 
replacements were found.19 Corbin’s sensible solution allowed Lawton and his staff to 
administer the Department of Santiago effectively. 
Although key staff officers continued to come and go from the Department of Santiago 
throughout the initial occupation, by October 4, most of the permanent officers had arrived. In 
almost every case these officers had years of experience serving at isolated posts on the 
American frontier. Lieutenant Colonel John H. Beacom, a West Point graduate from the class of 																																																								
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1882 who commanded a company of Native American soldiers in the Dakotas and accompanied 
the British expedition to the Sudan as an observer, took over as the Adjutant General of the 
department.20 His capable assistant, Captain R. G. Mendoza, was a volunteer who spoke Spanish 
fluently and was born in Cuba.21 Chief Ordnance Officer Lieutenant Colonel Henry D. Borup 
graduated from West Point in 1876 and served in the 2nd Artillery at Fort Reno in Indian 
Territory. After subsequent frontier duty based in San Antonio, Borup passed the Ordnance 
Examining Board in 1879.22 On 19 September, Major George T. Bartlett, commissioned in 1881 
from West Point as an artillery officer, arrived in Santiago de Cuba to relieve the exhausted 
Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Osgood as Chief Commissary of Subsistence.23 
Similarly, on October 3, Corbin replaced Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Jacobs, who as a 
lieutenant served as a quartermaster in Brigadier General John Gibbon’s Montana Column 
during the 1876 Sioux campaign, with Major John T. Knight as the Santiago Department’s Chief 
Quartermaster.24 Corbin allowed Lawton to keep as his chief surgeon Lieutenant Colonel Valery 
Havard, a graduate of New York University’s medical school. In 1871 Havard joined the U.S. 
Army as an acting assistant surgeon. Before landing at Siboney with Shafter’s invasion force, he 
accompanied expeditions to fight the Sioux and Nez Perce and explore western Texas. Other 
new staff officers included Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Ribbel as Judge Advocate, Major 
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Robert S. Smith as Chief Paymaster, Charles G. Starr as Inspector General, and Jasper E. Brady 
Jr., as Chief Signal Officer.25 
As Lawton’s staff evolved into an efficient administrative organization, he suddenly 
left—ostensibly due to illness. This story appeared plausible to the American public, given the 
high rate of disease among American soldiers in Cuba; however, the only sickness this popular 
general suffered was from alcoholism. In late September, Lawton went on a weeklong drinking 
binge and, in the process, ransacked a bar and assaulted the police chief in Santiago de Cuba. A 
reporter for the pro-administration New York Evening Sun sent the story of Lawton’s abuses to 
his editor, William Laffan, who did not publish it and confidentially notified President 
McKinley. Laffan’s loyalty earned McKinley’s lasting gratitude. Hardly needing another scandal 
in Santiago, McKinley relieved Lawton by giving him a “confidential leave of absence on 
account of sickness, for sixty days.”26 He replaced Lawton with his former personal doctor, 
Brigadier General Leonard Wood.27 On October 7, Corbin notified Wood that “during the 
absence of General Lawton, on sick leave, you are by direction of the President assigned to the 
command of the Department of Santiago.”28 Three days later, Wood assumed command, and 
Lawton left for Washington to recover not from illness, but from a tarnished reputation.29 
During his brief tenure, Lawton did much to bring order and stability to the Department 
of Santiago. He repaired the fractured relationship with the U.S. Army and the Cuban generals, 																																																								
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becoming close with Calixto García. He supervised the successful withdrawal of the 5th Corps 
and the Spanish prisoners, and set the foundation for the reestablishment of civil government. 
The Spanish merchant Antonio Battles spoke for many of his peers and high-ranking officials 
when he wrote to Lawton that the Spanish element lamented his departure “because we looked to 
you as a worthy governor, a true friend, a lover of peace and good order, and a firm protector of 
the working class.”30 Word spread as far away as Havana of the Cubans’ satisfaction with 
Lawton’s military administration of Santiago.31 While Lawton strictly adhered to the President’s 
guidance, asserted his control over the department, and maintained order, he simply could not 
control his excessive drinking. 
Lawton’s replacement, Wood, owed his new position to high energy, good fortune, and, 
perhaps most importantly, his ruthless pursuit of promotion through carefully cultivated political 
relationships. After graduating from Harvard Medical School in 1884, Wood joined the Army as 
a surgeon and spent his first decade on the western frontier. Soon after his arrival, Wood earned 
the Medal of Honor for bravery during an expedition with his first commander, then Captain 
Henry W. Lawton, chasing Geronimo. However, on at least one instance during the pursuit, on 
August 22, 1886, in Fronteras, Sonora, Wood had to cover for Lawton when he was too 
intoxicated to perform his duties.32 In 1895, after using his influence to get to Washington, the 
young surgeon attended to President Cleveland and cabinet members before becoming the 
personal physician for the new president’s invalid wife, Ida Saxton McKinley. While in 
Washington, Wood formed close relationships with territorial expansionists, such as Senator 																																																								
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Henry Cabot Lodge and publisher Whitelaw Reid. His closest and most important friendship, 
however, was with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt. During long hikes and 
hunting trips, the two became close friends, and Wood soon embraced Roosevelt’s expansionist 
ideas. When war with Spain broke out in 1898, Roosevelt and Wood used their close relationship 
with Alger and Lodge to maneuver Wood into the command of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, known 
as the Rough Riders. Roosevelt became the lieutenant colonel of the regiment. In Cuba the 
Rough Riders were under the command of Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young, who fell ill 
with malarial fever after the fight at Las Guásimas. Wood took command of the brigade, moving 
Roosevelt into command of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry in time for the fight on San Juan and Kettle 
Hill.33 
Three days after the Spanish surrender, Shafter needed someone to administer the city of 
Santiago de Cuba. With approximately a hundred civilians dying every day from disease and 
starvation, Wood, a proven leader and still technically an Army surgeon, seemed the natural 
choice to sanitize the city and restore order. Also, unlike many of the other senior regulars 
officers in Santiago, who despised Shafter, Wood kept his criticisms of Shafter private.34 
Wood’s rapid promotion to Brigadier General of Volunteers and appointment as 
commander of Santiago de Cuba angered these same long-serving regulars and West Point 
graduates who despised Shafter for his obesity, mismanagement of the campaign, and 
membership in the anti-West Point clique of Civil War volunteer generals. These regular officers 
who had waited years, if not decades, for promotions based on seniority detested Wood’s rapid 
promotion, which they rightly credited to his political connections. First Lieutenant J. H. Reeves, 																																																								
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who as General Samuel B. M. Young’s aid-de-camp, kept a journal for the general at his request 
and who worked closely with Wood during the Santiago campaign, best described Young’s and 
other senior regular officers’ sentiments towards the upstart Wood. Reeves wrote that “Wood is 
in a certain way a good man, extremely energetic and all that, but he is now beyond his proper 
limit and talks a great deal and does nothing.”35 
Wood continued to use his political connections to advance his cause once he assumed 
command of the Department of Santiago. He maintained a regular correspondence with Alger, 
Roosevelt, and Lodge. All three assured Wood that they praised him in front of the President and 
showed McKinley the general’s letters.36 Wood also served an important purpose for his 
powerful political patrons. For instance, Lodge wrote to Wood about how he invoked Wood’s 
success in Santiago in his campaign speeches. Lodge attributed Wood’s popularity as a major 
contributing factor in bringing about the “great Republican victory, something very remarkable 
for a midyear” election, including the election of Wood’s friend Roosevelt as the governor of 
New York and a fifteen-seat majority in the U.S. Senate.37 As long as Wood maintained order 
and control over the Department of Santiago, garnering popular support for the Republican 
administration, his friends in Washington would continue to reward him with further promotions 
and higher positions. All Wood had to do was concentrate on controlling and bringing order to 
the province. 																																																								
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Bringing Order to Santiago de Cuba and Ending the State of War 
Four days after the Spanish surrender, General Young’s aid, Reeves, commented on the 
utter chaos in the city of Santiago de Cuba. Thousands of sick and starving refugees returned to 
the city, and an uneasy peace existed between the fearful Spanish, the cautious Americans, and 
the eager Cubans. Reeves warned that more soldiers were required to ensure order in the city.38 
By July 23, Reeves noted in his diary that the city was “orderly considering the conditions and 
business [was] resuming” with the increased presence of U.S. soldiers. However, he urged that 
the U.S. Army “must occupy the territory we have conquered and not leave it in absolute chaos, 
and this can only be done by our soldiers.”39 
Reeves’s sentiments on the method required to bring order to the chaotic situation 
matched both those of the senior commanders on the ground in Santiago and the decision-makers 
in the War Department. The Department’s preferred strategy for controlling local populations 
and enforcing U.S. policies on the American frontier had long been to establish garrisons, and 
the U.S. Army did not deviate from its institutional methods in Santiago. When Corbin asked 
Shafter how many troops would be required to maintain order in the province, Shafter replied 
that “a battalion of four companies is sufficient for any” town, “except Santiago. The presence of 
troops will be sufficient to preserve order.”40 Shafter justified his relatively “small estimate” by 																																																								
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explaining that “all the [Spanish] guerrillas are disarmed, and the only fear that the people 
apprehend is from the [Cuban] insurgents, and they (the insurgents) assure me that they will not 
interfere with any of them, though in many cases this promise will not be kept from inability to 
control the men.”41 Clearly, the only serious threat that concerned Shafter was from Cuban 
soldiers challenging his authority. As long as the “insurgent” leaders controlled their men, or as 
long as the Cuban soldiers feared the strength of the U.S. Army, Shafter expected that the mere 
threat of force alone would be sufficient to maintain order in the province, enforce U.S. policy, 
and keep the peace between the Spanish loyalists in Cuba and their bitter Cuban enemies. 
Reeves chastised those officers who were so eager to leave and who did not realize the 
difficulty of occupying the province and the “size of the job we have on our hands.”42 The 
exhausted 5th Corps, as is so often the case with armies after the fighting ends, showed little 
interest in the work of administering the recently surrendered province. The War Department 
understood that, given the mental and physical condition of the soldiers and officers of the 5th 
Corps, they could not be expected to garrison the province. Because the 5th Corps suffered 
extensively from malaria and yellow fever, the War Department issued orders for five of the ten 
“immune” regiments to relieve the 5th Corps. On May 10, 1898, at the request of the War 
Department, Congress authorized the enlistment of 10,000 soldiers, whose prior exposure to 
tropical diseases allegedly made them immune to reinfection. These newly recruited soldiers 
were to be mustered into ten regiments of United States Volunteer Infantry, U.S.V.I., or more 
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commonly known as immunes.43 The 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Immune Regiments arrived in August 
1898 to replace the 5th Corps. The 4th U.S.V.I. did not arrive until October 12. The 9th U.S.V.I. 
differed from the other immune regiments sent to Santiago because it consisted of black soldiers 
and lieutenants with white senior officers, whereas all of the members of the other immune 
regiments were white. In addition to the five immune regiments, the War Department, under 
pressure from black Republican constituents, ordered the 8th Illinois Infantry and 23rd Kansas 
Infantry to Santiago. African Americans completely manned and led these Regiments, and the 
War Department incorrectly hoped that these black soldiers would resist the diseases in the 
tropical climate better than their predecessors had.44 
After the first two immune regiments to arrive showed ill discipline in Santiago de Cuba, 
the embarrassed Shafter requested the War Department send Lawton at least one regiment of 
regulars to garrison the city. The War Department, eager to avoid additional negative press, 
dispatched two battalions from the 5th U.S. Infantry, not to be confused with the immunes of the 
5th U.S.V.I.45 The War Department hoped that seven of the eight regiments chosen to garrison 
the Province of Santiago would have at least some immunity to tropical diseases. Based on the 
two partially correct notions in the late-nineteenth century medical community that African 
Americans were resistant to malaria and other fevers and that people in the southeastern United 
States who had previously suffered from tropical fevers were immune to reinfection, Corbin 
picked the units he thought best suited to relieve the 5th Corps. 																																																								
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On arriving in Santiago de Cuba, these replacement regiments took over responsibility 
for maintaining order in the city and guarding the Spanish prisoners. Colonel Duncan N. Hood’s 
2nd U.S.V.I. arrived first in Santiago de Cuba on August 2. Hood, the son of the Confederate 
General John B. Hood, recruited his regiments of immunes out of Louisiana and eastern Texas.46 
After disembarking, the 2nd Immunes marched to the Parque Alameda promenade next to the 
Santiago de Cuba’s docks.47 There, it replaced the 9th U.S. Infantry, patrolling the city center “in 
the preservation of order and protection of life and property.”48 Colonel H. H. Sargent’ 5th 
Immunes arrived next on August 12. Wood, now in command of the two replacement regiments 
in the city, ordered the 5th U.S.V.I. to act “in conjunction with the 2nd U.S. Volunteer Infantry in 
preserving order during the withdrawal of the 5th Army Corps.”49 A notable moment occurred 
on August 18 when the 8th Illinois Infantry landed in Santiago de Cuba. For the first time in 
American history, a regiment completely manned and officered by African Americans deployed 
overseas. On arrival, the 8th Illinois’s Colonel John R. Marshall received written guidance that 
his duties were to “preserve the peace, maintain order, and protect lives and property of 
individuals.”50 
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Some of the lives they had to protect were the former guerilleros, members of the militia 
loyal to Spain. The guerilleros waged an especially unrestrained war against the Cuban 
Liberation Army and both sides committed many atrocities against one another. After the war, a 
despised guerillero leader named Carvajal returned to Santiago from Spain, where he fled after 
the Spanish surrender. But when he landed on the docks a crowd of angry Cubans gathered 
around him and threatened to kill him. To save himself from lynching, Carvajal ran to a building 
guarded by American soldiers. The soldiers escorted him back to the ship he arrived on, and 
“advised him to effect a landing in some other safer place.”51 Another former guerillero named 
Francisco Castellanos Casanovas tried to return to Santiago de Cuba later that afternoon. Again 
U.S. Army soldiers had to save him from a mob of angry Cubans. The soldiers placed him in the 
city’s prison for his own protection until they could escort him to safety. The U.S. Army soldiers 
strictly followed McKinley guidance to maintain order and protect the lives of all individuals, 
regardless of who they had fought for during the war.52 
While the first three regiments to arrive maintained order in Santiago de Cuba, the next 
two regiments of immunes to arrive relieved the regiments guarding the Spanish prisoners, 
secured the abandoned camps of the 5th Corps, and guarded the supplies that were strewn across 
the deserted battlefield.53 These two immune regiments consisted of Colonel Patrick H. Ray’s 3rd 
U.S.V.I., recruited from Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, and Colonel J. Crane’s 9th 
U.S.V.I. of African American soldiers and lieutenants.54 Both regimental commanders had 																																																								
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fought extensively in the Indian Wars. Ray maintained the peace and represented U.S. authority 
in the Alaskan Territory, while Crane did the same on the Mexican border and with disgruntled 
Mormon settlers in Utah.55 The 3rd U.S.V.I. also sent a company to Siboney, the site of the first 
U.S. landings in June to relieve the 24th U.S. Infantry that was still working at the Yellow Fever 
Hospital and guarding the large stores still sitting on the landing beach.56 At the end of August, 
the two battalions of regulars from the 5th Infantry arrived, but Lawton quarantined the battalions 
because some of the soldiers reportedly had yellow fever.57 After their quarantine, these more 
disciplined regulars replaced the unruly 2nd U.S.V.I. in garrisoning Santiago de Cuba.58 
In early August, as the first replacement regiments arrived and the 5th Corps began to 
depart for Montauk Point, the United States and Spain had yet to sign an armistice. Most of the 
members of the 5th Corps believed that after spending the remainder of the summer recuperating 
at Camp Wikoff they would return to Cuba in the dry season and seize Havana.59 This all 
changed when news arrived on August 12 that the President had signed the Peace Protocol 
between Spain and the United States, ending hostilities until a peace commission from the two 
countries could meet in Paris to negotiate the full details. The War Department immediately 
forwarded the text of the protocol and expected the generals in Santiago to begin implementing 
the agreement, yet the generals received no specific guidance on how to do so. The agreement 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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made it clear to Shafter and Lawton that Spain was to “relinquish all claim of sovereignty over 
and title to Cuba.”60 These generals and the War Department also understood that the Teller 
Amendment, which was added to the joint resolution of Congress for declaring war on Spain, 
ensured Cuban independence after pacification of the island. But the commanders did not receive 
any specific plan from the McKinley administration for when, how, or even if this transfer to 
Cuban sovereignty would take place. Only the sixth clause of the protocol, which immediately 
suspended hostiles, gave the commanders in Santiago a clear directive to enforce.61 
Lawton immediately took calculated steps and used symbolic gestures to signal the end 
of hostilities in the Department of Santiago. For example, on August 24 he noted that “as the 
state or condition of war no longer exists, and as there is no armed enemy in this vicinity, the 
necessity of carrying arms as a measure of self-protection has passed away.”62 Furthermore, he 
ordered that no soldiers could carry weapons unless on official duty, and even sentries could not 
carry loaded weapons unless an officer deemed it necessary.63 Lawton clearly sought to create a 
climate of stability and peace, rather than one of war or hostile occupation. His purpose is 
evident in Lawton’s September 2 order to Wood to remove all the sentries he had placed on the 
street corners in Santiago, writing that they could only guard public property.64 On the same day, 
Lawton ordered Crane, commander of the 9th Immunes, to investigate a report that a detail of his 
soldiers confiscated a machete from a Cuban laborer. If the charges of an unlawful seizure were 																																																								
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true, Lawton insisted that Crane prefer charges “against each and all of them.”65 Lawton, a 
professional officer for more than thirty-five years, strictly adhered to McKinley’s instructions to 
end the state of hostilities by making it illegal for soldiers to confiscate personal weapons or 
property.66 
Besides removing visible signs of war and occupation, Lawton knew from experience 
that one key way to prevent disorder in the department was to keep armed people of any 
nationality out of the cities and towns so the local police and sentries could maintain law and 
order without armed opposition. The largest threat to order and stability in Santiago de Cuba 
after the Spanish surrender came not from the Cubans or Spanish, but from the ill disciplined and 
recently arrived men in the 2nd Immunes who became inebriated and indiscriminately fired their 
weapons in the city. These acts “mortified and embarrassed” Lawton and forced him to use 
“every possible lawful means … to maintain order” by confining those responsible.67 It is no 
coincidence that Lawton enacted his ban on U.S. soldiers carrying arms in the city only days 
after the incident with the 2nd Immunes. 
Drunken off-duty U.S. soldiers were not the only armed group that Lawton targeted with 
his August 24 order. His order also confirmed Shafter’s contentious decision of July 14, which 
prevented the Cuban soldiers, who had carried the entire burden of fighting the Spanish for three 
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years before the arrival of the U.S. Army, from entering the city armed, participating in the 
surrender ceremonies, or administering the city. Calixto García fumed when he learned of the 
Spanish army’s surrender only through “public rumor,” and he resented Shafter’s decision to 
leave in office “the very same Spanish authorities against which [he had] fought three years as 
enemies of the independence of Cuba.”68 He dismissed as absurd Shafter’s argument that he 
could not allow García’s forces to enter Santiago over fears of reprisals against the Spanish and 
their sympathizers, arguing that his men “are not savage people that are not aware of the 
principles of civilized war.”69 Insulted, García marched his 5,000 Cuban soldiers north of the 
city, and offered his resignation to General Máximo Gómez. Cuban residents in Santiago 
gathered to protest Shafter’s decision to keep the Cuban Liberation Army from entering the 
city.70 Shafter’s, and later Lawton’s decision to keep armed Cuban soldiers out of the towns 
controlled by the U.S. Army, thereby denying them local self-determination after three years of 
fighting, creating lasting animosity.71 
Why did the uncompromising Shafter and the more diplomatic Lawton choose to alienate 
their Cuban allies? They acted in response to President McKinley’s specific guidance and an 
obsession with order and stability deeply imbedded within the U.S. Army’s institutional culture. 
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The day after the Spanish surrender the President proclaimed the Province of Santiago as 
“conquered territory” and the “powers of the military occupation are absolute and supreme and 
immediately operate on the political condition of the inhabitants.” He then declared “severance 
of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political 
power.” Additionally, the President made clear that the U.S. Army’s primary mission was to 
protect the rights and property of all the inhabitants of Cuba, including the wealthy Spanish 
merchants and European and American plantation owners who feared retaliatory attacks after 
three years of bitter war. Finally, McKinley ordered that the “municipal laws…judges, and 
constabulary” [remain] in force.”72 The President’s clear mandate combined with the fact that the 
President and the War Department consciously denied the Cuban Liberation Army or the Cuban 
provisional government anything resembling formal recognition gave Shafter and then Lawton 
no other choice but to exclude armed members of the Cuban Liberation Army from entering 
Santiago de Cuba, and to use the preexisting municipal government and their own forces to 
maintain order and administer the city.  
Falling back on his upbringing as a lawyer, McKinley based his detailed instructions to 
his commanders within the accepted norms of international law, especially the right of conquest. 
There was almost universal consensus among Western legal scholars of the nineteenth century 
that any state that captured and held territory through military means had sovereignty over it and 
the inhabitants living there once the opposing state ceases trying to recapture the territory. The 
right of conquest in Western tradition probably originated in the Middle Ages, when war 
between two opponents who both believed they had legal title to land was the norm, and war 																																																								
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served as a judicial procedure where God determined who had legal claim by ordaining their 
victory. After the Treaty of Westphalia Europeans saw war as a legitimate and legal means of 
settling disputes over land and advancing national interests. Enlightenment thinkers later justified 
the right of conquest by arguing that it limited the duration of wars, it created international 
stability, and there was no international body to adjudicated differences between countries. 
While Western states in the 1890s agreed that conquest provided legal title to captured territory, 
they did not go far as to believe that it meant the conqueror had rightful possession or a just 
cause.73 Therefore, McKinley believed that by defeating Spain in Santiago and by occupying 
eastern Cuba international law gave the United States legal sovereignty over the territory. The 
United States legal title to Cuba by right of conquest could only be challenged by a recognized 
Cuban state under international law; therefore, it was imperative that McKinley and the War 
Department did not recognize the existence of the Cuban revolutionary government or the Cuban 
Liberation Army. If the United States did acknowledge their existence, the Cuban revolutionaries 
could also claim legitimate title over Cuba by right of conquest. 
In addition to legal maneuvering, the military administration also made symbolic gestures 
to mark the severance of Spanish authority and the “establishment of a new political power.” 
Symbols representing the Spanish monarchy were removed from official documents and from 
the facades of the building.74 For example, Wood ordered the Spanish coat of arms that adorned 
the governor’s palace and other public buildings in Santiago to be taken down and replaced with 
																																																								
73 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th ed., ed. Richard Henry Dana (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1866), 165-66. Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in 
International Law and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 8-29, 80-93, 100-131. 
74 Marial Iglesias Utset, A Cultural History of Cuba during the U.S. Occupation, 1898-1902 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2011), 13-14. 
 	273	
the shield of the United States.75 Earlier, to signify the new political order, Lawton ordered the 
U.S. flag flown at all “buildings occupied for official purpose, either military, civil or municipal, 
throughout the department.”76 Conscious of McKinley’s order “not to make war on the 
inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any faction of them, but to protect their personal…rights,” Lawton 
did not consider removing the Cuban flags that adorned most private residences and 
nongovernmental buildings, such as private clubs in Santiago de Cuba.77 
Besides installing symbols of Cuban national identity, or Cubanía, the Cubans also 
sought to celebrate significant days in Cuban history. In October 1898, more than 10,000 Cubans 
gathered in Santiago de Cuba’s central plaza to commemorate the “Grito de Yara,” which 
marked the moment when Carlos Manuel de Céspedes first declared Cuban independence in the 
town of Yara in Santiago Province, starting the Ten Years’ War (1868-1878). Despite the fact 
that Wood prohibited the Cubans’ petition to hold their first large-scale celebration of a Cuban 
national hero, the Cubans held the celebration anyway.78 Instead of suppressing the Cubans first 
act of national agency, Wood took steps to control it. He permitted the Cubans to give several 
speeches from the “portico of the San Carlos Club,” so long as they spoke glowingly of the 
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American administration.79 In one speech, General Calixto García, “cautioned the people not to 
be led astray by demagogues, and declared that the Americans meant to guarantee a stable 
government in Cuba, to restore industry, and to protect lives and property.”80 To prevent disorder 
and dissention, Wood placed companies of the 5th Regulars and the 5th Immunes in view of the 
celebration. He used these troops to clear a group of anti-American Cuban soldiers from a 
drinking establishment where they were “indulging in incendiary talk.”81 The American soldiers 
removed the Cuban dissenters without major incident, because Wood maintained his monopoly 
of military force within the city by continuing to prohibit Cuban soldiers from carrying arms in 
the city, even during the large parade of Cuban Clubs and soldiers that took place on October 17. 
While Wood maintained the force necessary to preserve order in the city of Santiago de 
Cuba and could demonstrate U.S. supremacy by placing symbols on public buildings, the 
McKinley administration’s strict guidance to preserve individual rights prevented him from 
suppressing the peaceful march of the Cuban clubs and soldiers or the decorating of the streets 
and private establishments with Cuban flags and nationalistic decorations.82 Shafter, Lawton, and 
Wood never received explicit guidance from McKinley or the War Department on the long-term 
U.S. policy towards Cuba during the initial occupation, probably because the politically cautious 
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and pragmatic President was still measuring Cuban and American public opinion before taking 
any definitive action. Nonetheless, his short-term guidance to his commanders was clear: they 
were to maintain order, protect individual and property rights, establish the rule of law, and end 
the state of war in the department. As long as the Cuban Liberation Army remained mobilized, 
however, the series of department commanders could not guarantee long-term stability or 
uncontested American supremacy in Santiago. 
 
Neutralizing the Cuban “Insurgents” 
American supremacy in the Department of Santiago depended on the Cuban Liberation 
Army’s acquiescence to U.S. authority. Cuban soldiers could have fought the occupying U.S. 
Army for immediate control of their affairs and made the occupation of eastern Cuba as 
untenable as it had been for the Spanish army, but there was little reason for the Cubans to resist 
the U.S. initial occupation in 1898. Exhausted, starving, and desperate to end the last in a series 
of three bloody wars of independence from Spain, the Cubans knew that the Teller Amendment 
guaranteed their independence. And in 1898, the Cubans still believed that the United States 
would honor its commitment to Cuban independence and leave quickly. Similarly, the Spanish 
merchants and foreign landholders had no reason to resist the American occupation because it 
guaranteed the protection of their property and the maintenance or order necessary to resume 
economic activity. The American soldiers, officers, and press understood within months of 
occupying Santiago that the majority of Cubans were “in favor of the immediate evacuation of 
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the island by the Americans and the establishment of a Cuban republic.”83 The War Department 
and the American commanders in Santiago thus immediately sought to neutralize and disband 
the Cuban Liberation Army in order to eliminate the only threat to its ability to dictate the policy 
and pace of the occupation. 
Outside every Spanish-occupied town and village in Eastern Cuba, soldiers of the Cuban 
Liberation Army, also known as mambises, camped just a few hundred yards away from the 
Spanish pickets. Fighting occasionally erupted when the Spanish columns left the protection of 
the fortified towns to do battle with the Cubans or to try to fight through the sieges to move to 
another town.84 Mambises throughout Cuba waited impatiently for the Spanish soldiers to depart 
for Spain under the terms of the Treaty of Paris so they could establish their own municipal 
governments, achieving one of the major objectives of the 1895 Cuban War of Independence. 
But time was not on the mambises’ side. The Cuban Liberation Army soldiers and their families 
suffered severe shortages of supplies, food, and clothing. During the Cuban War of 
Independence, the mambises provided for themselves by foraging and stealing food, while their 
families were caught between two equally unfortunate options: either face disease and possible 
starvation as reconcentrados in Spanish concentration camps or risk the same possible fate 
hiding out in the countryside from often-vengeful Spanish patrols. With the cessation of 
hostilities, Cuban soldiers and their families eagerly awaited the opportunity to return to their 
communities and assert their claim to local governance. Wealthier Spanish merchants and shop 
owners in the towns and villages, however, feared reprisals and chaos, which they assumed 																																																								
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would ensue if the Cubans dictated the terms of the new municipal governments. The U.S. Army 
sought to maintain peace between these two factions, as well as to ally with the members of each 
party who shared similar political views with the McKinley’s administration. 
Throughout the initial occupation, the relationship between the U.S. Army and the Cuban 
Liberation Army ranged from friendly to extremely tense. To alleviate hostile feelings, the 
American commanders worked with conservative Cuban army officers to convince them to 
disarm and disband their formations of soldiers. In return for their cooperation, the Americans 
offered these Cuban officers lucrative positions in local government and gave their disbanded 
soldiers rations and public works jobs. Wood succinctly summarized his policy toward the 
Cuban Liberation Army in a letter to the President at the end of the initial occupation. His simple 
plan to deal with the mambises was “getting them to disband, getting them to work, and 
impressing upon them the necessity of recognizing the absolute authority of civil law.”85 
Disarming potentially hostile forces by coercion or by the denial of resources had been 
one of the primary missions of the Regulars during reconstruction and on the American frontier, 
which if not done carefully could lead to bloodshed, as at Wounded Knee Creek. Threatening to 
use force also worked well to break-up strikers, remove white settlers from Indian lands, and 
reopen railroads during the Pullman Strike of 1894.86 Offering food was another effective 
weapon in the U.S. Army’s arsenal to compel Indians to return to reservations or accept peace 																																																								
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offers on the trans-Mississippi West.87 In the Sioux campaign, the U.S. Congress compelled 
members of the Northern Cheyenne to return to their Missouri River reservations and sign the 
Black Hills treaty by delivering the rations they appropriated for the Cheyenne to survive the 
winter to the Missouri reservations.88 The denial of rations convinced many Sioux to give up the 
Ghost Dance before Miles’s Army arrived to quell the rebellion.89 During the 35-year-long war 
against the Apaches, the U.S. Army repeatedly coerced Apache raiders to return to reservations 
in Arizona and New Mexico by offering them rations.90  
In the immediate days and weeks following the Spanish surrender of the city of Santiago 
de Cuba, the U.S. Army acted cautiously toward the Cuban “insurgents,” as the Americans called 
them, and for good reason: it respected the Cuban Liberation Army’s military capabilities. For 
three years, Cuban armies controlled most of eastern Cuba. They kept the Spanish forces 
confined to fortified towns and cities and restricted their inland movements. While the Cuban 
Liberation Army rarely took and held any important population center or defeated a large 
Spanish field Army, the mambises excelled in guerrilla tactics. Their ambushes and raids 
prevented the Spanish from dispersing sufficient troops to control the smaller towns and from 
moving units or supplies through the countryside except when marching with overwhelming 
force or along a few fortified lines of communications known as trochas. 
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Lawton and Wood knew that if the Cuban Liberation Army contested the U.S. 
occupation, they would soon confront the same dilemma that Spain had faced, and they might 
find themselves forced to fight a similarly costly war requiring a huge field army. At the time of 
the Spanish surrender, Wood estimated the Cuban Liberation Army had about 11,000 soldiers in 
eastern Cuba; of these, about 5,000 were in the vicinity of the city of Santiago de Cuba.91 The 
veteran 5th Corps, concentrated around the city, greatly outnumbered the Cuban soldiers and 
maintained a tremendous superiority in machine guns and artillery. Also, their Krag-Jorgenson 
rifles were roughly equivalent to the Spanish Mauser rifles that most Cubans carried. Once the 
War Department replaced the 5th Corps with volunteers, the balance shifted. Fewer than 8,000 
recently mustered volunteer soldiers made up all but one of the regiments sent to garrison the 
Department of Santiago. With the exception of the 5th U.S. Regulars, these soldiers carried the 
inferior Springfield rifle and brought almost no artillery. Private Mack H. Brinkley of the 3rd 
Immunes remembered fearing both the Mauser, which “shot 5 times to our one,” and the Cuban 
three-foot long machete that was “as sharp as a razor.”92 With superior weaponry and numbers, 
and by using irregular tactics, the Cuban Liberation Army could have challenged the occupation 
forces for control of the Department of Santiago. 
War Department officials and the commanders in Santiago did not just fear the Cuban 
Liberation Army’s military potential; they also worried that the desperate situation of its soldiers 
might force them to commit acts of violence out of pure necessity. The Chief Commissary in 
Santiago, Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Osgood, noted that the thousands of Cuban soldiers still 																																																								
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armed in the department were “observing [the] law while their families are naked and starving. It 
is asking too much of human nature to expect its continuance.”93 Unless the soldiers and their 
families received food, jobs, and farming tools, Osgood explained, the Cuban soldiers might be 
forced to violence. He believed that giving aid to the mambises was wiser in the long run than 
using “expensive force to repress” them.94 The 5th Corps commander, Shafter, concurred. 
Observing that “there is nothing for men to do in the country” as “it has absolutely returned to its 
wild state,” Shafter reasoned that because the Cubans soldiers “show no disposition to disband 
and go to work, and until they do there will be trouble, for they have got to live, and they will 
have to live by robbery— there is no other way.”95 Shafter also warned that “a dual government 
can’t exist here; we have got to have full sway over the Cubans… as war is no longer possible to 
them except with ourselves.”96 Both Shafter and Osgood believed that the lack of employment 
opportunities and the devastation to the farmland inhibited Cuban soldiers from returning to 
work and giving up their arms. They urged the McKinley administration to formulate a specific 
policy for handling the Cuban Liberation Army, because the Army clearly lacked the capacity to 
implement American policy freely while an armed Cuban force asserted its right to dictate at 
least some of the policy decisions in the occupied province. 
Shafter feared more than Cuban soldiers’ lack of opportunities. He also thought that 
Cuban generals might be scheming to challenge U.S. authority by taking control of the towns 																																																								
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outside of the city of Santiago de Cuba and then refusing to yield them to the U.S. military 
authorities. On August 17, he read in the local newspapers that Gómez, the commander-in-chief 
of the Cuban Liberation Army, and García departed for the town of Cobre, four miles from 
Santiago de Cuba, and issued orders for the Cuban Soldiers to meet him there. Shafter warned 
Corbin that “the assemblage of such a force may lead to complications of a grave character.”97 
Before he departed for Santiago, Shafter received permission from the War Department to work 
with “any of the insurgent forces in the area,” but Miles cautioned him not to put “too much 
confidence in persons outside your forces.”98 
Shafter’s racial prejudices toward the Cubans blinded him from recognizing the valuable 
assistance the Cuban Army provided to his forces by isolating the city and preventing it from 
being reinforced by other Spanish garrisons, and in scouting, providing guides, and performing 
other auxiliary work for the U.S. Army. Despite his racial prejudices, Shafter sincerely believed 
that if he did not keep the Spanish and Cubans separated a massacre might ensue. He became 
convinced of this after numerous conversations with both surrendering Spanish officers and 
wealthy Spanish-born citizens, and after receiving numerous reports concerning Cuban 
maltreatment of the Spanish.99 For all these reasons, and because the War Department 
specifically ordered him to avoid recognizing the insurgents or any so-called Cuban government, 
Shafter angered the Cuban soldiers by keeping them out of the city of Santiago de Cuba. As 
Shafter explained, he made the Cuban soldiers “very sore because they were not permitted to 																																																								
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take part in the conference leading to the capitulation and because I will not permit them to go 
into the city armed.”100 He continued: “they expected and claim as their right to take possession 
of the city and control affairs.”101 The Cubans’ claim was justified, but given Shafter’s orders, 
prejudices, and fears, impossible for him to permit. 
On August 14, 1898, Lawton assumed command of the Department of Santiago, and the 
problem of disbanding the Cuban Liberation Army without starting another insurgency became 
one of his biggest concerns. Only two days after taking command, he urgently sought firm policy 
guidance. “These people still maintain their organization, are scattered through the country in 
[the] vicinity of city, are threatening in their attitude, and keep the inhabitants stirred up and 
panicky by threats and acts of violence.”102 Only three hours later, Corbin replied that the 
President and Secretary of War ordered him not to tolerate hostile acts from the Cubans or 
anyone else. Lawton, they wrote, was “responsible for peace, and must maintain order in the 
territory surrendered and in your department, and must protect all persons and their property 
within said jurisdiction.”103 The War Department urged Lawton to treat the “Cuban 
insurgents…justly and liberally,” but made it abundantly clear that “interference from any 
quarter will not be permitted,” and that the Cuban Liberation Army “must recognize the military 																																																								
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occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities.”104 Lawton now 
had the authority he required to assert U.S. Army control over the Cuban Liberation Army. 
According to his instructions from Washington the Cuban insurgents were not an allied army, 
but instead were simply armed Cuban civilians. 
Lawton did not act aggressively or hastily against the Cuban forces. Instead, the wise 
diplomat with decades of experience on the American frontier cooperated with the Cuban 
generals and slowly established his authority over the Cuban forces in Santiago Province. The 
day after he received the policy guidance, Lawton sent his aide, the Spanish-speaking Captain R. 
G. Mendoza, to deliver a copy of the telegraph to the local Cuban Army commander, General 
Demetrio Castillo Duany. The War Department’s policy might have inflamed tensions between 
the two sides, but the language in Lawton’s cover letter was conciliatory and humble.105 Rather 
than assert supremacy of the U.S. Army over Cuban internal affairs and its armed forces, as the 
administration directed, Lawton asked to meet Castillo so they could “work together and in 
harmony for the mutual interest of Cuba and the United States.”106 Lawton also sought Castillo’s 
advice on local affairs and added that if Castillo needed anything from him “personally or 
otherwise” to “please command me.”107 Lawton’s effort to include the Cuban officers in his 
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administration and his friendly attitude enabled him to diffuse some of the tension between the 
Cuban and American armies. 
Besides using diplomacy, Lawton also capitalized on the Cuban Liberation Army’s 
desperate need for food and basic supplies to compel the mambises to disarm and return to 
civilian pursuits. On September 3, Lawton received a note from Cuban Lieutenant Colonel M. 
Belanzo desperately requesting food for Cuban soldiers in the towns of Dos Caminos and El 
Cobre. Because Army regulations prevented anyone from giving away government property, 
including food, without approval from the War Department, Lawton asked Corbin for permission 
to distribute rations to these “insurgents, called Cuban Army.”108 Lawton had appealed to the 
War Department in a similar situation twenty years earlier, when he advocated for the 
distribution of government rations to the starving Northern Cheyenne under his charge.109 In 
Santiago, Lawton placed some of the blame for the Cuban soldiers’ destitution squarely on their 
very existence as a concentrated military organization, telling Corbin that the Cuban soldiers 
“could soon, if disbanded secure work and become self supporting.”110 Additionally, Lawton 
blamed the Cuban soldiers for stifling local economic recovery, because local planters “hesitate 
to reclaim their farms, fearing loss from pilfering of their crops by these bands.”111 While 
Lawton waited for McKinley and Alger to return to Washington from vacation, he sent a return 																																																								
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note to Belanzo kindly asking how many rations he required.112 On McKinley’s return, Corbin 
reconfirmed that according to congressional law “no subsistence…will be issued to any armed 
troops other than the United States.”113 With the President confirming Lawton’s preferred policy, 
the general politely informed the Cubans that because the “war is practically over and further 
resort to arms cannot be contemplated,” he endorsed an early disbanding of the forces, “that they 
may return to their plantations and other civil avocations.”114 Not wanting to seem unsympathetic 
or brash, Lawton sent Belanzo the necessary rations, but insisted that he did not have the 
authority to do so again.115 Additionally, Lawton promised to help the Cuban soldiers after they 
disbanded “by the issue of rations to them individually until they can secure employment or 
mature a crop on their plantations.”116 Lawton’s strategy worked. He successfully appealed to the 
War Department for a policy that forced the Cuban Liberation Army to disband. Then, in dealing 
with the Cuban officers in his vicinity, he acted as if the McKinley administration’s policy had 
tied his hands while treating the Cuban officers cordially and still giving them a few necessary 
supplies, seeking their counsel, and promising to aid the mambises after they disbanded. 
The U.S. Army soon began employing these tactics across the Department of Santiago. 
On September 9, Circular Number 3, stated “No subsistence or other stores will be issued to any 
armed troops other than that of the United States, the law providing that issues be made only to 																																																								
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‘inhabitants of the Island of Cuba who are in immediate danger of perishing unless they receive 
the same.’”117 Only after the War Department decided to compel the Cuban Army to disarm and 
disband did it start strictly enforcing this law. In his annual report, Wood reported on the success 
of this tactic in compelling the destitute soldiers of the Cuban Liberation Army to disband in 
September and October. He exaggerated when he bragged that by “the end of October there were 
no Cuban soldiers under arms anywhere in the province.”118 In fact, some western parts of the 
province still remained outside of American control and contained both Spanish and Cuban units, 
yet within weeks these Cuban formations also disbanded. Wood’s patron, Lodge, lauded Wood’s 
success in “breaking up the Cuban Army.”119 Thus, Lawton and Wood established an effective 
policy of using food as a weapon to compel the Cuban formations to disarm and disband as the 
U.S. occupation expanded. 
Ever diplomatic, Lawton incorporated the local Cuban Army commanders into the 
military government, first as paid advisors and later as officials in the military government. By 
late August, Lawton established a close working relationship with Castillo, the Cuban Liberation 
Army commander of the troops in the Santiago Province. Castillo’s soldiers lost 67 of his men 
fighting alongside Lawton’s troops against the Spanish. Now, Castillo and Lawton each 
approached their superiors for approval to have Castillo placed in a paid position under Lawton’s 
command. Lawton assured Corbin that Castillo favored the U.S. policy of “disbanding the Cuban 
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force.”120 After Lawton’s sudden departure, Castillo became Wood’s closest Cuban advisor, and 
Castillo eventually became the first civil governor of the province during the military 
government. Lawton’s technique remained the norm even after Wood assumed command of the 
department. By maintaining excellent relations with Generals García, Gómez, and Castillo, 
Lawton assuaged their fears of an uncompromising or lasting American occupation. Unlike his 
predecessor, he assured Corbin that he expected that “no serious complications will arise” from 
the Cubans.121 
Lawton’s conciliatory measures went a long way in limiting the possibility of the Cuban 
Liberation Army waging a new war against the American occupation army, but General Gómez 
played the largest role in ensuring that the Cuban officers and soldiers cooperated with the U.S. 
Army. Historian John Lawrence Tone describes how Gómez used his reputation and prestige to 
suppress any talk among his subordinates of renewing the Cuban War of Independence. Gómez 
believed the U.S. would honor the Teller Amendment and understood that the extreme 
destitution of his army eliminated any other course of action.122 To repair relations with the U.S. 
Army after García’s falling out with Shafter, Gómez relieved García of command of the Eastern 
Department but did not accept his resignation, knowing that he held too much influence over the 
soldiers in Santiago and hoping not to make a powerful enemy. Gómez sent Division General 
Pedro A. Pérez to replace García, with instructions to obey orders from U.S. Commander in 
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Chief in Santiago.123 Nonetheless, Lawton held less ill will against García than Shafter or even 
Gómez. On September 6, Lawton invited the old Cuban General to visit him in Santiago de Cuba 
to discuss matters in person, saying, “that any small cause for resentment should be forgotten.”124 
Perhaps out of economic desperation or a sense that the Americans were the new power 
brokers in Cuba, García soon visited Lawton. He found García “warmly in accord with our 
policy and is giving me the support of his influence.”125 García’s friends let Lawton know in 
private of the Cuban generals’ destitution. Lawton understood García’s influence and 
recommended to Corbin that the War Department appoint the impoverished general to an 
important commission. Lawton remarked that “his influence is great and we will purchase it 
cheap by giving him a good salary and a position commensurate with his former rank.”126 The 
War Department took Lawton’s advice and placed García on the five-man commission sent to 
Washington in December to negotiate compensation for the soldiers of the Cuban Liberation 
Army across all of Cuba, so they would disband. In the negotiations García insisted, against the 
vehement protests of the other commissioners that only three million dollars would suffice to pay 
off the Cuban soldiers. This dollar figure was the exact amount remaining in the discretionary 
funds Congress appropriated to the President to fight Spain and not nearly what the Spanish 
commissioners were sent to request. Clearly Lawton and Wood did purchase García’s 
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cooperation cheaply. Unfortunately, the U.S. lost its new ally when García contracted pneumonia 
while in New York and died on December 11.127 
In order to receive their seventy-five dollar share of the three million dollars, each 
mambise had to give up his rifle to the U.S. Army, a requirement that caused much consternation 
among the Cuban soldiers. The mambises had an intimate attachment to their weapons. Many 
Cuban soldiers refused to turn their rifles over and whole units stockpiled their weapons in case 
they needed them to fight the new occupiers. The Cubans refused to compromise in most 
circumstances, so the War Department reluctantly allowed the mambises to turn over their 
weapons to their officers or local mayors, where Cuban officials guarded them. Once again, the 
U.S. Army’s conciliatory measures prevented open conflict with the Cuban Liberation Army.128 
During the initial occupation of Cuba, the U.S. Army feared that the Cuban Army might 
wage a guerrilla war against the U.S. occupation or launch vengeful attacks against native-born 
Spanish merchants and planters. After encouraging the War Department to authorize the U.S. 
Army to force the Cubans Army to disband and accept U.S. supremacy in the Department of 
Santiago, the U.S. Army began to force the destitute Cuban soldiers to disperse in order to 
receive necessary rations, and the U.S. Army neutralized the Cuban Army’s leadership by 
incorporating their officers into the military government by appointing them into official 
positions. 
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Taking Physical Control of the Towns in the Department of Santiago 
The same process of withholding rations and offering employment to compel the Cuban 
Liberation Army in Santiago de Cuba repeated itself across the department. Just as in Santiago 
de Cuba, the local Cuban insurgents and U.S. Army commanders initially struggled for 
dominance, but with more force and food, and the support of the top Cuban generals, the 
garrison commanders soon disbanded the rival Cuban forces and asserted control over these 
small communities. In return, the U.S. Army’s garrison commanders incorporated the local 
Cuban insurgent leaders into official positions in the municipal government. Lawton and 
subsequently Wood gave these garrison commanders the same guidance that they received from 
Washington. They were to end hostilities, protect personal property and rights, and treat the 
Cuban soldiers kindly, but also ensure that all recognized the supremacy of the U.S. government 
in the Department of Santiago. After the Spanish surrender, Lawton first established garrisons in 
towns already under his control. Subsequently, he took control of those towns immediately under 
Toral’s command, which the general had ceded to the Americans in the surrender negotiations. 
Other towns in the province not immediately under Toral’s jurisdiction, such as Manzanillo, 
Holguín, and Gibara, remained occupied until the Spanish troops departed for Havana or Spain 
after the commissioners formally ended the war by signing the Treaty of Paris. But accessibility 
also mattered. Until the rainy season ended in late October, the U.S. Army’s forces could reach 
those towns only by transport ships or rail. Not until the few roads and footpaths dried out 
enough for pack trains could garrisons move into these interior towns. 
Once the U.S. Army began to relieve the immediate humanitarian crises and started to 
evacuate both the 5th Corps and Spanish prisoners, the U.S. forces started to garrison the other 
major towns in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba. One of the first towns occupied was the 
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Province of Santiago’s third largest city: Guantánamo. The U.S. Navy landed marines in 
Guantánamo Bay as early as June 10, 1898; however, the actual city of Guantánamo remained 
under Spanish control, and was fourteen miles of rail away from the port of Caimanera.129 In late 
July, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long relayed important information from Rear Admiral 
William Sampson to the War Department concerning the unsettling conditions in the town of 
Guantánamo. Not only were a third of the 5,000 Spanish soldiers there sick, but a Spanish 
cavalry detachment under General Antonio Pareja also dispersed a force of loyalist militia 
vigilantes who tried to storm the city jail and execute the Cuban political prisoners there. 
Fortunately, the fast-acting Spanish commander promised to continue protecting the political 
prisoners until the arrival of U.S. or Cuban forces enabled their safe release.130 
Ewers, in his first duty after being assigned to the Department of Santiago, arrived in 
Guantánamo in early August with his staff to reconnoiter the city for the purpose of determining 
the number of troops necessary to pacify and control the city. Ewers had experience over his 
career bringing order in troubling situations, spanning from the Civil War to the War with Spain. 
He managed displaced Navajo at Fort Sumner, New Mexico, until they returned to their 
homeland after signing a treaty. During the Ghost Dance episode of 1890-91, Ewers arrived at 
Cherry Creek, South Dakota, to convince Chief Hump and his 400 Minniconju followers to 
abandon the movement and return to Fort Bennett.131 After his arrival in Cuba, Ewers noted that 
the countryside around Guantánamo offered good prospects for a quick economic recovery 																																																								
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because none of the sixteen major plantations around the city were destroyed during the war. He 
thought a regiment should garrison the city to protect the nearby plantations and that the Cuban 
political prisoners held in prison for “several years without trial” by the Spanish should be 
released as soon as U.S. troops arrived to ensure their safety.132 To send his critical report, Ewers 
relied on two mounted Cuban soldiers whom he furnished with food and fodder. He asked that 
they be resupplied in Santiago for the difficult return journey. This suggests that Ewers initially 
worked well with the Cuban Liberation Army outside of Guantánamo.133 
On August 21, a battalion of Colonel Ray’s 3rd Immunes arrived to garrison 
Guantánamo.134 The troops immediately disarmed the volatile loyalist militia forces, relieved the 
Spanish Army, and released the Cuban political prisoners in the city jail.135 As Lawton had done 
in Santiago de Cuba, Ray prohibited anyone except municipal police and U.S. military patrols 
from carrying arms in Guantánamo and the nearby town of Jamaica. He authorized these patrols 
and police to confiscate weapons from anyone who violated this order and to turn the violators 
over to the civil magistrates.136 Symbolically, this order marked the end of hostilities and allowed 
the U.S. Army to assert undisputed control over Guantánamo by monopolizing military force in 
the city. 
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The timing of Ray’s order was no accident. The very day he issued it, two regiments of 
Cuban soldiers gathered outside the city and threatened to enter it, after allegedly hearing a 
rumor that the Spanish prisoners, awaiting shipment to Spain, planned to rebel.137 Since almost 
all of the Spanish prisoners were well behaved and happy to be returning to Spain, Ray and 
Lawton had good reason to question the Cuban Liberation Army’s motives. Their suspicions 
seemed justified when the Cuban Liberation Army’s intention to march into Guantánamo with 
the Cuban Flag became known. Asserting that Guantánamo was territory of the United States, 
Ray responded to the Cuban proposition by stating, “he would look upon this action as hostile 
and call out his men.”138 After the Cubans backed down from their legitimate right to control the 
city that they had fought for three years to run, they asked Ray for 4,000 rations to prevent 
themselves from starving. Ray quickly forwarded their request to Department Headquarters and 
soon after learned that the law stated he could issue rations “to all who were destitute,” including 
Cuban soldiers.139 Of course, the War Department used the same wording of the law to deny 
Cuban soldiers rations a month later. This pragmatic approach enabled Ray to offer a carrot as 
well as a stick to the Cuban battalions in Guantánamo. In light of his orders to maintain control, 
treat the Cubans kindly, and ensure that they respected the supremacy of U.S. authority, Ray 
handled the situation skillfully. 
Ray’s Immunes not only feared the Cuban soldiers camped outside Guantánamo but they 
also worried about militias still loyal to Spain. A patrol searching for these loyalist militiamen in 																																																								
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the dark jungle one night became alarmed at the sound of troops moving to their front and fired 
into the shadows. Private Mack H. Brinkley recalled that the men he was with kept firing “to 
keep them from advancing on us.” Unknowingly, the soldiers on Brinkley’s patrol were shooting 
at their own men who had become separated in the dark uneven terrain. Fortunately, the fire from 
their .45 caliber Springfield rifles was ineffective and they realized their mistake “before anyone 
was killed.”140 Besides these two potentially dangerous incidents, the battalion from the 3rd 
Immunes had no other problems in maintaining order in Guantánamo for the rest of the initial 
occupation. 
After completing his reconnaissance of Guantánamo, Ewers took command of the U.S. 
garrison in and around San Luis.141 This town of 6,000 lay on a railroad line running 20 miles 
south into Santiago de Cuba.142 The 8th Illinois Infantry reached the city eight days before 
Ewers.143 On arrival the commander of the 8th Illinois wrote his governor in Springfield that the 
“the Cuban Soldiers want to take possession of everything. They still carry arms, but do not 
come into the city armed.”144 Just as in Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo, the local insurgents 
around San Luis wanted to have a say in administering the town they spent years fighting to 
control. And, just as before, the local U.S. Army commander compelled by the War 																																																								
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Department’s policy kept the armed mambises out of the town to maintain order and establish the 
supremacy of the U.S. government in the Department of Santiago. As in the other towns, the 
U.S. Army initially fed the starving Cuban soldiers and gave some conservative Cuban officers 
positions in the new municipal government. On August 31, the 23rd Kansas Infantry arrived, 
easing the burden on Ewers and the 8th Illinois.145 Finally, on September 9, the last remaining 
regiment of African Americans not already in San Luis, the 9th Immunes, was assigned to Ewers 
and formed the third regiment of his brigade.146 
Soon after arriving in San Luis, Ewers received reports of about 1,500 Spanish loyalist 
guerrillas in the mountains above San Luis. The general posted a notice that they had just a few 
days to surrender before the U.S. Army would come up and clear them out. As a precaution the 
8th Illinois posted an extra line of pickets around their camp and issued ammunition. Moreover, 
Colonel Marshall had his men sleep under arms. The rumor of Spanish militia in the mountains 
proved later to be false, but to the sentries on duty each night, the threat of an attack was very 
real. One night, an unsuspecting farmer drove his ox cart through the picket line and a jittery 
sentry shot the poor ox in the darkness. Hearing the first shot, other sentries discharged their 
weapons, raising the general alarm. Soon an entire battalion of soldiers was formed in the 
darkness awaiting the expected Spanish attack. Company H observed movement to its front and 
unleashed a volley of fire into the darkness. Regrettably, for privates Smith and Blakes, two 
sentries on duty to the company’s front, the soldiers of H company shot both of their comrades 																																																								
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from over a quarter of a mile away in the darkness. Private Smith received a fatal shot through 
the neck and his lifeless body lay undiscovered until morning, while Private Blakes received a 
wound through the thigh. Major Charles G. Starr, sent to investigate the tragedy, blamed the 
mishap on a “nervous and green sentry” and Company H, which was “equally frightened but was 
stopped by the officers as soon as they could reach the Company.”147 The friendly-fire incident 
caused a stir in the press about the competence of African American officers, but Lawton 
shrugged off these opinions, commenting that the black officers controlled their men admirably. 
The episode illustrates how seriously the U.S. Army soldiers perceived the threat of Spanish 
militia attacks in the first month of the initial occupation.148 
Ewers’s brigade of African-American soldiers not only garrisoned the town of San Luis, 
but also occupied smaller towns and villages in the vicinity. The largest, Palma Soriano, boasted 
a population of 4,000.149 E and F Companies of the 8th Illinois garrisoned the town. One of the 
few African American officers to hold an independent command of a garrison during the initial 
occupation, Major Robert R. Jackson commanded the detachment. His garrison got along well 
with the Cubans in this community. A few of his soldiers even married local women. The small 
patrols and details also felt little threat from the local mambises. Corporal Goode in Company F 
went on a patrol with a squad of soldiers but soon became separated in the thick jungle. After 
hours of wandering hopelessly through tall grass and streams, he encountered a small formation 																																																								
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of Cuban soldiers on their way to Santiago to turn in their weapons and disband. Goods’s fear of 
these Cubans soldiers quickly turned into admiration as the helpful mambises told the hapless 
corporal that there were “mucho American soldou [sic] over there,” reuniting the corporal with 
his squad. If the Cuban Liberation Army had resisted the American occupation, it would have 
become impossible for small patrols, like Goode’s, to retrieve water and wood or to send 
supplies to small outlying posts without the backing of larger units to provide security. The 
soldiers in Palma Soriano cooperated so well with the local Cubans that they were more offended 
than anything else when they heard that Cuban guerrillas might attack the garrison over a small 
charge of mistreatment by a soldier against a local. Despite the fact that these African-American 
soldiers favored the Cubans in their area more than the wealthier Spanish-born elites, they 
strictly followed their orders to protect all individuals and property and to end the state of 
hostilities. For example, when the Cubans turned over a man who spied for the Spanish during 
the war, Major Jackson quickly released him. And Company K, commanded by Captain Leon W. 
Denison, a black law student in Chicago, guarded the largest sugar mill in the area, owned by a 
hated foreign-born Spanish sympathizer named Creausau. Company K prevented attempts to 
burn the plantation and mill. Soon after the 8th Illinois left Cuba, the mill was left unguarded, and 
the Cubans quickly put it to the torch.150 
Later, Wood assigned the 2nd Immunes to Ewers’ brigade in order to garrison the towns 
of Songo, El Cristo, and El Cobre.151 With populations of only a few thousand each, these towns 
lay scattered in the rugged countryside north of Santiago de Cuba. Wood ordered garrisons sent 																																																								
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there after receiving a report from Second Lieutenant Jefferson D. Rooney on his return from 
delivering supplies to the destitute in El Cobre by mule train. Rooney encountered many armed 
Cuban soldiers and officers in the town celebrating a “feast day.” The Cuban soldiers had 
received only heard rumor that they were to “to disarm and get to work.”152 Still treating armed 
Cubans as a challenge to U.S. authority in the department, Wood sent the 2nd Immunes to 
garrison these towns as soon as the trails became dry enough to supply them. 
After only a month in these towns, the 2nd Immunes established the supremacy of the 
military government. Wood then abruptly ordered Ewers to replace these 2nd U.S.V.I. garrisons 
with other companies from his three regiments of African American soldiers. Wood specified 
that the relief of the 2nd Immunes should be done so that “these points will not be left without a 
garrison” for even a moment. Wood planned for the 2nd U.S.V.I. to move by transport ship to 
occupy towns on the north coast of Cuba, soon to be abandoned by the Spanish Army. He sought 
to have U.S. troops in the towns before the Spanish soldiers departed to prevent disorders from 
occurring and Cubans from dictating local policy decisions to the U.S. military government.153 
The Spanish first surrendered the towns of Baracoa and Sagua de Tánamo on the north 
coast of Santiago. The soldiers there belonged to Toral’s command, and he surrendered these 
garrisons at the same time he surrendered Santiago de Cuba under the same condition that they 
be shipped to Spain. On August 29, Lawton ordered a battalion from the 3rd Immunes under 
Major Thomas S. Wylly to take the transport San Juan to Baracoa and Sagua de Tánamo. Wylly 
arrived in Baracoa on September 5 with two companies and Captain Marion W. Harris steamed 
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off with the remaining two companies, arriving to garrison Sagua de Tánamo the next day.154 
Later, the 3rd Immunes kept only a single company in Sagua de Tánamo under Captain Harris 
who reported to Baracoa.155 On arriving to Baracoa, Major Wylly found 500 Spanish soldiers in 
fortifications facing 600 mambises awaiting their departure. Just as the U.S. Army did elsewhere, 
Wylly prohibited the Cubans from entering Baracoa until all the Spanish prisoners departed for 
Guantánamo to meet transports from Spain. Once they left, the Cuban soldiers could enter 
without arms. Wylly maintained the peace and affirmed that the U.S. Army set policy, not the 
Cubans. As an inducement for cooperation, Wylly came equipped with 10,000 rations to feed 
needy Cubans and mambises who disarmed and submitted to U.S. authority.156 
Wylly (recently promoted to lieutenant colonel) tolerated no opposition to U.S. authority. 
When the Cuban brigadier general in command of the area refused to allow workers to cross his 
lines to work on the plantations outside of the town, probably owned by Spanish loyalists, Wylly 
arrested him the first time he entered the city and disarmed his 35-man bodyguard.157 Similarly, a 
former major in the Cuban Liberation Army assaulted the foreman of a public works project, and 
Wylly confined the attacker for thirty days on bread and water. Cuban officers approached Wylly 
and demanded their former comrade’s release. Although the Cuban Army in the area 
outnumbered his men by at least four to one, the brash Wylly did not yield. He stated that their 
comrade would remain confined and that “any attempt to rescue him … would be met with force 																																																								
154 Leonard Wood Papers, Special Orders, Department of Santiago, 1898, S. O. 12, August 29, 1898. National 
Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1504, Annual Report of Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U.S. Volunteers, 
Commanding Department of Santiago, 1899, 2-3.   
155 Leonard Wood Papers, Special Orders, Department of Santiago, 1898, S. O. 50, October 11, 1898. 
156 Leonard Wood Papers, Special Orders, Department of Santiago, 1898, S. O. 12, August 29, 1898. 
157 The Spanish-American War Veterans Survey Collection, Small Collections, Thomas S. Wylly Papers, Box 
Number 1, Scrapbook, “Our Flag at Manzanillo,” The U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania. 
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of arms.” Furthermore, if any of Cuban soldiers were found in the city with arms “they would be 
arrested and severely punished.”158 No one challenged Wylly’s authority in Baracoa again, and 
soon thereafter Cuban Colonel Francisco Valiente, a conservative and pro-American officer, 
arrived from Santiago to help Wylly pick other conservative Cubans to run the civil 
administration and municipal police.159 
Despite the fact that the Cuban and U.S. armies did not fight each other during the initial 
occupation of Cuba, at times tensions between them almost boiled over. The U.S. coerced the 
exhausted and undersupplied Cuban Liberation Army to accept its authority and co-opted 
conservative leaders from the Cuban army. In his letter to Corbin on September 13, Lawton 
summarized his policy for garrisoning the major towns in the Department of Santiago and the 
necessity of continuing this strategy: “Troops will be required at these places so long as armed 
Cubans occupy the country or the United States retains control of the Island against the 
sentiment of a majority of the Cubans, or while it is necessary to distribute large quantities of 
sustenance.”160 The U.S. Army physically controlled the province by establishing Army 
garrisons in the population centers and using the incentives of sustenance and jobs to disband the 
Cuban Liberation Army. 
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Conclusion 
The U.S. Army had garrisons in twenty-one towns and villages in the Department of 
Santiago by the end of the initial occupation, effectively controlling both the Cuban and Spanish-
born populations. In January 1899, the garrisons in Santiago de Cuba and San Luis each 
consisted of more than a regiment of soldiers. Additionally, four other large towns had garrisons 
with at least a battalion (four companies), and an additional five towns had garrisons with at least 
two companies. Finally, ten villages had a single company garrisoning them. This distribution 
enabled the U.S. Army to maximize its influence and control over the population. Widely 
dispersed as they were, the garrisons were vulnerable to attack, but the U.S. Army could afford 
to keep their soldiers dispersed by first compelling the Cuban Liberation Army and Spanish 
loyalist militias to disband and disarm, and then by establishing a logistical system capable of 
sustaining them.161 
To compel the Cuban soldiers to disband and pursue peaceful employment, the U.S. 
Army capitalized on the Cuban Liberation Army’s persistent inability to supply, feed, or pay its 
troops. Once the U.S. Army established a monopoly of military force in the province, it was free 
to administer the province as it saw fit. Brooke later implemented the same method of 
establishing control over the population by placing garrisons in major population centers to 
pacify the rest of Cuba. With U.S. Army garrisons in every town and no significant armed force 																																																								
161 Ewers to the Adjutant General, Division of Cuba, January 16, 1899, National Archives, Record Group 395, 
Entry 1479, Vol. 4 of 8, January 7, 1899 to March 1, 1899, 113. Disposition of troops across the Department of 
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B, C, & L in Guantánamo, A, G, & M in Baracoa; I at Sagua de Tánamo, D at Guasa, K at Solidad, E & F Jamaica, 
H at Santa Rosa); 4th U.S.V.I. (HQ, Companies C, D, E, G, K & I at Manzanillo, A at Campechuela, B at Bayamo, F 
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to oppose them, the McKinley administration could afford to develop a lasting U.S. policy 
toward Cuba, one that unfortunately denied it of much of its independence. Only Cuban public 
sentiments and anti-imperialist opposition within the United States prevented the expansionists 
in the McKinley administration and the Republican Congress from annexing Cuba outright.   
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CHAPTER 6: 
POLICING CUBA: USING LOCAL PROXIES TO CONTROL THE BOUNDARIES OF 
AMERICAN EMPIRE 
 
Chaffee says that Wood told him in person that he 
was having alleged banditti killed without trial. When 
he sent his men out for them he expected them to 
bring back their heads, or an evidence of their death. 
 
- Major General James H. Wilson to R. Suydam Grant 
(September 14, 1899) 
 
Introduction 
On the night of October 1, 1898, Sergeant William L. Head of the 5th United States 
Volunteer Infantry (U.S.V.I.) walked through the streets of Santiago de Cuba to attend the bi-
weekly band concert presented by the U.S. Army. The beauty of the city took him aback. Head 
thought the city was “most orderly for a place that has just emerged from” three years of savage 
warfare “concluded by a siege and a surrender.”1 For the three hours the sergeant walked 
Santiago de Cuba on pass from his camp overlooking the city, he “heard no unusual noise, not 
even a loud voice, which speaks well for a place where entoxicants [sic] are sold at almost every 
corner.”2 Streetlights were sparse, so he relied on the light emanating from the few larger 
businesses to outline the road for him and his friends. They noticed several young Cuban ladies 																																																								
1 Lee to Annie, October 2, 1898, 5th Regiment, U.S. Volunteer Infantry - Head, William L., Company D, Spanish-
American War Veterans Questionnaire, The Spanish-American War Veterans Survey Collection, Box Number 48, 
Folder Number 13, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
2 Ibid. 
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peering at them through “the iron grating of their windows.”3 Head and his fellow Yankee 
soldiers “heard good music and singing in numbers of these homes and always stopped on the 
side walks to listen.”4 While U.S. Army soldiers did guard their camps and government 
buildings, the security that Head and his unarmed comrades so admired that October night was 
provided primarily by the local police. Some were police under the Spanish regime, but 
increasingly, former soldiers of the Cuban Liberation Army, known as mambises, filled the 
police ranks. 
Many of the mambises who had fought in eastern Cuba found work in the construction 
and sanitation crews used by the U.S. Army to rebuild the roads and sanitize the towns in the 
province. Most Cuban officers hoped to be appointed to leadership positions in the military 
government. Other former Cuban soldiers found work policing the towns throughout the 
Department of Santiago. The most politically dependable mambises joined the Rural Guard, 
ranging the province in small groups to maintain order and guarding large plantations from 
bandits, often with little regard for the rights of the alleged offenders. Through careful selection, 
the U.S. Army and its conservative Cuban advisors ensured that the Rural Guard and Municipal 
Police were recruited from—and protected—the propertied class in Cuba. Army officers used 
former Cuban soldiers to police Santiago from the very beginning of the occupation because the 
practice of employing native constabulary was ingrained in the culture of the U.S. Army and the 
experiential memory of the War Department’s senior officers. Furthermore, the U.S. Army 
operated under the assumption that it would be in Cuba for many months or years, if not forever. 
The primary purpose of the infantry regiments assigned to occupy Santiago was to provide the 																																																								
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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U.S. Army with overwhelming military superiority. The War Department, however, never 
intended to use American soldiers to police the province. 
The Rural Guard and municipal Cuban police offered many advantages over U.S. soldiers 
when it came to policing the Department of Santiago. Most Cubans had developed immunity to 
yellow fever and malaria through prior exposure, but the two diseases devastated American 
troops during the summer months. The military government encouraged the Rural Guard to use 
extrajudicial means to handle the alleged criminals they captured, instead of going through the 
notoriously corrupt and inefficient Cuban courts or the onerous judicial procedures used by the 
War Department. Furthermore, by keeping most U.S. soldiers in barracks and focused on 
drilling, the occupation government could continue to train its regiments and have soldiers 
massed and ready to respond with overwhelming force to suppress any hint of insurrection and to 
assist small Rural Guard patrols and municipal police in emergencies. While in their barracks 
and camps, American soldiers were seldom seen by the Cuban people and were not a constant 
reminder of the unpopular occupation. To reduce tensions with the Cuban people, the best 
approach was one they had utilized in the U.S. South and with the Indians, to rely on local 
policing and keep the Army in their barracks, using them only at times of crisis. Leonard Wood, 
Henry W. Lawton, and the other Army officers who had served in the American West 
remembered the difficulty Regulars had pursuing hostile Native Americans off the reservations 
without the help of friendly Indian scouts. Wood preferred to have the mounted Rural Guard—
who spoke Spanish and had familiarity with the backcountry trails—pursue bandits and thieves, 
rather than sending heavy columns of U.S. infantrymen stumbling through jungle trails in vain 
pursuits.  
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Frontier Legacy of Policing 
The U.S. Army came away from Reconstruction with an institutional disdain for policing 
civilian populations, and sought to avoid performing the mission again on the Trans-Mississippi 
West. When scouting or policing became absolutely necessary, the Army preferred to conscript 
Indian allies or assist local law enforcement officials. The Army exported these institutional 
habits to Cuba, where it preferred to use local police to maintain law and order after it had 
established control of a town. 
 The U.S. Army quelled violent insurrection, riots, and strikes on several occasions under 
the President’s constitutional authority throughout the nineteenth century. Much more 
commonly, local Army commanders assisted local officials to bring order to lawless portions of 
the American frontier, even without permission from the War Department. Acting as a posse 
comitatus, Army units sometimes made arrests on their own authority, but more often, they 
provided armed escorts to local and federal authorities serving warrants. The U.S. Army also 
temporarily held and transported civilian prisoners to local courts. Because of the questionable 
legal authority they had to perform these law enforcement functions, Army officers often found 
themselves the target of civil suits by those they arrested. Faced with serious legal repercussions, 
officers disliked their unofficial policing mission, and they used discretion before providing 
military assistance to local law enforcement officials.5 
 Moreover, the U.S. Army’s experience in the South during Reconstruction led to strong 
institutional contempt within the Army for acting in a law-enforcement role. Soldiers stationed in 
the South disliked policing their seemingly ungrateful countrymen and became frustrated by their 																																																								
5 Paul H. Carlson, “Pecos Bill:” A Military Biography of William R. Shafter (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1989), 88-90. Michael L. Tate, The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 80-92. 
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inability to secure convictions in Southern courts, especially for crimes against former enslaved 
African Americans and Northern carpetbaggers. Out of revenge for a decade of military 
occupation of the South, the Democratic majority in the U.S. House of Representatives added the 
posse comitatus amendment to the 1878 army appropriation bill, which prevented the use of 
federal forces for policing duties except in specific cases authorized by the president or 
Congress.6  
The Army continued to perform some law enforcement missions after Reconstruction, 
but usually did so only with presidential approval, inside the newly created National Parks, or in 
extreme emergencies and at their own risk. For instance, Captain Ezra P. Ewers—one of the 
three generals left to occupy Santiago after the departure of Shafter’s Fifth Corps—led Indian 
scouts under his charge to arrest horse thieves in the vicinity of Fort Keogh, Montana in 1880. 
Just a year after the passage of posse comitatus, Charles Crane, who later commanded a regiment 
during the initial occupation of Cuba, led a troop of cavalry to assist a peace officer with an 
arrest. If the column ran into trouble, he did not see how he “could escape laying myself liable to 
civil suit,” but he supported the lawman anyway.7 President Rutherford B. Hayes used the U.S. 
Army during the Great Strike of 1877, as other presidents did to maintain law and order during 
large social disturbances. Ewers’s battalion and many other Army units guarded public property 
and helped to arrest lawbreakers in Chicago during the Pullman Strike of 1894. The Federal 
government sent the U.S. Army to Washington and Wyoming in the 1880s to protect Chinese 
miners from lynching by mobs of hostile white miners. The Army brought law and order to 																																																								
6 Michael L. Tate, The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 
93-110. Robert Wooster, The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 243-46. 
7 Charles J. Crane, The Experiences of a Colonel of Infantry (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1923), 88. 
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Alaska in 1897 due to the lack of any local police to control miners heading to the Klondike. 
When a mob of masked miners seized and demolished a nonunion mine in the Coeur d’Alene 
region of Idaho, President Benjamin Harrison sent the 24th Infantry to support state law 
enforcement and protect the property rights’ of the mine owners. In these violent labor disputes, 
the Federal government almost always sided with business interests.8  
On the Indian Reservations, the Interior Department began using local Native Americans 
to police their own people in the early 1880s.9 Sioux police tried unsuccessfully to break up the 
Ghost Dances in 1890, but Standing Soldier and other native lawmen did help to convince many 
other Indians to return to the reservations after the tragedy at Wounded Knee.10 In Arizona, 
White Mountain Apache policed their own reservation and even arrested Geronimo and his band 
on April 21, 1877.11 The U.S. Army went on the reservations only to preserve order when 
beleaguered Indian agents asked for help after their native constables were unable to handle the 
situation. Several presidents also ordered the War Department to send troops of cavalry to 
perform law enforcement to protect Sequoia, Yosemite, and Yellowstone National Parks from 
herders, loggers, and miners, and to monitor tourists.12 Fearing civil suits and further 
unpopularity, the Army exercised great restraint in all of its policing missions. Besides its limited 
role of protecting the parks, the U.S. Army did not consider policing a primary duty before 1898. 																																																								
8 Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 21. William L. Ewers, When the Army Still Wore Blue: The Military Life and Times of 
General Ezra P. Ewers (Glendale, AZ: 1996), 79, 123. Robert M. Utely, The Last Days of the Sioux Nation (New 
Haven: Yale University, 1963), 26. 
9 Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale University, 1988), 
35. 
10 Robert M. Utley, Geronimo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 142. Robert M. Utely, The Last Days of 
the Sioux Nation (New Haven: Yale University, 1963), 91-98, 146-66, 241-43. 
11 Robert M. Utley, Geronimo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 88. 
12 Harvey Meyerson, Nature’s Army: When Soldiers Fought for Yosemite (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2001), 170. 
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Following this institutional norm, the series of U.S. Army commanders in the Department of 
Santiago left municipal policing to the Cubans, but did not hesitate to use their soldiers to assist 
overwhelmed local law enforcement officials and to prevent the possibility of a Cuban 
insurrection against the occupation government.13  
 
Cubans Policing Santiago 
 Cuban police offered several advantages over American soldiers in maintaining civil 
order. They spoke the language; they knew the people; they understood the local laws; and they 
did not create an image of a foreign occupier in the minds of Cubans. When Lawton observed 
that U.S. Army soldiers guarded every street corner in Santiago de Cuba, he ordered Wood, the 
city’s commander, to remove them at once.14 American soldiers limited their security duties to 
guarding government buildings, property, and military camps, and helping the Cuban police 
when situations required additional manpower. Lawton did not want the U.S. Army to appear to 
be an army of occupation to the Cubans or to get involved in police work. Instead, he wanted the 
local police to bring order to the towns of the province. 
To help the native police maintain order in Santiago de Cuba against unruly Cuban and 
even American soldiers, Wood prohibited anyone from carrying firearms except U.S. Army 
soldiers and Navy sailors on official duty, watchman employed by the occupation government, 
																																																								
13 Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 246-254. Robert Wooster, The American Military Frontiers: The United States 
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14 Starr to Wood, September 2, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1479, Vol. 1 of 8, August 15, 
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members of the Rural Guard, and the city’s police officers.15 Those who defied the order faced a 
twenty-five dollar fine or thirty days in the city jail, plus the confiscation of their weapon.16 
Wood did not allow even his sentries to carry loaded weapons.17 Other garrison commanders in 
the Department of Santiago enacted similar laws prohibiting civilians, Cuban soldiers, and off-
duty American soldiers from carrying weapons in towns.18 
 Before he could rely on the police to maintain order in Santiago de Cuba, Lawton needed 
to hire more constables. Shafter had reduced the city’s police force of two hundred to a mere ten 
lawmen in a reckless attempt to save money. Within days, it became readily apparent that ten 
police officers could not maintain order in a city of approximately 50,000 people. Shafter 
admitted his mistake and hired fifty more officers.19 This small police force struggled to keep the 
city of refugees, hungry citizens, and soldiers under control, and they relied on the U.S. Army to 
help keep order. As Lawton tried to turn over the policing mission entirely to the Cuban police in 
Santiago de Cuba, he had Wood hire twenty-six more police in late September.20 Even with the 
additional manpower, the municipal police continued to struggle.  
Wood allowed the city’s police to use brutal force to maintain order. Wood employed the 
police to round up civilians and, if necessary, forcefully impress them into work gangs to clean 																																																								
15 Leonard Wood Papers, General Orders and Circulars, Department of Santiago, 1898, G. O. 7, Office Acting 
Civil Government, December 16, 1898. 
16 Leonard Wood Papers, General Orders and Circulars, Department of Santiago, 1898, G. O. 8, Office Acting 
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17 Leonard Wood Papers, General Orders and Circulars, Department of Santiago, 1898, G. O. 2, August 24, 1898. 
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the city after the war, although he did pay and feed the workers for their service. The police had 
the authority to shoot anyone resisting arrest, committing a theft, or suspected of looting in the 
city after the siege ended. By keeping the city under strict martial law, Wood gave the municipal 
police the authority to quickly and ruthlessly restore order.21 
Wood wanted to limit the use of American soldiers in policing the city. His goal “was to 
uphold the civil authority, not to supplant it” with the U.S. Army.22 He did not want Cubans or 
the American press to see “uniformed troops of the United States chasing petty offenders through 
the street.”23 Cubans could tolerate local police arresting residents for crimes, but if American 
soldiers regularly detained Cubans it would create an image of the American as ruthless foreign 
occupiers, which Wood, Lawton, and the War Department wanted to avoid. U.S. Army soldiers 
did assist the police when necessary, guard important government buildings, and prevent civil 
disturbances. Typically, the Army tried to break up protests before they became violent, 
especially any anti-American gathering. Wood concluded that to use American soldiers for 
anything other than garrison duty and to help “civil authorities over rough places…would be a 
mistake.”24 He believed that American soldiers made bad policemen because of the language and 
cultural barriers between them and the Cubans. Moreover, he believed that if the U.S. Army 
assumed policing duties, instead of reviving local police forces, then the moment the U.S. Army 
departed the province “chaos would follow.”25 																																																								
21 Leonard Wood, “Santiago Since the Surrender,” Scribner’s Magazine 25, no. 5 (May 1899): 522. 
22 Leonard Wood, “Santiago Since the Surrender,” Scribner’s Magazine 25, no. 5 (May 1899): 522. 
23 Leonard Wood, “Santiago Since the Surrender,” Scribner’s Magazine 25, no. 5 (May 1899): 522. 
24 Leonard Wood to the President of the United States, November 27, 1898, Container 26, General Correspondence, 
Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 3. 
25 Leonard Wood to the President of the United States, November 27, 1898, Container 26, General Correspondence, 
Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 3. 
 	312	
 Lawton and Wood also wanted to remove the Army from the business of trying and 
imprisoning Cubans by turning over all charged citizens to Cuban judicial authorities. On 
October 29, American sentries discovered a Cuban named José Maso trying to steal a large 
blanket from the military hospital by wrapping it around his body and putting his clothes on over 
it. The hospital commander, Major L. C. Carr, ordered Maso placed in the guardhouse. Cubans 
complained about his arrest and confinement, and Wood ordered Carr to deliver Maso to the city 
jail immediately with charges.26 No longer were Cuban civilians to be tried by court martial or 
held indefinitely in military guardhouses. 
 Bringing order to the cities and towns proved relatively easy for the U.S. Army garrison 
commanders during the initial occupation. The Spanish controlled all the towns and cities in the 
province, and when the U.S. Army arrived to relieve the Spanish garrison, they found town 
police already maintaining a semblance of order. The U.S. Army simply kept in place the 
municipal police forces that had kept law and order during the Spanish regime. The military 
government also kept garrisons in all the larger towns to control the province, and to provide 
soldiers to assist the local police when necessary. 
Establishing order over the lawless interior of the province proved far more difficult. The 
Spanish Army failed to control the rural interior of eastern Cuba during the war and the 
mambises placed their safe havens in these remote areas. Because the U.S. Army refused to give 
food or jobs to the Cuban soldiers who remained armed, most veterans reluctantly turned in their 
weapons and returned to civilian pursuits. Ordinary bandits, starving mambises who did not find 
jobs in the occupation government, or those Cuban soldiers who remained armed for both 																																																								
26 L. C. Carr to Adjutant General, Department of Santiago, November 3, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 
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honorable and dishonorable reasons continued to pillage the countryside and break into shops 
and homes to find food.27 Foraging in peacetime is theft, and the distinction between ordinary 
bandits and the veterans of the Cuban Liberation Army quickly blurred. The U.S. Army had to 
find a way to stop these armed marauders to bring stability to the Department of Santiago. Not 
wanting to start another war by directly confronting the remaining armed mambises or to chase 
outlaws through the mountainous jungles that they knew all too well, the U.S. Army fell back on 
its frontier experience of using local auxiliaries familiar with the terrain to track and defeat the 
armed marauders. 
 
The U.S. Army’s Long Tradition of Using Native Scouts 
 The U.S. Army had relied heavily on allied Native American scouts to pursue their 
traditional native enemies during their conquest of the trans-Mississippi West in the decades 
after the Civil War. Native American scouts excelled at tracking and often had knowledge of the 
waterholes and campgrounds favored by the hostile Indian groups that they pursued.28 Congress 
authorized the use of 1,000 Native American scouts in 1866.29 Colonel Eugene A. Carr used 
Pawnee scouts to catch and destroy Tall Bull’s Cheyenne at Summit Springs in 1869.30 Two 
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years later, Ranald B. Mackenzie used Seminole-Negro scouts to pursue renegade Apache and 
Kickapoo across the Mexican border.31  
The U.S. Army officers who later served in Cuba also had extensive experience using 
Indian scouts. Shafter employed Seminole-Negro scouts in 1875 to help him explore the Llano 
Estacado of northwest Texas.32 While serving at Ft. Sill Oklahoma, Charles J. Crane commanded 
a company of Comanche and Kiowa scouts long before he commanded a regiment of Immunes 
in Santiago.33 Miles also made extensive use of Sioux and Cheyenne scouts to track down the 
Nez Perce in their attempt to reach the Canadian border in the summer of 1877. No officer in 
Santiago used Native American scouts more than Ezra P. Ewers. He first employed Indian scouts 
during the Red River war of 1874-5. Later, Ewers recruited a company of Cheyenne fighters 
under Chief Hump to become U.S. Army scouts, to the dismay of the Nez Perce they later 
tracked down for Miles.34  
George Crook was probably the Army officer most adept at using Indian allies as scouts 
after the Civil War. He used Shoshonis to catch the Paiutes from 1866 to 68, Maricopas and 
Pimas to catch Apaches in 1872, and Shoshonis and Crow to fight Sioux and Northern Cheyenne 
in 1876.35 By the time he pursued Geronimo, Crook relied on San Carlos and White Mountain 																																																								
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Apache, and even other Chiricahua Apaches, as scouts. Usually reliable, Apache scouts did on 
occasion turn against their U.S. Army employers, as they did at Cibicue Creek on August 30, 
1881.36  With these Apache scouts, led by a few intrepid Army officers, and supplied by mule 
trains to maintain the column’s operational mobility, Crook finally caught Geronimo’s band in 
1886.37  
 Crook received criticism from other Army officers for his almost complete reliance on 
Apache scouts to capture Geronimo. After Geronimo’s escape from the reservation, Lieutenant 
General Philip H. Sheridan transferred Crook from the Department of Arizona and replaced him 
with the confident and ambitious Brigadier General Nelson A. Miles, who promised to make 
better use of regular troops. Miles sent Captain Henry W. Lawton, accompanied by his Surgeon 
Leonard Wood, to recapture Geronimo. While still relying heavily on friendly Apache and Yuma 
scouts, Lawton, Wood, and a small number of regulars chased Geronimo’s band deep into the 
Sierra Madre, where exhaustion and fear of pursuing Mexican soldiers bent on revenge for his 
past atrocities compelled Geronimo to surrender to the small American force.38 Despite their 
heavy reliance on Apache scouts during the campaign, Miles, Lawton, and Wood argued that the 
second capture of Geronimo proved that well-conditioned regulars could pursue Indians just as 
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well as scouts. Later, both Lawton and Wood avoided using American soldiers to chase Cuban 
bandits in the Department of Santiago. Instead, they reestablished the Cuban Rural Guard to 
perform this mission. They knew from their experience in Arizona that local auxiliaries were 
much more capable of successful pursuits because of their familiarity with the local terrain, 
language, and people. 
 
The Rural Guard 
 Within a month of taking command of the Department of Santiago, Lawton was already 
pondering the use of former Cuban soldiers led by U.S. Army officers to patrol and secure the 
interior of the province, in a similar way to how the Army used Apache scouts in Arizona. 
Lawton knew that the entirety of the department needed to be occupied as long as armed bands 
of Cubans remained and as long as the “United States retains control of the island against the 
sentiments of a majority of the Cubans.”39 After witnessing the Fifth Corps become debilitated 
by malaria, yellow fever, and dysentery, Lawton doubted whether “American soldiers [could] 
successfully withstand the climate.”40 Instead, he believed that Cuban soldiers led by American 
officers should be used if the administration was contemplating a prolonged occupation. He 
wrote Adjutant General Henry Clark Corbin on his plan to use former Cuban soldiers, carefully 
vetted for their character and loyalty, as a rural police force. Lawton argued that if the former 
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mambises received regular pay and rations, they could be loyal, “tractable, patient and easily 
controlled.”41 
 When Lawton heard no reply from the War Department for two weeks, he again insisted 
that he be allowed to create a force of local auxiliaries. He further detailed his plan to raise a 
battalion of Cubans with the same organization and equipment as a U.S. Army battalion. Lawton 
insisted that he would recruit only the best and most loyal Cuban soldiers. If the War Department 
did not approve that scheme, then Lawton with General Garcia’s concurrence proposed an 
alternative plan; he would simply fill vacancies in the American volunteer regiments under his 
command with former Cuban soldiers. They believed that by putting former mambises in U.S. 
Army units the Cubans would eventually adopt American culture and U.S. Army drill and 
ceremony. Lawton believed that Cubans would eventually replace all the Americans within the 
regiments and become the new colonial army. Regardless of which course of action the War 
Department chose, Lawton implored it to take action soon. He reiterated, “Eventually we must 
have native troops here. I desire to attempt the scheme. Am sure I can make it successful.”42 
Lawton’s sudden recall ensured that he never had time to implement his plan.  
 After assuming command of the Department of Santiago, Wood also saw the need to 
create a mounted auxiliary force of Cubans to patrol the interior. Unlike Lawton and Shafter, the 
confident Wood simply established the Rural Guard and then reported to the War Department of 
its creation as a fait accompli. He wrote to McKinley that he needed the local constabulary force 
to counter “the great danger of these tropical people” to drift toward militarism, “revolution, and 																																																								
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upheavals.”43 He worked with Cubans loyal to the occupation government to hand-select former 
Cuban soldiers to fill the ranks of the new unit, ensuring that the Rural Guard would remain loyal 
to Wood and the conservative Cuban agenda. Wood lectured the new recruits on the importance 
of their mission to maintain order in the name of the civil government under Wood’s command, 
to arrest anyone who violated the civil laws of the province, and to conduct themselves with 
honor and integrity. Furthermore, Wood reminded them that their “failure will be, not a failure 
for them personally, but a failure for civil law in Cuba, and an advertisement to the world that 
they are unable to control and govern themselves.”44 
 As he did in so many other facets during the establishment of a civil government in 
Santiago, Wood tried to limit the financial cost of the Rural Guard. The main reason Wood kept 
the Rural Guard small in number and poorly equipped was to save money. However, he also did 
not want to create a large force that could challenge his overwhelming advantage in military 
force. For uniforms, the Cuban troopers wore cool and rugged linen clothes with a small insignia 
on their collar to denote their occupation. Privates in the Rural Guard received $36 a month in 
gold, which was slightly more than the American soldier, but they had to provide their own 
weapon, ammunition, uniform, food, horse, forage, and other equipment. Corporals received $40 
a month, sergeants $46, lieutenants $50, captains $100, and Colonel Francisco Valiente, a former 
commander in the Cuban Liberation Army, received $200 per month. Valiente organized his 
Rural Guard of 225 troopers into groups of eleven men. Led by a sergeant, a group also 
contained two corporals and eight privates. A lieutenant commanded three groups, and each of 																																																								
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the four captains was in charge of the Rural Guard in a military districts. Wood gave Valiente 
considerable leeway to administer the Rural Guard as he saw fit, but the troopers received 
missions from the U.S. Army commanders in their area.45  
 In a further attempt to cut the cost of maintaining a mounted police force, Wood ordered 
Colonel Duncan N. Hood to reduce the number of existing mounted troopers in the military 
district of Gibara. Duncan arrived to find that the existing mounted police in his newly created 
military district outnumbered the Rural Guard in the other three districts combined. Wood had 
him trim the number to seventy-five by carefully selecting only the most trustworthy, and 
warned him to prepare to reduce the force to fifty within a few months. Furthermore, Wood 
ordered Hood to organize, uniform, and pay the existing mounted police in the same manner as 
the Rural Guard throughout the province and to put them under Valiente’s command. Wood 
reiterated that the troopers were to be paid $36 a month and that the government would provide 
nothing but their salary.46 Wood bragged that despite their modest pay, the Rural Guard was “in 
fact entirely self sustaining.”47 
 Wood’s inspector general, Major James H. McLeary, disagreed. During his December 
1898 inspection tour, he reported that the Rural Guard troopers he encountered were 
“insufficiently equipped to perform their duties.”48 He blamed their inability to afford adequate 
fodder for their poor-quality mounts. McLeary also noted that the overworked animals were 																																																								
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“poorly shod and almost invariably sore backed.”49 The Rural Guard used whatever weapon they 
could get their hands on and some of them did not even have ammunition for their rifles. 
Furthermore, the Rural Guard patrol of five troopers assigned to protect and guide the inspector 
general on his mission had no canteens, cooking utensils, or money. McLeary had to purchase 
rations from the U.S. Army garrisons along the route with his own money to keep his scout 
escort from starving. Even with these few meager rations, the five Rural Guards were reduced to 
“begging from people along the road or from my orderly, for something or other to appease the 
pangs of hunger.”50 
 Despite their decrepit state, the Rural Guard performed its mission well and significantly 
reduced the levels of banditry in the province’s interior, though they often resorted to 
extrajudicial killings. Even the martinet McLeary confessed that Corporal Rafael Ramires and 
his four troopers performed their scouting and escort duty admirably despite their frail state. 
McLeary was impressed by their willingness to accompany the chief of police in Holguin into 
the interior to arrest five bandits that had been stealing horses. Ramires and his men pursued and 
captured the five marauders and turned them over to Hood and his police chief at the city jail 
without resorting to violence.51 Leonard Wood agreed with McLeary’s positive assessment of the 
Rural Guard’s devotion to their mission. Yet Wood avoided acknowledging to his superiors in 
the War Department that many of the highwaymen the Rural Guard pursued were former 
mambises, and instead claimed “the men engaged in this were old hands at it, and have returned 																																																								
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to it naturally since the end of the war.”52 He credited the Rural Guard with running down the 
bandits and almost entirely pacifying the countryside. Wood officially reported that the Rural 
Guard killed a number of the bandits while they resisted arrest, an allusion to the fact that he did 
not expect or want them to be brought in alive simply to be released shortly thereafter by the 
inefficient and corrupt Cuban courts.53 
 Unfortunately, the extrajudicial killing of bandits was common practice among the Rural 
Guard, and the U.S. Army barely denied that they condoned and encouraged the killings. The 
orders from the U.S. Army was to “capture or kill the bandits wherever they were found” with 
“promptness and efficiency,” an obvious suggestion that killing the bandits was preferred to 
capturing them.54 Ironically, the Rural Guard troopers that pursued and exterminated the bandits 
were usually killing comrades that they had fought with in the Cuban Liberation Army during 
the war. The Rural Guard returned with the spurs and machete of their victim as proof of the 
bandits “capture.” In Baracoa for example, the military district commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Thomas S. Wylly, approved a list of names to be put upon a blacklist and sent it to the Captain 
Andriano Gallano, the district commander of the Rural Guard. Gallano then sent a Rural Guard 
patrol to hunt down each criminal on the list. In one instance, a former major in the Cuban 
Liberation Army organized a band of horse thieves that pillaged the interior near Baracoa. When 
Gallano discovered that two members of the gang had recently left town, he sent a group of his 
Rural Guard down each possible escape route, leading one squad himself. Gallano’s troopers 																																																								
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followed the bandits’ trail for twenty-five miles before discovering the major and his 
accomplices hiding in a house in the jungle. Gallano surrounded the house and returned with a 
spur and machete, which Gallano collected from the major “whom he stated had been killed 
while endeavoring to escape.”55 The harsh methods employed by the Rural Guard allowed for 
the rapid pacification of the countryside through methods that the U.S. Army could not use. 
 
Operational Mobility: The U.S. Army’s Need for Mounted Soldiers 
 The Rural Guard did an excellent job securing U.S. Army officers as they traveled the 
countryside on official duties, securing large plantations, and pursuing bandits in the interior of 
the province. The mounted troopers of the Rural Guard performed these duties better than the 
U.S. Army could because of their familiarity with the terrain, language, and people, but also 
because they were mounted. The War Department sent only infantry regiments to occupy 
Santiago. These units effectively controlled towns, but did not have the operational mobility 
necessary to secure the rural interior. Wood and Lawton both knew that without cavalry their 
forces did not have the mobility to support the Rural Guard if they ran into large groups of 
bandits, or suppress a renewal of hostilities in the interior by former mambises, or worse, 
disgruntled Rural Guard troopers. 
 In order to ensure they could maintain control of the interior and effectively deal with a 
renewed insurgency, both Lawton and Wood requested that the War Department send a cavalry 
regiment. Even though he did not expect a renewal of hostilities, Lawton sought a squadron of 
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cavalry just days after assuming command of the Department of Santiago in August.56 A month 
later he continued to plead with Corbin in the War Department to send him cavalry. Lawton 
argued that a cavalry squadron would allow him to occupy the province with fewer men because 
the horse soldiers would allow him “to patrol a large territory, which need not then be 
garrisoned” by infantry.57 To help convince the adjutant general, Lawton offered to give up three 
infantry regiments in exchange for a single squadron of cavalry.58 Lawton never received his 
squadron of cavalry. 
 Wood continued to harass Washington for cavalry. After a drunk and belligerent African 
American soldier shot a Cuban police officer who tried to arrest him, Wood—who had a disdain 
for the African American regiments—used the incident to implore Corbin to reassign two of his 
three black regiments to another part of Cuba in return for a regiment of regular cavalry. Wood 
could not mount his troops on the horses left behind by the Spanish because a glanders epidemic 
forced the U.S. Army to put almost all of them down. Wood argued that he badly needed cavalry 
to act as couriers and to patrol the interior. He insisted “infantry cannot under any circumstances 
do this work in Cuba without great inconvenience and hardship” due to the toll that the tropical 
heat took on dismounted soldiers on the march and because the “vegetation [was] so dense that 
men on foot are practically buried under it while marching.”59 Later in November, he made the 
same case to the President for a cavalry regiment. Wood told McKinley that if he could get a 																																																								
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regiment of cavalry, then he could easily spare two to three regiments of infantry “at anytime, 
absolutely do not need them.”60 The problem was that the War Department had no regular 
cavalry regiments to spare. Almost all of them had fought in Cuba and were recovering from 
their ailments in Long Island or were deployed in Puerto Rico or the Philippines. 
 Nonetheless, Corbin found a way to get Wood mounted troops. He authorized the 
shipment of one regiment’s worth of horses, carbines, and horse tack to Wood in Santiago to 
mount one of his infantry regiments. Instead of using all the horses and tack to mount a single 
infantry regiment, the ecstatic Wood wanted to mount two companies of infantry from each of 
his five white regiments, his racist beliefs never allowing him to trust the martial abilities of his 
black soldiers. Wood’s plan allowed him to have two companies of mounted riflemen in each of 
his four military districts, with the extra two companies acting as his reserve in Santiago de 
Cuba. Wood also requested to the Adjutant General that no sabers be issued, since the 
infantrymen were not trained to use them, and he did not harbor any romantic notions that the 
sword was still useful in battle. Additionally, he wanted the War Department to send small and 
hearty horses from Texas to Cuba and not large northern horses, which struggled in the tropical 
climate.61 By 1899, Wood had his Texas mustangs, carbines, and horse accouterments; however, 
he did end up mounting two companies of African American soldiers from the 9th U.S.V.I. due to 
the disposition of his troops in the department. In addition to the 9th Immunes, 150 infantrymen 
from the 5th Infantry, and the 5th, 4th, and 2nd Immunes all received horses and carbine rifles 
between February and March of 1899. When the volunteers eventually departed Cuba later that 																																																								
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year, they turned over all their horses and equipment to the  5th Infantry, enough to mount the 
entire regiment. The War Department replaced the seven departing volunteer regiments with the 
10th U.S. Cavalry, giving Wood only two regiments of Regulars to garrison the Department of 
Santiago, both mounted.62 
 Before the volunteers departed Santiago, Wood utilized their mobility to pursue some of 
the larger bands of banditti that were too large for the Rural Guard to handle on their own. The 
worst groups of marauders in the province operated around Mayarí. Troncon commanded this 
band of former mambises, and rumor had it that he had served as the former executioner for 
Lieutenant General Antonio Maceo y Grajales, where he “removed the heads of a hundred 
Spanish prisoners, each with one stroke.”63 After the Rural Guard failed to defeat a large group 
on banditti operating near Mayarí, Wood ordered the 9th Immunes to assist them in tracking 
down the gang. Days of pursuit by Company I of the 9th Immunes, commanded by Captain 
Claron A. Windus, could not capture the bandits.  
The fortune of Troncon and his gang changed after they ambushed Company I’s lightly 
guarded supply wagon left near the Santa Ana sugar plantation and killed a teamster. Sergeant 
Thomas Cohen escaped the bandits’ attack and notified the rest of the company of the Troncon’s 
attack. The hunters soon became the hunted as I Company found the murderers’ trail and began a 
nonstop ninety-six-hour pursuit. The mounted infantry company tracked down the gang to their 
mountain hideout, where, after a shootout, the Immunes captured most of the gang leaders. The 
commander of the 9th Immunes, Charles Crane, described Troncon as the largest man he ever 																																																								
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saw, “coal black, about six feet and two or three inches tall, exceedingly broad shouldered, and a 
finely proportioned giant.”64 The triumphant African American troopers brought their prisoners 
“bound and gagged” to the Cuban authorities for trial.65 A year later, Troncon was back on the 
rampage, ravaging the area until another unit of African American soldiers, the 10th U.S. 
Cavalry, caught him for the final time.66 
 Wood tried to downplay the significant threat that the marauding bandits in the interior 
posed to the Cubans and his own soldiers. In an attempt to demonstrate control over the situation 
in Santiago, he reported to the War Department that the repeated press reports on the significant 
levels of brigandage in the Department on Santiago were “very largely exaggerations.”67 
Unfortunately, the threat posed by the numerous bands of bandits to Cuban civilians and even 
Americans were quite significant. Soldiers in the 9th Immunes recalled daily skirmishes with 
Troncon’s large gang of bandits in the interior where “murder and rapine were daily 
occurrences.”68 Similarly, Private Andrew Paul of the 3rd Immunes remembered chasing bandits 
and cattle thieves in the vicinity of Sagua de Tánamo.69 
 While the U.S. Army’s garrison troops in Santiago did assist the Rural Guard in 
neutralizing bandits in the interior of the province, American soldiers spent the vast majority of 																																																								
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their time drilling and guarding their encampments, government installations, and private 
property. Private Willie L. Potts of the Fifth Immunes never fired his weapon in Cuba, and he 
recalled spending his months in Cuba in formation drilling, protecting Morro Castle, and 
securing the docks in Santiago de Cuba.70 Potts’s experience typified most American soldiers, 
who spent almost their entire stay in Cuba killing time between morning and afternoon drill and 
guard shifts. Very few experienced the excitement of chasing bandits.  
More often than pursuing the troublemakers, American officers ordered their soldiers 
outside the garrisoned towns to protect private property from the marauders. The garrison 
commanders sent soldiers in response to pleas made by plantation owners desperate for 
protection. Many of the plantation owners had fled Cuba during the three-year conflict, and upon 
their return they asked the U.S. Army to protect them from the bandits in the countryside.71 For 
example, the son of the German Consul in Santiago, Young Shumann, complained to the 
occupation government that thieves continued to steal livestock from the sugar plantation he 
managed in San Luis, and that several of the other nearby plantations and sugar mills had similar 
problems with bandits.72 In response to pleas like these, Wood ordered his subordinate 
commanders to send soldiers to guard the plantations. In December, Wood ordered Colonel 
Patrick H. Ray of the 3rd Immunes to use his regiment to protect the sugar plantations in vicinity 
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of Guantanamo.73 Similarly, Wood ordered the newly arrived garrison commander in January 
1899 to consult with the plantation owners near El Cobre and find the best way to protect them 
from the marauding bandits.74 
The U.S. Army also tried to protect the property of the private telegraph companies, vital 
to their effective communication with their garrisons and the United States, and the U.S. Army 
allowed its soldiers to use lethal force to keep the lines from being tampered with. After 
unknown vandals broke into a building containing the English Cable Company’s junction boxes 
and damaged with them, Wood ordered guards already posted near the building at Morro and 
Punta Blanca to protect it and prevent a further disruption to the telegraph lines used by the 
Department of Santiago to communicate with the outside world.75 Wood ordered Ray to send 
regular patrols to protect the telegraph line running from Guantanamo to Macuriges after thieves 
repeatedly tampered with it and stole the copper wire and other components. When attempting to 
make an arrest, Wood had no problem if “extreme measures have to be resorted to by the 
patrol.”76 Desperate to keep his lines of communication open, Wood also authorized the garrison 
at Songo “to prevent in whatever way is necessary any and all interference with the line” running 
to the town.77 The extreme measures worked, and the telegraphic lines of communication were 
restored. 																																																								
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Despite the fact that marauding bandits posed a significantly larger threat to the security 
of the telegraph lines, businesses, farms, and plantations in the interior than Wood first admitted, 
by the summer of 1899, the Army and its Cuban allies had largely neutralized bandits in the 
Department of Santiago. By the end of the initial occupation, Wood could report to President 
William McKinley that because of the work of the Rural Guard, his mounted soldiers, and the 
municipal police in the larger towns, “brigandage and robbery have virtually ceased in this 
department.”78 Wood concluded that the work of the local constabulary, “combined with the re-
establishment of the courts, [was] gradually and surely putting these people in the way of 
governing themselves.”79 
 
Policing Cuba 
 Wanting to demonstrate its overwhelming strength, discourage the Cuban Liberation 
Army from continuing its armed struggle, and ensure the Spanish peacefully departed Cuba, the 
War Department sent nearly 45,000 soldiers to occupy the island, arriving between December 
1898 and March 1899. Lieutenant General John R. Brooke did not have this volume of soldiers 
for long. Most of the troops sent to occupy Cuba were volunteers called up in April and May of 
1898. With the official conclusion of the War with Spain as the Treaty of Paris took effect on 
April 11, 1899, the citizen soldiers in Cuba clamored to return home, and the War Department 
struggled to find a political or legal justification to keep them under arms. Furthermore, the 
Philippine Insurrection began in February 1899, forcing the War Department to send the majority 																																																								
78 Leonard Wood to the President of the United States, November 27, 1898, Container 26, General Correspondence, 
Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 2. 
79 Leonard Wood to the President of the United States, November 27, 1898, Container 26, General Correspondence, 
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of its regiments to the Pacific. The McKinley Administration had to disavow any plan for the 
outright annexation of Cuba in order to prevent another violent insurrection against the United 
States, a conflict it could not afford. Now a secondary concern to the War Department, Brooke 
had only 11,000 soldiers to occupy all of Cuba by the end of 1899, just slightly more than Wood 
had to occupy Santiago during the initial occupation. By 1902, the last year of the occupation 
and the Philippine insurrection, the U.S. Army only had 4,600 soldiers left to control Cuba.80 
 McKinley sent Robert P. Porter as his emissary to Cuba, where Porter and General 
Máximo Gómez developed the first plan to supplement the scanty number of U.S. Army soldiers 
available to occupy the island. They considered the possibility of mustering several Cuban 
regiments manned by his former soldiers to supplement the few remaining U.S. Army 
occupation forces. Recruiting Cuban soldiers into formations controlled by the U.S. Army was 
part of McKinley’s broader policy to demobilize the potentially hostile Cuban Liberation Army 
by providing mambises jobs and food in return for their weapons. The McKinley administration 
approved Porter and Gómez’s plan in the fall of 1898 and hoped to recruit up to ten thousand 
former mambises into a new Cuban army, but the administration did not act on it yet.  
Later, the new Secretary of War, Elihu Root, decreased the size of the proposed Cuban 
colonial army. He envisioned recruiting three regiments of Cubans soldiers and junior officers, 
with American officers holding the higher ranks, a similar command structure to that used by the 
War Department for Indian scout companies on the Western frontier, African American 
volunteer regiments, Philippine Scouts, and the Puerto Rican Provisional Regiment. Similarly, 																																																								
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McKinley and the War Department hoped the proposed Cuban regiments would look less like an 
army of occupation, and that service in the regiments would Americanize the Cuban soldiers and 
induce loyalty to the United States. Eventually, the McKinley administration abandoned the idea 
of fielding a colonial army after Gómez’s ouster and the subsequent fall of the Cuban assembly. 
Furthermore, Brooke correctly argued that Cubans perceived the scheme of establishing a 
colonial army as further evidence of the United States intention to remain in Cuba indefinitely. 
The War Department dropped the plan and decided instead to extend Wood’s Rural Guard 
mounted police to the entire island.81 
 The creation by department commanders across the island of mounted police similar to 
Wood’s Rural Guard served several purposes for Brooke’s military government in Havana and 
the administration in Washington. Heavy columns of U.S. Army soldiers could not possibly hope 
to chase local bandits efficiently through the jungles and mountains of rural Cuba. Conversely, 
mounted constables were familiar with the back trails of the interior, understood native language 
and customs, and often knew personally the bandits they chased, since both the armed gangs and 
the mounted police were usually former mambises. Most Cubans had also built up natural 
immunity to the malaria and yellow fever that ravaged the ranks of the U.S. Army during the 
rainy season. In addition, the rural police forces provided an economical way to supplement the 
ever-decreasing number of U.S. Army soldiers, who could not possibly occupy every town or 
patrol every rural road in Cuba. The Rural Guard and municipal police also allowed the U.S. 
Army to control Cuba without resembling an occupier, and to provide employment to former 
Cuban soldiers. The U.S. Army did not want to enforce local laws or act directly against the 																																																								
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Cuban people, at risk of direct conflict between Cubans and American soldiers. By avoiding law 
enforcement duties that smacked of outright conquest, the U.S. Army sidestepped missions that 
might lead to hostile feelings by the occupied people. Most importantly, by recruiting politically 
dependable mambises into the mounted and municipal police, the War Department neutralized 
the threat of armed insurrection against their administration of the island by hiring potential 
insurgents into the ranks of the military government. Without jobs in the rural police forces, 
municipal police, sanitation crews, or construction teams, former soldiers turned to brigandage 
for survival since there was no work on the sugar plantations devastated during the war.82 
 While department commanders found rural police forces useful for chasing bandits, most 
questioned whether it was a good idea to have a constable force that did not directly report to 
civil authorities. Generals Fitzhugh Lee, William V. Ludlow, and Brooke all discouraged the 
creation on a national police force. However, Major General James H. Wilson, the department 
commander of Matanzas and Santa Clara, was the most outspoken critic of Wood’s Rural 
Guard.83 He believed more than other U.S. Army commanders did that Cuban civil officials 
could effectively run the island and that the creation of a national police force might be used later 
for undemocratic machinations. Wilson argued for the immediate absorption of all rural 
constables into the existing municipal police force. To him, the idea of a national police force not 
directly controlled by municipal authorities was neither republican nor American.84 In an 
interview, Wilson said that the “the rural guard is not needed; the municipal police is sufficient, 																																																								
82 Allan R. Millett, “The Rise and Fall of the Cuban Rural Guard, 1898-1912,” The Americas 29 (October, 1972): 
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by being organized with unmounted together with mounted men, under the command of the 
mayors.”85 
 Wilson and other U.S. Army department commanders also heavily criticized Wood for 
encouraging his Rural Guard to use extrajudicial killings during the formal occupation of Cuba, 
and Brooke threatened a formal investigation. Most murders of alleged criminals by the Rural 
Guard occurred under Wood’s watch in Santiago. Major General James H. Wilson confided to a 
friend that Brooke told him Wood was “in very deep water” for “hanging a lot of people without 
trial.”86 He also noted Wood had supposedly admitted to Chaffee that he was “having alleged 
banditti killed without trial.”87 Brooke ordered an impartial investigation into the killings by the 
Rural Guard, but Wood conducted the internal investigation himself. Wood’s handling of the 
investigation angered Brooke, but he refused to investigate his wayward subordinate further, 
fearing what would be revealed. Brooke’s, Chaffee’s, Wilson’s, and the other department 
commanders’ outrage over Wood’s methods suggest that other U.S. Army commanders in Cuba 
did not condone the extrajudicial killings of alleged bandits. It seems that only Wood in the 
Department of Santiago encouraged extrajudicial killings. 
Wood was the only department head to advocate for the creation of a nationwide 
mounted constabulary based on his Rural Guard. He had support from Secretary Root, some 
other Army officers, and local planters because of the Rural Guard’s success in eliminating 																																																								
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banditry in the Department of Santiago, despite their methods. After Wood took command of the 
Division of Cuba, he consolidated his control over the disparate mounted police forces still 
working directly for the department commanders and created a national Rural Guard. On April 
11, 1901, Wood issued the Organic Law of the Rural Guard, which placed the provincial units 
under his national control and created an artillery corps to assume responsibility for Cubans 
coastal fortifications from departing U.S. Army coastal artillery units. Wood, who was always 
opposed to centralized control from Havana while he served as commander of the Department, 
had no problem consolidating the several rural constabularies under his authority once he was in 
charge of the Division of Cuba. He appointed Captain Herbert J. Slocum, a forty-five-year-old 
and long-serving Regular, to oversee the national Rural Guard. A future Army commander, 
Robert L. Bullard, served with Slocum in Cuba and remembered that he would never “set the 
world on fire” with his intellect, but his “qualities as a ‘mixer’ and ability to make others work 
for him [were] really enviable, valuable.”88 Slocum reported directly to Wood and worked very 
well with General Alejandro Rodríguez, a former Cuban Liberation Army officer, to oversee the 
lieutenant colonels who commanded the Rural Guard units in each of the six provinces. The 
provincial Rural Guard commanders no longer reported directly to the U.S. Army department 
commanders, but to Rodríguez and Slocum in Havana.89 
 To the delight of Wood and local property owners, Slocum and Rodríguez’s Rural Guard 
of 62 officers and 1,342 troops did an excellent job of patrolling the interior, catching bandits, 																																																								
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and protecting the plantations. They no longer had to supply their own equipment, weapons, and 
uniforms, and the national Rural Guard troopers revived khaki uniforms, lived in government 
barracks, and received government mounts.90 They also escorted Army officers and civil 
authorities and secured construction crews building a railroad across the island. The Rural Guard 
maintained a professional appearance and compared favorably to the U.S. Army cavalry 
regiments after whom they were modeled. They did not, however, Americanize themselves or 
others, or show the selflessness and devotion to duty that Wood had hoped. They also acted in a 
less than disinterested manner when it came to politics and were known to terrorize campesinos 
and other lower-class Cubans on behalf of their wealthy patrons.91 
 When selecting officers and men from the Cuban Liberation Army to serve in the Rural 
Guard, the U.S. Army typically chose Cubans of European dissent who were from the higher 
classes. The selection process ensured that the Cuban Rural Guard protected the interests of the 
propertied class that wanted to avoid a social revolution and desired stronger relations with the 
United States. In return, the Rural Guard received land and other aid from the propertied class to 
establish outposts that enabled the Rural Guard to protect their plantations from the marauding 
bandits of former mambises. The Rural Guard never represented the social diversity of the Cuban 
Liberation Army. To ensure that more radical and less desirable classes of Cuban society did not 
join the Rural Guard, the Wood administration enacted literacy qualifications and required letters 
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of recommendation, preferably from well-respected property owners. Like the Rural Guard, the 
municipal police recruited from “better” Cuban families, resulting in few black patrolmen. 
Similarly, the Artillery Corps accepted only white officers. The Rural Guard became inseparable 
from the propertied class and the occupation government it served. After the U.S. Army departed 
Cuba, the Rural Guard continued to protect the property and interests of the large plantation and 
mine owners.92 
 
Conclusion 
As an economy-of-force mission for the War Department, Brooke and Wood had to rely 
heavily on native auxiliaries to control the island, just as the U.S. Army had relied on them on 
the Western borderlands of North America. Similarly to what Wood had done in Santiago, local 
police secured the urban areas, and the mounted Rural Guard patrolled the interior and protected 
plantations from bandits. The U.S. Army kept its troops in garrisons where they drilled and 
supported the Cuban police forces when they needed assistance. Primarily, however, the U.S. 
Army’s forces maintained the threat of overwhelming military force to ensure the Cubans had to 
accept the authority of the occupation government. The disbanding of the Cuban Liberation 
Army and the small size and dispersed nature of the Rural Guard ensured that even the reduced 
U.S. Army’s supremacy of military forces could not be seriously challenged. 
Just as it did on the Indian reservations of the American Western frontier, the U.S. Army 
created a native constabulary in Cuba to maintain order, continuing the methods used by the U.S. 
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Army to keep control over newly conquered populations in North America and overseas. The 
process of using native auxiliaries commanded by American officers repeated itself in Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines, and in the twentieth century with the Gendarmerie d’Haiti, Guardia 
Nacional Dominicana, and the Guardia National de Nicaragua. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
SUSTAINING THE OCCUPATION: COLLECTING REVENUES, BUILDING 
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND SANITATION 
 
The capitulation of Spanish forces in Santiago de 
Cuba…render it necessary to instruct the military 
commander of the United States as to the conduct 
with which he is to observe during the military 
occupation. One of the important and most practical 
problems with which it will be necessary for him to 
deal is that of the collection and administration of the 
revenues. You will therefore at once arrange to collect 
customs duties and port charges on goods and ships 
entering Santiago or other ports or places coming 
under our control.  
 
- William McKinley to The Secretary of War (July 
18, 1898) 
 
Introduction 
To control the Department of Santiago, the War Department monopolized the use of 
military force by disbanding the Cuban Army and replacing it with a native constabulary that 
was too small to challenge the U.S. Army’s occupation forces. The War Department also needed 
to create the necessary infrastructure to sustain its soldiers in the Department of Santiago. The 
roads across the eastern Cuba suffered from years of neglect and in most places had been 
reduced to overgrown footpaths. One of Wood’s staff officers remembered that the so called 
“roads which we were compelled to travel…are of the worst possible description,” and that 
“none of the roads, in scarcely any part of the country, appear to have been traveled by wagons 
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within a recent time.”1 After examining the Department of Santiago, Wood concluded that the 
roads that once traversed the interior had ceased to exist.2 Furthermore, almost all the bridges, 
telegraph lines, and railroad tracks that once connected the towns in eastern Cuba had been 
destroyed during the Cuban War for Independence. Fortunately, the U.S. Army regularly 
repaired roads, built barracks, ran telegraph wire, and supported railroad constructed on the 
American West, and the soldiers quickly set to work rebuilding the transportation network in the 
Department of Santiago. But before the War Department could rebuild the lines of 
communication across Santiago that it required to sustain its occupation soldiers, it needed to 
collect tariff revenues to pay for them. The U.S. Army immediately reopened the port of 
Santiago de Cuba so that it could begin collecting customs duties on imports. The military 
government used this revenue to rebuild the dilapidated lines of communication to its garrisons 
across the Department of Santiago, to pay for the sanitation of the towns and barracks, and to 
provide employment for many former Cuban soldiers. 
 
Financing the Occupation 
Deeply concerned about the cost of the War with Spain, McKinley and the War 
Department considered how to pay for the pending occupation even before the Spanish 
surrendered Santiago de Cuba. The solution they devised was simple: the Spanish government 
primarily used the tariff revenues collected on imported items and the export of raw material to 
pay for the cost of administering its Cuban colony, so the McKinley administration would simply 																																																								
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adopt and enforce the existing Spanish tariff laws to fund the occupation. McKinley still needed 
to go back to a sympathetic, but fiscally conservative, Republican majority in Congress to 
request additional funding for the expanded army of volunteers and the costs associated with 
delivering food and military equipment overseas. Congress even paid for the millions of rations 
given to needy Cubans. Yet almost all of the other funds used to make infrastructure 
improvements in Santiago and pay for the costs of administering the military government came 
from tariff duties collected on goods entering and raw material leaving Cuban ports.  
The U.S. Army gradually expanded its control over the coastal towns in the Department 
of Santiago as ships became available to transport Spanish troops home and bring U.S. garrisons 
to take their place. But the War Department did not wait for the transition before collecting tariff 
revenues. It immediately sent representatives to take control of the customs houses and the funds 
in the surrendered territory. The satellite customs houses sent the collected tariff revenues to the 
department headquarters in Santiago de Cuba. After analyzing all the proposed monthly 
expenditures across the province, the department commander redistributed the collected revenues 
back to the local garrison commanders to cover the costs of local reconstruction projects and 
running the local municipal governments. The McKinley administration created a private 
banking entity run by U.S. investors for the military occupation to hold the collected tariff funds. 
Finally, to end the financial and administrative chaos of having numerous national currencies in 
use in Santiago Province, the McKinley administration and the War Department created policies 
that manipulated the currency making the gold-backed U.S. dollar the primary currency. 
The day after the Spanish surrendered Santiago de Cuba, Major General William R. 
Shafter immediately opened the port to merchant ships to unload their urgently needed cargoes in 
the city, and he ordered the local customs collector to use the existing tariff schedules to collect 
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duties. Not wanting to overstep his authority, Shafter immediately cabled the War Department 
for further guidance. The reply did not take long. The President and his advisors had just 
finalized a plan that they had been working on for days to deal with this expected problem of 
financing the occupation. McKinley and his advisors instructed the Secretary of War to have 
Shafter immediately arrange “to collect customs duties and port charges on goods and ships 
entering Santiago or other ports or places coming under our control.”3 Furthermore, McKinley 
instructed the War Department to use the existing Spanish tariff schedules for goods imported 
from the Spanish mainland for all goods entering the country including imports from the United 
States, but he repealed an additional $1 per ton tax on cargoes and replaced it with a more 
reasonable 20 cents per ton rate.4 McKinley’s new policy abolished the mercantile system of 
trade with Cuba, which had given Spanish goods favored rates for the previous 400 years. By 
requiring all nations, including the United States, to pay the same tariff rates, the McKinley 
administration upheld the free market principles its campaign ran on. The fact that the 
administration already had a clear plan for collecting revenue at the time of General José Toral y 
Vásquez’s surrender demonstrates that it had been pondering how to pay for the occupation for 
quite some time. Furthermore, the President authorized the newly created North American Trust 
Company of New York City to operate out of Santiago de Cuba as the official financial agent of 
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the U.S. government only three days after the capitulation.5 The creation of a banking entity and 
the election of board members was surely not the work of a mere three days. 
Soon after the McKinley administration established its customs policy and sanctioned the 
North American Trust Company to act as a bank for the military government in Santiago, it 
ordered the Treasury Department to send a customs official to administer the customs house in 
Santiago de Cuba. The administration appointed Walter A. Donaldson to the position. He had 
more than twenty years of experience as a customs collector in various ports in the United States 
and a familiarity with the Spanish language and tariff system.6 Donaldson’s experience allowed 
him quickly to establish an efficient customs service in the Department of Santiago. Although 
many Spanish customs officers resigned and returned to Spain after the occupation began, this 
did not hamper the efficiency of Donaldson’s office. Following McKinley’s explicit guidance, 
Donaldson allowed existing Spanish customs officials to retain their positions if they so desired, 
unless they were known to be exceptionally corrupt. The collector of customs in Baracoa, John 
López Chávez, typified the uncertainty the Spanish customs officers felt about retaining their old 
positions after the U.S. Army took control. López wrote Donaldson to ask if he should continue 
his duties, to which Donaldson immediately affirmed that he should carry on in his former 
position and specified the number of clerks, boatmen, and inspectors López was authorized to 
employ.7 Donaldson found the Spanish customs bureaucracy bloated with extraneous personnel, 
and he sought few replacements for the positions vacated by Spanish officials returning to Spain. 
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The few vacancies that required replacements Donaldson easily filled with the many qualified 
applicants from both the United States and Cuba. 
Unlike Donaldson, who had an excess of employees, Lawton found his own military staff 
insufficient to account properly for the increasing volume of funds turned over by Donaldson’s 
collectors and the other staff work needed to run a military government. In the first five weeks of 
the occupation, Lawton’s headquarters processed the collection and expenditure of $90,000.8 
Lawton requested a professional bookkeeper to account for every penny, knowing that auditors 
from the Inspector’s General’s Department would arrive to scrutinize all of his receipts and 
books. On August 29, Lawton wrote the head accountant of the Inspector General’s Department, 
W. T. Kent, asking for the name of a “good accountant and book-keeper capable of 
superintending the receipt, disbursement and accounting of the revenues from duties, taxes and 
other sources.”9 Kent recommended Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Cook of the 1st Rhode Island 
Infantry, and Lawton immediately requested that Corbin reassign the officer to his staff.10  
Fortunately for Lawton, the War Department sent him the necessary personnel to account 
for the department’s finances, since the volume of funds that it processed grew substantially with 
increased imports and exports as the U.S. Army garrisons brought peace and order to the 
province. By November 1, the customs house in Santiago de Cuba alone had collected 
$221,636.65, not to mention the equally large dues that other ports in the department brought 
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in.11 Despite a reported plague at the ports of Baracoa and Gibara, which prevented commerce 
from arriving at those docks for months, the total revenue that Donaldson’s custom officers 
collected across the province far exceeded Wood’s expectations.12 
Despite the efficiency of his administration of the customs house, Donaldson still 
struggled to eliminate a culture of corruption among local merchants and tenured customs 
officials. For centuries, Spain paid its colonial officials such low salaries as to essentially 
sanction corruption. Moreover, the debt crises in Spain forced its government to levy onerous 
tariffs on goods not only to pay for the Cuban colony, but also to send badly needed revenue to 
the treasury in Madrid. Absurdly high tariffs and the culture of corruption made the smuggling of 
goods common practice. Unfortunately, smuggling remained difficult to prevent.13 Donaldson 
employed revenue cutters to patrol the coasts in an attempt to stop smugglers from landing 
merchandise outside of the designated ports of entry. On November 29, he asked Wood to allow 
his customs officials to search passengers’ personal baggage.14 Donaldson’s strong suspicion that 
passengers were smuggling merchandise in their baggage to avoid paying customs proved to be 
correct. On December 14, his customs agents detained Magin Meléndez for smuggling 
merchandise in his sea trunks and turned him over to military officials while he awaited charges 
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in a civil court. According to regulations, Donaldson sold the confiscated merchandise and added 
the proceeds from the sale to the government’s customs account.15 
Just as Wood changed the regulations to allow officials to search personal baggage, the 
War Department made other modifications to the inherited Spanish tariff schedules. The 
President lifted the import duties in September on supplies of food “intended for the relief of 
starving inhabitants of the Island of Cuba,” thereby alleviating relief agencies from paying duties 
on their donations.16 On November 29, Wood ordered administrative reforms to ensure proper 
accountability of employee salaries and duties.17 A week later, Wood introduced additional 
reforms to the procedures that customs officials used to verify ship manifests in an effort to 
prevent smuggling by misrepresenting the actual goods on board a merchant ships and to 
standardize port procedures across the department.18 
Meanwhile, the War Department moved a little too quickly in its attempt to regulate and 
standardize the currency in the Department of Santiago. The military and civilian officials in the 
department struggled to exchange and deposit the myriad of different currencies in circulation 
throughout the province and used to pay duties by foreign merchants in the customs house. The 
War Department responded to this situation by enacting a regulation on August 1 that declared 
the currency of the United States “obligatory for all transaction[s] which may take place in this 
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territory.”19 The President of the Santiago de Cuba Chamber of Commerce, Elisio Ros, asked 
Wood to use his influence to delay the enactment of the law. Ros argued that the law was 
premature, as there was not enough American currency yet in circulation, and that it was 
“prejudicial to the interests of commerce and to public wealth on account of depreciation which 
it would cause in the present circulation medium of Spanish coinage, and would besides, cripple 
mercantile operations.”20 It appears that the War Department either repealed the law or limited 
its enforcement, as Wood complained in December that the checks he received in pesetas from 
Spanish merchants were not being accepted by the Treasury Department.21 Wood asked the 
Secretary of the Treasury to have his department accept his checks in Spanish currency at the 
current exchange rate.22 To prevent people in the Department of Santiago from using the Spanish 
silver coinage that the Republican Party and administration so despised, Wood set the exchange 
rate of silver at 50 cents to the gold-standard dollar.23 The exchange rate encouraged the holders 
of Spanish silver to spend it outside the occupied province, where they could get twice the goods 
or Spanish gold for their money. By the end of the initial occupation, almost all transactions in 
the Department of Santiago occurred in American currency, and while Spanish and French gold 
were still in circulation, Spanish silver disappeared from use.24 
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After Lawton, and later Wood, established control over revenue sources and currency, 
they turned their attention to regulating expenditures. Besides the small accounts budgeted to 
district commanders for pre-approved reconstruction and sanitation projects and local municipal 
tax revenues kept to pay local officials, the Department Commander approved all other 
expenditures in Santiago paid from tariff revenues. Lawton and later Wood tried to act in a 
fiscally responsible manner by reducing the excessive number of government officials inherited 
from the Spanish government. The Spanish administration had appointed an unnecessarily large 
number of employees as an effective form of political patronage, but the resulting system was 
inefficient and lent itself to rampant corruption. Wood and Lawton also sought to reduce the use 
of expensive locally owned properties rented for military purposes. To make these cost saving 
reforms, Lawton issued an order in August requiring all current employees, rentals, future hires, 
and expenditures to be approved by his office. After Lawton’s staff reviewed all of the proposed 
monthly budget, he cut unnecessary expenditures by releasing excessive government officials, 
limiting additional hires, and ordering U.S. troops to rent fewer private properties. Furthermore, 
Lawton strictly prohibited any military official from spending more than Lawton allocated them 
without his approval.25 
The cost-saving measures made by the War Department, Donaldson, Lawton, and Wood 
prevented the Department of Santiago from expending more than it collected from revenues and 
going into debt. Additionally, the stability and security provided by U.S. garrisons instilled in 
planters and merchants the confidence to increase the volume of trade in the province, 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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consequently increasing the duties and taxes collected. Soon, the Department of Santiago was 
fiscally viable. Wood reported to President McKinley in late November that “the finance of the 
province will render it self-sustaining, and it will not be necessary for the United States to spend 
any money in the Province of Santiago, other than maintenance of its Army.”26 That same 
month, Wood divided the Department of Santiago into four military districts and gave each 
district commander a few thousand dollars a month to supplement locally collected municipal 
taxes. When combined, these funds allowed the district commanders to pay municipal officials’ 
salaries, do sanitary work, and keep local schools and courts open.27 The bulk of the customs 
funds collected in the province paid for larger construction projects, building repairs, and salaries 
and operating costs for provincial-level administrative services, including the rural police, the 
high courts, and state schools of higher education. Tariff revenues also funded the civilian 
doctors’ salaries, hospital repairs, and free medicines for needy Cubans.28 
Without controlling the collection of local tariff revenues the U.S. government would 
have lacked the means to fund the administration of the Department of Santiago. From the first 
day of the occupation, the McKinley administration adopted the former Spanish tariff schedules 
to pay for the cost of governing Santiago and established a bank to deposit the revenue collected 
in the province. The security provided by the U.S. Army garrisons in the province gave 
merchants and planters the confidence to resume normal economic activity in the U.S.-occupied 																																																								
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parts of the island. The increasing revenues collected from customs dues allowed the War 
Department to pay for the cost of administering the military government and making necessary 
improvements to the province’s infrastructure to support U.S. Army garrisons. Tariff funds also 
allowed Lawton and Wood to assert more control over the province. The processes of 
establishing military and economic control of the province were mutually reinforcing––both 
needed to occur simultaneously for the U.S. Army to exist in Santiago Province, allowing the 
War Department to avoid a costly occupation, in both lives and money.  
 
Building Military Infrastructure and Establishing Lines of Communication 
By maintaining a monopoly on military force, using local constabularies to secure the 
Cuban population, and collecting tariff revenues, the U.S. Army established firm control over the 
Department of Santiago. The next priority for the American generals was to build the necessary 
infrastructure to sustain the U.S. Army garrisons, which were disbursed to all the major 
population centers in the province to enforce the policies of the McKinley administration and the 
military government. After paying the monthly salaries of the civilian employees working for his 
military government, Wood and his garrison commanders spent what remained of their monthly 
revenue on public works projects that helped them supply their soldiers or directly facilitated 
their health. The construction of roads, port facilities, and the telegraph lines to the Army’s 
outposts allowed them to control the province.29  
Perhaps the most difficult task Lawton and Wood faced during the initial occupation was 
the reconstruction of the destroyed road network in the Province of Santiago to supply and 																																																								
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communicate with garrisons located in remote towns in the interior. Wood recorded in his annual 
report that “the roads throughout the province are wretched. In fact, it might almost be said that 
we have, with very few exceptions no roads.”30 For the majority of the initial occupation, the 
Quartermaster’s pack trains were the only reliable means of supplying the interior garrisons. 
Mules were also the U.S. Army’s preferred method of supplying soldiers in restricted terrain on 
the Trans-Mississippi West.31 When the roads permitted it, quartermasters preferred to use 
wagons to haul supplies, but pack trains were often the only means of traversing the countryside 
on the West and in Cuba. The Spanish had maintained a road network in Santiago before the 
Wars of Independence but after almost thirty years of neglect and war these roads, especially in 
the mountainous and rainy jungles of eastern Santiago, had fallen into complete disrepair.32 
During the war the Spanish and Cuban armies also destroyed bridges, further inhibiting the later 
use of roads by wagon trains. Western Santiago had a much better road system, but because these 
adobe clay roads contained no gravel, their surfaces turned into a thick, sticky mud in the rainy 
season, and were thus impassible to wagons until they dried in early November. At first, the 
Quartermaster Department suffered from a severe shortage of mules to run the necessary pack 
trains, but slowly they collected the many stray mules lost by the Fifth Corps during the fighting 
around Santiago de Cuba. Within weeks, the Chief Quartermaster had more mules than he 
																																																								
30 National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1504, Annual Report of Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, U.S. Volunteers, 
Commanding Department of Santiago, 1899, 9. 
31 Brigadier General George Crook more than other utilized mules to give his columns the operational mobility 
necessary to pursue hostile Indians, see Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 
(New Haven: Yale University, 1988), 126-27; and Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and 
the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 48-9. 
32 John Lawrence Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2006), 26, 75. 
 	351	
needed, and with permission from the War Department he sold the extras to Cubans eager to buy 
livestock.33 
In December 1898, Inspector General Major James H. McLeary noted little improvement 
in the overall condition of the department’s road network on his inspection tour. He found that 
wagons could travel only on the road between Santiago de Cuba and San Luis and the road 
between Holguín and Gibara. Army wagons could not traverse any of the other roads in the 
department for more than “five or ten miles consecutively.”34 His report continued to describe 
how “most of the highways are merely openings through the timber, and in wet weather seem to 
have been abandoned altogether by the pack trains, which have pursued narrow paths on the 
margin of the roads, or taken new routes generally parallel to the highway through adjacent 
timber.”35 As the pack trains crossed the muddy roads to stay on the drier high ground, the 
original roads became overgrown and the meandering footpaths that crossed back and forth 
across the highway increased the total length of any route “from twenty to fifty percent.”36 The 
pathetic state of the roads frustrated Wood, and he spent a great deal of money to improve the 
lines of communication to his isolated garrisons. 
Fortunately, the U.S. Army had over a hundred years of institutional experience building 
roads. Throughout its history, most army soldiers spent far more time maintaining and building 
forts and roads than they spent drilling or conducting any other martial activities. Usually, the 																																																								
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military roads they constructed linked forts to major population centers, the closest navigable 
river or railroad, or other forts. The Army also built national roads for the government as a form 
of free labor. As early as 1802, soldiers constructed a road from Nashville to Natchez. The U.S. 
Army constructed approximately 1,900 miles of road in the sixteen years following the War of 
1812, including a road from Nashville to New Orleans and a road from Detroit to Fort Meigs, 
Ohio. In 1836, Congress approved the largest road project up to that time. Soldiers worked to 
build an 800 mile-long road to link a series of forts on the western border of the United States, 
completing work in 1841. Starting in the 1840s, the U.S. Army developed a system of road 
construction refined during work on for the Mormon Trail, the Honey Lake wagon road, the 
Southern Military Road, and the Oregon Trail, to name just a few. They later implemented this 
system in Cuba, where Army topographical engineers surveyed routes and supervised their 
construction, though contract workers—instead of soldiers—did most of the labor.37 
After the Civil War, the Army continued to use its soldiers and other laborers to build and 
repair roads in the trans-Mississippi West, and many of the officers who later served in Cuba 
gained valuable experience supervising these construction projects.38 After taking command of 
the 1st Infantry Regiment at Fort Randall, Dakota Territory, in 1879, Shafter supervised the 
construction of a military road by his soldiers to Camp Keya Paha to protect settlers in the area 
from Sioux raids. The 1st Infantry deployed to Texas in 1880 during the Victorio War, but days 																																																								
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after the destruction of the Apache band at the hands of Mexican soldiers, Shafter put his 
regiment to work repairing roads in the Trans-Pecos region.39 Colonel Charles J. Crane, who 
commanded the 9th Immunes during the initial occupation of Cuba, commented on the fine 
roadwork done by soldiers of the 24th Infantry on a trip to Fort Davis, Texas in 1880.40  
Not until the summer of 1899 did the road network in the Department of Santiago begin 
to show major improvements. Early in December 1898, Wood sent the recently arrived Colonel 
James S. Pettit, commander of the Military District of Manzanillo, a large number of picks, 
shovels, and other lightweight tools to begin improving the roads in his district. Meanwhile, 
Wood hired two work crews of 100 Cubans each to begin building roads from Santiago de Cuba 
to Guantánamo and to Holguín. Wood wanted to build a fork off the road to Holguín to connect 
Bayamo and Manzanillo to the road network.41 In San Luis, the 8th Illinois Infantry cut a 25-mile 
road from Palma Soriano directly to Santiago de Cuba to cut the distance supply trains traveled 
to Palma Soraino by more than half. The old route from Santiago de Cuba to Palma Soriano was 
58 miles, because the road went through San Luis.42 Before the rainy season began in the spring 
of 1899, Wood’s military government completed over 200 miles of road suitable for military 
wagons. Given the difficult terrain and climate, as well as the original poor state of the existing 
road network, Wood believed that every effort had “been made to repair these roads as rapidly 
																																																								
39 Paul H. Carlson, “Pecos Bill:” A Military Biography of William R. Shafter (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1989), 115-18. 
40 Charles Judson Crane, The Experiences of a Colonel of Infantry (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1923), 112-13. 
41 Wood to Pettit, December 2, 1898, National Archives, Record Group 395, Entry 1479, Vol. 3 of 8, November 17, 
1898 to January 6, 1899, 138-40. 
42 Corporal W. T. Goode, The “Eighth Illinois” (Blakely Printing Company: Chicago, 1899), 174. 
 	354	
and systematically as possible.”43 One unintended consequence of these long-term road 
construction projects was the peaceful dissolution of many Cuban army units; road construction 
required a large labor force, and this gave Wood an opportunity to hire a large number of the 
unemployed mambises of the Cuban Liberation Army. These long-term jobs provided added 
incentive for soldiers to disband and alleviated Wood’s fear of having a large body of armed 
soldiers with no means to support themselves or their families.44 
The same reasons that caused the highways to fall into a state of disrepair also led to the 
neglect of the streets inside the cities and towns of Santiago Province. Most of the streets lacked 
proper drainage, and the daily deluge of water running down the streets during the rainy season 
caused large ruts and cracks to form and littered old cobblestones across the road surface.45 By 
the time U.S. soldiers arrived, the streets looked more like riverbeds than roads. The military 
government spent municipal tax funds and tariff revenue to improve the drainage and resurface 
municipal streets across the department. Santiago de Cuba, the capital of the province, received 
the greatest allocation of the province’s tariff revenues, and one of Wood’s top reconstruction 
priorities was paving the roads in this important city. Major C. L. Woodbury supervised the 
contract with the Barber Asphalt Company to pave more than five miles of asphalt boulevards 
and another five miles of macadam streets in the Santiago de Cuba city center. The subtle angles 
on these new streets whisked water into grated drainage ditches, and they had curbs made of 
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concrete and blue stone.46 Although the city did not have a modern sewer system, Wood insisted 
that sewer lines be placed under the newly paved streets so they would not have to be destroyed 
later if a sewer system was added.  
These slow and costly road improvements would not have been necessary to establish 
garrisons in the interior if a railroad network had existed within the Department of Santiago. 
Unlike the extensive railroad network spokes originating from Havana in western Cuba, the 
Department of Santiago only had a few privately owned railroads running from ports to large 
plantations and mines. These antiquated tracks were all built before 1878, as recession, war, and 
government debt prevented the building of new lines.47 The Sabanilla and Maroto line linked 
Santiago de Cuba to San Luis and Songo. Another line leaving Santiago de Cuba passed through 
Siboney on its way to the Juragua Iron Mines. A privately owned line linked the Brooks 
plantations around Jamaica and Guantánamo to the port at Caimanera. Likewise, the large 
agricultural town of Holguín was connected to the coast by well-maintained tracks to Gibara. 
Unfortunately, the line running from Manzanillo to the equally important farming valley of 
Bayamo deteriorated and was not repaired during the initial occupation.48 The exorbitant rates 
charged by these private rail lines prevented all but the most affluent Cubans from using them.49 
Even the Quartermaster Department preferred to use inexpensive pack trains to resupply the 
interior towns connected by rail, unless time or the size of the supplies necessitated the use of the 																																																								
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expensive railroads. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Army garrisoned the few interior towns linked by 
railroads to the coast before communities that had to be supplied by pack train. 
The U.S. Army had partnered with railroad companies throughout the trans-Mississippi 
West to lay new railroad lines. The relationship between the two was mutually beneficial. The 
Army saved enormous sums of money transporting soldiers and supplies by train, often at 
significantly reduced rates. Trains also allowed for the Army to consolidate its soldiers on larger 
posts, close smaller posts, and move units quickly to points of crisis. In return, railroad 
companies received protection from hostile Native Americans and robbers, and a potent means 
for breaking up strikes. Also at no cost, railroad companies gathered timber and stone from 
military lands, and the Army was more than happy to have the railroad companies build railroad 
stations on their installations. The fact that many of the nation’s top railroad executives served in 
the U.S. Army during the Civil War helped facilitate the close relationship between the two.50 
Half of the U.S. Army helped to guard railroads during the Pullman Strike of 1894 and 
many other soldiers protected the trains and work crews against Indian raids during their time on 
the frontier. Twelve Cheyenne attacked Ezra Ewers—who later commanded the brigade of 
African American soldiers in Santiago—and two of his soldiers when they went to investigate a 
break in the railroad track near Fort Wallace, Kansas, in 1872. Only the timely arrival of the rest 
of their company saved their lives. In 1879, Colonel Nelson A. Miles’s 5th Infantry Regiment 
escorted supply trains and work crews of the Northern Pacific Railroad, protecting them from 
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Sioux raiders in the Dakota Territory. The experience served Captain Ewers and his fellow 
officers well when the War Department sent the regiment to occupy Santiago.51  
Similar to the War Department’s experience working with railroad companies in the 
West, Wood tried to work with financers to repair and build new track across eastern Cuba and 
offered them his support in return. Because of the high cost of material and equipment for 
railroad construction, Wood did not have enough tariff funds to build new rail lines. He tried to 
grant concessions to private companies and bankers, so they could shoulder most of the cost. On 
November 15, Wood sent Corbin an application from the Messars, Brauet & Co., the former 
bankers of the Spanish Army in Santiago, to build a railroad covering a large portion of the 
Department of Santiago. Wood had Lieutenant Blount of the 3rd U.S.V.I., a lawyer versed in 
Spanish law, review the application to ensure it met the existing Spanish laws for granting a 
charter. The only exception the impatient general wanted to make to the law was one to speed up 
the slow process.52 Unfortunately for Wood, the War Department resisted granting the 
concession until the shrewd businessman, and now Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger could 
implement a system that enabled him to grant concessions in a manner that benefitted both his 
acquaintances and the friends of the administration. After the American press ran an article on 
the review board Alger established to review concessions in Cuba, public outrage enabled 
Senator Joseph B. Foraker to introduce an amendment that specified, “no property franchises, or 
concessions of any kind whatever, shall be granted by the United States, or by any other military 
or other authority whatever in the Island of Cuba during the Occupation thereof by the United 																																																								
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States.”53 Senators John C. Spooner and Orville H. Platt, both annexationists, opposed the 
amendment. However, when the ardent imperialist Senator Henry Cabot Lodge lent his support 
to the measure, the Foraker Amendment carried through the Senate by a 36-vote margin.54 The 
amendment prevented further exploitation of Cuba by Alger, but also hampered most railroad 
construction during the occupation of Cuba. 
While Wood worked to improve the road and rail network, he and the previous 
commanders relied heavily on sea transport to move supplies, soldiers, and messages to the 
dispersed garrisons in the department. The port in the city of Santiago de Cuba was the most 
important point in the department’s logistical infrastructure. Most of the military stores, 
humanitarian relief, and private merchandise landed there first before being distributed by small 
coastal vessels to the other ports in the province. From the very first day of the occupation, 
improving the port’s logistical and navigational infrastructure became a top priority for the U.S. 
Army’s senior commanders and logisticians.  
After the Spanish surrendered and the U.S. Navy removed the mines at the mouth of the 
Bay of Santiago de Cuba, U.S. supply transports and merchant ships immediately began 
unloading their supplies directly on the docks in the harbor. This was particularly important 
because during the fighting a huge backlog of transports developed, mostly because of a severe 
shortage of shallow-draft lighters to unload the transport ships at Siboney. The docks at Santiago 
de Cuba had only enough space to accommodate a few of the dozens of ships waiting to unload 																																																								
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their military stores, humanitarian supplies, or merchandise at any one time. Through August, the 
military and humanitarian ships monopolized the docks, causing the chamber of commerce to 
protest to the military government. Local Cuban merchants requested that they be allowed to use 
one of the four piers to unload merchandise and send out their goods, so they could revive their 
failing businesses.55 Even after the backlog of ships dissipated weeks later, Lawton and Wood 
recognized that they needed to improve the city’s docks to make the harbor facilities sufficient 
enough to support the U.S. Army’s garrisons in the department while still accommodating local 
trade. 
The lack of adequate space to store the coal necessary to refuel transports before they 
returned to the United States forced the Quartermaster officers to either buy coal from the Navy 
or send ships to other Caribbean ports before they returned to the United States. The shipping 
delays proved costly and inefficient. Shafter wrote to Corbin on August 9 pleading, “We must 
have coal here.”56 Shafter continued, “a loaded collier, with all the necessary appliances for 
unloading, should be sent here as soon as possible.”57 After the War Department remedied the 
coal problem, focus turned to increasing the size and capacity of Dock #1, used by the 
Quartermaster Department to unload government contracted transports. Wood approved the 
expenditure of funds collected from Cuban tariffs to extend Dock #1 by 150 feet, add a roof to 
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the extension, and repair the existing portion of the dock.58 In late November, Wood learned that 
lawyers representing Callego, Messo & Co., the once-absentee owners of many of the wharves 
and warehouses in Santiago de Cuba, filed claims in Washington, D.C. asking for $300 per day 
back payment for the U.S. Army’s use of their facilities. Wood believed this price was 
“preposterous” and “nothing less than an attempt of extortion.”59 He suggested that the War 
Department pay no more than $50 per day for the use of the facilities.60 In addition, Wood asked 
permission to use a small portion of the revenue collected from customs duties to build storage 
sheds to protect perishable supplies, noting that the cost for building the sheds would quickly pay 
for itself with the money saved by not using privately owned warehouses and from the daily loss 
of food from the weather and thieves.61 Besides the sheds, Wood eventually funded the 
construction of a new warehouse, the dredging of the harbor, and the building of a seawall to 
protect the harbor.62 
While it may seem odd that the U.S. Army performed harbor improvement, seawall 
construction, and dredging duties in Santiago de Cuba’s harbor during the occupation, the Army 
was actually quite accustomed to such missions. These tasks traditionally belonged the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers. Harbor improvements were considered to be a clear federal 
responsibility. All along the Pacific coast the Army built levees and seawalls and dredged 																																																								
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harbors. The Army Corps of Engineers also made harbor improvements in San Francisco and 
Los Angeles and was also responsible for constructing, but not running, the lighthouses on the 
Pacific Coast until 1910.63 
With their experience, U.S. Army’s engineers in the Department of Santiago were more 
than comfortable overseeing harbor improvements and lighthouse construction. During the siege 
of Santiago de Cuba, a shell fired from a U.S. Navy ship hit the lighthouse located in El Morro 
Castle, an obsolete Spanish fortress guarding the mouth of the bay, making the lighthouse 
“practically useless and liable to tumble down at any moment.”64 During an inspection tour of a 
Spanish government shed Wood uncovered the parts needed to repair the lighthouse in 
Santiago.65 Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Spanish had intended to use the parts to build a 
new lighthouse in Guantánamo. Wood assigned the engineer Lieutenant E. C. Brooks to use the 
parts to first repair the lighthouse at Morro Castle and then construct a new lighthouse at 
Guantánamo Bay.66 With the parts already on hand, Wood estimated that repairs to the 
lighthouse at El Morro Castle would cost his military government only $500, the cost of 
employing Cuban laborers.67 Later, after a merchant ship sank on the north coast of Santiago 
Province, Wood asked Corbin to send a tender with repair parts from the United States to fix the 
neglected lighthouses on that side of the province, with the understanding that the associated 																																																								
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costs would be charged to the Department of Santiago.68 While Wood and his engineers strove to 
repair lighthouses, the U.S. Navy placed navigational buoys in all the major harbors in the 
Department of Santiago.69 Also in Santiago de Cuba, Wood and Donaldson created a board of 
pilotage to standardize the fees charged by navigational pilots in the ports across the 
department.70 These improvements to the port facilities enabled merchant ships and U.S. 
government transports to efficiently unload and safely move their cargos to the garrisons 
controlling the Department of Santiago. 
Although ships were preferable to using riders or pack trains to send military 
correspondence to all but the nearest outposts, telegraph lines remained the quickest and easiest 
way for the department commander to communicate with his subordinate officers and to his 
superiors in the War Department. Lawton and Wood considered telegraph communications 
essential to their ability to command and control their dispersed outposts effectively, and they 
went to great lengths to establish, maintain, and secure these communication lines. Immediately 
after the establishment of the Department of Santiago, all the staff bureaus in the War 
Department began planning the equipment and personnel required to sustain the U.S. Army’s 
forces in the occupied province. Brigadier General Adolphus W. Greely, Chief of the Signal 
Corps of the Army since 1887, wrote Lawton asking him what transportation assets and “how 
many miles of line material” he should send with the signal company preparing to leave for 
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Santiago.71 Greely, a veteran of the Civil War, Indian Wars, and a three-year polar expedition, 
promised to fully support Lawton in establishing effective communications in Santiago. Greely 
had good reason to care. He was one of the few members of his command to survive a three-year 
tour at an arctic meteorological station because they lacked communications to coordinate a 
rescue after frozen seas prevented their supply or rescue.  
Like many other Army officers and soldiers, Greely had extensive experience running, 
securing, and maintaining telegraph lines linking forts to each other and to higher headquarters 
during his time in the American West. He personally supervised the construction of 1,218 miles 
of wire across Texas in 1875 to link the series of forts stretching from the Red River through Fort 
Concho to the Rio Grande. Similarly, Nelson A. Miles built extensive roads and telegraphs in the 
Department of the Columbia during his tenure as its commander. As commander of the 1st 
Infantry Regiment in the Dakota Territory, Shafter had one of his companies run a telegraph line 
to link Fort Randall to Fort Bennett guarding the Sioux reservation near the confluence of the 
Cheyenne and Missouri Rivers.72 Furthermore, Ewers and his company did repair work on 
several telegraph lines near Fort Keogh, Montana, during the summer of 1881.73 Many regulars 
serving in Cuba had run miles of telegraph wire as members of fatigue parties on the American 
frontier. Signal Corps soldiers operated most of the military telegraph systems and received 
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special training at Fort Meyer on how to operate telegraphs and heliography. They were the 
highest rated enlisted men in the Army because of their special skill set.74 
Despite Greely’s desire to send any materials needed and the U.S. Army’s extensive 
experience establishing telegraph networks, Lawton simply did not know the condition of the 
lines in the province at the start of the initial occupation. After consulting the signal officer in 
Santiago, Lawton knew only that the lines running from Santiago de Cuba to Cristo, Songo, San 
Luis, and Palma Soriano required “fifteen miles No. 9 wire, 1500 each brackets, and insulators 
with spikes.”75 Lawton and his signal officer understood what repairs were needed to fix the lines 
only in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, and could only speculate as to the condition of the once 
extensive telegraph network that existed across the province before the outbreak of the Cuban 
War of Independence.76 Fortunately, they rightly assumed that the other lines in the province 
were also destroyed in the fighting and that none of the tools or telegraph materials needed 
existed in the province. Therefore, Lawton requested that the signal company bring fifty 
additional miles worth of line material to start with, all the necessary construction tools, and its 
own “wagons, harness, and animals [that] will render it independent and free to move without 
delays.”77 																																																								
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Just as President McKinley and the War Department immediately considered using tariff 
revenues to pay for the occupation and military government, Greely also needed a way to pay for 
the cost of maintaining the telegraph lines in Santiago. On September 1, Greely ordered the chief 
signal officer in Santiago to use the funds collected for the transmission of messages to pay for 
the maintenance of the lines and to send any surplus revenue to the treasury.78 Unlike the 
railroads, the telegraph lines in Cuba were state owned and not private property, allowing the 
military government to charge for their use, make repairs, or add extensions to existing lines 
whenever required. Unfortunately for Greely and the department commander, however, the 
revenues collected for transmitting messages did not cover the cost of maintaining the lines, and 
tariff revenues had to be used to supplement the maintenance costs. The difficult terrain and the 
inexperience of the Cuban linemen and station operators made the telegraph service in the 
department unreliable or unavailable during the initial occupation. To get a message from 
Santiago de Cuba to Havana took an appallingly slow twenty-four hours. The inexperienced 
Cuban work crews and difficult terrain also slowed maintenance and building efforts, thereby 
increasing the number of days for which laborers needed to be hired. Additionally, using the 
“prompt and reliable” French-and British-owned cables to communicate with the United States 
incurred major costs to the War Department and military government in Santiago.79 
The volunteers who supplemented the small but professional U.S. Army’s Signal Corps 
during the War with Spain were predominately professional signalmen. On arriving in Santiago, 
the signalmen found that Cuban soldiers had almost completely destroyed the old Spanish lines 																																																								
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during the war and that the work required building new ones would be arduous and dangerous. 
The experienced signalmen and their Cuban workmen traversed narrow footpaths, placed new 
poles, and strung telegraph wire through some of the most difficult terrain in Cuba. Even after 
completing the lines, these work crews constantly had to venture back onto these perilous tracks 
to repair broken wires, mainly caused by falling trees. Workmen and many mules were injured or 
killed in accidents while working in this dangerous terrain, and many more signalmen became 
infected with tropical diseases. For example, Lieutenant Frank W. Dunn died when a tree fell on 
him while he supervised the construction of the Baracoa line, and two other signal officers died 
of yellow fever.80 
In addition to disease, hazardous trails, and falling trees, the signal crews repaired 
damage done by Cuban saboteurs and those who simply stole essential materials from the 
telegraph lines. In November, the English Cable Company reported that the houses sheltering 
their junction boxes at El Morro Castle and Punta Blanca were broken into and the “cables 
interfered with.”81 Not only did this damage cost the owners lost revenue, but it also cut one of 
Wood’s essential lines of communication with the War Department. Wood ordered permanent 
guards posted at the two junction boxes. Similarly, after someone repeatedly tampered with the 
telegraph line between the towns of Songo and Macuriges, Wood ordered the commander of the 
9th Immune garrison in Sango to send patrols to “prevent in whatever way is necessary all 
interference with the line” and to find someone within his ranks to make the necessary repairs.82 																																																								
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Throughout the occupation, running, maintaining, and protecting the telegraph lines to the 
garrisons made great demands on the soldiers and signalmen in Santiago. 
Despite the difficult terrain, dangers, and high costs, the U.S. Army’s signalmen and their 
Cuban work crews eventually ran a communication network that connected all the major 
garrisons and towns to the rest of Cuba. The volunteer signal company arrived in Santiago in the 
first week of September and immediately went to work running lines to the few U.S. Army 
garrisons already established in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba. After signal crews repaired the 
existing line running to Ewers’s garrison at San Luis, First Lieutenant William Jarvie and Second 
Lieutenant Franics Creighton and a small work crew began to construct the first new line to the 
isolated garrison at Palma Soriano.83 
Once telegraph wires connected the garrisons located near Santiago de Cuba, the Signal 
Company began constructing a series of lines that linked all the towns in the southern portion of 
the province, from Baracoa to Manzanillo. As work crews built lines east toward Guantánamo 
and Baracoa, Lieutenant C. H. Martin’s crew laid line to the west from Palma Soriano toward 
Manzanillo. The Chief Signal Officer in Santiago, Captain Frederick T. Leigh, provided Martin 
with the signal supplies, tools, and hired a crew of Cuban workers, and he asked the Adjutant 
General in Santiago to issue orders to the Quartermaster Department to provide the pack train, 
fodder, and teamsters. Additionally, the Chief Commissary Officer gave a written order to 
Martin that allowed him to draw rations from any commissary officer in the department. The five 
signal soldiers, seventeen Cuban workers, and all of their equipment and animals also received 
railroad passes to San Luis where they would start their expedition. Finally, the Chief Signal 																																																								
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Officer made a special request that the quartermaster civilian teamster, J. C. Shaffer, be put in 
charge of the pack train. Shaffer and the Chief Signal Officer served together when Shaffer was 
still in the Army, and reliable teamsters were hard to come by.84 By mid-December, Martin had 
used most of his wire and insulators. Instead of returning all the way to San Luis to pick up the 
supplies, the new Chief Signal Officer, Captain Frederick T. Leigh, requested that a second 
quartermaster pack train drop the supplies to him at Jiguani or Bayamo, saving him at least seven 
days’ travel, during which time Martin’s crew could be working.85 
Soon after Martin’s expedition reached Bayamo, the last major town before the telegraph 
terminus at Manzanillo, the expedition ran out of poles and money to pay the unskilled Cuban 
laborers. Once again, telegraph construction had gone over budget. Given the importance of 
communicating with his outposts, Wood ordered Pettit, in charge of the garrison in Manzanillo, 
to use his own funds to purchase additional poles and hire laborers, so that Martin could finish 
the final leg of the telegraph wire. Wood promised that the funds Pettit used would be 
reimbursed and would not count against his normal appropriations.86 
After connecting all the garrisons on the south coast with telegraph wires, the signal 
crews began connecting the north coast towns of Mayarí and Gibara to the “Main Line,” which 
linked Santiago Province to the Province of Puerto Principe. These lines proved to be the most 
difficult for the signal company to construct. Second Lieutenant William T. Davenport spent 
most of December looking for a route to cross the interior of the western portion of Santiago 																																																								
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Province. Reports first indicated that the best route across the interior ran from Jiguani to 
Holguín, but after searching in vain for an acceptable path, Davenport learned from a Cuban that 
no Spanish telegraph wire had ever traversed this difficult route. From Holguín, Davenport saw 
that the old Spanish telegraph wire used to run to Bayamo and that 390 poles remained standing 
on this old route. He speculated that very few of these old poles were still serviceable, but they 
did help to mark the path the new line should take. Davenport rated the Bayamo route to Holguín 
as the easiest route of the three proposed to cross the interior. He also found the old Spanish line 
used to connect Holguín to Las Tunas and the rest of Cuba. Davenport’s effective scouting in the 
last month of the initial occupation identified the last paths needed to complete the telegraph 
network in the Department of Santiago and link it to the telegraphs in the rest of Cuba.87  
Unlike the telegraph lines that belonged to the Spanish Government, the few telephone 
systems in the province of Santiago belonged to private companies, which had been granted 
concessions and monopolies by the Spanish government. Wood had no power to repeal these 
concessions. Instead, he had his lawyers look at the terms of the original concessions in the 
hopes that the companies violated the original terms. Wood investigated the possibility of buying 
out the concessions so that municipalities could run their own telephone service. None of 
Wood’s ideas to establish private telephone exchanges in any of the towns, however, came to 
fruition during the initial occupation.88 The Signal Corps did install a telephone exchange in the 
city of Santiago de Cuba specifically for military and government use, which did not violate the 
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Spanish government’s concession. The telephone system gave Wood and his staff officers in 
Santiago de Cuba “a rapid means of [communicating] between the many offices and depots of 
the various military and civil departments.”89 This system consisted of thirty phones and twenty-
five miles of telephone wire.90 
By the start of the rainy season in May 1899, the U.S. Army’s signal soldiers and their 
Cuban assistants had military telephone exchanges in three other occupied towns and ran a total 
of 663 miles of new telegraph wires in the Department of Santiago.91 By the time the formal 
occupation began in 1899, the signalmen and Cuban work crews succeeded in establishing 
reliable communications to all the garrisons controlling the province and the newly established 
division headquarters in Havana. 
 
Sanitation: Controlling Disease in the American Encampments and Barracks  
Just as moving supplies and communicating with the garrisons was necessary for the U.S. 
Army in Santiago to establish control over the Cuban Army and civilian population, so was 
keeping the American soldiers healthy and in fighting condition. Both Lawton and Wood fought 
with the Fifth Corps and witnessed how tropical fevers and dysentery turned the U.S. Army’s 
soldiers from an effective fighting force to an army of invalids. Acting in accordance with the 
best science of the time, the officers and doctors believed that unsanitary conditions caused all of 
the diseases infecting the U.S. Army soldiers, and they took extreme measures to disinfect the 																																																								
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environment. Although two Cuban physicians, Carlos Finlay and his associate Claudio Delgado, 
already suspected that the Aëdes aegypti mosquito was the vector for yellow fever, it was not 
until 1900 that an Army medical team under Walter Reed proved Finlay’s hypothesis.92 The U.S. 
Army’s sterilization methods did help to diminish the number of cases of dysentery and other 
communicable ailments, even if they did not directly reduce the incidence of yellow fever. 
Additionally, many of the sanitation measures, such as clearing standing water and vegetation 
around camps, indirectly reduced disease caused by mosquitos. The U.S. Army officers and 
soldiers wanted to improve the health of the Cubans for humanitarian reasons, but also because 
an unhealthy environment and infirm Cuban civilians directly imperiled the health of the 
American soldiers occupying the country. Concern for Cuban civilians was of secondary 
importance to the garrison commanders, but it mattered nonetheless. 
The humanitarian crises in Santiago de Cuba compelled Shafter to place the young Wood 
in command of the city following the Spanish surrender. Wood proved an able commander 
during the fighting around the city, but more importantly he was still officially an Army surgeon. 
Besides providing medical care to infirm soldiers, Army physicians during this time were 
responsible for inspecting and enforcing sanitary measures in camps. This made Wood a logical 
choice to run a city plagued by disease after three years of conflict, bombardment, and siege.93 
On arrival in the city to receive the Spanish surrender, the officers of the Fifth Corps found the 
streets covered in garbage, excrement, and dead and dying animals. So many Cubans died each 
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day from hunger and diseases that they had to be burned in large funeral pyres of almost a 
hundred bodies at a time.94 
Wood, with total authority within Santiago de Cuba, went to work with his usual energy, 
efficiency, and ruthlessness, using draconian measures to sterilize and disinfect the city. He used 
squads of U.S. soldiers to round up unemployed men and put them to work sweeping and then 
carting off the filth. When one Spanish gentlemen with a high hat urinated on a wall in front of a 
work crew, a soldiers seized him and “put a broom in his hand and another emphatically ordered 
him to sweep mid [sic] many protestations to clean the little spot he had soiled.”95 Later, Wood 
created a sanitary department whose medical officers inspected houses and buildings and forced 
the population to assist in cleaning the city.96 Wood consulted with Major Barber, who had 
experience with street cleaning in New York City and Chicago, about writing sanitary 
regulations for Santiago de Cuba.97 Barber established a regular sanitary department, which hired 
hundreds of white-clad workers. The sanitation workers rode wagons or pushed carts in each of 
the city’s wards removing refuse to the city’s dumps. Many of the former Cuban soldiers were 
now armed with brooms. The sanitation officers inspected almost every house, street, and 
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alleyway for unsanitary conditions and demanded that violations be corrected immediately.98 
Anyone caught repeatedly violating the strict sanitary regulations faced the possibility of arrest 
and could be brought before a military tribunal where the general summarily punished the 
accused either with lashes or by forcing him to join sanitation work parties.99  
By the end of August, Wood’s ruthless battle against disease paid off. Despite only a 
slight drop in the number of fever cases, the population and the soldiers garrisoning the clean 
city had much better health overall. Wood estimated the death rate in Santiago de Cuba fell 50% 
below its pre-war levels.100 Although Wood and other doctors mistakenly believed that 
cleanliness alone could stop malaria and yellow fever, some of their sanitary methods indirectly 
reduced the rate of mosquito-borne illness. Wood supervised the dredging of the sewer flats and 
swamps outside the city of Santiago de Cuba. By the end of the initial occupation, engineers 
diverted the city’s sewage away from the swamps and into the deep ocean water by El Morro 
Castle. Also, the U.S. Army’s engineers completed construction plans to build a modern 
“intercepting sewer” with “disinfecting and settling basins.”101 
The cost of disinfecting the city soon added up. When Lawton asked the Army’s 
Quartermaster General, Brigadier General Marshall I. Ludington, to send large quantities of 
chloride lime, disinfectant, street brooms, and kerosene to burn infected materials, Ludington 
promised to send as much as Lawton requested. Ludington, however, insisted that Lawton use 
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customs revenue to reimburse the Quartermaster Department for the sanitation supplies shipped 
to Santiago.102 Initially, the War Department covered the cost of some of the sanitation materials 
sent by the staff bureaus, but by October the large increase in the tariff revenues collected in 
Santiago led the Secretary of War to order that the Department of Santiago be charged for all 
additional sanitation materials sent to it.103  
In all the towns in the province, U.S. Army garrison commanders implemented the same 
sanitation methods that Wood first employed in Santiago to sterilize the streets and buildings. 
These garrison commanders used the funds they had collected from small municipal taxes and 
money the department commander dedicated for these measures.104 The exception to this rule 
was Holguín, where “over eight thousand cubic yards of unsanitary material [had] been removed, 
and every effort [was] being made to thoroughly disinfect all buildings which [had] been 
occupied by small pox patients.”105 The high cost of purchasing vaccinations and sterilizing the 
entire town to eradicate a smallpox epidemic went beyond what municipal officials could raise 
on their own, forcing Wood to supplement the revenues he had sent to the commander 
garrisoning Holguín.106 
Wood also used tariff revenues to make other improvements, which were vitally 
important to sustaining both the U.S. Army’s soldiers and the civilian population of the city. 
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During the siege of Santiago de Cuba, the U.S. Army had cut off the water supply to city. After 
the surrender, U.S. Army engineers restored the flow of water to the city, but soon realized that 
the flow into the city was insufficient to meet demand and that thousands of leaks existed in the 
system. Lieutenant E. C. Brooks repaired leaks in the aqueduct and began work to heighten the 
dam at the reservoir in order to increase the city’s water supply. He also replaced the old pipes 
with a larger, four-inch pipeline, doubling the flow of water into the city. Unfortunately, Wood 
estimated that the increased water supply still provided only a “fifth of what is needed” in the 
city. Fortunately, the cisterns built throughout the city to catch rainwater kept the water crises 
from becoming dire.107 Wood and his engineers had a progressive plan to provide the city with 
an adequate water supply, but Wood did not have sufficient funds to begin the necessary 
construction by the end of the initial occupation.108 
The U.S. Army’s physicians in Cuba also desperately wanted ice to relieve the suffering 
of the many infirm soldiers in Santiago. Fortunately, Nathan Straus, the co-owner of both the R. 
H. Macy Company and Abraham & Straus department stores in New York City, donated an 
expensive ice plant to the U.S. Army specifically for the benefit of the “sick and wounded 
soldiers” in Santiago.109 Alger ordered that the Quartermaster Department ship the donated ice 
plant as quickly as possible and at no charge to the already generous donor.110 Despite the 
Quartermaster Department’s best effort, it took over a month to transport the plant to Santiago de 																																																								
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Cuba.111 By the time construction was done, the Fifth Corps had already departed for New York, 
but the ice plant still helped the garrison in Santiago de Cuba and the sick Cubans and Americans 
in the hospitals. 
The strict standards of cleanliness that the garrison commanders and Army doctors 
imposed on the Cuban towns originated from the Army’s own regulations on camp life. Since 
before the Civil War the U.S. Army understood that clean and sanitized camps reduced disease 
rates among its soldiers. Despite the best efforts of the Army’s officers and doctors in Santiago 
to enforce every health regulation and observe best practices, the soldiers still suffered from high 
rates of fever until the end of the rainy season. This did not stop these doctors and officers from 
trying new methods to battle the fevers. When the garrison regiments first arrived, the officers 
and commanders sought campsites on high ground close to water supplies. After pitching the 
units’ tents, the officers ensured that the soldiers immediately dug drainage ditches, that the 
camps were well policed, and that food, animal, and human waste were disposed of in regularly 
sanitized sinks far from the sleeping tents. The Inspector General Department and senior medical 
officers regularly inspected the regimental camps and garrisons to ensure that Officers strictly 
enforced all sanitary and health regulations.   
Wood sent Doctor R. S. Woodson, a Captain and an assistant surgeon in the Army’s 
Medical Department, on several inspection tours of the garrisons and camps in the Department of 
Santiago. In November, Woodson examined the camp of the six companies from the 3rd U.S.V.I. 
garrisoning Guantánamo. There the doctor found the “camp well selected, on a sloping hill-side, 
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well ditched and drained.”112 Additionally, Woodson reported that the “privy and kitchen sinks 
were carefully dug and well policed,” and that the water the soldiers drank from the Guantánamo 
River was pumped into an iron reservoir tank and then “piped into a large cauldron and boiled” 
before the soldiers drank it.113 Despite the sanitary conditions of the camp, the “immune” 
companies still had almost a quarter of their soldiers sick with malarial fevers.114 To the 
frustration of the doctors, officers, and soldiers of the U.S. Army living in the camps, even the 
best sanitation measures did little to slow the high rate of tropical fevers. 
Another problem with the camps was the cost of renting privately-owned land and paying 
for the damages done to it by the soldiers living there. In October, Luis Dagnese, the owner of 
the La Chivera estate where the 5th Infantry was camped outside Santiago de Cuba, complained 
to Lawton about the damage done to his property by the soldiers. Not only had the soldiers cut 
down thirty coconut trees and removed the posts from his wire fences for fuel, but the military 
traffic coming to and from his camp created a road in his pasturelands. When Dagnese 
complained to the commanding officer of the camp, Dagnese reported that he “was insulted by 
the interpreter.”115 Upon receiving the note, Lawton asked the commander of the 5th Infantry for 
an investigation and a report on the incident.116 
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Towards the end of the initial occupation, the War Department and Wood came to realize 
that living in tented camps, no matter how clean and orderly, exposed the soldiers somehow to 
malaria and yellow fever. Complaints from the property owners such as Mr. Dagnese probably 
also influenced the War Department, in consultation with Wood, to place all the soldiers in 
government-owned barracks before the arrival of the next rainy season. Wood ordered the 
Quartermaster Department in Santiago to supervise the sanitizing of existing barracks and the 
construction of any new barracks required for the garrisons.117 Given that Wood and the Army’s 
surgeons blamed the high disease rates among Spanish soldiers in Cuba during the war on the 
unsanitary conditions of their barracks, the Quartermaster Department and local commanders 
focused on completely sterilizing and overhauling the Spanish barracks before they allowed their 
soldiers to live in them.118 Where barracks did not exist, the Quartermaster department built new 
ones, repurposed other government buildings, or rented private buildings. All of these options 
incurred significant cost to the Quartermaster Department, and drained Wood’s limited tariff 
revenues.  
Even rented private buildings required sanitation. In Palma Soriano, the two companies 
from the 8th Illinois Infantry garrisoning the town first lived in old palm sheds previously used as 
shelter for pack animals. Corporal W. T. Goode complained that the fleas in these sheds feasted 
on the soldiers––each morning the soldiers shook their hammocks and blankets and dispatched 
the fat fleas that fell to the ground, too full of the soldiers’ blood to hop away.119 When one 8th 
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Illinois soldier bitterly complained about the flea problem, his comrade sarcastically reminded 
him that he had volunteered in Springfield to “come and fight these fleas. Now let them eat.”120 
Eventually, the basic sanitation measures taken by the soldiers of the 8th Illinois took care of their 
flea problem. 
In Santiago de Cuba, the 5th Infantry’s two battalions moved from the La Chivera estate 
into the Mercedes Barracks, previously used by the Spanish Army and transformed during the 
fighting into a makeshift hospital. Chief Surgeon Valery Havard, concerned that the barracks 
were disease-ridden, insured that the Quartermaster Department thoroughly repaired and 
disinfected the barracks before allowing the battalions to occupy the building in November.121 
The Mercedes Barracks did not have room for the regimental hospital or officers’ quarters. The 
hospital remained outside under canvas,122 and Lawton received permission from the Secretary 
of War to rent quarters for the officers of the 5th Infantry.123 In Baracoa, before Lieutenant 
Colonel Thomas S. Wylly moved his garrison from a well-sanitized camp to the old Spanish 
hospital and fort located on a hill west of the town, he oversaw the extensive remodeling and 
sanitation measures in the hospital. Scientific theory of the day assumed that microbes in the soil 
caused diseases. Therefore, Wylly ordered the floors and the top two feet of soil removed in the 
barracks. The workers replaced the soil with “fresh gravel and covered over with a one half inch 
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layer of concrete.”124 Wylly even had water pumped up the hill from the Baracoa water works to 
a reservoir, and distributed by pipe throughout the newly named Fort Wood.125 While these clean 
and remodeled barracks did not reduce the number of fever cases, they did improve the comfort 
and general health of the garrisons across the Department of Santiago. 
By the end of the initial occupation the War Department in conjunction with the officers 
in the Department of Santiago developed a system to sustain the garrisons in the province. 
Always cognizant of costs, McKinley and his advisors implemented the same system of tariff 
schedules to pay for the military occupation that the Spanish had relied on to finance their Cuban 
colony. As security improved in the department, commerce also increased until tariff and tax 
revenues sufficiently paid for the military government. Shafter, Lawton, and Wood all reduced 
the overhead costs of their administrations by releasing superfluous government employees, 
reducing the number of rented buildings used by the Army, and controlling the spending of their 
subordinate commanders. Besides paying for the administration of the province, each of the 
subsequent department commanders used the tariff revenue to make infrastructure improvements 
necessary to supply and maintain the isolated garrisons. The officers and soldiers of the U.S. 
Army and the Cubans worked to repair the harbor facilities as well as the road and telegraph 
networks in the province, so that before the rainy season arrived in May 1899, they had 
established effective lines of communication throughout the Department of Santiago. 
Maintaining the health of the garrisons was just as important as supplying them. The garrison 
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commanders and the U.S. Army physicians enforced sanitation measures in the towns and 
military camps in their spirited, but sometimes misdirected, attempts to curve the epidemics of 
diseases and tropical fevers. By the end of the initial occupation, the medical measures 
implemented by the U.S. Army and the placement of soldiers in cleanly barracks greatly reduced 
the sick rates among the Army’s soldiers until the arrival of the next rainy season. 
In January 1899, Brooke used the same methods developed by Lawton and Wood to 
assert his authority over the Department of Cuba. Similar to Wood, Brooke consolidated all of 
the revenues collected across the island in Havana and managed the expenditures of all of his 
subordinate department commanders. Although first Lawton, then Wood, and finally Brooke 
spent most of the revenues to pay the salaries of government officials, they also repaired and 
built new buildings and roads. Later in the occupation, Wood devoted some construction dollars 
to projects intended solely to help ordinary Cubans, but this did not occur during the initial 
occupation. 
 
Preparing Cuba for the U.S. Army’s Arrival 
 The lessons Shafter, Lawton, and Wood learned about sustaining and caring for U.S. 
Army regiments in the Department of Santiago were not lost on the War Department. The 
different staff bureaus and their chiefs worked to take what they had learned during the last six 
months of 1898 to ensure that the tens of thousands of American soldiers arriving in Cuba 
between December 1898 and February of 1899 did not suffer from the lack of supplies, 
inadequate living arrangements, or tropical fevers which decimated Shafter’s Fifth Corps. To 
determine how the U.S. Army would occupy the rest of Cuba, evacuate the Spanish army, and 
establish the logistical infrastructure to avoid another fiasco once more American soldiers arrived 
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on the island, the War Department sent a commission of senior military officers to Havana to 
plan the transition. Advance parties surveyed the countryside for suitable camps and engineers 
began construction on the infrastructure and encampments required to sustain the nearly fifty 
thousand soldier-strong occupation force the War Department planned to send to occupy Cuba as 
a show of force to prevent any trouble with the Spanish army, loyalists, or the Cuban Liberation 
Army. Most of the work took place in and around Havana, Cuba’s largest and most important 
city, and also the location where the War Department planned to garrison nearly half of the 
occupation force. Although not without issues, the planning and preparations made to build the 
logistical infrastructure around Havana allowed for a well-organized occupation of the city.126 
 In accordance with the armistice, McKinley appointed Major Generals James F. Wade 
and Matthew C. Butler, and Rear Admiral William T. Sampson to the American Military 
Evacuation Commission for Cuba on August 16, 1898. They arrived in Cuba in mid-September 
and primarily concerned themselves with negotiating the earliest possible withdrawal of Spanish 
troops from the island and the custody of immovable military property on the island with their 
polite but obstinate Spanish counterparts. Even before these larger issues were resolved, Wade 
and the War Department also began planning the logistical requirements necessary to introduce 
American forces into Havana and Cuba’s five unoccupied provinces. The commissioners thought 
it best to move U.S. Army regiments to Cuba a few at a time to coincide with the phased 
withdrawal of Spanish forces, both to reduce the number of troops exposed to yellow fever and 
malaria at any one time and to ensure there were adequate logistical arrangements prepared for 
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their arrival. Finally, McKinley and the War Department decided to send the Seventh Corps, 
commanded by Major General Fitzhugh Lee, to occupy Havana.127 
 To select campsites and barracks locations, and make logistical and sanitary preparations 
for the Seventh Corps’ arrival in Havana and for the other occupation troops arriving in Cuba, 
Secretary Alger created a planning board of six officers with representatives from the 
Quartermaster, Ordnance, Medical, and Subsistence Departments under the leadership of 
Colonel James G. C. Lee. Other officers from the War Department’s staff bureaus arrived in 
Havana and other major ports to make preparations for the storage of arriving supplies. 
Moreover, Lee and the other Corps commanders sent their own quartering parties to Cuba to 
begin more detailed planning for the reception and garrisoning of their soldiers. In sharp contrast 
to Shafter’s invasion of Santiago de Cuba, the occupation of Cuba was well planned. However, 
in both operations Alger and the War Department failed to effectively coordinate the various 
efforts and directives of the staff bureaus, field commanders, planning boards, and 
commissions.128 
Advance parties worked hard to ensure that Havana and the surrounding areas had 
adequate port and rail facilities for the disembarking soldiers. Colonel Frank J. Hecker, one of 
the members of the Lee Board, was a railroad executive before volunteering for the war. He 
made arrangements with the Cuban railroad companies to move troops and supplies from 
Havana to various parts of the island. Other staff officers rented and prepared several wharves 
and warehouses inside Havana for the arrival of tens of thousands of soldiers and millions of tons 																																																								
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of supplies. The War Department decided to build a pier outside the city for arriving troops 
because they incorrectly reasoned that the unsanitary conditions inside Havana would expose the 
arriving American soldiers to yellow fever and malaria. The existing pier Hecker decided to use 
to avoid Havana was at La Playa. The dock used by the Havana Yacht Club was in shallow 
water, so ships had to be unloaded by lighter, but it was connected to Havana by good roads and 
a railroad. Unloading at Havana was far easier and more cost effective, so the dock at La Playa 
was rarely used.129  
Still trying to find a place to unload troops and supplies outside Havana, Hecker decided 
to construct a deep-water pier in the Havana suburb of Triscornia. He planned to connect the 
proposed wharf to Cuba’s existing railroad by building a six-mile trunk line. Unfortunately for 
Hecker and the War Department, the three companies that bid on the contract colluded to make 
huge profits. Even worse, the contractor used unskilled engineers and the project was further 
delayed by bureaucratic procedures, so that the dock and wharves were not completed until long 
after most of the American troops arrived using the existing docks and warehouses in Havana. 
The contractor of the Trescornia project also used shoddy materials on the railroad so that much 
of it had to be rebuilt later.130 
 Despite the Trecornia fiasco, the Quartermaster Department officers in Cuba still 
efficiently managed the offloading of supplies and soldiers in Havana. Even more impressive 
was the Quartermaster’s Department careful coordination of troop movements from their camps 
in the United States to the port of Savannah. Quartermaster General Ludington carefully planned 																																																								
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the movement of each regiment by train so they would arrive less than a day before their 
preloaded transports left for Cuba to avoid the fiasco of loading seen at Tampa during the war. 
Ludington assigned Major John B. Bellinger—who was the officer who had eventually sorted 
out the logistical mess in Tampa—to run the Quartermaster Department’s operations in 
Savannah. Bellinger handpicked an excellent staff, forced the other staff bureaus to cooperate 
with his instructions, secured plenty of storage and dock space, and carefully packed each ship 
for ease of offloading. Units also found their ships preloaded with all the additional equipment 
they would need in Cuba, and soldiers received new khaki uniforms. Furthermore, the War 
Department established the Army Transport Service within the Quartermaster Department in 
November 1898 to operate and maintain the Army’s transports. The new agency helped to 
coordinate the movement of troops and supplies from Savannah to Havana. The War 
Department’s operations sending troops and soldiers to Cuba were very efficient, despite what 
happened with the Trecornia project and delays caused by winter storms.131 
As during the initial occupation of Santiago, the biggest concern of the Lee Board, 
commissioners, and bureau chiefs was preventing another yellow fever and malaria epidemic. 
They generally agreed that the best way to do this was to encamp the arriving American soldiers 
in sanitary camps, clean the filth in the surrounding areas, and avoid contaminated barracks until 
they could be cleaned and sterilized. In an attempt to limit disease, the tents in the camps would 
be framed and raised two feet off the ground and have board floors. Furthermore, the camps 
would have running water and sewage systems. To build camps for fifty thousand soldiers, the 
War Department planned carefully and spent prodigiously. The Quartermaster Department 																																																								
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purchased eight million feet of pre-cut wood and huge quantities of pipe and other building 
materials.132 Most of the lumber destined for Camp Columbia outside Havana shipped directly 
from New Orleans, Tampa, and Charleston aboard schooners and anchored at the San José docks 
in the city’s harbor.133 
 Lee sent Major General Francis V. Greene—one of his division commanders who had 
also been an engineer in the Regular Army—to Havana with a battalion from the 2nd United 
States Volunteer Engineers (U.S.V.E) to begin preparing for the arrival of the Seventh Corps. 
Greene arrived with Hecker and other staff officers and immediately began consultations with 
Wade, Spanish authorities, and Cuban officers to determine which of three camp sites proposed 
by the Lee Board near Havana was best. They decided on Marianao, located seven miles west of 
Havana and two miles from the ocean on dry terrain. Cubans had long used the area to escape the 
fevers of Havana during the summer months, as it had a natural spring and a stream that drained 
the area. Furthermore, the area was connected to Havana by a road and rail.134  
The 2nd U.S.V.E., under Greene’s supervision, immediately set to work surveying the 
site, building the tent frames, and laying sewer and water lines. They increased the capacity of 
the rail line for unloading supplies by laying additional track to the newly built warehouses and 
building sidings. The 2nd U.S.V.E. also repaired the roads and bridges running into the camp. 
The engineers initially did not have enough wood to raise all the tents off the ground because of 																																																								
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shipping delays caused by winter storms. But within weeks, the necessary lumber had arrived. 
They used dynamite to make latrine sinks in the bedrock, and then built bathhouses and 
functioning sewage and water-works systems, employing paid Cuban soldiers and details from 
infantry regiments to perform most of the labor. The engineers even installed an ice machine and 
refrigeration plant to preserve stored food. Eventually, they built permanent warehouses and 
wooden barracks, and rechristened the area Camp Columbia.135  
While the U.S. Army prepared camps for the Seventh Corps’ arrival, it also started 
cleaning up Havana. The sanitary problems in Havana posed a direct threat to the health of the 
arriving soldiers and were similar to those found in Santiago de Cuba immediately after the 
Spanish surrender. Raw sewage, dead animals, and trash filled the city’s deteriorating and 
unpaved streets; dozens of Cubans died each day of starvation and disease. Municipal services 
had deteriorated or ceased completely during the war. Greene used War Department funds to 
renew the contract of the company that cleaned the streets of Havana before the war, and began 
surveying the city’s logistical and medical capabilities. He even began reactivating the municipal 
police force to avert a period of chaos in Havana during the transition to American authority.136 
By October 1899, only 11,000 U.S. Army soldiers remained in all of Cuba because of the 
general peace that had been upheld by the U.S. Army and the decision by the Máximo Gómez 
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not to contest the U.S. occupation.137 The remaining American troops began moving into 
renovated and sanitized Spanish barracks or newly constructed buildings, like those at Camp 
Columbia. All the new military encampments were connected by telegraph lines, and American 
soldiers moved around Cuba on a reconstructed and improved road and rail network. Instances of 
yellow fever, malaria, and dysentery greatly diminished among the occupation troops because of 
the newly built or renovated barracks, the sanitation of Cuba’s towns and cities, and the 
increased understanding of these diseases. The War Department had learned from its mistakes 
during the War with Spain and the initial occupation of Santiago. Army officers not only planned 
and executed an efficient movement of men and supplies to Havana and the remaining five 
unoccupied provinces, but also created an adequate network of barracks and camps to sustain 
their occupation of Cuba. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
AMERICANIZING CUBA: GOVERNING THE DEPARTMENT OF SANTIAGO 
Throughout the Province the work of the Cubans is of 
a much better character than I expected at first. Of 
course they are impetuous and hot-headed and liable 
to do a good many foolish things, but in the main, the 
current is the right direction. The civil government of 
this Province, for a time at least, has got to be one 
almost of Paternalism. 
 
- Brigadier General Leonard Wood to the President of 
the United States (November 27, 1898) 
 
Introduction 
While establishing control over the towns in the Department of Santiago and building the 
infrastructure required to sustain their garrisons, the War Department also began to set up a 
military government for the province. U.S. Army officers typically ignored Cuban customs when 
governing Eastern Cuba. Believing that Latin culture was the root of Cuba’s problems, 
ethnocentric Army officers thought they could solve almost every problem in postwar Cuba by 
introducing their “superior” American institutions and practices. To ease the transition to a 
military government, President William McKinley ordered each of his three sequential 
commanders of the province—William R. Shafter, Henry W. Lawton, and Leonard Wood—to 
avoid rapid and wholesale changes to longstanding Spanish laws and bureaucratic structures. 
Within months, however, the War Department and its representatives in Cuba began introducing 
American methods of governance. Their self-righteousness prevented them from considering that 
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decades of intermittent warfare might have devastated a once functioning Cuban society. When 
selecting Cubans for political positions, Lawton and Wood chose those that supported the 
military government and wanted to see Cuba become more like the United States, or perhaps 
even a part of it. The Cubans that the U.S. Army favored were typically wealthy landowners or 
businessmen who were of European descent, spoke English, and had received their education in 
the United States. 
Unlike other aspects of the occupation, the frontier experience of the U.S. Army did little 
to prepare American officers to govern Cuba. A few senior officers in the War Department 
experienced Reconstruction in the South; however, the bitterness of that experience left the War 
Department strongly inclined to remove the Army from civil governance in the Trans-
Mississippi West. With little actual experience in governance, Army officers relied upon what 
they considered to be analogous experiences administering frontier forts and encampments to 
frame their improvisational approach to governing Cuba. The War Department made Santiago 
another geographic command in the War Department’s military bureaucracy. Within the 
command, Army officers headed each civil agency and reported to the military governor as 
members of his staff. They also used customary Army protocol and bureaucratic procedures to 
run the military government. When it came to dealing with the civilian population, both Lawton 
and Wood demanded the same obedience to their orders that they received from their soldiers, 
and they were not afraid to use heavy-handed measures to force compliance. On the other hand, 
the Army’s reliance upon familiar and commonly-practiced bureaucratic procedures allowed it to 
quickly establish an efficient government that was relatively transparent and generally free of 
corruption, a significant improvement from the old Spanish regime. The Army also reformed 
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Cuba’s archaic civil service system, and in many cases brought an end to certain special interest 
groups’ dominance on the island.  
When Army bureaucratic procedures provided no guide to solve the problems of civilian 
governance in the Department of Santiago, Lawton and Wood consulted experts and selectively 
borrowed ideas from popular reform movements within the United States. These professional 
officers tried to implement many of the social, economic, and administrative reforms 
championed by progressives in the United States. In spite of their best efforts to use some tact 
when dealing with dissent and their campaign to implement progressive reform in Cuba, officers 
ruled the Department of Santiago in a dictatorial fashion. 
U.S. Army officers also struggled to accommodate Cuban culture and customs when 
implementing their reforms. After the Civil War, many former abolitionists and religious groups 
hoped to protect and reform the Native Americans by “civilizing” the “noble savages.” Activists 
and religiously motivated Indian agents hoped that converting the Indians to western systems of 
agriculture, strict temperance, and Protestant Christianity would make them virtuous American 
citizens, not contemplating how these ideas went against long-standing Native American 
traditions and culture. Similarly, many Americans in Cuba and in the United States hoped that 
Cuba could quickly rebuild itself by reforming the corrupt and inefficient practices of the 
Spanish government and Catholic Church, and making Cuba more American. Unfortunately, the 
prejudices of these American reformers made it impossible for them to realize that while many 
of their reforms to change the Cuban school, postal, and legal bureaucracies may have in some 
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instances helped the Cuban people, they ran counter to their culture. As a result, the Cubans did 
not fully embrace them.1 
 
A Troubled Legacy of Military Government 
While the War Department did have some experience in civil governance before the War 
with Spain, it despised the duty and sought to quickly turn over the burden to civilian officials. 
Following their republican tradition, the people of the United States believed it was 
undemocratic for American soldiers to govern civilians. On many occasions, however, the Army 
was the only arm of the federal government capable of governing its newly acquired territories 
until they could elect their own officials. As early as 1803, General James Wilkinson directed the 
occupation of Louisiana after its purchase, and he governed Missouri from 1805 to 1807. As late 
as 1870, the U.S. Army governed the territory of Alaska until gladly passing the responsibility 
over to the Department of the Treasury.2 
Reconstruction had reaffirmed the U.S. Army’s disdain for providing military 
governance, especially over a less-than-friendly population. The Army governed the portions of 
the South it occupied during the Civil War. After the war, the Army governed all former 
Confederate states except Tennessee, and it continued to provide military governors after the 
Radical Republican majority in Congress placed the former Confederate states under martial law 
in 1867. As it did later in Cuba, the Army governed entire states, supervised elections, restored 
the economy, maintained law and order, and assisted the Freedmen’s Bureau’s efforts to provide 																																																								
1 Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale University, 1988), 
42-7. 
2 Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 27-28, 30-35. Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 20-21. 
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relief to refugees and protect the interests of African Americans during Reconstruction. 
Republicans in Congress criticized the Army for not being harsh enough toward their former 
enemies and for not adequately protecting African Americans and Union sympathizers from acts 
of terrorism by the Ku Klux Klan and other vigilante groups. Officers also faced lawsuits from 
Southern civilians for enforcing martial law and interfering in civil matters. The difficulty of the 
task, the unpopularity of Reconstruction in both the North and the South, the resentment of 
Southern whites, and the Army’s own discomfort and distaste for martial law left a bad taste in 
the War Department’s mouth for accepting missions involving governance in the West for the 
remainder of the nineteenth century.3  
Despite its institutional disdain for civil governance, the Army was the only federal 
agency capable of administering local and territorial civil governments on short notice. Some of 
the senior officers in Santiago had experience as acting Indian agents on reservations when 
Indians became hostile or civilian appointees were relieved for corruption or incompetence.4 
Such was the case for Ezra P. Ewers, who looked after Chief Hump’s Minniconjou Lakota for 
seven years and temporarily administered the Cheyenne at the Tongue River Reservation in 
Montana after the tragedy at Wounded Knee. Other assignments included acting as a caretaker 
for the Navajos living near Fort Sumner, New Mexico and protecting them from Comanche 
raiders.5 Military officials also ran large military administrative organizations after the Civil 
War. For instance, Shafter commanded the administrative Department of California.  																																																								
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Establishing Civil Governance in Santiago 
After the unexpected surrender of all of eastern Cuba to Shafter on 17 July, McKinley 
had no choice but to have the Army administer the occupation government. He gave clear 
guidance to the War Department on how he expected it to govern Santiago during the military 
occupation. First and foremost, the powers of the occupation government were “absolute and 
supreme” over the inhabitants of Santiago.6 He implied that the so-called Cuban government had 
no authority. McKinley wanted the military governor to keep the Spanish municipal laws, 
judges, and ordinary tribunals in force as much as possible. If the American commander found 
the laws and officials incompatible “with the new order of things,” the President gave him the 
authority to “replace or expel native officials…substitute new courts…[and] create such new or 
supplementary tribunals as may be necessary.”7 To varying degrees, the three military governors 
of Santiago each adhered to the President’s guidance by ignoring the revolutionary Cuban 
government and keeping Spanish laws and officials in place at first. After a short evaluation 
period, not one of them hesitated to dismiss officials and change laws, as they deemed necessary.  
In general orders to his command and proclamations to the inhabitants of Santiago de 
Cuba and the surrounding towns, Shafter echoed McKinley’s directives that Spanish laws and 
officials were to remain in place.8 McKinley and the War Department hoped that this would ease 																																																								
6 William McKinley to the Secretary of War, July 18, 1898, Nelson A. Miles Papers, Box Number 6, Official 
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the transition to an occupation government. The decision upset the allied Cubans because it kept 
in office the very people they had fought against for three years. In late July, a large group of 
Cubans signed a petition addressed to McKinley that formally condemned the retention of 
Spanish officials in office.9 The decision to keep Spanish officials in placeThis policy caused 
more damage to the Cuban-American alliance than any other issue. On the other hand, many 
loyal Spaniards had no desire to stay in office under a new regime, whether it was Cuban or 
American, and they resigned. McKinley’s policy did allow for a smooth bureaucratic transition 
to military rule and made the government more efficient and economical, but it did little to 
assuage the Cubans’ anger. Soon after taking command, Shafter decided to get rid of most of the 
former civil officials in Santiago de Cuba.  
Shafter had begun discussing the possibility of dismissing most of the Spanish officials 
within weeks of establishing the occupation government. His subordinates warned him that such 
a drastic action would lead to chaos.10 The Spanish government in Cuba maintained an excessive 
number of officials in office as a form of political patronage. A large number of bureaucrats 
inundated Shafter, demanding paychecks and asking the War Department to pay their wages and 
only use tariff money to cover the salaries of the governor, police, and customs officials. “Their 
services not being required” any longer, Shafter asked to dismiss the rest of the officials.11 
McKinley agreed to allow Shafter to discharge excess civil officials as he saw fit, provided that 
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he retain enough officials to govern effectively.12 Armed with the President’s consent, Shafter 
acted quickly. He reduced the number of employees working for the city of Santiago de Cuba at 
the mayor’s office, police department, slaughterhouse, cemetery, city prison, and fire department 
to a total of 38.13 He relieved the governor and the governor’s entire office, and cut in half the 
number and pay of the officials working at the customs house. Furthermore, Shafter ordered the 
removal of the Spanish coat of arms from all government buildings and stationary.14 He did not 
concern himself with the political allegiance of the officials he terminated, or even check to see 
if they were Cuban or Spanish born, to the great dismay of his erstwhile Cuban allies.15 
While such reforms did lead to a more economical administration, Shafter almost caused 
irreparable harm by inadvertently cutting some critical positions. The large city needed far more 
than ten police officers, and Shafter quickly hired fifty back to the force, still 140 less than 
before the occupation.16 The Inspector of Measures and Weights at the docks in Santiago de 
Cuba knew the city still needed him to check the scales, but did not know if he was still in office 
or relieved.17 After inquiring with the U.S. Army he discovered that Shafter had relieved him. 
Shafter also dismissed the Engineer of Public Works and the Mines and Forest Engineer. 
Fortunately, the two engineers neatly stacked their archives of hundreds of record books in the 																																																								
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hallway of the mayor’s office before departing. Captain Ramon G. Mendoza and another 
volunteer officer discovered the stacked archives of all the titles and surveys for private and 
public lands in the province.18 The military government also located and translated a copy the 
“Practical Guide for Town Councils and Deputations,” which had all the laws for provincial 
governorships on the island.19 Without recovering these records and the code of laws, the 
military government could hardly have functioned and certainly would have faced innumerable 
lawsuits.  
When Lawton assumed command of the Department of Santiago, he knew that he needed 
to enlarge the civil bureaucracy to make it more responsive and functional. Lawton complained 
to the War Department that “Shafter practically abolished civil functions in this province,” and 
that he had been forced “to administer on his lines.”20 Eager to rebuild relations with the Cubans, 
who petitioned him to reopen the province’s civil services, Lawton asked permission to restore 
the courts, schools, and other government functions. Knowing that few of his regular officers had 
experience serving as civil officials, Lawton wanted to appoint volunteer Army officers under his 
command with pre-war experience in law and government to head the civil government and to 
relieve the hated Spanish executives.  
Using the only government structure with which he had experience in his adult life, 
Lawton planned to run the civil government as an extension of his military staff. He asked to 																																																								
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appoint Lieutenant Colonel Ariosto A. Wiley of the Fifth U.S. Volunteer Infantry (Immunes), a 
capable lawyer in civilian life, to the position of civil governor. Furthermore he wanted to 
replace the Spanish mayor of Santiago, Rafael P. Salcedo, with Major James H. McLeary, his 
inspector general. Lieutenant James H. Blount of the 3rd U.S.V.I. studied and translated local 
Spanish laws and became the judge advocate on Lawton’s staff, responsible for ensuring that the 
U.S. Army’s actions were in accordance with the former colonial laws.21 Subordinate to these 
American officers, Lawton planned to place former Cuban officers and others who had supported 
the revolution in order to begin rebuilding the fractured relationship with the Cuban Liberation 
Army.22 The President approved Lawton’s request to recreate a robust civil government and 
accepted most of his appointees. McKinley insisted that Leonard Wood act as civil governor of 
the province in addition to his duties as commander of the city, so Wiley became the assistant 
governor.23 
By restoring civil services, Lawton also hoped to undercut the strength of the Cuban 
Revolutionary Party (PRC), which continued to act as a parallel government and threaten the 
legitimacy of the American military government. The commanders of the U.S. Army had orders 
from McKinley not to recognize the Cuban government upon their arrival in Cuba. While the 
Americans established governance in Santiago de Cuba, Cuban revolutionary leaders, including 
Demetrio Castillo Duany, Jesús Rabí, Pedro Pérez, Domingo Mendez Capote, and others, met in 
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Santa Ana to discuss the election of a new Cuban government.24 Shafter had alerted the War 
Department that “the attitude of the pronounced Cubans is hostile,” and that “a dual government 
can’t exist here.”25 On September 1, the PRC released a manifesto thanking the United States for 
their “decisive” intervention, but reminding the people of the island that they must remain in 
session because they were “elected by the people under arms” and because the “Cuban Republic, 
which was the ideal for which we fought, has not yet been constituted.”26  
Lawton understood that using force to break up the assembly might initiate fighting 
between the Cubans and the U.S. Army. He wisely capitalized on the tensions between the 
Cuban Liberation Army and the PRC by giving certain conservative-minded Cuban officers jobs 
in the newly constituted civil government. By granting pro-American officers and a few 
supportive PRC officials a stake in the American occupation government, he weakened and 
delegitimized the penniless PRC. Lawton, and later Wood, tended to appoint those they 
considered “prominent and reliable” Cubans to positions in the civil government. Both Lawton 
and Wood deemed Cubans who had been educated in the U.S. or Europe, were of European 
descent, or were pro-business to be “prominent and reliable.”27 They also thought highly of those 
Cubans who favored strong long-term relations with the United States, and even more highly of 
those who favored outright annexation. 																																																								
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For example, Demetrio Castillo Duany rose to power in the occupation government 
because he fully supported the U.S. Army and helped Lawton and Wood identify other 
likeminded and conservative Cuban leaders. Born to a prominent Cuban family, Castillo went to 
France for school and later became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Living in New York, he opened a 
business school and also was a partial owner of the Juraguá Mines near Santiago de Cuba. He 
had returned to Cuba to fight with José Maceo during the revolution and rose to the rank of 
Brigadier General. Furthermore, Castillo had assisted the U.S. Army secure Siboney during the 
landings.28  
By the time Wood took over from Lawton as commander of the Department of Santiago, 
Castillo had become the most trusted Cuban advisor to the occupation government. Castillo 
traveled on the lighter Los Angeles and appointed the mayors and justices of the peace in the 
coastal towns of the province after the U.S. Army took control of them and had evacuated 
Spanish forces. Wood told his subordinate commanders in Caney, Cobre, Songo, and Palma 
Soriano that he gave Castillo the authority to inspect and reorganize the civil governments of 
these towns as he saw fit, and that he had “the fullest confidence of the Commanding General 
and his opinions will be given all the consideration.”29 The Cuban officials selected by Castillo 
were still subordinate to their local American commanders but generally ran their municipal 
governments. Castillo picked Cubans who were respected by “prominent citizens” but who were 
also active or supported the revolution.30 In Baracoa, Castillo and Major Thomas S. Wylly 																																																								
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appointed Colonel Hipolito Gallano mayor. The Americans reported that the former surgeon in 
the Cuban Liberation Army was a man of “high attainments and culture.”31 Castillo went on to 
recommend the Lehigh University-trained engineer, José Ramón Villalón, be appointed as 
secretary of public works in Santiago de Cuba. In February 1899, Wood recommended to the 
War Department that Castillo be appointed the acting civil governor of the Province of Santiago 
with the substantial salary of $4,800, noting that he had acted in this role since October.32 As for 
the “so called Cuban government,” Wood reported that it still remained in session, but after he 
and Lawton stripped the PRC of some of its most influential leadership in eastern Cuba by giving 
them paid positions in the occupation government, the PRC had little legitimacy there.33 
Driven by his ethnocentric belief that American forms of government were inherently 
superior to Spanish ones and his paternalistic feelings toward Cubans, Wood soon began making 
drastic changes to existing legal and bureaucratic structures in Santiago. Naturally, he fashioned 
the Department’s civil code along the lines of the laws of the United States, the only political 
system he really knew. Wood found the former Spanish laws of the province incompatible “with 
the new order of things” and introduced a temporary constitution for the Province of Santiago 
based on the Bill of Rights.34 Although not perfectly aligned with its American counterpart, 
General Order No. 1 for the civil government of Santiago de Cuba did assure Cubans freedom of 																																																								
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speech, assembly, and religion; the right to protection under the court without cost; the right to 
face accusers and to have legal counsel; and protection from self-incrimination, double jeopardy, 
and unreasonable searches and seizures.35 Additionally, Wood held firm ethnocentric biases 
against the work ethic and culture of the Cubans. Despite admitting the “work of the Cubans is of 
a much better character than I expected at first,” he still found them to be “impetuous and hot-
headed and liable to do a good many foolish things.”36 In his report to the president, he argued 
that “the civil government of this Province for a time at least, has got to be one almost of 
paternalism,” with the Cubans being carefully supervised.37 
Wood was not the only one to look down on Cubans in a paternalistic way. Most 
American soldiers, though certainly not all, felt that they were racially and culturally superior to 
the Cubans they encountered. Almost all Americans were appalled that Cubans allowed their 
children to run in the streets partially or fully naked until they were at least ten years old. They 
also looked down on the paltry dress of the rural Cubans and their practice of bathing in mass 
along rivers with no concern for privacy or gender.38  
The different regional origins of the American officers had much to do with their varying 
views toward Cuban civilians. Unsurprisingly, the officers and soldiers from the American South 
thought much better of the Cubans of Spanish decent than those of African descent. Wylly, a 
South Carolinian from the 3rd U.S.V.I., explained how the former lived in “fine style, are cleanly 																																																								
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in their habits, refined in their tastes and hospitable,” while the Afro-Cubans were “filthy and 
degraded and have no modesty.”39 Private Mack H. Brinkley, also of the 3rd Immunes, “was very 
very disappointed in the Cuban People. They were a low class of people. Their morals were very, 
very low.”40 He found the “Spanish people were very superior to them.”41 Despite feeling that he 
“had made a mistake by “volunteering to defend these people,” he believed that all the Cubans, 
regardless of color, were kind to the Americans and they in turn were compassionate to them.42 
Captain Matthew Steele, a Regular Army officer from Alabama, had no sympathy for freeing the 
Cubans from Spanish rule, saying that he “would rather free the hyenas and gorillas of Africa.”43 
He wrote to his wife that he had gotten to the point where he had to “close my eyes or turn my 
head as I pass one of them or it will nauseate me,” and he told her that the women and children 
“are beyond the possibility of your imagination to picture in hideous blackness, scrawny 
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ugliness, squalor, and everything horrible.”44  He concluded his rant about the black Cubans by 
telling her that he “didn’t suppose there were such people on the face of the earth.”45 
The African American officers serving in the volunteer regiments felt much more 
empathy and pride for the black Cubans than their white Southern peers. Chaplain William H. 
Coston of the 9th U.S.V.I. believed that disparagers of the Afro-Cubans did so because they 
refused to prostrate themselves to white Americans due to their race or impoverished condition 
or “submit to the abuses with which the Afro-American is so familiar.”46 Captain W. B. Parsons 
of the 23rd Kansas described the abject poverty of the black Cubans, but noted that they did 
everything in their power to help and be friendly with the African Americans from Kansas.47 
Despite some of their racist views, American soldiers generally thought the Cubans to be 
generally kind toward them. 
One way that Wood believed he could supervise the Cubans whom he viewed as childlike 
was to give himself unlimited power as military governor. In the same general order that 
guaranteed and protected the rights of all Cubans, he gave himself the right to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus and modify any law as he saw fit.48 Moreover, all civil officials remained under 
the absolute control of the military officers who oversaw the occupation in the towns and 
districts across the Department of Santiago. Given Wood’s low opinion of Cuban institutions and 																																																								
44 Steele to Wife, July 22-23, 1898, Matthew F. Steele Papers, Box Number 8, Correspondence with Wife, July 3 to 
October 26, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
45 Steele to Wife, July 22-23, 1898, Matthew F. Steele Papers, Box Number 8, Correspondence with Wife, July 3 to 
October 26, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
46 W. Hillary Coston, The Spanish-American War Volunteer: Ninth United States Volunteer Infantry (Harrisburg, 
PA: Mount Pleasant Printery, 1899), 167. 
47 William B. Gatewood Jr., “Smoked Yankees” and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898-
1902 (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1971), 190-1. 
48 Leonard Wood Papers, General Orders and Circulars, Office of Acting Civil Governor, 1898, G. O. 1, October 
20, 1898. 
 	405	
prospects for self-government, he argued that the military must have ultimate control of the civil 
government until “the governments so instituted are stable, practicable and capable of self-
support.”49 Wood did not hesitate to allow his soldiers or civil officials to use corporeal 
punishment to ensure the Cubans obeyed his dictums. As civil mayor of Santiago de Cuba, 
Wood compelled every able-bodied man to work cleaning the streets under guard. Those who 
refused to work or did not give it their all “soon learned that there were things far more 
unpleasant than cheerful obedience.”50 One observer recalled, “People making sewers of the 
thoroughfares were publicly horsewhipped in the streets.”51 Wood did pay the Cubans for their 
work, making the desperately hungry Cubans much less likely to rebel against his draconian 
measures. 
 
Progressive Reforms and the Americanization of Santiago 
The middle-class American officers that governed Cuba had much in common with the 
progressives making reforms back in the United States. They borrowed many ideas from their 
social peers to alleviate what they saw as the political inefficiencies and social ills of Cuban 
society, however much they disregarded Cuban customs or opinions in the process. The officers’ 
reforms brought positive results to Santiago when they introduced the progressive ideas of 
bureaucratic efficiency, scientific reform, and order to the outdated and corrupt vestiges of the 																																																								
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Spanish colonial government.52 The Americans were less successful when they tried to force 
their moral norms on Cuban society with laws and regulations. And despite their ethnocentric 
and paternalistic behavior, the American military government was generally free from corruption 
and efficiently administered. 
One of the characteristics of colonialism is that the mother country installs a unitary 
government in its colony to centralize its control and exploitation. Correspondingly, Spain ruled 
Cuba through a military governor in Havana who had complete control over the provincial and 
municipal governments. City and provincial officials had almost no decision-making power and 
all laws and decisions originated in Havana, causing a great deal of inefficiency. Local officials 
received their jobs as a form political patronage with the intent of profiting from their positions, 
not governing, which led to rampant corruption. 
Unsurprisingly, Wood found the Spanish system of municipal government inefficient and 
corrupt. In his annual report he complained that there were entirely too many officials at the 
municipal level and maintaining them cost “far in excess of what is required to obtain an 
efficient performance of public duty.”53  Wood described how even a small town of four hundred 
people had almost ten officials drawing large salaries even when their responsibilities were 
largely ceremonial. The larger towns had proportionally excessive numbers of government 
officials. Like Lawton and Shafter before him, Wood believed that he could make sweeping cuts 
to the number of paid bureaucrats without losing efficiency. Besides bloated bureaucracies, the 
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Spanish colonial bureaucracy in Cuba had functioned in a system where all government action 
required some sort of fee or payoff. Wood struggled to change a political culture that believed 
“that influence and money [could] accomplish anything.”54 He set about ruthlessly dismissing 
corrupt civil servants who accepted bribes, regardless of their rank or stature, and found that civil 
officials changed their behavior when they knew the consequences of any irregularities in their 
record keeping.  
In addition to battling corruption, Wood worked to empower municipal governments and 
make them more efficient. He organized his civil government as a military bureaucracy by 
dividing the Department of Santiago into four districts closely aligned with the old Spanish 
judicial districts in the province. The military commanders of the Districts of Guantanamo, 
Holguín, Manzanillo, and Mayarí received funds along with specific guidance on how to 
administer the civil and military affairs in their areas. Wood maintained direct control of the city 
of Santiago de Cuba.55 In a letter to Colonel Duncan N. Hood, one of his district commanders, 
Wood reminded him to not allow the municipality to incur any debt, and he allowed Hood to 
collect a small municipal tax to pay for Gibara’s municipal government and other small 
expenses.56 The model Wood established to control the civil and military government of 
Santiago became the standard for the remainder of the U.S. Army’s occupation of Cuba. 
While Wood provided some tariff funds to pay for municipal-level officials, he 
encouraged towns to become self-sufficient. Wood had the towns establish a municipal tax to 																																																								
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raise the funds necessary to pay their mayor and doctor, and to conduct small sanitation and 
repair projects. By the end of the initial occupation, most towns had reduced the number of civil 
servants they employed to a number they could independently sustain.57 Following Wood’s 
instructions to him in Baracoa, Wylly established a municipal government with a mayor and 
created a municipal tax to make the town self-sustaining. Wylly planned to use the surplus 
revenue the tax created to build water works for the city, pave the streets, and bring electric 
lighting.58 Citing Wylly’s success at bringing humanitarian relief and rebuilding Baracoa during 
his tenure, the city council and mayor petitioned Wood in February 1899 to have Wylly stay on 
permanently as the military commander of the town and not to return to South Carolina with his 
regiment.59 Yet towns like Baracoa in the Department of Santiago never reached the level of self-
sufficiency Wood hoped for. Wood had to authorize Colonel James. S. Pettit, the district 
commander of Manzanillo, to give department funds to help his local military commanders with 
small projects and purchases, since they did not generate enough revenue on their own.60 By the 
end of the initial occupation, Wood still needed to send each district commander several 
thousand dollars a month to assist them in running their municipal governments and prevent the 
towns from going into debt.  
Despite their low yields, the modification of the Spanish tax system and the transparency 
of the military government’s use of funds was probably the most popular aspect of the U.S. 																																																								
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Army’s occupation. All the military governors despised the old Spanish tax system. Wood 
reported that taxes were not spread across society in proportion to one’s wealth, “so that a poor 
man will pay as much as a rich.”61 Furthermore, Wood believed that by taxing trade and 
consumption of goods and not property, the system “fails to encourage, but actually retards and 
in many instances prevents, the improvement and development of the country by penalizing 
energy and enterprise and by rewarding, indirectly, neglect and inertia.”62 He immediately made 
small changes to the tax law to make it a little more equitable and less onerous on the poor but 
recommended the tax code be completely rewritten. 
The military government, like the Spanish-colonial government before it, received most 
of its revenue from tariffs on imports and exports. The difference was that the occupation 
government used all the tariff revenue for internal improvements and not to enrich Spanish or 
corrupt local officials’ coffers. The effects of this change were felt immediately. The President 
appointed Walter A. Donaldson as collector of customs for the Department of Santiago because 
of his familiarity with Spanish customs laws.63 Donaldson rigorously accounted for every cent 
and investigated any irregularity. He reported the amount of collected funds and expenditures to 
the War Department in meticulously kept records and made recommendations on how to 
improve the tariff system to make it more efficient, and not necessarily more profitable.64  																																																								
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Also unlike the Spanish, the War Department granted exceptions to the tariff laws to help 
provide humanitarian relief to the destitute Cubans and to restart their economy. The President 
had the Assistant Secretary of War George de Rue Meiklejohn lift the tax on all imported food to 
keep costs for relief agencies down.65 Meiklejohn also abolished the export tax on ore and 
considered allowing some farm machinery to enter free of charge in order to restart the mining 
and farming industry in the province.66 A company involved in coastal trade between 
Guantanamo and Santiago de Cuba complained to Donaldson that they wanted to trade between 
more American controlled ports in Eastern Cuba but could not afford to because the tariff law 
charged them two cents per ton each time they stopped in a port, which they found excessive. 
The War Department agreed with their argument and also saw the importance of coastal trade in 
rebuilding Cuba’s economy, so it enacted a new regulation that capped the maximum annual rate 
costal traders would have to pay each year.67 Additionally, to increase the efficiency of trade to 
American occupied Eastern Cuba, the War Department began allowing ships coming into 
Eastern Cuba to go directly their destination port without first stopping in Santiago de Cuba. 
Newly appointed tariff officials at these smaller customs houses collected the tariffs and sent the 
fees to the department headquarters.68 
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To supplement the tariff revenues, Lawton had asked Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin 
for permission to reestablish local taxes and stamp duties. Lawton wanted to open more civil 
functions once operated by the state—such as the schools, courts, and electric and water works—
and to make each town self-sustaining.69 The Republican administration and the War Department 
were vehemently opposed to incurring debt for ideological reasons and refused to open civil 
functions until they had enough funds to operate them consistently. Even though the stamp tax 
on all government transactions produced the majority of municipal revenue, Wood convinced the 
War Department not to reinstate this tax, because no former Spanish law was so “utterly 
distasteful or repugnant to the Cubans” because of the inefficiency and graft it caused, knowing 
he would still have to cut the size of local governments and police forces without the profitable 
stamp revenues.70 To make up for the lost revenue, Wood allowed municipalities to tax stores for 
business licenses. In Santiago de Cuba, Wood employed Bernardo J. Bueno and Juan M. Galdos, 
two former Cuban officers, to work alongside two Americans to survey the city and to issue 
business licenses that Wood estimated would increase the cities revenue by $100,000 a year.71  
By November, Wood’s Department of Santiago had its finances in order. The 
municipalities were nearly self-sustaining, although they did cut many positions and services, 
and the increased tariff revenues enabled Wood to reopen most civil functions. The Department 
collected $221,636 in customs revenues through the month of October.72 With the additional 																																																								
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revenue Wood hired more police, reopened the civil courts and schools, and began repairing the 
roads and lighthouses in the province.73 Most importantly, Wood could boast that his 
government was generally free of corruption, operating efficiently, and operating within its 
means—all progressive traits venerated by both Wood and the Republican administration. While 
Wood’s frugality caused the loss of countless government jobs, the dismissed public officials 
were typically loyal to the old Spanish regime and planned to return to Spain anyway. By 
replacing them with conservative Cubans friendly to the United States, the military government 
faced little complaint, save from Cubans desiring immediate independence. 
The transparency and efficiency of the occupation government’s use of Cuban revenue 
marked a stark contrast from their Spanish predecessors. The same was true for its approach to 
private property. The U.S. Army insisted upon using government-owned property, and renting 
private property when necessary. The U.S. Army’s respect for private property was another way 
that it avoided perceptions of corruption. Assistant Judge Advocate Wiley investigated which of 
the buildings formerly used by the Spanish government were public property and which were 
privately owned and rented. He concluded that the building used by the Chamber of Deputies 
was privately owned and could no longer be used by the military government unless it paid rent 
to the owners in Spain.74 The military government of Santiago de Cuba was even more 
disheartened when Assistant Adjutant General Mendoza searched the record of titles he 
discovered in the mayor’s office to learn that the magnificently decorated and maintained 
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Spanish officers’ club was also privately owned and could no longer be used by the U.S. Army.75 
When Wood received a report that Major Frank Gordon of the 3rd U.S.V.I. was using the home 
of two priests to stable his horse without their consent, he ordered an investigation, which 
substantiated the claim.76 For this and other acts unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman, 
Gordon was compelled to resign his commission and return to the United States.77 The U.S. 
Army also immediately returned furniture originally stored in an office building to its owner that 
it had removed after mistakenly believing it belonged to the Spanish army using the building 
during the siege.78  
While the U. S. Army respected the private property of Spaniards and Cubans in Santiago 
during the occupation, it refused to compensate civilians for either damages resulting from the 
fighting to take the city, or items stolen by American soldiers and the Cuban Liberation Army. 
To investigate the numerous claims made by civilians against the U.S. Army in Santiago de 
Cuba, Lawton convened a board of three officers to investigate and make recommendations on 
each petition.79 On the recommendation of the board of claims, Wood authorized a payment to 
Pedro Secunido Silva of $912 for the U.S. Army’s use of his building on Cristina Street as a 
customs house. He had rented it to the Spanish government and the occupation government had 
used it for 111 days until it signed a new lease with the owner.80 On the other hand, the board 																																																								
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refused to pay any damages claimed to have done by the U.S. Navy or Army during the 
bombardment of the city as the board decided that these were either lawful acts of war or were 
false claims against the government to repair dilapidated buildings.81 Furthermore, the board 
refused to compensate Bernardo Lageyre for the horses that two U.S. Army deserters stole from 
him. Wood considered the affair a matter for the civil courts, but he did promise to make every 
effort to capture the men and return the stolen property.82 When the board recommended that the 
military government pay Lageyre for the ninety-three cows consumed by General Calixto 
García’s forces while working with the U.S. Army to siege Santiago de Cuba, Wood demurred.83 
He thought that if the occupation government paid Lageyer’s and two other claims against the 
Cuban Liberation Army “while they were nominally co-operating with us” it would be 
“establishing an extremely dangerous precedent.”84 Wood worried that it would amount to 
recognition of the Cuban Liberation Army and that citizens would “make claim upon us for all 
the past damage done by the Cuban Army in other portions of the Island during this period,” and 
“perhaps establish a ground for them to claim salaries etc., from the United States.”85 Given the 
McKinley administration’s policy of refusing to recognize the existence, let alone the legitimacy, 
of the Cuban Liberation Army or the PRC, the War Department agreed with Wood’s 
recommendation not to pay these claims. 																																																								
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Another shortcoming of the occupation government was in its intolerance of any negative 
press and its manipulation of material released to the press. Shafter’s trouble with the American 
press began during the fighting because he disliked their reporting on his obvious shortcomings 
planning and executing the invasion. Corbin reminisced that Shafter could have been celebrated 
for his accomplishments, but “he was not tactful in the treatment of the representatives of the 
press.”86 Shafter’s troubles continued into the first day of the occupation when he ordered the 
reporter Sylvester H. Scovel of the New York World off the roof of the governor’s palace as he 
tried to place himself in the photographs of the surrender ceremony. Scovel attacked the general 
when he had him removed. Shafter considered trying Scovel and possibly having him shot for his 
assault, but “preferred to fire him from the island. A trial would only have given him the 
notoriety he” sought.87 The War Department retracted Scovel’s license and prohibited him from 
accompanying the U.S. Army overseas under any circumstance.88 Shafter also ordered the arrest 
and deportation of three pro-administration reporters from the New York Journal for attempting 
to incite violence against the Spanish in Santiago de Cuba by posting large posters with a large 
heading that read “Remember the Maine” over a picture of the battleship.89 Shafter again 
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overreacted when faced with dissension and thought “the action of these men deserved death.”90 
The War Department was shocked that Shafter could not even get along with friendly reporters 
and that the paper most supportive to the administration did not have any representatives in 
Cuba. The administration ensured the editors that Shafter had no issue with the paper sending 
other journalists to Santiago, and rushed them down on the next government transport out of 
New York.91 
After the signing of the peace protocol in Washington on August 13, 1898, the War 
Department could no longer censor the American press and all telegraph lines out of Cuba were 
opened.92 From that point on, the U.S. Army could not control the stories American journalists 
published, regardless of their veracity. Major Charles G. Starr, the Inspector General of the 
Department of Santiago, went to San Luis to investigate a newspaper’s claim that soldiers from 
8th Illinois Infantry had forced “their way into homes, insult[ed] women and children, and even 
committed crimes which cannot be specified” because the soldiers of this regiment were 
“negroes gathered from the riff raff of our northern cities, officered by men of their own color.”93 
After interviewing dozens of civilians, soldiers, and town officials, Starr concluded that the 
newspaper reports did a great injustice to the 8th Illinois “by reason of their color” and the 
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published story consisted of utter “falsehoods manufactured out of whole cloth.”94 He 
recommended that action be taken to prevent the paper from publishing additional libels, but 
there was little the military government could do. 
Wood came down much more harshly on Cuban papers. He feared the rhetoric of 
Santiago de Cuba’s La Independencia, which openly called for the continuance of the revolution 
against the Americans and feared that the occupation government was dividing the independence 
movement while it was on the verge of success. The journal reminded the occupiers that the 
Cubans were “a people who have proved by the way we liberated our country from Spanish 
tyranny that we can resist aggression and oppression whenever it comes and whatever it form.”95 
The editors were right as to American intentions but not the nearness of unilateral Cuban success 
in their fight against Spain. They feared American annexation most, but also worried that the 
Americans in power would favor their conservative rivals within the revolutionary camp. 
Knowing that the editors wanted him to “make martyrs of them” and their cause by using “harsh 
measures,” Wood skillfully used a combination of persuasion and threats to suppress what he 
considered to be the “ultra-radical element.”96 Fortunately for Wood, most Cubans seemed tired 
of war and happy that their desperate situation was improving, and were not eager to renew their 
struggle for independence.97 
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The American press heaped praise on Wood for his handling of the humanitarian crisis in 
Santiago de Cuba and the establishment of a progressive government of thrift, economy, and 
order in the city. The pro-administration New York Times celebrated Wood’s administrative 
abilities and held it as a model for governing other American dependencies. Even the anti-
imperialist New York Evening Post conceded that “if the President will keep on giving us men 
like Gen. Wood…we may hope for the winning of renown in civil administration.”98 
Furthermore, Wood carefully managed his own image in the press by writing self-
aggrandizing articles in the popular magazines, Scribner’s Magazine and the North American 
Review.99 The former magazine asked Wood to write an article on his work as military governor, 
but did not need to remind him of the “great importance in forming public opinion” on the 
problems he faced in Santiago, and their belief that “the public which we reach is a very 
important element in the formation of that opinion.”100 Wood even hired A. E. Mestro to lobby 
for him in Washington to become the military governor of all of Cuba. Wood had him deliver a 
letter to the president on his behalf, and Mestro convinced William McCloy of the New York 
Evening Sun to publish an editorial arguing that Wood was the most qualified person for the 
governorship.101 
Despite his boasting, Wood had made great progress during the first months of his tenure 
in establishing control, relieving the humanitarian crises, building infrastructure, and making the 
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Department of Santiago self-sufficient. Wood, however, struggled when he attempted to reform 
long-held Cuban customs, institutions, and traditions. Changing cultures takes generations, but 
Wood wanted immediate results from his reforms. Building infrastructure in the Department of 
Santiago and enforcing laws with force proved to be an easier task for the military government 
than changing Cuban culture. 
Using tariff money, Wood oversaw the renovation and repair of Santiago de Cuba’s jail, 
slaughterhouse, market, hospital, and orphanage. He authorized the newly appointed mayor, 
Emilio Bacardí, to open a museum and library to display relics of the wars of independence, and 
even provided some government funds to establish it.102 Various Catholic sisterhoods labored to 
keep the hospitals and orphanages open during the war but the hard-pressed Spanish regime 
could provide almost no money or supplies. To keep these charitable institutions operating, 
Wood and Lawton initially relied on the Red Cross and private donations of generous individuals 
and social groups in the United States. Once tariff revenue increased, Wood began to appropriate 
government funds to support the charities.103 Additionally, Lawton worked closely with the 
Department of Agriculture to set up a meteorological weather station near the city so they could 
study the causes of hurricanes and analyze how they approached the United States.104  
Wood used municipal police and soldiers when necessary to enforce strict compliance 
with his dictates, demanding order in the city and in the province. Wood confiscated every cart 																																																								
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and wagon, and used police and soldiers to impress the male population of Santiago de Cuba to 
clean up the refuge in the streets. He paid and fed the desperate population, but used physical 
force against those who refused to work. To reduce the theft of livestock and to hold owners 
accountable for their wandering animals, Wood ordered all livestock to be registered. He made 
all previous proofs of ownership void after January 1, 1899. To conserve water during the winter 
dry season, Wood ordered the public fountains closed from 7 p.m. to 5 a.m., rotating the time 
that each neighborhood had water, and prohibited the washing of the streets without approval 
from the Sanitary Department.105 
Wood was far less successful at using laws to enforce progressive American morality on 
Cuban society. Embracing concerns shared by middle-class Americans for their own 
communities in the United States, many of the first laws enacted by the civil government were to 
curb what Wood saw as morally bankrupt behavior in his “civilizing mission” to “uplift” the 
Cubans.106 In an attempt to try to stop the rampant gambling among Cubans and Americans 
soldiers that most American officers and educated Cubans detested, the civil government enacted 
a law that threatened arrest and a thousand dollar fine, or a year hard labor, for those caught 
running gambling houses. The civil government decreed another law two days later that tried to 
stop bull and cockfighting, which the American officers considered barbaric.107 Also 
unsuccessfully, the U.S. Army tried to bring temperance to Cuba by stopping or limiting the sale 																																																								
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of alcohol. Colonel Patrick H. Ray, the military governor of Guantanamo, prohibited the sale or 
gifting of liquor, beer, or wine without a costly license. He hoped to curb the sale and 
consumption of alcohol and fined violators a thousand dollars or imprisoned them for six 
months.108 Despite these strict laws, American officers had about as much luck enforcing their 
morality upon the Cubans as they did upon their own soldiers. 
The majority of ordinary Cubans despised the occupation government imposing 
American values on them and continued to drink, gamble, and attend cockfights no matter how 
steep the penalties. Cubans had long relished these activities after the harvest and during major 
holidays. Surprisingly, the Cuban nationalist and educational elite, like José Miguel Gómez who 
later became the civil governor of Santa Clara, strongly supported and even advocated for the 
occupation government to eliminate the wildly popular tradition of cockfighting and gambling. 
However, most Cubans, especially the lower-class campesinos, loved these popular pastimes and 
rejected the progressive crusades to reform what was perceived as Cuba’s moralistic vices.109 
The military government also struggled to change the justice system of Cuba that was 
based on the tradition of Roman civil law. As it did in other facets of civil government, the U.S. 
Army first reestablished the Spanish colonial system of courts to ease the transition of the 
military government on the Cuban people. Even before the formal surrender of Santiago de Cuba 
on July 17, 1898, McKinley instructed Adjutant General Corbin to order the Army to continue 
using the existing municipal law in the province during the occupation. Shafter kept the courts 
closed because most of the Spanish officials resigned and he did not have the money to pay the 																																																								
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remaining ones. After Lawton assumed command, he worked to reestablish civil functions using 
the ever-increasing tariff revenues. Lawton asked for and received volumes on American and 
English legal systems, and international law from the War Department’s Judge Advocate 
General to help him deal with the myriad legal issues he faced.110  
The Spanish judicial system that Lawton reestablished for the Department of Santiago 
consisted of a three-tiered hierarchy of courts. At the bottom were the seventeen municipal 
courts, each presided over by a single judge who dealt with low-level civil cases where $200 
dollars or less was at stake, and with misdemeanors known as faltas. The municipal judges and 
their clerks received no salary but collected fees for their services. The Courts of the First 
Instance made up the second tier and had final jurisdiction over appeals made in municipal 
courts. Furthermore, the second-tier courts investigated all delitos (felonies). Each of the seven 
Courts of the First Instance were presided over by a judge originally appointed from Spain who 
received a fixed salary. If the judge determined the accused crime was only a misdemeanor, he 
sent it back to the municipal court, but if he determined that there was enough evidence to 
warrant a trial for the delito he sent the case to the Audiencia (Supreme Court) in Santiago de 
Cuba, the only court in the province that tried criminal offenses. The Audiencia consisted of a 
chief justice and five other judges, three state attorneys, and several clerks. All witnesses and 
accused parties in felony cases had to go to the Supreme Court in Santiago de Cuba and stay 
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there for the trial, eliminating any hope for speedy deliberation. Many witnesses refused to 
testify because of the time they would have to spend away from their homes and jobs.111  
Wood preferred to retain the majority of the Spanish laws, as they were satisfactory and 
the Cubans were accustomed to them, but he pleaded that he be allowed to modify the judicial 
system for criminal cases which he found “radically defective.”112 The Americans were most 
shocked that no jury system existed in Cuba. Assistant Adjutant General Mendoza, a member of 
the Havana bar before immigrating to the United States, recommended giving salaries to the 
municipal judges and their notary clerks because the fees that law allowed them to accept were 
too small to live off, leading almost all of them to use “blackmail, bribery, and extorsion [sic]” 
just to survive.113 Moreover, Mendoza recommended reducing the excessive salaries of the 
higher judges and cutting extraneous personnel. To overcome the Spanish judicial system that 
Wiley considered “slow…clumsy, primitive, and unsatisfactory,” Wood’s judge advocate 
general proposed establishing a military commission composed of three military officers, a 
prosecutor, and a clerk to try felony cases.114 Wood forwarded the recommendation to the War 
Department in early October, but did not receive approval. On November 28, Wood appointed 
new judges to the Supreme Court and some Courts of the First Instance. They were conservatives 
who were loyal to the occupation government, and several were former officers in the Cuban 																																																								
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Liberation Army.115 The President and the War Department decided to wait to make more radical 
changes to the judicial system until after the formal occupation of the island began in January 
1899. Later, when Wood became military governor of all of Cuba, he oversaw the modification 
of the Cuban judicial system along American lines.116 
Unlike the Cuban judicial system, the U.S. Army’s occupation forces quickly reformed 
the defunct postal system in Santiago by eliminating corruption and modernizing it along the 
American model. The War Department needed a functioning postal system to communicate 
cheaply and efficiently with its occupation forces posted in scattered garrisons throughout the 
island. McKinley dictated to the War Department on July 21, just four days after the Spanish 
capitulation, that it open the port of Santiago de Cuba to U.S. postal deliveries, and that all 
occupied areas use American postage stamps. All revenues from the sale of postage in Cuba 
were to be used to pay for the operating costs. The McKinley administration deemed postal 
communications too important to ever rely on the old Spanish system. The post office in the 
Department of Santiago fell under the Postmaster General of the United States, who sent a 
civilian appointee to operate the system.117 
Outside of the provincial capital, U.S. Army officers ran the postal system until civilian 
appointees arrived from the United States or the military government appointed sympathetic 
Cubans. In Guantanamo, as in most of the towns the U.S. Army occupied, Colonel Ray relieved 																																																								
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the Spanish sympathizer who operated the postal system in the city during the war because he 
could not be trusted to handle military mails and the Cubans despised him.118 In his place Ray 
appointed Chaplain Daniel Parker until a civilian postmaster arrived from the United States.119 
By the end of the initial occupation, the U.S. Army had opened post offices in all the towns in 
the province. 
With the ending of the initial occupation, Havana became the single port of entry and 
departure for all mails arriving from or departing to the United States. Wood hated the system 
because it took eleven days for a letter from New York to arrive in Santiago de Cuba. He 
proposed that the United States Post Office contract Boston Fruit Company steamers, already 
authorized to carry U.S. mail and going to and from Jamaica three time a week, to add a quick 
stop to bring mail to Santiago. Furthermore, Wood wanted to modify the Spanish laws on posts 
to make them more modern and efficient, and he wanted to be allowed to punish corrupt postal 
officials and those who robbed the mail under military courts instead of prosecuting offenders 
under the slow-moving Cuban judicial system. Similar to his request to reform the Cuban 
judicial system and civil code, the McKinley administration decided to wait to reform the postal 
laws until the long-serving career soldier, Major General John R. Brooke, arrived to head the 
occupation government of all of Cuba, so they could make nation-wide reforms.120 
Despite not directly controlling the postal system, Wood still found himself responsible 
for managing many portions of it. As in its frontier mission in the American West, the U.S. 																																																								
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Army became responsible for ensuring the safe delivery of mail, especially in isolated places.121 
When Wood sent the Los Angeles to deliver rations and supplies to the garrisons of the province, 
he authorized the ship to carry the mail.122 Wood could not make wholesale changes to the civil 
laws concerning the mail, but he did make regulations for the couriers who carried the mails to 
ensure that they arrived on schedule and safely guarded the mails.123 
The commanders who ran the Department of Santiago took a similar approach with the 
schools in the province by first reopening them along the existing Spanish system before 
reforming their administrative bureaucracy and Americanizing the curriculum. Although the 
Indian Bureau ran the schools on the reservations, the War Department did have recent 
experience managing schools. It built and managed a school for the Chiricahua Apaches at 
Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama, in 1889, that served to educate and Americanize their 
children. The War Department also ran the famous Carlisle Indian Industrial School with a 
similar mission under the care of Richard H. Pratt from 1879 through the First World War.124  
The U.S. Army began reopening and administering the schools in Santiago de Cuba, 
closed because of the fighting. Lawton received a letter from the Director of the Superior School 
of Santiago Province in September that under normal circumstances students in the province 
would be enrolling for the next school year that began in October. Students who missed their 
exams the previous May also needed to take them before the new academic year. He explained 																																																								
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the schools operated, by law, from fees paid by the students and could proceed with those funds 
for a time. The school director understood that McKinley’s proclamation stated that the civil 
government in the province should continue on as before, but wanted confirmation from the U.S. 
Army commander before proceeding “with the examinations and opening the new course.”125 
Not wanting the students to miss a school year, Lawton ordered Wood to open the schools in the 
Santiago de Cuba as usual on October 3. Lawton gave him an annual budget of $20,480 and 
asked him to send his appointments for teachers and school board officials to him for final 
authorization. Wood appointed twelve teachers within the city limits who each received $60 
dollars per month, except for the Upper School teacher who received $125. The occupation 
government used municipal funds to pay the instructors.126 
As a good progressive, Wood quickly seized upon the inefficiencies in the old Spanish 
school system and looked to make the school board more efficient and the schools more 
inclusive. Wood complained that the biggest challenge to opening new schools in Santiago was 
that there was no government land to place them on and that the lack of transportation prevented 
children that lived “any distance from the centers of population” from attending schools.127 
Wood was pleased with the energy and zeal of his school board and wanted to provide public 
primary education to all Cuban children. But he felt handicapped by existing Spanish laws on 
education that seemed “to have been designed more in the interest of teachers and other office 																																																								
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holders than in the interest of real and general public instruction.”128 He made a comprehensive 
plan to reform the entire school system in Cuba, but in the meantime he began work on less 
ambitious plans to open a school to train girls to become teachers and a high school for boys in 
Santiago de Cuba, so they would no longer need to travel to Havana to further their education. 
Meanwhile, Wood opened thirty kindergartens in Santiago de Cuba for children under seven 
years old.129 Garrison commanders across the Department of Santiago followed Wood’s lead and 
opened dozens of schools. In Baracoa, Wylly opened two public schools by the end of 1898. 
Furthermore, across the island all schools began to teach English as well as Spanish to their 
pupils, making it easier to Americanize a new generation of Cubans.130 
While the inefficient and overly bureaucratic postal, education, and judicial system 
confounded American officers, nothing bewildered them more than the relationship between the 
Catholic Church and the former colonial government. To these almost exclusively Protestant 
officers, the special privileges and funding the Catholic Church received from the former 
colonial government seemed to confirm their worst fears of papal corruption and violated the 
very foundation of the American constitutional government, which demanded the separation of 
the church and state. 
The Spanish government considered the church and the state to be a single indivisible 
entity and had taken control of the property and land owned by the Catholic Church in Cuba, as 																																																								
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well as the mortgages they collected from rented land. The Catholic Church fought back against 
Spain and regained some right to land in Cuba with the Concordat of 1851. In return for the land 
confiscated by the Spanish government, the church received large payments every year and 
ensured that Roman Catholicism continued to be the only religion of the country and its colonies. 
Church property in Cuba, therefore, belonged to the state, and the colonial government made 
itself responsible for all the expenses of the church, including the clergy’s salaries. Furthermore, 
the Catholic Church in Cuba profited from the rent of large amounts of land and property 
bequeathed or purchased by the church in corporation. When the U.S. Army occupied Santiago, 
it terminated the government payments to the church for former church properties. The 
Archdiocese of Santiago argued that all these lands should be turned over to it because the old 
colonial government had failed to fulfill its obligations on them. The War Department argued 
that the property belonged to the state and could therefore be used or sold in any way the 
occupation government saw fit. Furthermore, the church made large sums of money from Cuba 
by capellanías. These were annual payments made to the Church from the income off lands, 
established in the wills on original owners. When an annual mortgage, or censos, was not met, 
which had often become the case on agricultural land during the series of revolutions on the 
island, the debt became a lien on the property. The owners could not rebuild or invest in their 
lands after the war because of the huge debts they owed the church, often in excess of the total 
value of the property.131 
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With the approval of the War Department the occupation government separated itself 
from the Catholic Church and looked for legal means to undermine its strength. Upon learning 
from a report made by Wood in September that the salaries of priests were made with public 
revenues, the War Department ordered an immediate ending of the practice.132 Wood and the 
War Department also wanted to continue to hold the lands that once belonged to the Church, not 
used for worship, which they believed still belonged to the state. Furthermore, they began 
looking into legal ways to unencumber the Cuban people from the capellanías, so they could 
begin reinvesting in their lands. Unfortunately, they knew these were long-term problems that 
required changing or manipulating the existing laws of Cuba.133 McKinley and the War 
Department decided to wait for the occupation of the entire island to begin on January 1, 1899 
before making major changes to Cuba’s civil code.  
 
American Governance During the Formal Occupation and its Impact on Cubans 
When Brooke took command of the Division of Cuba, he followed the guidance 
McKinley gave to Shafter in Santiago four months earlier to keep the existing colonial laws and 
Spanish officials in place initially. Brooke made some limited progressive reforms to Cuban laws 
and government structures, and he was less paternalistic toward the Cubans than Wood during 
his administration. He generally gave his Cuban ministers the power to run things. However, he 
organized the occupation government to more closely reflect traditional U.S. Army command 
structures. Under Brooke, a general commanding a military department directly supervised each 																																																								
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civil province and Havana; and American officers ran the customs houses, quarantine service, 
treasury, and telegraph and phone services.134 
 Brooke had served in the U.S. Army since 1862. A thorough professional, he did not 
consider it proper to make major policy decisions without approval or guidance from McKinley 
or the War Department. Neither provided him much in the way of specific guidance for his 
military government. Nor did Brooke receive any long-term policy decisions regarding American 
intentions in Cuba. Without direction, Brooke made only a few small reforms and focused on 
bringing order and peace to the island. He focused on making his military and civil governments 
more efficient and gave his Cuban ministers and his department commanders considerable 
leeway. Nevertheless, he also Americanized some laws and bureaucracies that were too alien for 
his conservative nature. His cautious and impartial approach frustrated the McKinley 
administration, which looked for Brooke to drive policy rather than wait for it. Brooke’s 
subordinate department commanders became frustrated with their superior’s passivity, especially 
Wood and Major General James H. Wilson, as these volunteer generals were more self-assured 
about both their ability to lead the occupation and the superiority of American methods of 
governance. McKinley and the War Department sided with Wood over Wilson in the political 
struggle to circumvent their commander and determine a Cuban policy that set the conditions for 
American hegemony, if not outright annexation. Once Wood took command of the Division of 
Cuba on December 23, 1899, he instituted an aggressive policy of Americanizing Cuba’s civil 
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government.135 Wood reported the necessity of his paternalism to McKinley after taking charge 
by arguing that he was “dealing with a race that has steadily been going down for a hundred 
years and into which we have to infuse new life, new principles and new methods of doing 
things,” and he continued that the Cubans knew “that they are not ready for self government.”136 
As in Santiago, many of those telling Wood that they wanted an American civil 
government were loyalist peninsulares or upper-class Cubans, both of whom looked to the U.S. 
Army for protection from the perceived threats of social revolution and disorder. They 
championed annexation by the United States from the beginning. The U.S. Army understood that 
for political reasons it must appoint Cubans to positions in the new occupation government. It 
leaned heavily on the upper-class merchants, professionals, landowners, and especially English-
speaking expatriates for support, with only some regard to their affiliation during the war. As in 
Santiago, the “better classes” of Cubans quickly loaned their support to the United States in 
return for the patronage of government jobs and for protection against the unprofitable chaos that 
revolutionary change to the existing political, social, and economic order would bring.  
Meanwhile, the PRC and Cuban Liberation Army, once tenuously united in war by their 
desire for independence from Spain, began to feud with each other for power in the peace, even 
as both organizations internally split along class and racial lines in their support for the 
occupation government. The former Cuban officers wanted the jobs that initially went to the 
expatriates, and with the threat of renewed fighting, began receiving a larger share of American 
patronage. Aided by the support of General Máximo Gómez, the U.S. Army exploited the 																																																								
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collapse of Cuban revolutionary consensus and its control of government employment to co-opt 
many former separatists to the American program. In the long term, they marginalized the 
revolutionaries by disenfranchising nearly the entire landless working class’s right to vote.137 
The calculated placement of Cubans in government positions, the progressive reforms, 
and the Americanization of Cuban laws by the occupation government created discord and 
cognitive dissonance among the Cuban people. According to the Cuban historian Marial Iglesias 
Utset, “a battle broke out among three segments of the Cuban polity: the proponents of a strident 
nationalism, the advocates of a forceful ‘Americanization’ of Cuban customs and institutions, 
and the defenders of the Spanish cultural heritage.”138 She argues that most Cubans went through 
an identity crisis because they wanted to reform their society and government but also 
understood that the American reforms carried a steep cost as they also targeted cherished 
traditions and subjected Cubans to a sort of cultural imperialism by the United States. She 
concludes that from its inception the American “occupation government was at once hated and 
admired, rejected and imitated” by the Cuban people.139 
The Cubans both admired and despised the Americanization of the Cuban education 
system. Cuba had an illiteracy rate close to 70% and only a small fraction of children went to 
school. Brooke appointed an American, Alexis Frye, as superintendent of the newly created 
public school system. He worked tremendous hours without pay and genuinely tried to protect 
the interests of Cuban teachers. Later, Frye even spoke out against Wood’s education policies, 																																																								
137 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 216, 235-
242, 285-300. 
138 Marial Iglesias Utset, A Cultural History of Cuba during the U.S. Occupation, 1898-1902 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 2. 
139 Marial Iglesias Utset, A Cultural History of Cuba during the U.S. Occupation, 1898-1902 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 8. 
 	434	
and the new governor replaced him with the loyal Lieutenant Matthew E. Hanna. The Cubans 
admired how the U.S. Army transformed former Spanish barracks, and any other unused public 
buildings, in Cuba into schools as they attempted to create enough space for all Cuban children 
to receive a primary education. In just over a year, they enrolled over 150,000 of Cuba’s 400,000 
school-aged children, opened close to 3,100 new public schools, reformed the private ones, and 
revived and reformed the University of Havana. By 1902, they enrolled another 100,000 students 
and spent close to 25% of the island’s total revenues on public schools.140 
Children marching into buildings that soldiers once occupied symbolized to Cubans how 
the progressive reforms brought by the U.S. Army could modernize Cuba for the better, but they 
despised the self-righteousness of the occupation government’s attempt to Americanize the 
curriculum and teaching methods. Most Cubans detested it when Brooke’s civil government 
followed Wood’s example in Santiago by making English a mandatory part of the school 
curriculum in September 1899. They also disliked that Hanna’s laws governing schools on the 
island borrowed wholesale from Ohio state law with no consideration for Cuban traditions. 
Furthermore, the occupation government purchased thousands of textbooks from American 
publishing companies in English or translated poorly into Spanish, full of histories of American 
founding fathers and images alien to the Cuban population. A nationalistic backlash ensued 
against the teaching of the English language as a form of cultural conquest that might lead to 
political annexation. In the end the ambitious plan failed because not enough teachers spoke or 
could be trained to teach English, so only a small fraction of primary students received any 																																																								
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instruction in the language during the four-year occupation. Moreover, the new public schools 
became more of a center to teach a new Cuban nationalism than they ever became a place to 
Americanize Cuban children.141 
Wood realized that the Cubans would never allow their children to be taught by teachers 
from the United States. Therefore, to help educate Cubans on “superior” American scholastic 
methods an American nonprofit called the Cuban Educational Association (AEC) partnered with 
over three hundred American universities to provide scholarships to Cubans and Puerto Rican 
students so they could become teachers upon graduation. Showing the best of American altruism, 
many sponsor families allowed the students to live with them at little or no cost and railroads 
transported them at no charge. Equally ambitious was Frye’s plan to send 1,237 Cuban teachers 
to socialize and study education and English at Harvard in the summer of 1900. The U.S. Army 
transported the teachers free of charge, private American benefactors paid all the other costs, and 
all of Boston treated the teachers warmly. Simultaneously, both programs showed the worst of 
Americans’ belief in the superiority of their culture and race as the AEC’s explicit mission was 
to “civilize” the “Latin Races” with the “American way of life,” and many annexationists hoped 
that the study of the English language and education of Cuban teachers would lead to what they 
perceived to be the inevitable annexation of Cuba.142 
Another nationalistic backlash occurred when Brooke followed Wood’s example in 
Santiago by banning cockfighting and trying to limit gambling, largely at the request of the 																																																								
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Cuban intellectual elite. Brooke’s secretary of state, Diego Tamayo, urged his boss to ban the 
practices because he believed them to be immoral and he thought that the U.S. Army would not 
leave Cuba until his countrymen could prove that they were civilized and capable of governing 
themselves. Not needing much persuasion, Brooke issued military order 165, which banned 
cockfighting across the island. Perhaps no civil law passed by the occupation government was 
more disliked because of the popularity of the blood sport among ordinary Cubans who saw it as 
part of a Cuban national culture, or cubanía. Despite several petitions, Wood and his Cuban 
secretaries refused to reestablish the legality of the sport, although they admitted that the sport 
flourished underground. The civil administration also refused to reinstate other popular pastimes 
they thought morally corrupt, like bull fighting and a national lottery.143 
The War Department paid for the occupation of Cuba with tariffs and municipal taxes, 
following the efficient model it established immediately after the capture of Santiago de Cuba, 
and refined under Wood’s administration of the province. McKinley sent his personal advisor on 
tariff issues, Robert P. Porter, to Havana in the autumn of 1898 to develop a tariff schedule for 
Cuba after holding public hearings in the city and in the United States. He began with the 
schedule used in Santiago during the initial occupation, which was the old Spanish model with 
some minor modifications, including that it did not discriminate against imports from any nation. 
Porter disliked the new schedule, but thought the modifications in Santiago moved the tariff law 
in the right direction. He continued to Americanize the new schedule in line with Republican 
Party economic theories. He even rewrote the tables in dollars. Porter slashed the old rates by 
more than half to help the island recover economically but still provide enough revenue to 																																																								
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support the occupation government. Porter believed his scheme would work if the rampant 
smuggling and inefficiencies that characterized the old-customs system were eliminated.144  
To modernize and reform the corrupt customs houses in Cuba, the War Department 
assigned the cerebral and honest Lieutenant Colonel Tasker H. Bliss to serve as Chief Collector 
of Customs for the Island of Cuba in December 1898. He dismissed excessive officials, 
modernized the bureaucratic systems, and ruthlessly fought corruption. He turned over 
meticulous receipts to the North American Trust Company, which acted as a bank for the 
occupation government. Bliss’s efficient and honest customs service soon began to pour money 
into government coffers that Brooke, and later Wood, put to use paying for the occupation 
government, distributing food and medicine to the destitute, rebuilding critical infrastructure, and 
reopening Cuban hospitals and charities.145  
Fortunately, the military government reached a satisfactory compromise with the 
Catholic Church to liberate property owners from their capellanías, while still compensating the 
church for the lands seized by the Spanish colonial government, or censos. The military 
government appointed commissioners to find a solution to the complex problem. To Wood’s 
dismay, they found that the Catholic Church should be compensated for the large amount of 
property appropriated by the former regime. Not to be denied, Wood worked through the Bishop 
of Havana to find an acceptable compromise. The Church retained the right to receive rents on 
its former lands held by the government at an agreed-upon low rate, but a future Cuban 
government gained the right to buy all the contested land at cost, just over two million dollars, 																																																								
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sometime during the next five years. In the meantime, the military government paid nearly a 
million dollars to purchase all the land mortgages owed to the church at fifty cents on the dollar 
and then sold the lands back to the renters at the same reduced price. By using tariff monies, the 
occupation government freed many small landowners from crippling liens and settled the 
relations between the Catholic Church and the American occupier without major offense to 
either party.146 
Furthermore, the occupation government made major reforms to Cuba’s judicial system, 
but Wood pushed the reforms too far by forcing aspects of English common law that were alien 
to the Cubans. Wood’s progressive reform of the barbaric prison conditions on the island and his 
release of prisoners who never had a trial or received excessive punishment met with universal 
praise.147 The governor gained further support for reducing corruption by ending the practice of 
paying fees for trial services—so cases were no longer decided by who had the larger purse—
and by giving judicial employees fixed salaries. Wood also streamlined the overburdened justice 
system by creating police or correctional courts to give summary decisions in smaller criminal 
cases at the city where the offense occurred. Most notably, he ensured that the state provided 
legal representation to those who could not afford it. The Cubans admired these reforms, but 
their legal heritage based on Roman law left them disinclined to accept hallmarks of English 
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common law such as the jury system and the writ of habeas corpus. Cubans simply did not 
believe it their duty to convict their peers.148 
Cubans also struggled to move away from a unitary system of government. While a 
Spanish colony, all laws and funds came from the governor general in Havana down to the local 
municipalities. Wood tried to reduce the amount of funding the municipalities received from the 
central treasury to pay for their police, officials, and local roads, while simultaneously abolishing 
the consumption tax that traditionally filled the local coffers, ensuring that towns could not 
sustain themselves without going into debt. Wood’s attempt to establish local self-governing and 
self-financing townships based on the Anglo-American model, as he attempted in Santiago, 
seemed completely alien to the Cubans and they reverted back to the old unitary system soon 
after the U.S. Army’s departure in 1902.149 
Perhaps the best characteristic of the occupation government was that the Army officers 
charged to run it were almost always honest and eliminated corruption in the civil government 
where it had once been the norm. The darkest blemish on the American civil government 
occurred in the Havana post office, run by the Postmaster General of the United States and not 
the U.S. Army. In May 1900 an audit ordered by the Inspector General, Colonel George H. 
Burton, of the American-run postal system in Cuba found large-scale embezzlement by Charles 
F. Neely, but suspicion of corruption spread all the way to Director General of Posts in Cuba, 
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Estes G. Rathbone, a Republican appointee.150 The postal scandal caused widespread criticism of 
the administration in Cuba and an outcry in many political sectors and the press to immediately 
end the American occupation.151 Army officers decried the blemish on their record. Wylly 
argued that because Army officers had “no political axes to grind and no political friends to 
reward…the military administration has been clean and efficient.”  He cited men like Neely 
when arguing that the “evils of carpet-bag appointments have been illustrated” and only officers 
should administer Cuba.152   
 While the War Department’s handling of the postal scandal was excellent, it caused 
irreparable damage to the hopes of annexationists. Wood ordered a ruthless investigation and 
released its findings to the public, understanding that “the only chance to free ourselves from 
blame is to smash the offenders without regard to who they are.”153 Federal agents captured 
Neely in Florida after he absconded from Cuba. During his trial, Neely’s lawyer argued that the 
occupation of Cuba by the United States was unconstitutional and therefore Neely could not be 
extradited to Cuba for trial. To the relief of the McKinley administration, the court ruled that the 
occupation was legal and found Neely and Rathbone guilty after a long trial. The court also ruled 
in January 1901 that Cuba “is territory held in trust for the inhabitants of Cuba to whom it 
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rightfully belongs and to whose exclusive control it will be surrendered when a stable 
government shall have been established by their voluntary action."154  
The highest courts in the land made it clear that the United States could not annex Cuba. 
Despite the forlorn hopes of a coterie of expansionists in the Republican Party, to include Wood, 
and a minority of wealthy businessmen and land owners in Cuba, annexing Cuba was never a 
realistic possibility. The large majority of Cubans made it clear throughout the four-year 
occupation with protests and their votes that they would not accept annexation. Their resistance, 
combined with fears of another Philippine-style insurgency, a resurgent Democratic Party, and 
popular opinion to honor the Teller Amendment ensured that Cubans would remain independent, 
even if the Platt Amendment took much of their sovereignty.  
Wood should have realized this sooner, as many of his reforms to Americanize Cuba 
were aimed at preparing the island for annexation. Wood’s faith in the superiority of American 
institutions and his paternalistic view toward his subjects naturally led him to attempt to “uplift” 
the Cuban people by imposing American culture on them. Changing the values, traditions, and 
customs of a nation takes at least a generation. Wood had less than four years, and he too often 
used power rather than persuasion to make his case. Wood failed to Americanize Cuba, but he 
did succeed in rebuilding its infrastructure and reforming its corrupt and inefficient government 
bureaucracy. Some of his reforms brought lasting benefits to the island, but in most instances the 
Cubans reverted back to their old ways, for better or worse. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examines how U.S. Army officers capitalized on their experiences 
pacifying the American West and South to conduct a successful initial occupation of Santiago, 
Cuba—beginning after the Spanish surrender of eastern Cuba to General William R. Shafter’s 
Fifth Corps on July 17, 1898. It argues that while contemporary and subsequent generations of 
Americans, Spanish, and Cubans may view this war as a new version of American Imperialism, 
the U.S. Army viewed its occupation as a continuation of policies and duties that it had 
implemented for decades. The U.S. Army’s officers relied on their frontier and Reconstruction 
experiences and ingenuity to help them evacuate their Spanish prisoners, relieve humanitarian 
crises, discover the causes of tropical fevers, control the Cuban population, establish a logistical 
infrastructure, and create a military government, which later became the model for how the U.S. 
Army conducted the remainder of its occupation of Cuba.  
Using a blend of coercion and conciliation, the U.S. Army disbanded the Cuban 
Liberation Army and delegitimized the Cuban revolutionary government. With firm control over 
the Cuban population and the creation of a loyal constabulary, and with no serious political or 
military challenger, the U.S. Army gave government officials in Washington the time to 
determine unilaterally the future relationship between Cuba and the United States. Unfortunately, 
the U.S. government decided to force the young Cuban republic to accept the Platt Amendment 
as part of its new constitution as precondition for ending its military occupation of Cuba in 1902. 
The effectiveness of the U.S. Army’s occupation gave the Cubans no choice but to accept the 
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Platt amendment, which stripped the country of much of its sovereignty and forced it to accept 
American hegemony for another fifty years. 
But no amount of frontier experience could prepare the U.S. Army to send a large field 
army overseas to fight in Cuba. The War Department had not waged a large-scale conventional 
conflict since the Civil War and most of the senior American generals had only served at the 
tactical level during the conflict. Furthermore, the War Department had an unproductive dual 
command structure and no general staff to coordinate its ten staff bureaus, each operating 
independently to support the Santiago campaign. The combination of the War Department’s 
anachronistic bureaucracy, faulty pre-war planning assumptions, a large influx of volunteers, and 
changing operational directives from President William McKinley’s administration help to 
explain the Fifth Corps’ poor performance in Cuba. Yet Shafter deserves considerable blame, as 
Major Generals Nelson A. Miles and Wesley Merritt overcame the War Department’s 
cumbersome bureaucracy to lead better-managed campaigns in Puerto Rico and the Philippines.  
Within weeks of the Spanish army’s surrender at Santiago, the War Department was 
already running more efficiently. President McKinley deserves much of the credit for the 
transformation. He sidelined Secretary of War Russell A. Alger and Commanding General Miles 
and took a direct leadership role over the War Department, allowing the very competent Adjutant 
General Henry C. Corbin to synchronize the War Department’s bureaucracy. Furthermore, he 
appointed two energetic and competent leaders, Generals Henry W. Lawton and Leonard Wood, 
to administer the Department of Santiago. With more efficient management, the War Department 
worked diligently to evacuate the 24,000 Spanish soldiers in eastern Cuba back to Spain. The 
success of this phase of the operation was due in part to the cordial relationship between the 
American and Spanish forces, which viewed each other as noble adversaries and brothers in arms. 
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The U.S. Army officers that served in the Fifth Corps spent considerable time patrolling the 
United States’s national boundaries and had many interactions with foreign officers that prepared 
them for dealing with the Spanish in Santiago. Moreover, most of the senior Army officers left 
behind to occupy Santiago had previous experience caring for large numbers of Indian detainees, 
contributing to the success of the prisoner evacuation. The cordial relationship between the 
Spanish and American armies in Santiago continued into 1899, as both sides coordinated the 
withdrawal of Spanish garrisons with the arrival of American occupying forces. Their 
coordination ensured that the Cuban Liberation Army had few opportunities to establish control 
of major towns before they were secured by some of the 40,000 American soldiers sent by 
McKinley to occupy Cuba after the signing of the Treaty of Paris.  
The same cannot be said for the relationship between the American forces and the 
irregular Cuban fighters, mostly of African decent. From their experiences on the American 
frontier with Indians and because of their own racial prejudices, many U.S. Army officers 
assumed that the Cuban soldiers could be used effectively only as laborers and scouts. 
Fortunately for the U.S. Army, Lawton soon rebuilt a solid relationship with the Cubans, 
preventing an outbreak of hostilities.  
The improved War Department bureaucracy also did a commendable job of evacuating 
the Fifth Corps quickly to the United States once it realized the severity of the malaria and 
yellow fever epidemics in Santiago. The U.S. Army had been coping with yellow fever and 
malaria epidemics in the United States since its inception. Despite over one hundred years of 
experience with the two diseases, the Army’s doctors still did not understand their causes. Their 
investigations had led Army doctors to suspect a microbe caused yellow fever, and that malaria 
was caused by a parasite. The Army’s medical community also knew at the time that malaria 
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could be treated with quinine, and that neither yellow fever nor malaria was contagious or 
transmittable through drinking water. While in Santiago, medical officers continued to rely 
unsuccessfully on sterilization and quarantine to stop the deadly fevers. Although they failed to 
achieve the desired outcome, these sanitation efforts greatly reduced the number of dysentery 
and typhoid cases.  
Uncertain of what else to do, Adjutant General Corbin hoped that sending African 
American and white volunteer regiments of allegedly immune soldiers to occupy Santiago would 
prevent more soldiers falling victim to fevers. His plan failed, and only the end of the summer 
rainy season brought an end to the epidemics. The Army Medical Department continued to 
research the causes of yellow fever and malaria during the occupation, and with the help of 
Cuban doctors, confirmed that mosquitos were the vectors of the two diseases. The U.S. Army 
soon implemented measures to control the mosquito populations in Cuba and to protect soldiers 
from being bitten. By the time the occupation ended in 1902, there were almost no new cases of 
yellow fever in Cuba. Now able to minimize the cases of malaria and yellow fever, the U.S. 
Army could sustain its soldiers for long-term occupations in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and 
Panama. 
Veteran soldiers and officers in Santiago had dealt with many humanitarian catastrophes 
during their post-Civil War service. They provided relief to former slaves and destitute whites in 
the South during reconstruction, delivered humanitarian aid after several natural disasters, and 
assisted Indians in dire need of food and shelter after the cessation of hostilities or when 
neglected on their reservations. Their experiences served them well as they managed the War 
Department’s relief efforts, first in Santiago and then in the rest of Cuba. The situation in 
Santiago de Cuba after the Spanish capitulation was terrible because of the devastation caused by 
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three years of fighting and the Spanish policy of civilian reconcentracion. Dozens died in the 
city each day from the lack of nourishment, exposure, and disease. Despite some friction, the 
War Department, Army officers on the ground, and Cuban volunteers worked hand-in-hand with 
the Red Cross to relieve the suffering in the Department of Santiago. Eventually, the U.S. Army 
took full responsibility for feeding the destitute in the province and the Red Cross shifted its 
efforts to delivering relief to the rest of Spanish-occupied Cuba. The measures taken in Santiago 
to relieve the humanitarian crises were immediately implemented in the rest of Cuba as the U.S. 
Army replaced Spanish forces from December 1898 to February 1899. The efforts of the War 
Department and the Red Cross saved the lives of a countless number of Cubans, and by the 
summer of 1899 the humanitarian crisis was largely over. 
The most essential mission the U.S. Army had to accomplish in Santiago was to control 
the province by garrisoning it, disarming and disbanding any potential adversaries, and 
threatening to use force against those who did not comply. The Cuban Liberation Army 
eventually gave up its arms and disbanded, convinced that the American occupation would last 
only a short time and because the Army offered the destitute Cuban soldiers jobs and rations in 
exchange for their compliance. The strategy of using forts to control restless populations and to 
use a mix of conciliation and coercion to pacify hostiles was a tried and true method developed 
by the U.S. Army on the American frontier and exported to Cuba and the Philippines by Army 
officers who had used it often during their careers. In Santiago and then in the rest of Cuba, the 
U.S. Army disarmed the Cuban Liberation Army by threatening, but never using, force against 
the few who at first did not comply. Most of the Cuban soldiers went home, however, because 
their leadership had received positions within the American military government, and then they 
convinced their soldiers to disband in return for small sums of money, rations, and the hopes of a 
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job. Once the U.S. Army established garrisons across Cuba and monopolized military force, it 
could implement Washington’s slowly developing policy for the island with little interference. 
Many disbanded Cuban soldiers found work in the sanitation and construction crews, 
rebuilding the country after the war, but the most politically reliable Cuban soldiers received 
coveted positions in the municipal police departments or in the Cuban Rural Guard. The U.S. 
Army had an institutional aversion to policing civilian populations after Reconstruction. 
Although the U.S. Army still responded to strikes and riots on the President’s authority, the 
posse comitatus act of 1878 made it legally risky for officers to become involved in civil 
policing. Even before 1878, the U.S. Army preferred to leave policing to civilian authorities and 
Indian police on the reservations, intervening only in emergencies. Upon arriving in Cuba, the 
U.S. Army tried to avoid policing from the onset of the occupation of Cuba for several reasons. 
First, the Rural Guard had a familiarity with the customs, language, and backcountry trails 
necessary to pursue bandits. Second, most Cubans did not view native police forces as an 
occupying force, and most of the Cuban police had immunity to the tropical fevers plaguing the 
Americans. Third, the Cuban police forces could get away with using extrajudicial means to 
capture alleged criminals, avoiding the legal constraints imposed on American forces. Finally, 
using the native auxiliaries to police Cuba allowed the U.S. Army to control the island with 
minimal American forces, which became imperative as the War Department gradually mustered 
out volunteer soldiers from 1898 and relied more heavily upon the Regulars to fight the 
insurrection in the Philippines. The U.S. Army also exported to the Philippines and Puerto Rico 
the practice of using native constabularies. 
In order to sustain the garrisons required to control Santiago, the U.S. Army had to build 
or repair the necessary logistical infrastructure. The roads in the Department of Santiago were in 
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a deplorable condition and most had been reduced to footpaths, forcing the U.S. Army to rely on 
mule trains. Furthermore, most telegraph lines in the province had been destroyed during the 
three years of fighting. Fortunately, American officers in Cuba had spent their careers building 
and repairing roads and running telegraph lines to their frontier garrisons. They also had ample 
experience using mule trains to supply campaigns moving through difficult terrain. Relying on 
these experiences, the U.S. Army went to work rebuilding the lines of communication across 
Santiago, employing many former Cuban soldiers as laborers. The War Department used 
customs revenues to pay for the Cuban labor making the repairs and sanitizing the towns. Brooke 
used the same method of revenue collection developed by Lawton and Wood in Santiago to pay 
the salaries of government officials and repair the infrastructure necessary to sustain the military 
occupation when he took command of Division of Cuba in January 1899. The War Department 
had learned from its failure to provide adequately for the logistical needs of the Fifth Corps. The 
department planned and executed an efficient movement of men and supplies, not only to 
Havana and the remaining five unoccupied provinces, but also to the Philippines. It also built a 
network of barracks and camps to sustain both occupations. 
After controlling the Department of Santiago and building the infrastructure necessary to 
sustain its garrisons, the U.S. Army established a military government. American constitutional 
and societal norms restricted the Army’s role in civilian governance. The Army’s unpleasant 
experience occupying the South after the Civil War reaffirmed the institution’s preference to 
avoid governing civilian populations. With little practical experience in civil governance, senior 
officers in Cuba had no choice but to rely on their analogous experience of administering the 
Army in the United States, using military protocol and staff procedures. Furthermore, officers 
consulted civilian experts and selectively borrowed ideas from progressive reform movements in 
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the United States. The occupation government successfully reformed much of Cuba’s byzantine 
civil service system, modernized the tariff system, and eliminated much corruption. The 
ethnocentrism of U.S. Army officers assumed that introducing “superior” American institutions 
and values could solve all of Cuba’s problems. By failing to consider Cuban culture, most of the 
Army’s reforms were short lived. American self-righteousness and the belief in the superiority of 
their values and political system limited the effectiveness of the occupation governments in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and all of the United States’s subsequent occupations. 
The transmission of methods of pacification from the American West to Cuba and the 
Philippines did not end in 1898. In 1899, soldiers recently returned from Cuba put down unrest 
among the Chippewa in Minnesota, while nearly 10,000 soldiers remained west of the 
Mississippi to keep watch over restless Indians, especially in southern Arizona and around Fort 
Sill, Oklahoma. Commanding General Miles reported in 1901 that the U.S. Army would need to 
keep forts near the reservations to maintain order for the foreseeable future.1 Simultaneously, the 
Army rotated Regulars from their garrisons in the United States back to occupation duty in Cuba 
and active counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines, where it utilized the same 
pacification method of garrisoning troops, protecting the populace, and establishing an effective 
civil government that it used in Cuba.2  
Meanwhile, the War Department adjusted to become a more efficient bureaucracy 
capable of managing the occupations of Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam; its many forts 
and garrisons in the United States; and the ongoing Philippine War. McKinley deserves most of 																																																								
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the credit for this as he took direct control of the War Department, dismissing the ineffective 
Alger and sidelining the arrogant Commanding General Miles. To help him run the day-to-day 
operation of the department and ensure his guidance was acted on, McKinley increasingly relied 
on the efficient and responsive Adjutant General Corbin. One of McKinley’s best decisions was 
to appoint Root as the next Secretary of War in 1899. Root worked with a Republican majority in 
Congress to create an Army War College and general staff to develop, coordinate, and 
implement strategy. Furthermore, he successfully worked to reorganize the War Department’s 
dysfunctional command structure by eliminating the position of commanding general and 
replacing it with a chief of staff, who worked for and not parallel to the Secretary of War.3 
 While the War Department fought internal resistance to become a better managerial 
organization, the methods of pacification used by the U.S. Army overseas remained remarkably 
consistent. Old rivalries among the different staff bureaus in the War Department stifled 
meaningful reform through World War I, as each agency fought to maintain its influence within 
the organization.4 Similarly, a series of adjutants general who succeeded Corbin fought a losing 
battle to keep their hold over the War Department from the newly created position of chief of 
staff, until finally being defeated by Chief of Staff Leonard Wood and Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson in 1912. Meanwhile, U.S. Army officers with experience conducting occupation duty in 
Latin America, the Philippines, China, and the Rhineland again relied on a pacification doctrine 
that blended coercion with reconciliation, efficient military government, and the use of native 																																																								
3 Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale University, 1988), 
200-202. Robert Wooster, The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 269. 
 
4 Robert Wooster, The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 269. 
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proxies to help secure the populations of Japan and Germany after World War II and control the 
maturation of their political systems. There is less evidence, however, that the Army applied—or 
even remembered—these lessons when it encountered similar challenges in Vietnam, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. 
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